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Introduction
0.1 Basic argument
‘Every one of us has in truth an underlying philosophy of life, even those of us to whom the names and the
notions of philosophy are unknown or anathema. There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you
choose to call it philosophy or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot
escape that current any more than other mortals..’.1 
Philosophy has often been used in international criminal law (ICL) jurisprudence, but such use has
not yet been systematically analysed nor the impact thereof on institutional legitimacy ascertained.
This thesis  empirically identifies the philosophies used in a selection of ICL judgments,  before
evaluating their compliance with a formal rule of law standard. The rule of law standard adopted is
that of Lon Fuller, which is discussed in section 1.2.3.2. Suffice it here to briefly note that the
proposed rule of law requires public, clear and consistent rules and justifications which contribute
to predictability in and foreseeability of the application of law.2 This protects the moral agency of
legal  subjects  who  can  then  adapt  their  behaviour  beforehand  in  accordance  with  consistently
pronounced law rather than shifting standards of conduct.3 Compliance with the rule of law by ICL
judicial bodies4 would, therefore, give effect to the individual’s moral autonomy. 
These rule  of law considerations directly  tie  into the outcome-based legitimacy of ICL judicial
bodies. The impact on legitimacy constitutes the third part of the thesis, after the identification of
the  philosophies  and  the  measurement  of  their  use  against  the  rule  of  law.  Outcome-based
legitimacy is  determined by the output  of the judiciaries,  i.e.  whether  judgments,  and this  also
pertains to supportive philosophical justifications, are clear and consistent.5 Since these are also
requirements under Fuller’s rule of law, the close relationship between rule of law and outcome-
based  legitimacy  is  assured.  Outcome-based  legitimacy,  in  turn,  leads  into  consent  legitimacy.
Consent  legitimacy revolves  around whether  ICL judicial  bodies  and their  pronouncements  are
perceived to be legitimate by the international community (here especially their constituency, other
1 BN Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press 1946) 12.
2 LL Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 39-94.
3 HLA Hart,  Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (OUP 1968) 181; Fuller (n 2) 162; J
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980) 272.
4 In this study, ‘judicial bodies’ will refer to ‘international criminal tribunals and courts’ unless sense requires specific
labelling. See, for e.g., C Damgaard,  Individual Criminal Responsibility for Core International Crimes (Springer
2008) 271; K Oellers-Frahm, ‘Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting Jurisdiction –
Problems and Possible Solutions’ (2001) 5  Max Planck UNYB 69; CPR Romano, ‘International Courts’ (Oxford
Bibliographies  2012)  <www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-
0046.xml> accessed 20 July 2018.
5 T Treves,  ‘Aspects of  Legitimacy of Decisions of International  Courts and Tribunals’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum and
Volker Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008) 172.
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states and academics).  Consent legitimacy is  particularly important in contemporary ICL where
allegations of ideological bias have, for example,  been raised against the International Criminal
Court  (ICC).6 It  is  argued  that  any  proof  of  greater  consistency  in  (even  a  part  of)  the  ICL
justificatory  regime,  i.e.  closer  conformity  to  the  rule  of  law,  will  contribute  towards  greater
outcome-based legitimacy which should, in turn, improve consent legitimacy.7 Increased consent
legitimacy could encourage greater compliance with the directives of these judicial bodies thereby
strengthening accountability for international crimes. 
Systematic content analysis (SCA) will be utilised as framework for this study because it ‘collects a
set of documents, such as judicial opinions on a particular subject, and systematically reads them,
recording consistent features of each and drawing inferences about their use and meaning’.8 SCA
enables,  firstly,  the  selection  of  commensurable  jurisdictions;  secondly,  the  empirical
systematisation of philosophies and those aspects of arguments which revealed philosophy and,
thirdly, the measurement of the philosophies against the rule of law standard adopted in this study
and  the  impact  thereof  on  institutional  legitimacy.9 SCA thus  divides  the  thesis  into  three
substantive  parts,  i.e.  firstly,  delineating  the  selection  of  jurisdictions  and  materials  to  be
investigated;10 secondly, determining the philosophies, which were used by the selected ICL judicial
bodies to  support  their  findings,  through  coding11 and;  thirdly,  comparing  this  philosophical
justificatory  apparatus  against  the  proposed  rule  of  law  standard  and  its  attendant  effects  on
institutional legitimacy.12
The next section considers the broader relevance of the thesis. In the process, legitimacy, which was
touched on above, will be elucidated. The introduction will be concluded with the chapter outline.
Chapter 1 will provide a detailed discussion on SCA as methodology as well as attendant study
precepts and demarcations.    
6 See section 0.2 below.
7 S Dothan, ‘How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 456-458.
8 MA Hall and RF Wright, ‘Systematic Content Analysis’ (2008) 96  California Law Review 64. See also O Holsti,
‘Content Analysis’ in Gardner Lindzey and Elliott Aronson (eds), The Handbook of Social Psychology (2nd edn, Vol.
II, Addison-Wesley 1968) 601 and section 1.2.
9 Hall and Wright (n 8) 79 et seq. 
10 See section 1.2.1.
11 See section 1.2.2. This part constitutes the main analysis of data under each chapter. 
12 See  section  1.2.3.  While  the  investigation  into  consistency  structures  the  data,  the  measurement  against  the
remainder of Fuller’s rule of law concludes every substantive subsection in the chapters. The main measurement for
legitimacy occurs in the conclusion across all the data.
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0.2 On the broader significance of the study
The significance of  this  thesis,  firstly,  revolves around the systematisation of philosophy as an
under-explored element of the ICL justificatory narrative which, as part of such narrative, has and
will  continue  to  serve  as  persuasive  authority  for  other  judicial  proceedings.  Secondly,  and as
indicated in section 0.1, this argumentative narrative impacted institutional legitimacy in various
ways. This section will reflect on both of these contributions, while also establishing ‘philosophy’
and ‘legitimacy’ conceptually. Finally, some additional merits of the study will be pointed out. 
Since it is foundational to the thesis, ‘philosophy’ has to be clarified conceptually first. This study
uses ‘legal theory’ and ‘philosophy of law’ (sometimes ‘philosophy’ in short since the context is
almost  always  law13)  interchangeably.14 In  agreement  with  Freeman,  philosophy  of  law entails
‘general theoretical questions about the nature of laws and legal systems, about the relationship of
law  to  justice  and  morality  and  about  the  social  nature  of  law’.15 Philosophy  of  law  is  thus
synonymous with the second meaning ascribed to jurisprudence by Fichtelberg, namely ‘a deeper
view  regarding  the  nature  and  purpose  of  the  law  in  general’.16 While  not  exhaustive,  these
definitions serve as functional point of departure here. 
Systematically identifying philosophy in ICL jurisprudence is important because it has not yet been
done. In addition, ICL provisions have been vague, unclear or non-existent (or in Hartian terms
resorted  under  the  ‘problems  of  the  penumbra’17).  In  these  cases,  the  philosophies  utilised  by
judicial bodies played a significant part in the conceptualisation of particular rules as well as the
reading afforded thereto.18 In sum, the solutions proffered were shaped by legal philosophy.19 This
13 Two exceptions may be Pal’s opposition to communism, for which see Pal Dissent 253, 547(24), and the use of a
Thales theorem in Prosecutor v Stanišić and Župljanin (Judgment) IT-08-91-A (30 June 2016) Separate Opinion of
Judge Afanđe para 2. This study focuses on philosophy in the context of law and so these arguments will not be
discussed here.
14 R Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence An Introduction to Legal Theory (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1 footnote 1.
15 M Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn, Thomson Sweet Maxwell 2014) 2. See, similarly, Wacks
(n 14) 1.
16 A Fichtelberg, ‘Liberal Values in International Criminal Law A Critique of Erdemović’ (2008) 6 JICJ 7.
17 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 607.
18 R Cryer, T Hervey, B Sokhi-Bulley with A Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart
Publishing 2011) 5. For confirmation see also LV Prott, The Latent Power of Culture and the International Judge
(Professional  Books  1979)  119;  J  Wessel,  ‘Judicial  Policy-Making  at  the  International  Criminal  Court:  An
Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 395;
Freeman (n 15) 12. See Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June
2018) Separate Opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison para 2.  For reliance on
several philosophers to clarify interpretation, causation and complicity, see Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
(Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji paras 110,
157-181, 223-231.
19 For  a  finding  to  this  effect  in  relation  to  the  Tokyo  IMT,  see  JB  Keenan  and  BF  Brown,  Crimes  against
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study accepts that the more indeterminate a norm is, the more crucial the ‘process by which, in
practice,  the norm can be made more specific’.20 Clarifying the legal  philosophies thus used is
important for better understanding the development of ICL jurisprudence. Justificatory arguments of
judicial bodies constitute persuasive authority for other judiciaries tasked with dispensing ICL.21
Clarifying a hitherto under-explored element of the justificatory arguments should further illuminate
the quality of the persuasive authority in question. This study, therefore, aims to cultivate awareness
of this part of the justificatory narrative and engender sensitivity to the use thereof on the part of
ICL judiciaries.
Since philosophical justifications enable a judicial body to read a particular provision in several
different ways, these justifications are significant. They may adversely or favourably impact the
determinacy, coherence and consistency of the law thus applied which, in turn, might be detrimental
or beneficial to the legitimacy of the institution involved.22 The ICL judiciary itself acknowledged
the importance of coherence for the body of law they dispense.23 This has also been supported in
literature since ‘the series of decisions which a judge makes must appear to be consistent and based
on a consistent philosophy’.24 
In the absence of consistency, concerns that the justifications offered for particular legal positions
were arbitrarily  cherry-picked or  pre-conceived might  ensue.  Although complete  consistency or
International Law (Public Affairs Press 1950) 58. Indeed for the concern at the ICTY that it ‘should not happen that
due to shifting majorities [and, arguably, ideological and philosophical positions] the Appeals Chambers changes its
jurisprudence  from case to  case’,  see  Prosecutor  v  Kvočka et  al (Judgment)  IT-98-30/1-A (28 February  2005)
Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen para 107 quoting from Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-
14/2-A (17  December  2004)  Joint  Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judge  Schomburg  and  Judge  Guney  on  Cumulative
Convictions para 13. This argument is accepted in jurisprudential writings too, see LL Fuller, ‘The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers’ (1949) 62 Harvard Law Review 616; P Suber,  The Case of the Speluncean Explorers Nine
New Opinions (Routledge 1998).
20 T  Franck,  ‘The  Power  of  Legitimacy  and  the  Legitimacy  of  Power:  International  law  in  an  Age  of  Power
Disequilibrium’ (2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 102. See also Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Separate Opinion Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert
and Judge Howard Morrison para 4. 
21 For e.g, Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14
March 2012) paras 533, 538; Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo against his conviction) ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5 (1 December 2014) para 49. For the view from the bench that the
ICTY and ICTR will ‘stand as examples of best practice for the prosecution of international crimes’, see  Prosecutor
v  Mrkšić, Radić and Šljivančanin (Judgment) IT-95-13/1-A (5 May 2009) Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Pocar  para  11.  For  the  importance  of  drawing from predecessors,  see  T Meron,  The  Making  of  International
Criminal Justice A View From the Bench Selected Speeches (OUP 2011) 114.
22 See, for e.g, T Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law
713-751; Suber (n 19) xi-xii; Wessel (n 18) 395; Wacks (n 14) 40.
23 Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment on Appeal) IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000) para 113 approved in Prosecutor v
Akayesu (Judgment on Appeal) ICTR-96-4-T (1 June 2001) para 22. 
24 Prott (n 18) 187. For the comparable requirement of a minimum degree of regularity and certainty, see Freeman (n
15) 15.
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inconsistency of theoretical justifications might be unrealistic in a social environment, such as the
ICL system, generally consistent arguments are, for the preceding reasons, to be preferred. Granted,
neither consistency nor inconsistency in philosophical justifications adopted in any particular case
will  inevitably result  in unfair  or wrong decisions. However, the overall  lack of coherence and
consistency in law may adversely affect an institution’s legitimacy. Consistency for purposes of this
study is closely linked with the Fullerian rule of law desiderata which was noted in section 0.1 and
will be discussed in section 1.2.3.2.  
Apart  from the systematisation of philosophy in ICL judgments,  the significance of this  thesis,
therefore, also pertains to institutional legitimacy. While different types of legitimacy are applicable
in the context of the ICL judicial bodies, most important for this study, and which will now be
conceptually explained, are outcome-based as well as consent legitimacy.25 
Outcome-based legitimacy26 includes questions pertaining to the characteristics of judgments, e.g.,
whether the reasons for decision are clear and consistent with previous decisions.27 Judges play an
important  role  in  a  judicial  body’s  outcome-based  legitimacy.  Judgments  have  the  potential  to
enhance the legitimacy of rules depending on the motivation offered for them.28 This is exacerbated
in the case of ICL, which is a relatively nascent field, where judges play a more active role in the
development of the law. The thesis pursued here accepts that philosophical justifications are part of
a  judicial  body’s  reasons  for  decision  and  could,  therefore,  bolster  the  body’s  outcome-based
legitimacy if their use is clear and consistent. Identifying and measuring the philosophies to have
informed judicial bodies’ justifications against a formal rule of law standard, requiring clarity and
consistency, enables findings regarding outcome-based legitimacy. 
Consent legitimacy,  on the other  hand, pertains to the degree of consent to and approval for a
judicial body by its constituency.29 It has been suggested that legal judgments will be perceived to
25 A Cassese, ‘The Legitimacy of International Criminal Tribunals and the Current Prospects of International Criminal
Justice’ (2012) 25  Leiden Journal of International Law 492-493 additionally identifies whether the institution is
vested on values, principles and goals shared by the majority of its constituency (purpose legitimacy), whether it
gives effect to values universal to the whole community within which it exists (universal values legitimacy) as well
as factors related to the judicial body’s performance such as answerability and transparency of decision-making
(performance legitimacy). In Treves (n 5)  171 the legitimacy of judicial decisions has been grouped into source-
based theories, process-based theories and outcome-based theories.
26 Outcome-based  legitimacy is  sometimes  labelled  ‘performance’ legitimacy,  but  for  uniformity  ‘outcome-based’
legitimacy will be used throughout. See the similarity, for example, in Cassese (n 25) 492-493; Treves (n 5) 172.
27 Treves (n 5) 172. Franck (n 20) 94 links clarity with determinacy while Franck (n 22) 741 links consistency with
legitimacy. 
28 A Pellet, ‘Discussion Following Presentations by Tullio Treves and Rein Müllerson’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker
Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008) 206 as well as R Howse, ibid, at 207.
29 Cassese (n 25) 492-493.
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be  legitimate  by  the  international  community  (including  states,  private  individuals,  judges,
academics  and other  interest  groups)  if  they  are  considered ‘generally  just,  legally  correct  and
unbiased’.30 Consent legitimacy can thus be improved if judgments are thoroughly reasoned, appear
determined by law and require actions deemed to be acceptable by the international community. In
sum, ‘the norms a court refers to and its method of reasoning can affect the way its judgments are
received and shape its legitimacy’.31 Outcome-based legitimacy may thus impact consent legitimacy.
Of course, enhancing the consent legitimacy of ICL judiciaries is necessary to improve the chances
that states will comply with their judgments and accept their jurisdiction. 
Illustratively, those states who initially supported the ICC and those who ab initio opposed it, have
exerted pressure on the consent  legitimacy of the ICC. By only opening cases thus far  against
African defendants, the ICC has been criticised for exhibiting prejudice towards the continent from
which most of its member states hail.32 While several African countries announced their intention to
withdraw  from  the  ICC,  only  Burundi  has  withdrawn  to  date.33 On  the  other  hand,  political
considerations have ensured that powerful (and military active) states have not ratified the Rome
Statute, including the USA, Israel, India, China and Russia.34 The nature of the ICC has meant it
relies on states to ensure suspects are arrested and transferred to the Court. The culmination of the
first-mentioned  perception  of  bias  and  the  last-mentioned  exertion  of  self-interest  has  led  to
countries  flaunting  their  obligations  in  this  regard,  thereby  further  undermining  the  consent
legitimacy of the Court.35 The argument for consent legitimacy is thus especially relevant for the
ICC,  which  is  the  permanent  international  court  established  for  adjudicating  ICL  violations.
Improving consent legitimacy through consistency in justificatory narrative might not solve these
political obstacles directly but could improve the cachet of the ICC and lead to an overall more
30 Dothan (n 7) 456.
31 Ibid 457-458.
32 See generally, A Cassese, ‘Soliloqui’ in Heikelina Verrijn Stuart and Marlise Simons, The Prosecutor and the Judge:
Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese: Interviews and Writings (Amsterdam University Press 2009) 176; R Cryer,
‘The Philosophy of  International  Criminal  Law’ in  Alexander  Orakhelashvili  (ed),  Research  Handbook on  the
Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 262.
33 As of 6 July 2018, South Africa is reconsidering its intention to withdraw. See, for instance,  ‘SA’s position in Africa
regarding ICC exaggerated - ISS’ available at <www.news24.com/Africa/News/sas-position-in-africa-regarding-icc-
exaggerated-iss-20180706>  (accessed  on  24  Aug  2018).  Burundi  became  the  first  country  to  withdraw,  see
<www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/africa/burundi-international-criminal-court.html>  (accessed  on  24  Aug
2018). Gambia rejoined, see <www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/17/gambia-rejoins-icc> (accessed on 24 Aug 2018). As
recently  as  February  2018,  the AU called  for  withdrawal,  see  <http://eastafricamonitor.com/african-union-calls-
mass-withdrawal-icc/> (accessed on 24 Aug 2018).
34 As of 20/07/2018, the USA, Russia and Israel have signed, but not ratified, the Rome Statute, whereas China and
India have neither signed nor ratified the treaty.
35 The refusal of the South African Government to arrest Omar al Bashir, while he visited the country for the AU
Summit  in  Johannesburg  during  June  2015,  reveals  how  politics  and  the  perception  of  bias  against  Africans
contributed to thwart the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
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acceptable system.36
Finally, this study’s significance extends beyond the systematisation of the philosophical narrative
and its impact on legitimacy, although those remain the primary contributions. It also contributes to
a relatively new and, as such, under-explored academic inquiry. Little research has been done on
this  topic.  Existing  scholarship  is  selective  in  terms  of  research  design  and,  therefore,
unrepresentative  of  the  totality  of  the  judicial  bodies’ case  law37 as  well  as jurisdictionally,38
thematically39 or  temporally  limited.40 Cherry-picking  some cases  of  a  limited  number  of
jurisdictions reflects an incomplete picture of the particular bodies’ jurisprudence and precludes
comprehensive inter-curial findings. This is exacerbated by studies which only focus on a particular
theme reflective of one philosophical approach. An investigation into all the cases of the selected
judiciaries,  as  intended  by this  study,  is  necessary  to  fairly  and comprehensively  establish  the
philosophical positions to have emanated from these judicial bodies’ diverse judging panels and to
identify inter-curial trends. Only this level of systematisation will enable the proposed comparisons
with rule of law and test impact on legitimacy. Finally, the limitations of existing literature on this
topic also pertain to their methodological design as most studies are solely based on traditional legal
analysis. It is in part to address the lack of a systematic investigation into the judgments that this
study aims to contribute by adopting qualitative SCA.41 
Thus, while academic literature is beginning to appear in this field, it is still limited. Aware of its
36 B Ferencz, ‘The Prosecutor: Interview with Benjamin Ferencz’ in Heikelina Verrijn Stuart and Marlise Simons, The
Prosecutor and the Judge: Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese: Interviews and Writings  (Amsterdam University
Press 2009) 37.
37 Fichtelberg (n 16) 3-19; Cryer (n 32) 232-267.
38 Q Wright, ‘Legal Positivism and the Nuremberg Judgment’ (1948) 42 American Journal of International Law 405-
414; SL Paulson, ‘Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg’ (1975) 4  Philosophy & Public Affairs 132-158 both
focus on the Nuremberg IMT. N Boister and R Cryer,  The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal
(OUP 2008) 271-300 focuses on philosophy at the Tokyo IMT; Cryer (n 32) 243-244 conceded this point in relation
to  the  ad  hoc  Tribunals.  G  Ferrera  and  M Alexander,  ‘Appellate  Judges  and  Philosophical  Theories:  Judicial
Philosophy or Mere Coincidence?’ (2011) 14  Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest 561 investigate
judicial philosophy, but their scrutiny is limited to the US Supreme Court.
39 See, for example, E Kopelman, ‘Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War
Crimes Trial’ (1991) 23 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 373-444 which focuses on
the dissent of Judge Pal at Tokyo; B Van Schaak, ‘Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law
and Morals’ (2008) 97 Georgetown Law Journal 119-192 which is limited to the legality principle; B Van Schaak,
‘“The Grass that Gets Trampled when Elephants Fight”: Will the Codification of the Crime of Aggression Protect
Women?’ (2010) 15  UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 327 which focused on the crime of
aggression. 
40 All the studies in the previous two footnotes omitted the most recent cases at the ICC, ICTR and ICTY. 
41 The methodology adopted in  this  study is  discussed  at  1.2.  There are  exceptions,  e.g.,  G Schubert,  ‘Jackson’s
Judicial Philosophy: An Exploration in Value Analysis’ (1965) 59 American Political Science Review 940-963 on
Justice Jackson, but this study employed quantitative (as opposed to qualitative) SCA; was limited to only one role-
player involved in the present study and only in his capacity as US Supreme Court Justice rather than as prosecutor
at Nuremberg IMT, which is the focus here.
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present  embryonic  state,  one  author  expressed  the  wish  that  his  chapter  on  philosophy in  ICL
‘...provokes further thought, and has provided some of the tools to work within this area’.42 This
study intends to honour this wish and pursue this important contemporary debate.
0.3 Structuring of thesis
Having briefly introduced the basic argument of the thesis and the broader significance thereof, the
thesis will hereafter be divided into a methodology chapter and four parts, corresponding to the
philosophical categories analysed for rule of law compliance. SCA, as methodology, is discussed in
chapter 1 alongside other general premises and limitations. Part A, dealing with natural law and
legal positivism, will consist of two chapters in accordance with the relevant codes. Thus, chapter 2
will analyse those codes historically linked to natural law and legal positivism, namely just war
theory, cosmopolitanism and the policy-oriented approach. Chapter 3 will investigate the codes in
substantive  ICL linked to  natural  law and legal  positivism,  namely  sources  of  law,  substantive
crimes, principles of liability and techniques of interpretation. Part B will deal with ethical theories
and consists of one chapter. Chapter 4 will thus investigate the use of utilitarianism and deontology
both generally and regarding sentencing purposes. Part C codes for critical approaches and consists
of one chapter. Feminism, antecedents to Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)
and generic instances of othering will be coded for in chapter 5. Part D will code for systemic
philosophies  in  one  chapter.  Chapter  6  will  therefore  code  for  realism and liberalism.  Finally,
chapter 7 will constitute the conclusion. 
This study reflects ICL as at 8 June 2018.
42 Cryer (n 32) 266.
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Chapter 1
Methodology
1.1 Introduction
This study investigates the use of philosophy in international criminal law (ICL) jurisprudence. The
justificatory  narrative  thus  identified  will  be  measured  against  a  rule  of  law  standard  and  its
contribution to institutional legitimacy evaluated.1 As was suggested in the introduction, some form
of systematisation of research data for the consequent measurement thereof against the rule of law
standard was necessary. For this study, qualitative systematic content analysis (SCA) provides the
necessary systematisation. Detailing SCA is required because the legal method is often imbibed
unconsciously through the training process, resulting in methodologies frequently left unarticulated
in research.2 Added incentive to detail SCA emanates from the infrequent use of qualitative SCA in
legal  studies  and  because  it  structures  this  study.  Throughout  the  discussion  of  SCA,  general
premises and limitations of the study design will be elucidated.
1.2 Research methodology and design – Systematic content analysis (SCA)
SCA is  a  social  science  technique  and will  be  understood as  ‘any procedure  for  assessing the
relative extent  to which specified references,  attitudes,  or themes permeate a  given message or
document’  and  as  ‘any  technique  for  making  inferences  by  systematically  and  objectively
identifying  specified  characteristics  of  messages’.3 The  ‘specified...themes’ or  ‘characteristics’
investigated in this study were the philosophies relied on by ICL role-players and the ‘messages’
they permeated, ICL pronouncements.4 
This study purports to analyse a series of ICL pronouncements by combining qualitative research
with SCA. Before discussing whether SCA and traditional legal analysis may be used together, it is
necessary to briefly juxtapose them. SCA investigates a series of cases, which are systematically
1 See section 0.2.
2 See, for e.g., P Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in A Knight and L Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods in the
Built  Environment (Wiley-Blackwell  2008)  35;  R  Cryer,  T  Hervey,  B  Sokhi-Bulley  with  A Bohm,  Research
Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 2.
3 The first definition is that of PJ Stone, An introduction to the General Inquirer: a computer system for the study of
spoken  or  written  material (Harvard  University  and  Simulmatics  Corporation)  quoted  in  O  Holsti,  ‘Content
Analysis’ in Gardner Lindzey and Elliott  Aronson (eds),  The Handbook of  Social  Psychology (2nd edn, Vol.  II,
Addison-Wesley 1968) 597, whereas the second is Holsti’s own, ibid, at 601. See also  MA Hall and RF Wright,
‘Systematic Content Analysis’ (2008) 96 California Law Review 64.
4 This study revolves around the encoding process of ICL pronouncements, i.e.  the ‘causes or antecedents of the
message’, in particular. See Holsti (n 3) 604, 606. See also O Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and
Humanities (Addison-Wesley 1969) 24, 68.
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selected, for overall patterns,  whereas traditional legal analysis  focuses on a smaller number of
exemplary  cases  which  are  selected  due  to  the  researcher’s  belief  that  they  are  illustratively
important for some or other point. SCA presupposes that the series of cases under scrutiny are
essentially of equal value, whereas traditional legal analysis relies on the expertise of the researcher
to  select  a  few  noteworthy  cases  and  discuss  the  important  themes  and  social  effects  of  the
decisions. Because of its linkage to the social sciences, SCA attempts to achieve greater objectivity,
repeatability and falsifiability in research as compared to traditional legal analysis, which has been
criticised for being a subjective exercise.5 Critically for this study, with its focus on justificatory
patterns, SCA is interested in breadth while traditional legal analysis focuses on depth in research.6 
Charges that (quantitative) SCA neglects subtleties in the judicial process resulted in the realisation
that  ‘one  form of  analysis  does  not  displace  the  other’ and  that  SCA ‘can  complement  more
interpretive forms of legal scholarship’.7 Thus, qualitative SCA is possible although it  has been
scarce in the context of legal research.8 This study supports the belief that SCA and traditional legal
analysis  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  but  may  be  complementary.9 Even  the  most  rigorous
quantitative  analysis  cannot  completely  escape  from qualitative  techniques.10 Thus,  the  method
adopted  in  this  study  will  be  qualitative  SCA,  as  it  ensures  both  systematic  breadth  of  and
qualitative depth into research data.
While this thesis does not ask the quantitative question, which can be rendered statistically (and
which is also a possible course of study),11 it is not incongruous with the quantitative approach. It is
concerned with the trends (or consistency) in the philosophical categories used by the courts. Trends
suggest a numerical quality. Yet the point is that the trends will only be fully investigated through a
qualitative analysis of the selected cases as opposed to a statistical analysis.
In passing, it can be counter-argued that this study is simply a traditional qualitative analysis and
that it is unnecessary to utilise qualitative SCA. However, this study conforms with the approach of
5 Hall and Wright (n 3) 63-66, 76-79. For the importance of social science methods for law, see H Oliphant, ‘A Return
to Stare Decisis’ (1928) 14 ABA J 71, 161 quoted, ibid, at 63. 
6 Hall and Wright (n 3) 88.
7 Hall and Wright (n 3) 81 fn 70, 82-83, 99, 118. See also Holsti (n 3) 598-602.
8 Ibid.
9 Compare Holsti (n 3) 597-598; Holsti (n 4) 11; Hall and Wright (n 3) 82-83, 99, 120-121. For the view that research
rarely reflects only one methodology and that some theories answer certain questions better than others thereby
justifying eclecticism, see Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 2) 14.
10 Holsti (n 3) 600. 
11 For support that content analysis may rely on (qualitative) ‘conceptual description and narrative illustrations rather
than numbers’, see Hall and Wright (n 3) 118. See similarly Holsti (n 4) 11.
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SCA  especially  as  an  explanation  of  the  self-reflexive  process  through  which  it  has  been
structured.12 SCA is invested in the very architecture of this study as the philosophies identified
demarcate chapters, the codes identified delineate subsections within chapters and the analysis of
codes for consistency provides the overall argument in relation to the rule of law.
As briefly alluded to under section 0.1, SCA requires (i) a proper selection of cases to investigate
(ii) coding cases and (iii) analysis of the case coding.13 SCA, in the context of this thesis, therefore
structures  the  argument  through (i)  a  proper  selection of  judicial  pronouncements  or  ‘cases’ to
investigate (ii) identifying and analysing signifiers (or ‘codes’) of philosophical justifications (or
‘philosophical categories’) and (iii) analysis of coded data against the rule of law standard. It is
possible to roughly demarcate part (i) and (ii) as expository and part (iii) as evaluative scholarship.14
The following sections illuminate the three constitutive elements of SCA for this study. While this
chapter provides an overview of the methodology and substantively addresses the issue of case
selection (i.e. part (i)), parts (ii) and (iii) systematise the thesis argument and structure the study’s
chapters.
1.2.1 Case selection
Turning  to  part  (i)  of  SCA,  this  study  investigates  a  series  of  ICL  pronouncements.  The
systematisation of what necessarily has to be a selection of cases is the subject of this section. As
such, this section serves as an important preface to the rest of the study. In order to comply with part
(i), the  sampling frame (or ‘theoretical universe of all relevant cases’) and  selection method (the
cases that will be considered and studied in fact) require elucidation.15 The sampling frame of this
study can be understood as ICL pronouncements  rendered by domestic,  international  or  hybrid
judicial bodies whether in their advisory opinions, judgments on merits, sentencing or decisions on
procedural matters; pronouncements made by counsel or through academic writings. However, this
‘theoretical  universe of all  relevant  cases’ is  too heterogeneous to  be a  proper  object  of study.
Indeed, SCA requires that the cases investigated must be of equal value.16 Consequently, this section
sets out the selection method to be considered in postulating a narrower, more homogeneous group
of relevant cases. To properly demarcate the relevant cases that may be considered for philosophical
categories, several factors will be considered, most notably, jurisdictions, judicial levels (e.g. appeal
12 Hall and Wright (n 3) 64 explain the close affinity between the traditional reading of legal decisions and SCA.
13 Hall and Wright (n 3) 79 et seq.
14 Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 2) 9. See also J Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John
Murray 1832) 278; J Bentham, A Fragment on Government (Clarendon Press 1891) 98-99.
15 Hall and Wright (n 3) 101-105. See also Holsti (n 3) 653-654.
16 Hall and Wright (n 3) 65-66.
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or trial), documentary output and role-players. This section is foundational to the entire study design
as it delineates the cases which will be investigated and which ones omitted. 
The focus will be on the judgments from the fully  international criminal judicial bodies created
since  WWII. Several  reasons  dictate  the  focus  on  the  international  regime  as  opposed  to  the
domestic one.  Firstly, the study’s research design precisely aims to investigate the philosophical
underpinnings of the seminal international criminal judicial bodies. Secondly, as the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court (ICC) is based upon complementarity with domestic jurisdictions,
domestic courts will likely be guided by the jurisprudence of the ICC when they adjudicate upon
international  crimes.  Elucidating  the  theoretical  approaches  underpinning  the  ICC  (actually  or
potentially) may thus help to prevent unarticulated prejudices and assumptions being unknowingly
assumed and perpetuated by domestic courts.17 This point can be argued in relation to the persuasive
value of other ICL judiciaries to be considered in this study for domestic judiciaries too. Thirdly,
well reasoned international legal judgments can arguably buttress domestic jurisdictions in the face
of executive pressure to digress from proposed international standards.18 Fourthly, questions into the
nascent structures, based on a voluntarist model, involved with coercion in international law are
much  more  pressing  than  the  same  questions  in  domestic  systems  which  are  firmly  based  on
coercion.19 
Consequently, the judgments of the post-WWII Tribunals, the Nuremberg and Tokyo International
Military Tribunals (IMTs), will be investigated; the judgments of the post-Cold War Tribunals, the
International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  Former  Yugoslavia  (ICTY),  the  International  Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) will
be researched and, finally, the judgments of the first permanent court of ICL, the ICC, will be
analysed.20 
These judicial bodies are selected because they are (and were) the seminal judicial bodies involved
with enforcing ICL. The Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs were the first International Tribunals tasked
17 This point was made in relation to the ICTY and domestic courts in Prosecutor v Ntagerura et al. (Judgment) ICTR-
99-46-T (25 February 2004) Separate Opinion of Judge Dolenc para 5.
18 S Dothan, ‘How International Courts Enhance Their Legitimacy’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 463-464.
19 See, for e.g., T Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law
707.
20 For works on the respective judicial bodies generally, see WA Schabas,  The UN International Criminal Tribunals
The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (CUP 2006); N Boister and R Cryer,  The Tokyo International
Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (OUP 2008); BN Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (CUP 2008); T
Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (Skyhorse 2013).
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with bringing perpetrators of the crime against peace and crimes against humanity alongside war
crimes to justice (thereby also justifying this as the temporal starting point of the study21). Their
respective judgments and separate opinions constitute the foundation of modern ICL and, as such,
justify their inclusion. The  ad hoc Tribunals, created post-Cold War, were the first international
judicial bodies since the post-WWII IMTs to adjudicate upon ICL. While they started slowly, their
jurisprudential output has now become pivotal in the development of ICL. Since the MICT was
established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on 22 December 2010 and ‘tasked with
continuing the “jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions”22 of the ICTR and the
ICTY; and maintaining the legacy of both institutions’,23 the justifications for including the ICTY
and ICTR apply  mutatis  mutandis to this institution.  Finally, although it  has rendered very few
judgments thus far,24 the ICC is set up to become the authoritative ICL court of the future.25 This,
added to the adverse political climate the court finds itself in currently,26 confirms the importance of
evaluating its justificatory narrative for rule of law compliance. 
Omitted  from this  study,  therefore,  will  be  the  plethora  of  hybrid  ICL structures  such  as  the
Extraordinary  Chambers  in  the  Courts  of  Cambodia  (ECCC),  the  Iraqi  High  Tribunal  and  the
Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) dealing, as they do, with domestic law and generally lacking
the  judicial  quality  of  the  jurisdictions  selected.  Although  the  Special  Court  for  Sierra  Leone
(SCSL) will also not be directly investigated, its jurisprudence will, at times, be insightful for the
purposes  of this  work as  it  primarily  expounds ICL and some philosophical  considerations  are
evident in its reasoning. Paying some attention to the SCSL is justified because, unlike the hybrid
courts, ‘it is a creature of international law, not domestic law’.27 Some illustrative references will
thus be made to this institution.28 
This study’s focus will be on the majority and separate (including dissenting) judgments (both trial
and  appeal  where  they  exist)  on  merits  and  sentencing  (where  applicable)  from  the  selected
jurisdictions.  Separate and dissenting opinions,  as has been pointed out in another context,  can
21 WA Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn, CUP 2011) 1-3.
22 UNSC Resolution 1966.
23 <www.unmict.org/en/about> accessed on 3 June 2016.
24 As of 20/07/2018 only a handful of judgments have been rendered, namely Lubanga,  Katanga,  Ngudjolo,  Bemba
and Al-Mahdi.
25 This was definitely the intention at its creation although it has been difficult getting this Court fully functional.
26 See section 0.2.
27 Schabas (n 20) 6. 
28 For concerns regarding the quality of SCSL reasoning, however, see R Cryer, ‘Of Custom, Treaties, Scholars and the
Gavel: The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study’ (2006) 11 Journal
of Conflict & Security Law 253.
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become important in the development of jurisprudence as it  might raise ‘an innovation not yet
accepted, and permitting it to mature in public consciousness’.29 Moreover, separate and dissenting
opinions are often theoretically insightful as they provide judges greater freedom to express their
particular understanding of the law and their  mandate. While the judgments will  be the central
focus, academic writings of the selected role-players will also be considered where they shed light
on positions adopted intra-curially.
This study will not focus on the decisions, procedural pronouncements (such as decisions dealing
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RoPE) at the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC), transcripts
or memoranda of the judicial bodies owing to constraints of space. The exceptions to this general
rule will be the Rule 61 decisions and a few significant interlocutory decisions at the ICTY. The
Rule 61 decisions are included because they were the first substantive decisions made by the ICTY
and, as such, contain reasoned findings revelatory of philosophical position. Since only five Rule 61
decisions  were  rendered,30 they  moreover  constitute  a  small  and  self-contained  selection.  The
interlocutory decisions at the ICTY will not be the main focus of this study either, but a few of these
decisions are seminal to ICL, in particular the Tadić decision,31 and so will be included in the cases
under investigation. 
Regarding  the  selected  judgments,  this  thesis  emphasises  justifications  rather  than  outcomes.32
Outcomes are not necessarily linked to articulated justifications. However, this study is precisely
focused on articulated philosophical justifications. Shedding light on the quality of justifications is
crucial  as  justifications  are  the  outcomes  in  the  making.  This  thesis,  therefore,  focuses  on
philosophy as an element of the justificatory regime which limits its ambit. Yet, it is the intention to
show how complex a single facet of the judicial argumentative structure might be. Hopefully this
might entice future research into this and other components of the justificatory narrative. Although
only a part of the total justificatory narrative will be explored, any taint of the part, will taint the
29 LV Prott,  The  Latent  Power  of  Culture  and the  International  Judge (Professional  Books  1979) 114.  See  also
Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment Volume 6 of 6) IT-04-74-T (29 May 2013) Separate and Partially Dissenting
Opinion of Presiding Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti p 89.
30 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-94-
2-R61 (20 October 1995);  Prosecutor v  Martić (Decision) IT-95-11-R61 (8 March 1996);  Prosecutor v Mrkšić
(Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-95-13-R61 (3 April
1996); Prosecutor v Karadžić and Mladić (Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure
and  Evidence)  IT-95-5-R61  and  IT-95-18-R61  (11  July  1996);  Prosecutor  v Rajić (Review of  the  Indictment
pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-95-12-R61 (13 September 1996).
31 For e.g., Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2
October 1995); Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Alagić & Kubura (Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction) IT-01-
47-PT (12 November 2002). 
32 For which SCA is particularly suited, see Hall and Wright (n 3) 98.
14
whole.  While  a  wholesome  part  will  not  necessarily  mean  a  wholesome  institution,  it  could
contribute thereto. 
As a general rule, this study will focus on the pronouncements of the judges from the selected
judicial bodies. The exception to this will be the opening and closing arguments of the prosecutors
and defence counsel at Nuremberg and Tokyo. As these were the first ICL Tribunals, both teams of
counsel  needed to  adopt  clear  philosophical  arguments  in  order  to  substantiate  their  respective
positions in relation to the ICL regime and the trials themselves. These arguments shed additional
light  on  the  philosophical  approaches  adopted  by  the  first  ICL Tribunals  as  they  provided  the
framework from which the judicial bodies themselves worked. Not all counsel were philosophically
minded, however, and this study will only focus on the main role-players that were so inclined. 
It tended to be the chief prosecutors and the chief defence counsel who were most concerned with
the theoretical framework and justification of the trials. Exceptionally at Nuremberg, however, the
defence chose Hermann Jahrreiss (supporting counsel for Alfred Jodl) to address, on behalf of all
the accused,  ‘general  questions  of  law and fact’.33 Counsel  on both sides  recognised that  their
opening and closing  statements  were  a  declamation  to  the  international  community  as  well  as
posterity and utilised it  accordingly. At Tokyo, for example, chief prosecutor Keenan began his
opening address by admitting his responsibility to present ‘an outline of our theory of the law under
which we are proceeding’ alongside the facts to be proven.34 Because the prosecution believed that
irreconcilable philosophies characterised the positions of the opposing counsel at Tokyo, they felt
the need to justify their theoretical position and ‘to relate the transitory and ephemeral factors of the
trial to permanent values which are found in legal history and philosophy’.35 Consequently, this
study will emphasise the arguments adopted by the main participants on both sides in so far as they
were manifested in the opening and closing arguments. 
Pronouncements by counsel in subsequent post-Cold War ICL proceedings will not be scrutinised in
any great depth, since the state of affairs during the 1990s differed markedly from those which
existed immediately after WWII. ICL was on much firmer ground by this time and the precedential
value of the IMTs’ judgments, Statutes and subsequent legal codifications had become established.36
Of necessity, the post-WWII counsel had to turn towards more abstract, philosophical arguments as
33 Taylor (n 20) 433, 474.
34 Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 383.
35 JB Keenan and BF Brown, Crimes against International Law (Public Affairs Press 1950) 13.
36 GA Res 95(I) of 11 December 1946 affirmed the principles of international  law recognised by the Nuremberg
Charter and the judgments of the Tribunal.
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they attempted to justify the nascent ICL legal regime. In the 1990s, the ICL legal regime was no
longer as rudimentary nor in need of as much philosophical justification and so arguments could
rather be based directly on the plethora of extant legal instruments.37 This study will thus not focus
on the arguments made by the post-Cold War prosecutors or defence counsel.
As mentioned earlier, equality of the cases under scrutiny is essential for SCA.38 The equality of the
selected cases here might be questioned, e.g., trial versus appeal judgments or pronouncements of
judges  versus  statements  from counsel.  Yet,  because this  thesis  is  concerned with justifications
rather than outcomes, equal weight can be afforded to these different cases in order to reveal which
philosophical justifications were used by the selected ICL role-players and the patterns thereof. 
1.2.2 Coding
Coding  (part  (ii)  of  SCA)  explains  which  of  the  selected  cases  are  illustrators  of  particular
philosophical categories (i.e. those cases will be discussed which reveal reasoned interpretations of
the codes). Coding, for this study, is the empirical process through which signifiers (or ‘codes’) are
established  as  indicators  of  philosophical  justifications  (or  ‘philosophical  categories’39),  which
constitute the indicated. Coding is a self-reflexive exercise which identified various signifiers of
philosophical justifications while reading the selected cases. The revealed philosophical categories
demarcate the thesis’ chapters and parts, while the specific codes, indicative of the said categories,
constitute  the  subsections  in  chapters.40 This  section  will  elucidate  the  two components  of  the
coding process, i.e. the signified philosophical categories and the signifier codes, while reflecting
on attendant study precepts too. 
As a  preliminary,  this  study accepts  that  a  taxonomy of  philosophies  can be postulated  and is
worthwhile.41 Any overarching taxonomy of philosophies, by function, has to be general. As Raz
pointed out, ‘theories belong to a tradition by their frame of reference’ rather than because ‘they all
share a central credo’.42 Yet, generalisation necessarily entails a degree of simplification which, as
37 Which in addition to GA Res 95(I) of 1946, included the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols
of 1977.
38 Hall and Wright (n 3) 65-66.
39 For the meaning of ‘philosophy’ used here, see M Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn, Thomson
Sweet Maxwell 2014) 2. See also section 0.2.
40 The structure of the thesis is reflected in section 0.3.
41 BH Bix, ‘Natural Law: The Modern Tradition’ in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 63 fn 13. Contrast, however, J Coleman, ‘Beyond Inclusive Legal
Positivism’ (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 392.
42 BH Bix,  Jurisprudence: Theory and Context  (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 35, 64 quoting from J Raz, ‘The
Argument from Justice,  or  How Not to  Reply to Legal Positivism’ in George Pavlakos (ed),  Law, Rights  and
Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of Robert Alexy (Hart Publishing 2007).
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Bix rightly pointed out, may result in distortion.43 In order to address these pitfalls, an explanation
of the philosophies used in this study will preface each part to clarify their meaning as they emerged
in the different contexts. 
This thesis does not purport to present the philosophies held by the selected role-players in their
personal capacities. Obviously, the role-players’ personal beliefs might differ from the arguments
they made in their juridical capacities. A study elucidating such personal views, which requires
interviews, is simply not the study envisaged here. This study focuses on the recorded philosophical
arguments as they appear in the selected ICL cases.  It bears noting that intentionality in the ICL
judicial bodies’ reliance on philosophy cannot be assumed. The possibility of courts not fully or
truthfully articulating their justifications also exists. These limitations appear irrespective of the
methodological approach adopted as inherent to the object to be researched, namely judgments.
This study will, however, be able to investigate what judges ‘say and do internal to the case law’.44
Once rendered, legal judgments provide an authoritative expression of law. The question regarding
intention or motive behind a particular justification then becomes less important than the fact that
the justification was employed. The matter of legitimacy is also more assuredly determined based
on what ICL role-players actually say in official pronouncements. 
Through the coding process, the philosophical categories identified for this study were natural law
and  legal  positivism,  deontology  and  utilitarianism,  feminism and  antecedents  to  Third  World
Approaches  to  International  Law  (TWAIL),  realism  and  liberalism.  Liberalism,  as  systemic
philosophy, will be shown throughout the study to explain various coded instances of the other
philosophies.  While  theoretical  debates  surrounding  various  philosophies’ contours  abound,  for
purposes  of  this  thesis  these  debates  were  not  the  focal  point.45 This  thesis  does  not  claim to
expound the undisputed objective version of the various philosophies identified. The aim is rather to
empirically identify the philosophies  as understood by the selected ICL judicial bodies. At times,
extensive  analysis  was  necessary  for  this  identification  (especially  regarding  natural  law  and
positivism).  Yet,  the  investigated  judicial  pronouncements  rarely  (if  ever)  purported  to  be
comprehensive  philosophical  treatises.  Pronouncements  usually  either  contained  paradigmatic
philosophical ideas or reflected philosophy when argument could be juxtaposed with its opposing
approach. At the very least, whenever the analysis was open to debate, this study hoped to reveal
43 BH Bix, ‘Patrolling the Boundaries: Inclusive Legal Positivism and the Nature of Jurisprudential Debate’ (1999) 12
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 25; Bix (n 42) 64.
44 Hall and Wright (n 3) 95-100. See also Holsti (n 3) 602.
45 See, for example, D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, ‘The Practical Difference between Natural-Law Theory and
Legal Positivism’ (1985) 5 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
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that the philosophical narrative was not as clear as it could be.46 Just because another philosophy
could  have  argued  in  the  same  way,  was  not  necessarily  conclusive  as  a  reading  of  a  whole
argument was necessary to venture findings on classification. 
Turning to the indicators or codes, in SCA traditionally codes should not overlap.47 However, the
subject matter of this thesis, namely philosophies adopted by ICL judicial bodies, rendered perfect
compliance with this postulate difficult. This was due to the fact that certain philosophies might
overlap and a particular  code might reveal instances of both simultaneously.48 Furthermore,  the
systemic  philosophy  of  liberalism,  as  will  be  argued  throughout,  contextualised  various  other
instances of philosophical justification. In short, neither the philosophical categories to which the
codes pointed nor the codes themselves could have been hermetically sealed. Although this was an
exception to the general rule, it is the intention to reveal the complex interplay of philosophical
categories in ICL jurisprudence. This also confirmed why a qualitative rather than a quantitative
approach was necessary pertaining to the interpretation of the coded data. Where overlap occurs, it
will not undermine the analysis under part (iii) against the rule of law standard precisely because it
is a qualitative rather than quantitative analysis.
To reiterate, coding is a process wherein certain signifiers, reflective of philosophy, are searched for
in ICL texts. Most of the codes themselves only point to the relevant parts of judgments from where
a further analysis is required to ascertain the philosophical category adopted. Coding (as part (ii) of
SCA) can move beyond explicit variables towards implicit variables which require inference and
evaluation.49 
The  overall  thesis  design  to  code  for  philosophy  (part  (ii)  of  SCA)  in  the  selected  ICL
pronouncements (part (i) of SCA) and then measure those justifications against the rule of law and
institutional legitimacy (part (iii) of SCA) is inductive, i.e. findings on rule of law and legitimacy
are derived from coded data. Coding (part (ii)) is, however, rarely only inductive or deductive. As
noted in section 0.2, a limited number of studies have appeared on this topic. Several philosophies
were  thus  already identified  in  ICL and could  be  deductively  sought  in  the  coded  data.  Also,
46 Which is, of course, a relevant consideration on the Fullerian desiderata adopted here. See section 1.2.3.2. 
47 Holsti (n 3) 646; Hall and Wright (n 3) 108.
48 Two philosophies may engage the same codes, e.g., liberalism considers individualism and, like natural law, legality
and interpretation too. See, for e.g., D Robinson, ‘A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’
(2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 148-149. One code may reveal multiple philosophies, e.g., the self-
reflexive code by definition may refer to any philosophy. 
49 Hall and Wright (n 3) 108.
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through the coding process, certain philosophies emerged inductively from the coded data.  The
thesis  codes  represent  clear  and  repeatable  indicia to  ascertain  philosophy  in  judicial
pronouncements.  Once  identified,  codes  also  aided  in  determining  which  versions  of  the
philosophical categories were invoked.
The codes,  through which  the  thesis’ identification  of  philosophical  category  occurred,  will  be
briefly  noted.  Self-reflexive  statements  (deductive  code50)  by  definition  could  reflect  any
philosophy. These statements do not require much analysis as they explicitly revealed philosophy.
The coded self-reflexive statements revealed natural law, legal positivism and ethical theories. Just
war  (deductive  code51)  and cosmopolitanism (deductive  code52)  have  historical  roots  in  natural
law,53 while  the  policy-oriented  approach (deductive  code54)  used  in  ICL jurisprudence  will  be
argued to reveal natural law.55 Substantive ICL, viz, sources of law (deductive code56), substantive
crimes (deductive code57),  nullem crimen sine lege  (NCSL) (deductive code58) and interpretation
(deductive code59) also exhibited natural law and legal positivism. Sentencing rationales (deductive
codes60) form the central codes for findings on deontology and utilitarianism. The women question
(deductive code61), colonialism (deductive code62) and othering (inductive code from research data)
reflect approaches critical towards the existing, traditional Western liberal narrative premised on a
male-centric individualism. Finally, several philosophical justifications were informed by political
or systemic concerns. State-centrism and individualism (inductive codes from research data)  were
50 Boister and Cryer (n 20) 271  as well as  R Cryer, ‘The Philosophy of International Criminal Law’ in Alexander
Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 232.
51 B Van Schaak, ‘“The Grass that  Gets  Trampled when Elephants Fight”:  Will  the Codification of the Crime of
Aggression Protect Women?’ (2010) 15 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 327; Cryer (n 50)
252-253.
52 Boister and Cryer (n 20) 271.
53 See, for e.g., J Moussa, ‘Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the separation of the two bodies of
law’ (2008) 90 International Review of  the Red Cross  966; MC Nussbaum, ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’
(1997) 5 Journal of Political Philosophy 5.
54 Cryer (n 50) 247-249.
55 See, in literature, G Gilmore,  The Ages of American Law (Yale University Press 1977) 90; M Koskenniemi, ‘The
Politics  of  International  Law’ (1990)  1  European  Journal  of  International  Law  11;  N  Duxbury,  Patterns  of
American Jurisprudence (OUP 1997) 176. R Higgins, Problems & Process International Law and How We Use It
(OUP 1995) 10 explicitly sees this as a movement away from positivism.
56 Cryer (n 50) 249-250.
57 E.g. Boister and Cryer (n 20) 130.
58 B  Van  Schaak,  ‘Crimen  Sine  Lege:  Judicial  Lawmaking  at  the  Intersection  of  Law  and  Morals’ (2008)  97
Georgetown Law Journal 119; Cryer (n 50) 243-245.
59 WA Schabas, ‘Interpreting the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ in LC Vohrah, F Pocar, Y Featherstone et al (eds),
Man’s Inhumanity to Man Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law International
2003) 847 et seq.
60 R Cryer, H Friman, D Robinson and E Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure
(2nd edn, CUP 2010) 22.
61 R Copelon, ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into International Criminal Law’
(2000) 46 McGill Law Journal 217; Cryer (n 50) 259-263.
62 Cryer (n 50) 259-263.
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exemplary of these systemic codes.    
Not all of the selected cases (part (i) of SCA) revealed every or, indeed, any single code. Some of
the selected cases evinced no philosophical categories. The cases which did not reveal philosophy
are reflected in the conclusion as part of the study’s findings. Further, when a judicial body merely
accepted  the  law  as  set  out  in  earlier  case  law,  which  has  been  called  the  ‘tonsorial  and
agglutinative’ style,63 it was not counted in this thesis unless the entire philosophical argument was
restated. The objective is to consider the articulation of philosophical category in ICL jurisprudence
rather than the non-reflective reliance on previous legal authority. 
While  the analysis  of the codes (under part  (ii)  of SCA) in order to identify the philosophical
categories relied on in the cases under scrutiny will be descriptive, the subsequent analysis thereof
against the rule of law will be inferential (the focus of part (iii)). This approach, it is suggested, is
completely congruous with the overarching requirement of SCA that the coding process not be one
of ‘reading between the lines’ whereas the interpretation of the results of the coding process may
consider more latent aspects.64 
1.2.3 Analysis of coded data
1.2.3.1 Qualitative framework
The study will next elucidate its qualitative framework for the analysis under part (iii). Suffice it to
repeat  that  consistency,  or  non-contradiction,  of  philosophical  justifications  will  be  imperative
under the adopted Fullerian rule of law standard.65 The patterned use of philosophical arguments
will structure the thesis and data.  This sub-section deals with the overall framework in terms of
which  patterns  will  be  identified,  while  the  next  sub-section  details  the  Fullerian  rule  of  law
standard which will be utilised in relation to the coded data. 
Three dynamics provide the means for comparing the reliance on philosophy between the selected
role-players for part (iii) of the SCA, namely the extra-curial, inter-curial and intra-curial dynamics.
This framework is crucial for the determination of consistency and, by extension, compliance with
the rule of law because it explains which aspects are to be compared for purposes of this study. This
also structures the study argument.
63 See tonsorial and agglutinative style noted by Prott (n 29) 177.
64 Holsti (n 3) 600. See also Holsti (n 4) 12.
65 See sections 0.1 and 0.2.
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Firstly, the extra-curial dynamic (which sets the philosophical approaches of ICL judicial bodies
against  an  external  reference  point)  can  itself  be  subdivided  into  the  value-based  extra-curial
dynamic (which measures the philosophical approach of ICL judicial bodies against a standard such
as  rule  of  law)  and  an  interest-based  extra-curial  dynamic  (which  weighs  the  philosophical
approaches of ICL judicial bodies against the interests of the international legal community which
created it). The value-based extra-curial dynamic represents the meta-dynamic for this study as all
of the other dynamics address the query whether ICL judiciaries as a whole contributed to the rule
of  law  and,  consequently,  the  institutional  legitimacy  of  ICL.  The  interest-based  extra-curial
dynamic emerges in relation to systemic and societal concerns which impact judgments and are
especially relevant in chapters 5 and 6.
Secondly, the inter-curial dynamic compares the use of philosophy between different ICL judicial
bodies. This enables horizontal comparisons between the post-WWII IMTs or between the post-
Cold War bodies (here the ICC may be included). The comparison between the earlier post-WWII
IMTs and the later post-Cold War bodies is also ensured. Throughout the individual chapters, this
dynamic  serves  as  the  backbone  for  structuring  the  thesis  in  terms  of  the  patterned  use  of
philosophy.
Thirdly, the intra-curial dynamic juxtaposes the use of philosophy within a particular judicial body
over  time  and  is  itself  subdivided  into  the  inter-jurist  dynamic  (which  compares  the  position
between judges or counsel on the same judicial body) and the intra-jurist dynamic (which sets the
earlier pronouncements of a particular judge or counsel against later pronouncements66). Counsel
will be compared thus, but, due to the practice of collegiate judgments, it is often difficult to ascribe
particular findings to individual judges.67 This explains why the focus will be on the trends that have
emerged  from  the  ICL  judicial  bodies  rather  than  on  establishing  each  individual  judge’s
philosophical approach.68 While the focus will, therefore, not specifically be on the inter-and intra-
jurist dynamics, they will be discussed in cases where they are unambiguously present. 
This division roughly corresponds to the argument of Holsti that meaningful conclusions from SCA
66 See for e.g., E Kopelman, ‘Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War
Crimes Trial’ (1991) 23 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics  373-444 arguing how Pal
may be seen as a positivist, an adherent to TWAIL or as a product of his own circumstances. See also Cryer (n 50)
245.
67 R Cryer, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and the Sources of International Law Antonio Cassese’s Contribution to
the Canon’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1047 fn 10.
68 S Jodoin, ‘Understanding the Behaviour of International Courts An Examination of Decision-Making at the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals’ (2010) 6 Journal of International Law and International Relations 5, 31.
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require data to be compared with other data whether from a single source over the course of time
(here labelled the intra-curial dynamic), or from two or more sources (here labelled the interest-
based extra-curial dynamic and inter-curial dynamic) or against a standard (which the rule of law
argument essentially is and here labelled the value-based extra-curial dynamic).69 
1.2.3.2 Rule of law as standard
The rule of law represents the standard against which the coded data will be measured as part (iii) of
SCA. For purposes of the precepts and broader limits on study design, the rule of law concept will
first  be  contextualised  and  justified  against  competing  ideals  before  delving  into  its  specific
meaning and contours for this study. 
Broadly, the rule of law can be formulated in both a formal and substantive sense.  In the formal
sense, law must be able to guide the conduct of its subjects. In itself this omits any guidelines as to
who  may  author  the  law  or  whether  fundamental  rights  or  justice  should  be  included  in  an
understanding  of  law.70 The  formal  view  considers  how  law  is  made  as  well  as  its  essential
attributes. The substantive approach goes further and also considers the basic content of law. These
views have been placed on a spectrum from ‘thinner’ to ‘thicker’ versions. On this view, the more
substantive the approach the more requirements are understood to be inherent to the concept. But
the subsequent conceptions include the requirements of the previous ‘thinner’ conceptions, so all
the formal versions of the rule of law are implied in every substantive version thereof – even the
‘thinnest’ substantive version contains all the requirements of the ‘thickest’ formal approach.71 
While attempting to extrapolate the rule of law to international law, it has been suggested that the
added strain imposed by substantive rule of law approaches, i.e. engaging with whether a law is
good or bad, militates against it.72 International society is fractured and, as such, the rule of law in
the international arena cannot (yet) be as (substantively) comprehensive as that in domestic systems.
This explains why a formal rule of law standard will be pursued in this study. 
69 Holsti (n 3) 605. See also Holsti (n 4) 28-31.
70 LL Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 155-156; J Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law
and Morality (Clarendon Press 1979) 211-214, 218-220. See also S Beaulac, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law
Today’ in Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 201.
71 Beaulac (n 70) 201. See also PP Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical
Framework’ (1997)  Public  Law  467.  Although adopting  a  substantive  conception,  J  Finnis,  Natural  Law  and
Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980) 268-271 incorporates considerations that overlap with the formal conception
of Raz (n 70) 214 and Fuller (n 70) 39-94. 
72 Beaulac (n 70) 201.
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Still, there is growing support for the emergence of the rule of law as a principle in international
law.73 Accordingly, the rule of law in international law has been tasked to balance ‘the sovereign
independence of states’ which allows for ‘unrestricted assertions of power’.74 Regardless of whether
the rule of law has become a principle of international law or is still in the process of becoming part
of it, it is clearly an important virtue for any legal system to aspire to.75 This is true also if the rule of
law is seen as quality of a legal system which enables it to function efficiently rather than as the
ultimate aim of such a system in itself.76 This confirms that the rule of law is a worthwhile and
meaningful commitment for purposes of this thesis.
A necessary  interjection  at  this  stage  pertains  to  whether  the  rule  of  law,  with  its  designs  on
consistency, is the only or best standard for this study. While the rule of law is one of the central
political ideals of a legal system which constrains the ‘illegal or extra-legal use of power’,77 it is not
the only normative political ideal worthy of pursuit in a legal system. It competes with justice,
security, efficiency and similar ideals. However, this study agrees that ‘other things being equal, the
greater conformity [to the rule of law] the better’.78 Some have argued that other principles, like
justice and the social good, are to be achieved through the rule of law and not while circumventing
or ignoring it.79 
An important and related argument entails that consistency or, phrased differently, conformity with
the  formal  version  of  rule  of  law does  not  necessarily  safeguard  against  substantive  iniquity.80
However, a moral standard requires a normative argument which will itself be controversial. To
advance a Dworkinian argument, for e.g., integrity in the context of community morality may be
proposed as such a standard.81 Several aspects, however, suggest that such a standard is premature
in  current  ICL.  Dworkinian  integrity  presupposes  a  political  community  based  on  fraternal
73 Beaulac (n 70) 198, 220 as well as J Waldron, ‘The Rule of International Law’ (2006) 30 Harvard Journal of Law &
Public Policy 16.
74 Beaulac (n 70) 207.
75 Waldron (n 73) 15, 29 links it to the moral health and the honour of the legal profession. See also GP Fletcher and
JD Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’ (2005) 3 JICJ 541 footnote 2.
76 Raz (n 70) 225-229.
77 C Murphy, ‘Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 239.
78 Raz (n 70) 228. See also Craig (n 71) 469.
79 Finnis (n 71) 23, 353; Waldron (n 73) 15.
80 Which could be a concern for those who see formal rule of law as separate from morality. See generally, R Dworkin,
‘The Elusive Morality of Law’ (1965) 10 Villanova Law Review 631-639; HLA Hart, ‘Review The Morality of Law
by Lon Fuller’ (1965) 78 Harvard Law Review 1285-1286.  D Lyons,  Ethics and the Rule of Law (CUP 1984) 83
argues that ‘treating cases in a regular or uniform manner may be a necessary condition of justice, but is not a
sufficient condition’.
81 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 176-275.
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obligations.82 While  this  type  of  community  may  exist  in  the  domestic  context  (and even  this
assumption  was  criticised83),  its  existence  on  the  international  plane,  with  its  heterogeneous
communities, will ostensibly be more difficult to realise. Integrity in the Dworkinian sense might
also  not  always  be  insulated  from immorality  if  immorality  pervades  institutional  history  and
community morality.84 In sum, Dworkinian integrity presents a moving target which will be difficult
to apply in the current ICL landscape. 
Dworkinian  institutional  history  and  community  morality  by  definition  presuppose  pattern  and
consistency. Right or wrong can only be determined once a standard has settled. In sum, a new field
of law needs to develop its history and patterns first – this study precisely looks to such patterns. In
a nascent regime like ICL it seems more prudent, at present, to utilise standards which are linked to
law itself  and,  indeed,  might  contribute to  the  clarification of  the  institutional  history which a
Dworkinian approach will require. Simply, envisaged, as a matter of study design, is an empirical
study rather  than  a  normative  one.  Hopefully,  this  study could  provide  some of  the  necessary
insights upon which normative approaches might build in the future. 
This also does not mean that the formal rule of law embodies no substantive concerns. The rule of
law aims to mobilise the law to promote the social good and limit harm to freedom and human
dignity.85 The importance of the rule of law for human dignity is well captured by Raz when he
argues that the ‘observance of the rule of law is necessary if the law is to respect human dignity.
Respecting human dignity entails treating humans as persons capable of planning and plotting their
future’.86 The requirements of the rule of law that law be applied predictably and coherently ensures
that individuals can align their conduct with the law and in advance of its application.87 This is
especially true in the (international) criminal law context as well.88 In the process some protection is
afforded to individual moral agency, i.e. substantive concerns. 
These considerations guide this thesis’ adoption of a formal rule of law approach. Due to its clarity,
82 Ibid 214.
83 AC  Hutchinson,  ‘Indiana  Dworkin  and  Law’s  Empire’ (1987)  96  Yale  Law  Journal 653-656;  A van  Blerk,
Jurisprudence an Introduction (Butterworths Lexisnexis 1998) 97.
84 R  Wacks,  ‘Judges  and  Injustice’  (1984)  101  South  African  Law  Journal  272;  R  Wacks, Understanding
Jurisprudence An Introduction to Legal Theory (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 138.
85 Raz (n 70) 228-229.
86 Raz  (n  70)  221.  See  also  Fuller  (n  70)  162;  Finnis  (n  71)  272;  NJ  McBride  and  S  Steel,  Great  Debates  in
Jurisprudence (Palgrave 2014)  71.
87 Raz (n 70) 214;  A Marmor, ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds),  The Oxford
Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 124.
88 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (OUP 1968) 181; Fletcher and Ohlin (n
75) 541 footnote 2.
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the version of Lon Fuller will be used.89 Briefly, Fuller, required law to be (1) created (2) public (3)
prospective (4) non-contradictory (5) clear (6) not require conduct ultra vires the affected party (7)
stable and (8) congruent with its administration.90 Fuller noted that the priority of the desiderata
inter se as well as the stringency with which they should be applied depended on the field of law in
question.91 Moreover,  the  requirements  do  not  lend  themselves  to  ‘separate  and  categorical
statement’.92 They function  as  a  whole  to  ensure  that  ‘a  system of  rules  for  governing human
conduct...is  efficacious  and  at  the  same  time  remain  what  it  purports  to  be’.93 The  principles
especially  relevant  for  this  study  revolve  around  the  rules  and  their  justification  being
created/general, public, prospective, non-contradictory and stable. Generality requires the making of
laws or, in the case of the judiciary, the explanation and justification of legal positions. When force
or politics are used to rule, governance will not be through the rule of law. Public rules and, in the
case of the judiciary, justifications require the reasons for legal positions to be given in judgments.
This principle questions whether the underlying philosophical justifications are acknowledged in a
judgment. Retrospective rules or, in the case of the judiciary, justifications are to be avoided under
the rule of law. While Fuller conceded that such rules might sometimes be necessary in a living
system of law as a curative measure,94 this exception does not apply in relation to criminal law.
Contradictory rules or justifications for legal positions undermine the rule  of law because they
undermine the predictability and foreseeability of the law’s application. Likewise, changing rules or
justifications often will also undermine the rule of law. The other rule of law principles appeared
infrequently.95 
Throughout the requirements of generality, non-contradiction and stability the notion of consistency
is pivotal and serves as the main structuring principle in this study along the dynamics discussed in
section  1.2.3.1.  Consistency  directly  engages  Fuller’s  non-contradiction  requirement  and  the
consequences for the other principles tend to follow from this requirement. Whenever justificatory
narratives undermined the predictability and foreseeability of the application of law in a manner
which impeded the moral agency of the person to act in accordance with the law, the rule of law
would be directly infringed.96
89 Fuller (n 70) 153.
90 Fuller (n 70) 39-94. See generally Murphy (n 77) 239-247; Waldron (n 73) 17; Beaulac (n 70) 205-220. For a
substantive rule of law argument which agrees with the desiderata, see Finnis (n 71) 270-271, 287, 351.
91 Fuller (n 70) 93.
92 Ibid 104.
93 Ibid 97.
94 Ibid 53.
95 I.e. the ultra vires, clarity and lack of congruence desiderata.
96 Hart (n 88) 181; Fuller (n 70) 162; Finnis (n 71) 272.
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While it has been criticised, none of Fuller’s opponents have argued that his rule of law principles
are incorrect.97 Indeed most of these principles are found in Raz too.98 Much of the controversy
surrounded the connection between the rule of law and morality. As it has been debated elsewhere,99
it is not critical for purposes of this study, with its focus on the relatively uncontroversial desiderata,
to resolve whether the rule of law desiderata are also implicitly moral or not. None of the arguments
in this study falls on this point. In sum, Fuller’s procedural natural law comfortably resorts under
the formal end of the rule of law spectrum which ICL can realistically hope to realise at its present
stage of development. This reiterates why it is the rule of law standard used in this thesis.
In agreement  with  Fuller,  therefore,  this  study accepts  as  a  precept  that  substantive iniquity  is
difficult to realise through his rule of law principles.100 But, while ‘[o]bserving the rule of law by no
means  guarantees  that  [violations  of  people’s  dignity]  do  not  occur....it  is  clear  that  deliberate
disregard for the rule of law violates human dignity’.101 Adherence to Fuller’s requirements is a
necessary rather  than sufficient  condition for  honouring human independence and dignity.102 If,
hypothetically, therefore, a ‘wrong’ philosophy was used, this study will at least reveal the patterned
use thereof and, as such, could serve as the point of departure for a more substantive-oriented study.
Additional precepts pertaining to the rule of law need to be briefly clarified. Firstly, it is accepted
that rule of law (consistency) designs can be evaluated over time and different jurisdictions. On
some views the rule of law standard itself might be circular, i.e. there is rule of law as there is law.
Alternatively,  rule  of  law  could  be  seen  as  a  mere  checklist,  requiring  a  ticking  of  Fuller’s
principles. However, this view seems simplistic as consistency, which is central to these rule of law
arguments, reveals. Simply put, it is possible to have law which is argued in an inconsistent manner.
While there is then nominally ‘law’, it falls foul of rule of law standards which require it to be
capable of guiding conduct (to adopt Fuller’s purpose for law103) – inconsistent law will most likely
97 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 623-624; HLA Hart,
The Concept of Law (OUP 1961) 202; Hart (n 88) 181; Fuller (n 70) 187 et seq; Raz (n 70) 214-218; Bix (n 41) 81;
McBride and Steel (n 86) 70. 
98 Cf. Raz (n 70) 214-218.
99 Fuller (n 70) 95-151, 187-242; Raz (n 70) 223-226; McBride and Steel (n 86) 66 et  seq. However,  even  Hart,
‘Positivism and the Separation of  Law and Morals’ (n  97) 624  conceded that  generality and constancy in law
precludes it being seen as morally utterly neutral.
100 Van Blerk (n 83) 113.
101 Raz (n 70) 221. Compare Freeman (n 39) 113.
102 McBride and Steel (n 86) 73.  LL Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71
Harvard Law Review 657 recognises that order and justice are inextricably linked.
103 This purpose need not be the only one. It is widely supported, see Hart (n 88) 181; Finnis (n 71) 272; McBride and
Steel (n 86) 70.
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not so direct conduct. Adding another layer of complexity, in a living system of law, Fuller also
warned against trying to realise all desiderata rigidly.104 As another precept, this study agrees with
Fuller  and  Raz  that  the  existence  of  a  legal  system  is  a  matter  of  degree. 105 Therefore,  the
compliance with rule of law in ICL can be tested and is not circular. 
Another precept pertains to the relationship between the rule of law and the judiciary. As a point of
departure the judiciary is taken to play an intrinsic role in the realisation of ICL. Since ‘just about
any matter arising under any law can be subject to a conclusive court judgment, it is obvious that it
is futile to guide one’s action on the basis of the law if when the matter comes to adjudication the
courts  will  not  apply  the law and will  act  for  some other  reasons’.106 Their  justifications  more
generally, shape rules and should be subjected to rule of law considerations as such. Fuller and Raz
both suggest that rule of law considerations play out in courts.107 This seems true irrespective of
whether a court merely interprets the law or acts as lawmaker (only the congruence desideratum of
Fuller falls away in the latter case, but all the others are engaged).108 
As a matter of study design, it must be noted that rule of law considerations need not only revolve
around law-making (as occurs under Fuller) but can also pertain to the institutional dimension. In
ICL this would question whether judicial bodies enjoy general jurisdiction, are easily accessible for
legal subjects, are independent, objective and effective.109 While these are important aspects for the
broader extrapolation of the rule of law to international law, they fall outside the scope of this study
with its focus on the philosophical justifications in the pronouncements of ICL role-players. 
Important, finally, is the connection between the rule of law and legitimacy, on the one hand, and
the different types of legitimacy, on the other.  Compliance with rule of law gives effect to the
institution of law which is the requirement under outcome-based legitimacy.110 Rule of law has been
directly tied to consent legitimacy. Thus, on an interactional understanding of law, the ‘disregard of
the principles of legality may inflict damage on the institution of law itself’.111 And again: ‘If we
104 Fuller (n 70) 93
105 Fuller (n 70) 42-45, 122-123, 145; Raz (n 70) 211-222. Finnis (n 71) 276-281 also noted that legal systems and the
rule of law exist as a matter of degree.
106 Raz (n 70) 217.
107 Fuller  (n  70)  81-91;  Raz  (n  70)  216-217.  See  also  LL Fuller,  ‘Adjudication and  the  Rule  of  Law’ (1960)  54
American  Society  of  International  Law  Proceedings 1-8;  AM  Danner,  ‘When  Courts  Make  Law:  How  the
International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War’ (2006) 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 3.
108 Fuller (n 70) 82; Raz (n 70) 217 footnote 6.
109 Beaulac (n 70) 212-220.
110 T Treves,  ‘Aspects of  Legitimacy of Decisions of International  Courts and Tribunals’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum and
Volker Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008) 172. See sections 0.2 and 0.3.
111 Fuller (n 70) 221. Compare Freeman (n 39) 113.
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view the  law as  providing guideposts  for  human interaction,  we shall  be  able  to  see  that  any
infringement of the demands of legality tends to undermine men’s confidence in, and respect for,
law generally’.112 Outcome-based legitimacy, in turn, can contribute to consent legitimacy. Consent
legitimacy is based on a set of complex factors (predictability, foreseeability, self-interest etc.). It
would be naïve to claim completely predictable judicial reasoning will ensure consent legitimacy,
let alone that consistency in a part of the justificatory regime will do so. The claim presented here is
more restrained, namely that a predictable justificatory narrative may contribute to improve consent
legitimacy.
1.3 Conclusion
While explaining SCA as this study’s methodology, crucial concepts like ‘philosophy’ and ‘rule of
law’ were clarified. The precepts and contours of the study design were established. Part (i) of the
SCA pertaining to case selection was undertaken and explained in this chapter. This serves as the
source from which the data will be coded. Part (ii) and (iii) of the SCA, dealing with coding and
analysis, structures the subsequent chapters. As noted in this chapter, the coding process was self-
reflexive  with  a  continuous dialectic  between the  identification  of  codes  and the  philosophical
categories thus signified. This chapter both explained its preference for the rule of law generally and
the specific understanding of the rule of law as utilised in this study. Also, importantly, this chapter
sets out the framework through which the patterns of compliance with the rule of law desiderata or
lack thereof between the selected judicial bodies are to be determined. 
112 Fuller (n 70) 222.
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Part A
Natural Law and Legal Positivism as philosophical categories for coding in the
selected international criminal law role-players 
Coding for consistency in, or in Fullerian terms the non-contradictory use of, natural law and legal
positivism resulted  in  the  largest  dataset  under  any  philosophical  category  in  this  thesis.  This
necessitated  dividing  the  applicable  codes  into  two  chapters,  namely  one  focused  on  codes
historically linked to these philosophies and one linked to the appearance of these philosophies in
material ICL codes. The larger dataset enabled more detailed findings which, in turn, meant that a
more  nuanced  discussion  of  the  substantive  understandings  afforded  to  these  philosophical
categories will be pursued in this preface. The specific codes will be detailed in chapters 2 and 3
respectively.  
Coding for natural law and legal positivism is complicated by the theoretical debate about their
distinction. Briefly, some questioned the viability of persisting with the distinction,1 while many
others have premised arguments thereon.2 It is especially important for this study that the distinction
has been accepted in international law and international criminal law (ICL) theory,3 as well as in
1 D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, ‘The Practical Difference between Natural-Law Theory and Legal Positivism’
(1985)  5  Oxford  Journal  of  Legal  Studies 17-32  questioned  the  conceptual  and  practical  significance  of  the
distinction, concluding significance on the part of the former while the latter arguably finds significance in a weaker
claim of difference. See also  BH Bix, ‘Patrolling the Boundaries: Inclusive Legal Positivism and the Nature of
Jurisprudential Debate’ (1999) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 24-31; BH Bix,  ‘On the Dividing
Line Between Natural Law Theory and Legal Positivism’ (2000) 75 Notre Dame Law Review 1617;  R Cotterrell,
The Politics of Jurisprudence (2nd edn, OUP 2003) 117-143; J Coleman, ‘Beyond Inclusive Legal Positivism’ (2009)
22 Ratio Juris 392; NJ McBride and S Steel, Great Debates in Jurisprudence (Palgrave 2014) 87. 
2 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961) 181-182; J Stone, Human Law and Human Justice (Stanford University
Press 1965) 74-77, 212-215;  RWM Dias,  Jurisprudence (3rd edn, Butterworths 1970) 544-546;    Beyleveld and
Brownsword (n 1); R Shiner, Norm and Nature The Movements of Legal Thought (Clarendon Press 1992) 284-307,
324  notes  the  impossibility  of  compatibility;  B  Reynolds,  ‘Natural  Law  versus  Positivism:  The  Fundamental
Conflict’ (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 441, 447; W Morrison, Jurisprudence (Cavendish 1997); A van
Blerk, Jurisprudence an Introduction (Butterworths Lexisnexis 1998) 1-25; Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line’ (n 1) 1618
fn  23;  BH Bix,  ‘Natural  Law: The Modern  Tradition’ in  Jules  Coleman and Scott  Shapiro  (eds),  The Oxford
Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 96; Cotterrell (n 1) 114-117, 119-123; Coleman (n 1)
384-386; R Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence An Introduction to Legal Theory (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 10-117; M
Freeman,  Lloyd’s  Introduction  to  Jurisprudence (9th edn,  Thomson  Sweet  Maxwell  2014)  75-480;  BH  Bix,
Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 33-91.  
3 In the context of international law, see R Cryer, T Hervey, B Sokhi-Bulley with A Bohm, Research Methodologies in
EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 35-41. In the context of ICL, see S Ratner and AM Slaughter,
‘Appraising  the  Methods  of  International  Law:  A Prospectus  for  Readers’  (1999)  93  American  Journal  of
International Law 291, 293; N Boister and R Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (OUP
2008) 271-300; BN Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (CUP 2008) 15-18; R Cryer, ‘The Philosophy
of International Criminal Law’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of
International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 239; K  Sellars,  ‘Imperfect  Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo’ (2011) 21
European Journal of International Law 1094; R Cryer, H Friman, D Robinson and E Wilmshurst, An Introduction to
International Criminal Law and Procedure (3rd edn, CUP 2014) 21-26. In the context of IHL, see A Nell, ‘The ICRC
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ICL judicial pronouncements.4 This provides evidence of the distinction’s vitality in the present
context. The taxonomy adopted here endeavours to steer between the pitfalls of postulating straw
men, on the one hand, or overtly fragmented theories, on the other.5 As with any taxonomy, the
resultant discussions cannot claim to include every view held under the respective theories. The
subsequent explanations will briefly set out natural law and positivism before reflecting on their
interrelationship as is relevant for this study. 
Natural  law accepts  a  necessary  conceptual  connection  between  law and morality.6 Traditional
natural  law arguments  included  the  existence  of  higher  law,  details  of  its  content  and  the
consequences of the existence of a ‘higher law’.7 This higher law was derived either from nature,
divine revelation, religious documents or human nature.8 Cicero argued in exemplary fashion that
natural law is universal, unchanging, knowable through reason and determinative of legal validity.9
Traditional natural law was concerned with the status of morality and the implications thereof for
conduct. Later theories revolved around the law, the moral evaluations required to describe the law
as well as to determine the validity of laws.10 Natural law’s focus is often away from conventional
law towards a higher or basic aspiration that guides such conventional law, potentially teleologically
(i.e.  towards  such  basic  aspiration  as  an  objective).11 Thus,  while  natural  law  does  not  reject
conventional law, such law is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish the natural law approach.
On the other hand, ‘legal positivism’ derives from ‘positive (human-created (posited)) law’.12 Legal
positivism  adopted  the  social  sources  thesis,  which  ‘asserts  that  law  is,  in  essence,  a  social
creation’.13 Moreover, in terms of the separability thesis, establishing the law is both necessarily and
Study  on  Customary  International  Humanitarian  Law  as  Viewed  through  the  Prism  of  14th-18th  Century
Jurisprudential Thought’ (2014) African Yearbook on International Humanitarian Law 1-28.
4 On the  judicial  pronouncements,  see self-reflexive statements  under section 2.2.  See also,  for  the  Tokyo IMT,
Boister and Cryer (n 3) 277-300.
5 J Raz, ‘Postema on Law’s Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons: A Critical Comment’ (1998) 4 Legal Theory 1;
Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line’ (n 1) 1614.
6 Dias  (n  2)  383;  Beyleveld  and  Brownsword  (n  1)  4;  Reynolds  (n  2)  448;  Cotterrell  (n  1)  115;  D Meyerson,
Understanding Jurisprudence (Routledge 2007) 43; Wacks (n 2) 10, 32.   
7 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 182; Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n 2) 69.
8 Morrison (n 2) 15-178;  Van Blerk (n 2)  6;  Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line’ (n 1)  1614-1615;  Cotterrell  (n 1)  115;
Meyerson (n 6) 33-36; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 3) 35; Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n
2) 69.
9 MT  Cicero,  ‘On  the  Commonwealth’ in  JEG  Zetzel  (tr),  Cicero  On  the  Commonwealth  and  On  the  Laws
(Cambridge University Press 2008) III.33. See also Stone (n 2) 213.
10 Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line’ (n 1) 1615; Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n 2) 86.
11 Dias (n 2) 381; Bix, ‘Natural Law: The Modern Tradition’ (n 2) 66, 98; Freeman (n 2) 77-78. See also Hart,  The
Concept of Law (n 2) 184-188.
12 Dias (n 2) 381; Morrison (n 2) 4-5; Bix, ‘Natural Law: The Modern Tradition’ (n 2) 62 fn 2; Meyerson (n 6) 45;
Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 3) 37; Wacks (n 2) 57; Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n 2) 33
fn 1.
13 K  Himma,  ‘Inclusive  Legal  Positivism’ in  Jules  Coleman  and  Scott  Shapiro  (eds),  The  Oxford  Handbook  of
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conceptually separate from moral evaluations about what the law should be.14 However, morality
does play a role in legal practice and the separation thesis should not be construed too narrowly.15 
Natural law and legal positivism were reportedly historically tied to the law-as-it-ought-to-be and
the law-as-it-is as respective points of departure.16 While this has remained their respective primary
interest, both have increasingly shown interest in the opposite side. A difference in mood, style and
focus thus endures between the two approaches.17 The is/ought distinction has led some to argue
that the conflict between natural law and legal positivism is a false dilemma as these factors cannot
be simplified.18 This would provide additional evidence of the distinction between them.
These philosophical categories can be used in combination.  The Grotian approach invokes both
natural  law  and  legal  positivism  independently  and  together.19 On  this  view,  natural  law  and
positivism exist  alongside each other,  with  natural  law often supplementing positivism.20 Thus,
natural  law and legal positivism constitute  parallel  sources of law.21 The Grotian approach was
popular with the selected ICL role-players,  yet often even these arguments showed favouritism
towards natural law or positivism. Still, at most, such instances will be coded as Grotian inclining
towards one or the other approach. 
Importantly for the taxonomy in this study, natural law and legal positivism can be seen as existing
Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 126. See also J Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and
Morality (Clarendon Press 1979) 38; J Raz, ‘The Morality of Obedience’ (1985) 83 Michigan Law Review 739; Van
Blerk  (n  2)  6; M  Stone,  ‘Formalism’ in  Jules  Coleman  and  Scott  Shapiro  (eds),  The  Oxford  Handbook  of
Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 182; Meyerson (n 6) 44; Coleman (n 1) 383, 391 favours the social
thesis rather than the separability thesis as central for positivism. 
14 A Marmor,  Positive Law and Objective Values (Clarendon 2001) 71 quoted in  Bix,  Jurisprudence: Theory and
Context (n 2) 35. See also J Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray 1832) 278; J Bentham,
A Fragment on Government (Clarendon Press 1891) 98-99; Hart,  The Concept of Law (n 2) 181; Reynolds (n 2)
445;  Morrison  (n  2) 5;  Van Blerk  (n  2)  21;   Ratner  and  Slaughter  (n  3)  293;  B  Simma and  A Paulus,  ‘The
Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View’ (1999) 93 American
Journal of International Law 302-303; Bix ‘Patrolling the Boundaries’ (n 1) 18; Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line’ (n 1)
1615-1616; Himma (n 13) 136; Cotterrell (n 1) 114; Meyerson (n 6) 44; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n
3) 37; Wacks (n 2) 10, 32, 58.
15 Simma and Paulus (n 14) 308; J Raz, ‘About Morality and the Nature of Law’ (2003) 48  American Journal of
Jurisprudence 2-15;  Cotterrell (n 1)  115;  Meyerson (n 6)  46-47;  Coleman (n 1)  370;  Bix,  Jurisprudence: Theory
and Context (n 2) 35-36.
16 Dias (n 2) 381-385; Coleman (n 1) 386, 393; Wacks (n 2) 32.
17 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 598-599;  Beyleveld
and Brownsword (n 1) 3, 18; Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line’ (n 1) 1617; Freeman (n 2) 76.
18 Dias (n 2) 544-546; Shiner (n 2) 1-12, 324; AWG Raath, ‘Wysgerige Kanttekeninge by HJ Van Eikema Hommes se
Regsbeginsel-Teorie’ (2017) 1 Journal for Christian Scholarship 60. 
19 H Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’ (1946) 23 British Year Book of International Law 21.
20 Ibid 21-22.
21 Ibid 22.
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on a spectrum.22 Some have even argued that positive law inevitably develops towards natural law
and vice versa due to the nature of the opposing side’s criticisms requiring closer adherence to its
point of view.23 While the determinism in this argument is debatable, the point that convergence
occurred due to critique cannot be gainsaid. The spectrum metaphor incorporates the multiplicity of
views  within  each  paradigm  which,  in  turn,  acknowledges  their  respective  internal  historical
variety.24 On the opposite ends both have traditional versions often incompatible with each other. As
both  move  towards  the  centre,  however,  the  approaches  start  to  coalesce  with  increasing
compatibility  visible.25 This  metaphor  explains  the  classification  of  philosophies  which  are  not
absolutely  pure  or,  phrased  differently,  on  one  or  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum.  Where  one
philosophy  is  predominantly  visible,  it  is  possible  to  classify  the  position  accordingly.26 The
spectrum metaphor also holds for Grotian arguments wherein natural law and legal positivism are
used independently and together.27 
It was the increasing convergence of natural law and legal positivism at the hypothetical centre of
the spectrum which led some to question the overall  distinction.  However,  importantly  for this
study, this cannot negate the prior centuries of difference – it merely suggests a relatively recent
coalescing on some views. The centre point of the spectrum (at best) nullifies the distinction for that
point. It should not negate the previous divergent thought (it would be to mistake the spectrum for
the centre point). Furthermore, whether the modern versions of the theories perfectly overlap – or
whether the exact middle of the spectrum has been reached – is itself controversial and a debate for
theorists (and another study!).28 
The discussion next turns to HLA Hart’s positivism as it is central to the taxonomical divide made
in this study between exclusive legal positivism (ELP) and inclusive legal positivism (ILP). Hart, in
particular,  was  a  pivot  in  the  coalescing  between  natural  law  and  legal  positivism.  While  he
22 For support of such a metaphor, see R Tur, ‘The Kelsenian Enterprise’ in R Tur and W Twining (eds),  Essays on
Kelsen (Clarendon Press 1986) 165-167.
23 Shiner (n 2) 326.
24 The spectral nature of natural law and legal positivism is confirmed by Reynolds (n 2) 441; Ratner and Slaughter (n
3) 293;  Simma and Paulus (n 14) 303;  Bix ‘Patrolling the Boundaries’ (n 1) 17-18;  J Finnis,  ‘Natural Law: The
Classical  Tradition’ in  Jules  Coleman  and  Scott  Shapiro  (eds),  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  Jurisprudence  &
Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 3-8; Bix, ‘Natural Law: The Modern Tradition’ (n 2) 64-68; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-
Bulley with Bohm (n 3)  35;  Wacks (n 2)  26-27, 58; Freeman (n 2) 75-76, 314; Bix,  Jurisprudence: Theory and
Context (n 2) 35, 85.
25 Stone (n 2) 219-226; Raz (n 13) 739; Wacks (n 2) 31; Freeman (n 2) 108.
26 ‘The idea of a pure positive law, like that of natural law, has its limitations’ as per H Kelsen, General Theory of Law
and State (3rd edn, 1949) 401 quoted in L Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958)
71 Harvard Law Review 641.
27 Lauterpacht (n 19) 21.
28 See footnotes 1-3 above.
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accepted a minimum content of natural law, it was merely consequent to the human condition. He
did not argue that ‘law is derived from morals’ or that the two are necessarily connected (which
would have entered natural law territory).29 Central to Hart’s theory was the rule of recognition
(RoR) which was a complex set of criteria through which the rules that form part of a legal system
could be distinguished from rules that did not.30 The RoR thus pertained to legal validity. Officials,
including judges, had to accept and obey the RoR ‘from the internal point of view as a public,
common standard of judicial decision, and not as something which each judge merely obeys for his
part only’.31 Officials had to critically reflect on their and their colleagues’ deviations from such a
common standard as mistakes.32 While the RoR was often left unexpressed, it could be ‘shown in
the way in which particular rules are identified...by the courts or other officials’.33 Importantly, for
this study, Hart also recognised that all rules have a ‘core of certainty’ and a ‘penumbra of doubt’ –
in the latter cases judges exercise hard discretion.34 Crucially, judicial discretion was not extensive
or the model of law construed would collapse.35 Using judicial discretion has been understood as
moving judges beyond the existing law (and subsequent criticisms had to be on moral grounds).36
While moral standards could be invoked to legislate for gaps, ‘it did not follow from this that these
standards were already there in the rules for the judges to find’.37 For purposes of the taxonomical
separation of positivism and natural law, hard discretion was an obstacle. One of the problems was
that judges rarely conceded that they were using hard discretion to make law. In this thesis,  if
discretion was not evident, it will be assumed that the judiciary purported to be working normally
within the boundaries of law. In agreement with Ockham’s razor, if something ‘can be interpreted
without assuming this or that hypothetical entity, there is no ground for assuming it’.38
Influenced by Hart, legal positivism separated into ELP and ILP.39 This, however, only occurred
after the post-WWII IMTs delivered their judgments. The difference between ELP and ILP revolves
around the ‘conceptual’ connection between law and morality, i.e. the separability thesis.40 ELP
29 Hart (n 17) 623; Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 188-195; Wacks (n 2) 79.
30 Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n 2) 40.
31 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 108-113.
32 Ibid 113.
33 Ibid 98.
34 Hart (n 17) 607;  Hart,  The Concept of Law (n 2) 119-132;  Stone (n 13) 181;  Bix,  Jurisprudence: Theory and
Context (n 2) 46.
35 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 130; Van Blerk (n 2) 43; Cotterrell (n 1) 99.
36 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 132, 141; Van Blerk (n 2) 44.
37 Freeman (n 2) 327.
38 B  Russel,  History  of  Western  Philosophy (Routledge  1996)  435.  See  also  C  Romano,  ‘The  Proliferation  of
International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle’ (1999) 31 International Law and Politics 709 fn 1.
39 See Meyerson (n 6) 51-54; Wacks (n 2) 110-113; Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n 2) 49.
40 Bix, ‘Natural Law: The Modern Tradition’ (n 2) 97-98; Himma (n 13) 125; Meyerson (n 6) 33; Freeman (n 2) 312;
Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n 2) 49. 
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entails that the ‘existence and content of every law is fully determined by social sources’.41 If judges
consider morality during the establishment of a new rule, they are determining what the law ought
to be rather than is.42 For ELP the validity criteria emanating from a Hartian RoR contain no moral
terms, just ‘morally-neutral “pedigree” criteria’.43 ILP, as foreshadowed by Hart, argues that there is
‘no necessary moral content to legal rule (or a legal system), [but] a particular legal system may, by
conventional rule, make moral criteria necessary or sufficient for validity in that system’.44 ILP
differs from natural law in that moral criteria are contingent, derived from choices and actions of
particular legal officials, rather than part of the nature of law (i.e. present in all systems).45 In sum,
for ILP, law can be deduced from extra-legal sources provided that a ‘valid legal rule [essentially
the RoR46] specifically mandates recourse to such concepts to determine its content’.47 Raz called
the incorporation of moral principles into the RoR ‘on the borderline of positivism’.48 
This study purports to code for consistency, i.e. compliance with Fuller’s rule of law, regarding
natural law, exclusive legal positivism (ELP) and inclusive legal positivism (ILP). Although not
completely beyond criticism, this taxonomical division allows sufficient generalisation while being
nuanced and sensitive to the theoretical debate between natural law and positivism. Moreover, it is
the classification allowed on the coded data. In sum, both natural law and legal positivism allow
judges to refer to extra-judicial sources but the mode for so doing differs: natural law argues that
morality and law are conceptually linked while positivism may allow reference to morality as extra-
judicial law-making (ELP and strong discretion in a Hartian ILP sense) or because the posited law
authorised such a reference (ILP). If positivism does not make the argument that the reference is
directed by a RoR or is an exercise in lawmaking, it runs a risk of being construed as natural law
because  natural  law  need  not  make  any  justificatory  argument  (except  that  the  solution  is
41 Raz, The Authority of Law (n 13) 46; Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n 2) 49. See also Bix ‘Patrolling the
Boundaries’ (n  1)  19;  A  Marmor,  ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules Coleman and Scott  Shapiro (eds),  The
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 104; Himma (n 13) 125, 140; Meyerson (n 6)
54; S Shapiro, ‘Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?’ (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 326 fn 1; Wacks (n 2)
31, 42, 59, 106; McBride and Steel (n 1) 52.
42 Raz, ‘Postema’ (n 5) 5; Simma and Paulus (n 14) 304-305; Finnis, ‘Natural Law: The Classical Tradition’ (n 24) 8-
11; Himma (n 13) 140; Shapiro (n 41) 328-329; Coleman (n 1) 370;  Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n 2)
50. 
43 Bix ‘Patrolling the Boundaries’ (n 1) 19.
44 Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (n 2) 49. See also Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 181-182; Bix ‘Patrolling
the Boundaries’ (n 1)  19-20; Finnis, ‘Natural Law: The Classical Tradition’ (n 24) 11-15; Bix, ‘Natural Law: The
Modern Tradition’ (n 2) 97-98; Marmor (n 41) 104-110; Himma (n 13) 125, 136; Meyerson (n 6) 51-52; Shapiro (n
41) 326 fn 1; Wacks (n 2) 31, 42, 59; McBride and Steel (n 1) 51-52.
45 Bix ‘Patrolling the Boundaries’ (n 1) 19; Bix, ‘Natural Law: The Modern Tradition’ (n 2) 98; Bix, Jurisprudence:
Theory and Context (n 2) 49-50.
46 Bix ‘Patrolling the Boundaries’ (n 1) 19; HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, OUP) 250; Coleman (n 1) 367. 
47 Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 3) 37. See also Hart, The Concept of Law (n 2) 199; Shapiro (n 41) 327;
Wacks (n 2) 42, 110-111.
48 Raz, The Authority of Law (n 13) 47.
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‘reasonable’ which is  implied in the reference to it)  as the link between morality and law is  a
necessary one. 
The theoretical battle lines may never be entirely clear.49 This thesis proceeds from the assumption
that these theories can be identified in (actual) judicial arguments and  codes accordingly in the
subsequent two chapters. It is not about solving the overall jurisprudential complexities involved in
the (abstract) debate, but to have workable labels to explain separate techniques in (actual) judicial
argumentation. Normally ICL role-players tended to venture straightforward pronouncements which
reflected ideas traditionally held by one approach or the other (towards the respective ends of the
spectrum)  and  could  be  coded  for  accordingly.  This  was  often  further  clarified  when  the  two
approaches  were  juxtaposed  in  argument.  Sometimes,  however,  the  lack  of  detail  in
pronouncements  impeded  the  unambiguous  identification  of  philosophies  especially  when  they
revolved around matters pertaining to the centre of the spectrum. On the converse, if a judicial body
deliberately adopted a  position closer  to  the middle point,  it  could follow that  the body might
clearly state where it was in relation to the line. If the role-player had such a nuanced view, it was
likely to be noted.
As occurs throughout the thesis, the coded data will be structured around the rule of law principle
requiring consistency before the remaining Fullerian desiderata will be tested if applicable. Finally,
as  will  be  detailed  in  section  6.3,  liberalism  in  ICL revealed  a  tension  between  criminal  law
liberalism, favouring the rights of the accused, and human rights (HR) liberalism, favouring the
rights of the victims.50 Part A produced a few codes which also revealed this tension and thereby
linked up with liberalism, namely the policy-oriented approach, NCSL and interpretation. While the
two liberalisms consistently pervaded the part B and C codes, they are noted in part A where they
appeared. 
49 Bix, ‘On the Dividing Line’ (n 1) 1623.
50 D Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms of International Criminal Law’ in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds)
Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press 2010) 115-118. See also GP Fletcher and
JD Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’ (2005) 3 JICJ 540, 544.
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Chapter 2
Historical philosophical codes utilised in ICL jurisprudence: Just war theory,
cosmopolitanism and the policy-oriented approach
2.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on codes which embody doctrines historically tied to natural law and legal
positivism,  namely  just  war,  cosmopolitanism and  the  policy-oriented  approach.  Also,  since  it
explicitly  revealed  natural  law  and  legal  positivism,  self-reflexive  statements  of  international
criminal  law (ICL) role-players preface this  chapter.  Chapter  3 codes for natural law and legal
positivism through substantive ICL and principles of liability. Both chapters must be understood
against the preceding discussion on natural law and positivism. Because natural law and positivism
exist on a spectrum, the identification of these philosophies required extensive analysis, at times, for
part (ii) of systematic content analysis (SCA). It bears repeating that the data identified under part
(ii) of SCA is presented on the qualitative frameworks discussed in section 1.2.3.1 for patterns of
consistency.  Consistency  directly  engages  the  Fullerian  principle  requiring  laws  not  to  be
contradictory. This constitutes the backbone of the argument throughout this thesis. Depending on
the code and the amount of data identified, the thesis will consolidate these findings on consistency
per  role-player  or  per  time  period,  i.e.  post-WWII  or  post-Cold  War.  Evaluation  against  the
remaining  rule  of  law  principles,  if  applicable,  will  conclude  the  discussions  on  each  code.
Institutional legitimacy will be discussed in the study conclusion, since it can only be addressed
once all philosophical justifications have been identified and measured against the rule of law. 
 
2.2 Self-reflexive statements
In  a  few cases  ICL role-players  explicitly  conceded  their  allegiances  to  natural  law and  legal
positivism. These instances are coded here as ‘self-reflexive’ statements of philosophical category.
Per definition, this code could reveal other philosophies as well since it codes for arguments which
utilise philosophy expressly.1 Both references to philosophy by name or references to characteristic
elements of philosophies will  be noted.  The data  revealed by this  code serves as an additional
justification for the inclusion of natural law and legal positivism in this study. It reveals that ICL
role-players accepted these theories as separate and professed their allegiance to them explicitly.
Because  the  dataset  was  small,  the  post-WWII  International  Military  Tribunals  (IMTs)  will  be
discussed  together.  This  also  applies  to  the  post-Cold  War  judicial  bodies,  including  the
1 Another dataset also appears in chapter 4.
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International Criminal Court (ICC).
A small number of self-reflexive statements on natural law and legal positivism were evident from
the selected prosecutors at Tokyo. Chief prosecutor Keenan explicitly argued for the existence of
the ‘natural law of international law’.2 He based the foundation of international law on natural law,
seeing that the sense of right and wrong shared by all people and necessity served to stimulate
natural law and convert it into rules of law.3 For Keenan and Brown, even the Nuremberg Charter
was a  translation of  natural  law principles  into  positive law as  ‘law,  previously resting  on the
authority of reason alone was given legalistic shape and political and physical sanction’.4 While
positivism does not deny that natural law principles might be the basis for positive law, the overall
gist  of  Keenan  and  Brown’s  arguments  revealed  a  preference  for  natural  law.  Their  argument
suggested the primacy of natural law and the subsequent ‘reinforcement of that law by political,
military and sociological power’, as promulgation in the Charters of the IMTs was, was merely
advantageous for the ‘certainty, clarity and finality’ required by positivism.5 
Keenan and Brown continued that natural law was not only the progenitor of positive law, but also
served as a direct and parallel source of law. Thus, as international law was still primitive, ius and
lex were both to be considered as legal sources. Moreover, ius, which was ‘predetermined by norms
of moral, juridical and legal justice’, had to be discovered by judges relying on their discretion.6 The
relationship between natural law and positivism was further resolved in favour of the former when
they justified punishment on the grounds that the imbalance between good and evil can thus be
addressed. If good was not restored then justice would not ensue. Justice, moreover, followed when
judges conformed to the precepts of natural law or positive law which was in harmony with natural
law.7 These sentiments elevated natural law above positive law as a higher normative system. If this
approach is  not natural  law (which,  of course,  the role-players suggested through their  explicit
terminology)  the  most  charitable  interpretation  ought  to  be  a  Grotian  approach firmly  inclined
towards natural law. The Grotian approach, as indicated in the preface, relies on natural law and
posited, consensual sources of law in combination.8 
2 Transcript  of  Proceedings 4 June 1946, 405-406 (hereafter ‘Transcript’) invoked  Justice Cardozo, US Supreme
Court, and Lord Wright, Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes Commission. On Keenan as natural lawyer see
also K Sellars, ‘Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo’ (2011) 21 European Journal of International Law 1095.
3 Transcript 406-410. [References omitted.]
4 JB Keenan and BF Brown, Crimes against International Law (Public Affairs Press 1950) 43-45.
5 Ibid 45.
6 Ibid 56.
7 Ibid 18-19.
8 For the Grotian approach, see the preface to part A and H Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’
(1946) 23 British Year Book of International Law 21.
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For purposes of part (ii) of SCA, the possible reading of this data as inclusive legal positivism (ILP)
needs brief scrutiny. Hart had not yet introduced ILP to jurisprudence by this stage and, as such,
could conclude the matter on whether ILP was a possible finding. Yet, for argument’s sake, neither
Hartian  discretion nor  exclusive legal  positivism (ELP) is  engaged because the particular  role-
players never purported to work outside the law through their moral principles. It is possible to see
Keenan and Brown arguing for a Hartian rule of recognition (RoR) which deems natural law a
source of law, but whether this was true seems highly contested as none of the other role-players
appeared to accept this from an internal perspective.9 In sum, without unnecessarily fragmenting the
data through hypotheses,10 these self-reflexive arguments of Keenan and Brown will be coded as
Grotian natural law.
The inclination to natural law seems corroborated when Keenan and Brown upheld immutable and
eternal values as the foundation of the trial.11 Immutable principles are a crucial element of natural
law. One such an immutable right was that to self-preservation.12 This right was considered by
Keenan and Brown as an intrinsic right of the world society. Only natural law and the rule of reason
could curtail this right.13 
Alongside the preceding arguments, the reliance on religion seemed to explicitly confirm the natural
law leanings of the arguments. That a possibly theocentric natural law was intended was further
evidenced when Keenan and Brown vested both Nuremberg and Tokyo on ‘the Christian-Judaic
absolutes of good and evil’14 and Brown, presenting testimony to the Subcommittee on Genocide in
1950, explicitly recognised his allegiance to Scholastic natural law.15  
Few self-reflexive statements were coded from the defence at Nuremberg and Tokyo. The distrust
of self-interested law-making at Nuremberg, where Jahreiss argued that he was ‘only [dealing] with
the problems of law as it is at present valid, not with the problem of such law as could or should be
demanded  in  the  name  of  ethics  or  of  human  progress’,16 neatly  embodied  the  traditional
9 For the internal perspective, see HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961) 108-113.
10 C Romano, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle’ (1999) 31 International
Law and Politics 709 fn 1.
11 Keenan and Brown (n 4) vi.
12 E.g. T Hobbes, Leviathan (R Tuck tr, Cambridge University Press 2007) 91; T Aquinas, ‘Summa Theologiae’ in RW
Dyson (tr), Aquinas Political Writings (Cambridge University Press 2008) IaIIae 94.2.
13 Keenan and Brown (n 4) 31.
14 Ibid vii.
15 Ibid 162.
16 H  Jahreiss  in Trial  of  the  Major  War  Criminals  Before  the  International  Military  Tribunal,  Nuremberg,  Vol.
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separability thesis of positive law.17 It will therefore count as positivist.  At Tokyo,  Takanayagi’s
critique of natural law and equity as ‘a roguish thing, if not in civil justice, at least in that category
of criminal justice which is closely related to politics, national or international’,18 suggested some
hostility to natural law without conclusively ascribing to positivism. 
Coding  for  consistency  in  self-reflexive  statements  on  natural  law and  legal  positivism in  the
pronouncements of the selected post-WWII counsel, resulted in a small dataset. The fragmented
nature of the dataset makes findings on consistency for Fullerian rule of law difficult. The self-
reflexive  philosophies  utilised,  however,  served  a  consistent  function.  For  Keenan and Brown,
invoking natural law as the basis of positive law and, indeed, a parallel source of law, attempted to
keep the ICL endeavour vital and legitimate. The defence opposed this by adopting the separability
thesis  (Jahreiss)  and  opposing  natural  law  (Takanayagi).  Of  course,  functionally,  they  tried  to
undermine the arguments of the prosecution in order to provide the most robust defence against the
respective indictments.    
Self-reflexive statements on natural law and legal positivism appeared at Tokyo but no instances
were found in the Nuremberg judgment (and very little in the entirety of the post-Cold War judicial
bodies as will be seen below). From Tokyo the opinions of Judges Bernard, Webb, Röling and Pal
must be briefly discussed and compared for patterns.  
Bernard  explicitly  revealed  his  support  for  natural  law  which,  in  paradigmatic  fashion,  was
universal and superior to man-made laws:
‘I preferred the expression of natural or universal law to that of international law. The latter has been used
too often to define the whole of the rights and obligations of nations as a result either of custom, social
convention, treaties or agreements. This whole can or cannot conform to the law shared by all individuals
and all nations but does not identify itself with it. It is to this law that I have reserved the qualification of
“natural” and “universal”. It exists outside and above nations. If opinions differ as to its nature, its existence
is not seriously contested or contestable and the declaration of this existence is sufficient for our purpose’.19
While  ILP and ELP may also  accept  the  separate  existence  of  positive  law and  natural  law,20
Bernard’s express support for natural law would not sit comfortably with positivism. It is again
XVII:459.
17 J  Austin,  The  Province  of  Jurisprudence  Determined  (John  Murray  1832)  278;  J  Bentham,  A  Fragment  on
Government (Clarendon Press 1891) 98-99.
18 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 188 (hereafter ‘Transcript’).
19 Bernard Dissent 18.
20 Again for argument’s sake as this argument preceded Hart.
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possible that this approach which accepts natural law alongside positive law might be construed as
Grotian.21 This  approach  is  further  visible  where  Bernard  argued  for  a  universal  authority  as
necessary to create a Tribunal which could adjudge alleged violations of the universal order. In the
absence of such a universal authority, as was the case with Tokyo, the person clothed with ‘actual
power and moral authority’ might set up such a trial for the prosecution of persons suspected to
have contravened ‘natural and international law’.22 The existence of natural law alongside positive
law is reiterated in this argument, but, consistent with his argument quoted above, he explicitly
preferred  natural  law with its  designs  on universality.23 Bernard’s  self-reflexive  statements  thus
evidenced his preference for Grotian natural law (i.e. support for both natural law and positivism
yet favouring natural law).
Some colleagues criticised Webb’s reliance on natural law in draft materials and his final judgment
toned down on those submissions.24 Explicit reliance on natural law can, however, still be found in
his  final  judgment.  Illustratively,  he  argued  that  ‘[t]he  Charter,  in  providing  for  the  [trial  and
punishment of the crime against peace], does not violate International Law or the Natural Law, but
gives effect to it..’.25 Webb continued in a Grotian natural law vein by arguing that rules of justice
and general principles of law may be used to supplement international law as ‘rigid positivism is no
longer in accordance with International Law. The natural law of nations is equal in importance to
the positive or voluntary’.26 As argued above, regarding Keenan, Brown and Bernard’s acceptance
of natural law and man-made laws as parallel sources of law, a retrospective reading of ILP in these
cases  is  a  less  convincing  interpretation  than  a  Grotian  natural  law  one.  In  his  self-reflexive
statements, then, Webb, consistent with Bernard, revealed Grotian natural law.
No self-reflexive statements on natural law and legal positivism were found in the dissent of Röling,
but his extra-curial writings produced data. As will be seen in connection with other codes, Röling
adopted positivism at times as well, but here characteristic natural law arguments emerged, namely
support for a teleological consideration regarding the law as such (‘Humanity of today instinctively
turns to this natural law, for the function of law is to serve the well-being of man, whereas present
21 Lauterpacht (n 8) 21.
22 Bernard Dissent 1.
23 Reading Bernard’s argument as natural law is supported by N Boister and R Cryer, The Tokyo International Military
Tribunal: A Reappraisal (OUP 2008) 280-281. See also, ibid, footnote 63 (which evidences self-reflexive natural
law, but falls outside this study’s case selection as per section 1.2.1).
24 Boister and Cryer (n 23) 282.
25 Webb Opinion 6.
26 Webb Opinion 9 relied on Oppenheim.
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positive international law tends to its destruction’27); the natural law basis of the ICL trials and the
role  of  natural  law  in  guiding  the  ‘revolutionary’ change  in  positive  law.28 Under  this  code,
therefore, Röling will be noted for his natural law.
Finally, unlike his Tokyo colleagues, Pal expressly utilised positivism. Pal’s rejection of arguments
for the criminalisation of aggression based on the progressive nature of law, the laws of nature and
the widening sense of humanity resulted in the following argument: 
‘Indeed, “for many the term ‘natural law’ still has about it a ‘rich, deep odor of the witches’ cauldron, and the
mere mention of it suffices to unloose a torrent of emotions and fears”...We must not however forget that this
doctrine of  natural  law is  only to introduce a  fundamental  principle  of  law and right.  The fundamental
principle can weigh the justice of the intrinsic content of juridical propositions; but cannot affect their formal
quality  of  juridicity...I  doubt  if  its  claim that  its  doctrines  should  be  accepted  as  positive  law is  at  all
sustainable’.29
Pal similarly sided with the law-as-it-is as opposed to the law-as-it-ought-to-be when dealing with
whether a judge should favour the moral development of law or not: ‘the body called upon to apply
it should not force it to be what it is not, even at the risk of missing the most attractive opportunity
for contributing towards the development of a temptingly significant concept of international law’.30
These sentiments favour the  role of the judge as applier of a consistent body of rules above the
judge as adjuster of rules to the dynamic standards of societal justice.31 Both arguments conform to
the expositorial/censorial divide made by Bentham and Austin as the question regarding what the
law is was separated from an evaluation regarding what the law ought to be.32 This, of course, is the
traditional separability thesis of positivism. This argument would, however, not run foul of all forms
of  natural  law –  just  as  was  the  case  with  using  Hart  in  the  context  of  post-WWII  IMTs for
argument’s sake – Pal’s understanding of natural law’s role in legal validity might be congruous
with John Finnis’ theory.33 Of course, the better reading, bearing in mind the existing philosophical
positions of the time and the explicit philosophical labels he used, is that of traditional positivism as
Pal clearly adopts the separability thesis here rather than just making a claim regarding the tests for
legal validity.
27 BVA Röling, International Law in an Expanded World (Djambatan 1960) 2, 124. 
28 Ibid. See also Boister and Cryer (n 23) 284. On the use of natural law in a revolutionary versus reactive sense, see A
van Blerk, Jurisprudence an Introduction (Butterworths Lexisnexis 1998) 2-3.
29 Pal Dissent 131-134, 49-150. [Footnotes omitted.]
30 Ibid 146.
31 LV Prott, The Latent Power of Culture and the International Judge (Professional Books 1979) 4-5, 83 et seq.
32 Austin (n 17) 278; Bentham (n 17) 98-99.
33 J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980) 364-365; Van Blerk (n 28) 115.
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The Tokyo judges, unlike their Nuremberg brethren, extensively revealed philosophical category
through  self-reflexive  statements.  In  terms  of  this  code,  Bernard,  Webb  and  Röling  adopted  a
Grotian approach which favoured natural law more, while Pal utilised positivism. As will become
clearer  when  other  codes  are  analysed,  Röling  oscillated  between  natural  law  and  positivism,
whereas  Pal  adopted  several  philosophical  approaches.34 Indeed,  the  tu  quoque arguments  Pal
essentially raised in conjunction with his  TWAIL sentiments,  arguably venture into natural  law
territory.35 Yet, in terms of the self-reflexive code, both judges were consistent. In sum, there was
some philosophical tension in the consistency of philosophy on the inter-jurist dynamic regarding
the self-reflexive code at Tokyo but the preponderance of weight was on Grotian natural law.
Overall, the self-reflexive dataset at the post-WWII IMTs was small. The coded instances of the
selected prosecutors and defence counsel were fragmented but united by their respective functions
to prosecute or defend. The Tokyo judges, unlike their Nuremberg counterparts, explicitly stated
their philosophical assumptions. In terms of this code, for rule of law purposes, natural law (albeit
often in a Grotian context) was consistently preferred by judges above positive law. Self-reflexive
statements as code reached its zenith at Tokyo. The post-Cold War cases contributed very little data
to this code and are briefly considered next. 
Extra-curially, Cassese expressed his dissatisfaction with positivism and its neglect of the social
context  within which legal  institutions existed.  He considered whether ‘one ought not  to  move
beyond the strict legal parameters agreed upon by States, at least whenever the need to oppose
glaring injustice would oblige one to do so’.36 On such a view, principle, in this case justice, would
overrule state agreement, which is the traditional positivist basis of law in the international arena.
Cassese conceded that his writings on law reflected a fluctuation between the legal method and the
desire  to  consider  the  lex  ferenda,  bearing  in  mind  political,  social  and  economic  contexts.37
Cassese’s desire to consider both, what he labelled, positivism and the lex ferenda, is probably best
coded as a Grotian approach using both philosophies cumulatively.  The second case at the ICTY
occurred  when  Bonomy  conceded,  in  academic  writing,  that  his  aim  was  ‘to  ensure  that  the
34 For overall impressions (as opposed to the code-based approach here) of Pal as positivist, pan-Asian or the product
of his personal circumstances see E Kopelman, ‘Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at
the Tokyo War Crimes Trial’ (1991) 23  New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 375-376,
411-424. For a reading of Pal informed by TWAIL, Hinduism and tu quoque arguments see A Nandy, ‘The Other
Within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on Culpability’ (1992) 23 New Literary History 49-65.
35 Kopelman (n 34) 407; Nandy (n 34) 49, 65. For tu quoque as natural law defence, see H Grotius, De Iure Belli ac
Pacis Libri Tres (Francis Kelsey tr, Clarendon Press 1925) II.XX.III at 465-466.  See sections 2.3 and 5.3.
36 A Cassese, ‘Soliloqui’ in Heikelina Verrijn Stuart and Marlise Simons,  The Prosecutor and the Judge: Benjamin
Ferencz and Antonio Cassese: Interviews and Writings (Amsterdam University Press 2009) 146-147.
37 Ibid at 149.
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proceedings before me are conducted fairly. I rely on my years of experience...of such proceedings
and my instinctive recognition of what is fair’.38 On this view, fairness was procedural as he linked
‘fair’ with principles of due process, considerations of expediency and the rights of the accused.39
Reliance on an instinctive sense of ‘fairness’ seemingly moved beyond the confines of posited law.40
Finally,  a negligible dataset was derived from the ICC with only one instance of self-reflexive
statement coded. Van Den Wyngaert utilised a non-source based teleological argument premised on
the Court’s ‘universalist  mission’41 to oppose the majority’s earlier  reliance on specific national
legal doctrines. Both the overall teleological argument and the universalism here suggested natural
law.
Very few instances of self-reflexive statements thus emerged from the post-Cold War Tribunals and
the ICC. Moreover, these instances were mostly found in academic writing. Still they generally
favoured natural law which is consistent with the findings pertaining to the post-WWII judiciaries
above where Grotian natural law was favoured.
Coding for express statements of natural law and positivism resulted in a small dataset. As a code,
self-reflexive statements, by definition, complied with the first two requirements of Fuller’s rule of
law, i.e. created justifications which are public. The desideratum against retrospectivity was not
directly  engaged  by  this  code.  The  crucial  principles  for  this  code  were  those  pertaining  to
contradictory rules and stability of rules. The majority of the coded data across all the selected role-
players  appeared  to  favour  the  Grotian  approach  with  specific  natural  law focus.  Coding thus
suggested neither contradiction nor instability of rules in relation to self-reflexive statements. The
other Fullerian requirements did not come into play regarding this code. While, based on the above,
the use of express statements seemingly contributed to the predictable application of the law to
which individuals could adapt their conduct, the quantity of the dataset suggested that philosophical
categories  were often not  stated.  If  natural  law was the favourite  to  be preferred through self-
reflexive statements, it was possibly because it was not the norm. While positivism could only be
coded for if it was explicitly stated, ironically its absence from self-reflexive statements coupled
with the overall dearth of coded data may very well prove its position as the norm. It makes sense
38 I Bonomy, ‘The Reality of Conducting a War Crimes Trial’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 351.
39 Ibid. For a failed charge of bias on these considerations, see Prosecutor v Šainović et al (formerly Milutinović et al)
(Judgment) IT-05-87-A (23 January 2014) paras 176-186.
40 Compare J Hutcheson, ‘The Judgement Intuitive:  The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision’ (1929) 14
Cornell Law Quarterly 274.
41 Prosecutor  v  Mathieu  Ngudjolo  Chui (Judgment  pursuant  to  Article  74  of  the  Statute)  ICC-01/04-02/12  (18
December 2012) Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van Den Wyngaert para 5.
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that  especially  early  ICL jurisprudence  explicitly  argued  for  Grotian  natural  law as  it  tried  to
establish the new field of ICL and create a new legal paradigm by bringing the lex lata closer to lex
ferenda.  In  sum, based on the coded data,  self-reflexive statements  tended to favour  a  Grotian
natural law approach. 
2.3 Just war theory
Before  coding  for  consistency  of  philosophy  in  just  war  arguments,  the  code  will  be  briefly
explained and its historical link with natural law and positivism indicated.42 Just war thinking can be
divided  into  the  ius  ad  bellum and  the  ius  in  bello.43 The  ius  ad  bellum deals  with  questions
pertaining to the rightness of going to war whereas the ius in bello entails how one is to act during a
period of armed conflict.44 In its traditional natural law guise (prior to the fall of scholastic natural
law under Grotius), just war theory tended to conflate the ius in bello and the ius ad bellum so that
only the side with the right to go to war had rights in war.45 The moral and rational basis of this
approach was the maxim ex iniuria non oritur ius, no right arises from an injustice.46 
Just war thinking lost ground to  raison d’etat in the 18th and 19th centuries. During this stage the
state’s right to wage war was unlimited due to  realpolitik. However, the 20th century’s aggressive
wars led to a re-emergence of the just war theory. These later developments, which increasingly
relied on posited sources, moved for the separate application of the  ius ad bellum and the ius in
bello.47 After  the  universal  ratification  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949,  the  ius  in  bello
42 For a comprehensive account of the historical development of just war, see JT Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the
Limitation of War Religious and Secular Concepts 1200-1740 (Princeton University Press 1975); JT Johnson, Just
War  Tradtion  and the  Restraint  of  War  a  Moral  and Historical  Inquiry (Princeton  University  Press  1981);  A
Bellamy, Just Wars From Cicero to Iraq (Polity 2006) 15-114.
43 Although the Latin epithets are a rather recent terminological development. See, R Kolb,  ‘Origin of the twin terms
jus ad bellum/jus in bello’ (1997) 37 International Review of the Red Cross 553. A third modern addition is ius post
bellum, but that falls outside the remit of this chapter.
44 N Dower, The Ethics of War and Peace Cosmopolitan and Other Perspectives (Polity Press 2009) 82-83. See also J
Moussa, ‘Can jus ad bellum override jus in bello? Reaffirming the separation of the two bodies of law’ (2008) 90
International Review of the Red Cross  963-968; B Van Schaak, ‘“The Grass that Gets Trampled when Elephants
Fight”: Will the Codification of the Crime of Aggression Protect Women?’ (2010) 15 UCLA Journal of International
Law & Foreign Affairs 334;  Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia paras 30-31.
45 Boister and Cryer (n 23) 273. See also  Kopelman (n 34)  398;  Kolb (n 43)  554-555;  Moussa (n 44)  966.  For the
acceptance of just cause on both sides in older natural law literature, see A Gentili, De Iure Belli Libri Tres (JC Rolfe
tr, Clarendon Press 1933) 33; G Best, Humanity in Warfare The Modern History of the International Law of Armed
Conflicts  (Methuen & Co 1983) 39;  J  Pictet,  Development  and Principles  of  International  Humanitarian Law
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985) 23. See, for the equal application of the  ius in bello during civil wars, E de
Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations
and of Sovereigns (CG Fenwick tr, Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916) 338.
46 Moussa (n 44) 966.
47 See importantly the Charter of the League of Nations; Charter of the United Nations; Common Article 2 of the
universally  ratified Geneva Conventions of  1949 and the preamble to  Additional  Protocol  I  of  1977.  See also
Keenan and Brown (n 4) 66-69;  Kopelman (n 34)  398-399; Kolb (n 43)  556-558; Boister and Cryer (n 23) 273;
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provisions contained therein became binding on all states as a (posited) contractual obligation.48 By
rejecting reciprocity, this separation ensured compliance with the laws of war irrespective of which
party violated the peace originally.49 In contemporary international society,  the  ius ad bellum is
enshrined in the United Nations Charter which allows the exertion of force for purposes of self-
defence.50 It  has  been argued that  the  Charter  itself  perpetuates  the  distinction  between ‘good’
defensive and ‘bad’ aggressive wars in a posited source.51 
Indicia in ICL jurisprudence as to whether the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello were conflated or
separated and the reasons provided revealed whether  a  particular  philosophy was relied on for
purposes of identifying philosophy under part (ii) of SCA. Only natural law dealing with morality
and the normative aims of the law, on the one hand, and positivism generally reliant on the social or
separability theses, with their focus on posited sources and the non-conceptual link between law and
morality, on the other hand, appeared under this code. Natural law, if understood as requiring a
necessary link between law and morality, inevitably tended to evaluations of the justness of cause or
tu quoque.  Positivism tended to reject such analyses in favour of posited sources. It was in the
juxtaposition that the difference in argument appeared.
Just war often appeared at the post-WWII IMTs due to their jurisdiction over crimes against the
peace.  This discussion focuses on the selected counsel  arguments on this  charge before briefly
considering the IMTs’ response thereto. Thereafter, the just war arguments pertaining to the murder
charges at Tokyo will be considered as they appeared from counsel and judiciary. It is only once the
philosophies used in conjunction with just war per role-player have been identified as required by
part  (ii)  of  SCA,  that  the  data  will  be  measured  against  the  rule  of  law standard  (albeit  with
consistency still structuring the data).
At Nuremberg, US prosecutor Jackson ascribed the pre-WWI development of impunity for inciting
and waging wars of aggression to the conflation of just war theory and raison d’etat.52 Traditional
just war thinking shielded the side with just cause from prosecutions for violations in bello whereas
Moussa (n 44) 967 as well as R Cryer, ‘The Philosophy of International Criminal Law’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili
(ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 253 which refers to
US v List (1948) 15 Annual Digest 632 as a positivist source which supports the equality of belligerents. 
48 Van Schaak (n 44) 366-367.
49 Ibid.
50 Charter of the United Nations art. 2(4) and 51. See also the Final Report (n 44) para 30. 
51 T Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ (1988) 82  American Journal of  International Law 720. See
comparably regarding the Covenant of the League of Nations, H Shawcross in  Trial of the Major War Criminals
Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. III:97. 
52 R Jackson in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. II:145. 
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the  raison d’etat of the 18th and 19th centuries accepted war as a legitimate activity for states to
undertake and thus precluded adjudication upon its legitimacy. Jackson’s asserted dismay can be
seen as a dissatisfaction with the cumulative effect of these rationales. This culminated in WWI
according to Jackson. Thereafter, ‘earthy common sense’ and ‘ethical principles’ led to a desire that
the requirements of the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello be considered cumulatively: 
‘Plain people with their earthy common sense, revolted at such fictions and legalisms so contrary to ethical
principles and demanded checks on war immunities...The common sense of men after [WWI] demanded,
however, that the law’s condemnation of war reach deeper, and that the law condemn not merely uncivilized
ways of waging war, but also the waging in any way of uncivilized wars – wars of aggression’.53
This  natural  law impetus,  focused on civilisation,  reason and morality,  Jackson interwove with
posited  sources  of  the  (renewed)  development  of  the  criminality  of  wars  of  aggression.54 The
combination of natural law and positivism revealed a Grotian approach. Jackson proceeded along
the just war route and proclaimed that:
‘Any resort to war – to any kind of a war – is a resort to means that are inherently criminal. War inevitably is
a course of killings, assaults, deprivations of liberty, and destruction of property. An honestly defensive war
is,  of course, legal and saves those lawfully conducting it  from criminality. But inherently criminal acts
cannot be defended by showing that those who committed them were engaged in a war, when war itself is
illegal. The very minimum legal consequence of the treaties making aggressive wars illegal is to strip those
who incite or wage them of every defense the law ever gave, and to leave war-makers subject to judgment by
the usually accepted principles of the law of crimes’.55
Jackson’s task was to loosen the hold realpolitik held over just war theory, yet not to resort to the
just war theory in its conflated natural law guise as that would lead to cases where the ius in bello
might  not  be  justiciable.  Effectively,  Jackson  emphasised  the  ius  ad  bellum  and ius  in  bello
independently in order to justify the most complete set of rules against impunity. In the process, he
relied on posited and natural law sources characteristic of a Grotian approach and coded here thus.56
The British Prosecutor, Shawcross continued in traditional ex iniuria non ius oritur vein to subject
the ius in bello to ius ad bellum: 
‘The killing of combatants in war is justifiable, both in international and in municipal law, only where the
war itself is legal. But where a war is illegal, as a war started not only in breach of the Pact of Paris but
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid 145-146. See comparably R Jackson, ‘Address at the First Conference of the Inter-American Bar Association’
(Havanna, Cuba on 27 March 1941) 4-5, 12-16 where he rejected the notion that all wars are legal based on a mixed
Grotian argument. See also T Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (Skyhorse 2013) 44.
55 Jackson (n 52) 146-147.
56 Lauterpacht (n 8) 21. For Jackson’s collaboration with Lauterpacht see Sellars (n 2) 1087.
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without any sort of warning or declaration clearly is, there is nothing to justify the killing, and these murders
are not to be distinguished from those of any other lawless robber bands’.57 
 
The French Prosecutor, De Menthon, similarly argued that ‘all acts committed as a consequence of
this aggression...will cease to have the juridical character of acts of war’.58 Wartime actions would
therefore only be legitimate if the war was itself lawful. For him, a ‘war perpetrated in violation of
international law no longer really possesses the juridical character of a war, it is truly an act of
gangsterism,  a  systematically  criminal  undertaking’.59 Both  Shawcross  and  De  Menthon  thus
adopted the conflated natural law understanding of just war, premising the ius in bello on just cause
ad bellum.
The defence at Nuremberg, per Jahreiss, countered, as could be expected, in strict positivist fashion,
that no general statute was established prior to 1 September 1939 that could determine which wars
were forbidden and which wars countenanced by law. The war itself ‘swept away all diplomatic and
juridical artifices with supreme indifference’.60 Jahreiss moreover, reliant on soft law, subscribed to
the position that the laws of war apply equally to both belligerents regardless of the war’s origins. 61
Jahreiss thus opposed the ex iniuria non ius oritur maxim by noting the lack of posited support for
prosecution of violations ad bellum and enumerating quasi-legal support for prosecuting violations
in bello. Coding thus revealed a positivist argument here.
At  Tokyo,  Keenan  and  Brown,  in  academic  writing,  reflected  approvingly  on  the  separation
between just  and unjust  wars  as  necessary  for  the  harmonious functioning of  the  international
community.62 For them unjust wars were  mala in se and so contrary to natural law. This close
correlation between law and morality is, of course, central to natural law. However, aware that the
crystallisation of this principle in posited sources would give it added legal meaning, they pointed,
like their Nuremberg counterparts, to various treaties and resolutions as expressly and implicitly
recognising the criminality of aggressive war.63 The reliance on posited sources could not escape a
broad interpretation to submit that the very nature of the activity outlawed by the Kellogg-Briand
Pact  pointed  to  criminality,  that  the  phrase ‘condemn recourse  to  war’ should be  construed as
57 H Shawcross in  Trial  of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal ,  Nuremberg, Vol.
XIX:458. Sellars (n 2) 1087 discusses the collaboration between Shawcross and Lauterpacht as well.
58 F de Menthon in  Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol.
V:387.
59 Ibid.
60 Jahreiss (n 16) 467.
61 Ibid 472-473.
62 Keenan and Brown (n 4) 66-71.
63 Ibid 77-79 and sources cited therein. Kopelman (n 34) 397 confirmed the dual argument adopted.
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criminal  illegality  and that,  in  spite  of  the use of understatement  in  the text  of the Pact,  ‘it  is
unthinkable that the Signatories were not assuming, as a matter of course, that aggressive war was a
crime’.64 They recognised that they were deviating from a literal interpretation of the treaty and
justified this on the basis that ethical control allowed just interpretations in certain areas of law. 65
Although posited sources were thus invoked, this was to supplement moral considerations and the
reading afforded to them relied on morality and reason. While this reliance on morality strongly
suggested natural law, the reliance on posited sources alongside morality means that coding the
approach as Grotian with an inclination towards natural law is more accurate. 
Coding for consistency in just war arguments amongst the selected IMT counsel pertaining to the
crimes against peace revealed that the prosecutors (with the exception of Jackson) tended towards
the conflated natural law argument, albeit with a Grotian approach tempering Keenan and Brown
(as  it  did  under  the  self-reflexive  code),  while  defence  counsel  adopted  positivism.  For  the
prosecution, the need to support the criminalisation of aggression beyond the few unconvincing
codifications of the time necessitated a more functional reliance on natural law which narrowed the
gap between lex lata and lex ferenda. When defence counsel Jahreiss’ argument is compared to the
prosecutors, their difference becomes apparent – the overall argument of the prosecutors exceeded
positivism. Jahreiss’ position was also functional as it provided the strongest argument in favour of
the  accused,  i.e.  that  the  ius  ad  bellum charges  were  baseless.  Having identified  the  trends  in
counsel  arguments,  the  effect  on  the  other  Fullerian  requirements  will  be  considered  after
considering the data from the respective IMTs as well.
In response to these arguments, the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs comparably circumvented the just
war theory in relation to aggression and invoked posited sources. Both majorities relied on their
respective Charters which established criminal jurisdiction over crimes against the peace.66 Both
proceeded, however, to read pre-IMT sources in a manner where reason dictated the constructed
meanings.67 Although  this  engages  the  codes  of  crimes  and  interpretation  in  chapter  3,  it  is
addressed here to resolve the just war narrative at the IMTs. Accordingly, the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
which solemnly condemned war as an instrument of national policy, was constructed to necessarily
64 Keenan and Brown (n 4) 79-80.
65 Ibid 81. See also Kopelman (n 34) 397.
66 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:173-
174, 218-219; Tokyo IMT Majority Judgment 25-26.
67 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:219-
221. Tokyo IMT Majority Judgment 25-26; Boister and Cryer (n 23) 120-121. See also Kopelman (n 34) 392-393.
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imply  that  war  was  illegal  and those  who plan  and  wage  it  were  perpetrating  a  crime  in  the
process.68 This  extrapolation  from condemnation  to  illegality  and  from illegality  to  criminality
revealed an interpretation which would be unacceptable to strict  positivism. There is simply no
posited, Hartian or ELP discretionary or RoR direction to such an interpretation. The Nuremberg
IMT continued with this expansive argument based on reason when it argued that it is just to punish
those who attack neighbouring countries in violation of treaties and assurances because ‘the attacker
must know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust
if his wrong were allowed to go unpunished’.69 Similar logic thus held sway regarding the finding of
illegality of aggressive war in Tokyo as compared to Nuremberg, i.e. an expansive reading of a
posited source. There was inter-curial consistency here regarding philosophical position adopted.
Perhaps this consistency was expected bearing in mind how seminal the Nuremberg judgment was
for the Tokyo IMT and the judicial technique of relying on previous authority.70 However, as this
was pursued through interpretation, the Nuremberg and Tokyo majority pronouncements will not be
added to the just war code. 
The just  war  code appeared in  the individual  opinions  at  Tokyo.  Thus,  Röling  denied that  the
posited sources cited by Nuremberg and the Tokyo majority proved the existence of the crimes
against  the  peace  charge.71 While  the  crimes  were  thus  not  criminalised  per  se,  the  right  of
preventative detention, according to him, accrued to the powers victorious in a ‘bellum iustum’.72
Whether this argument meant to include the just war theory, in any form, is questionable as Röling’s
submission  that  the  ‘conception  of  “bellum  justum”  according  to  natural  law,  if  it  has  ever
amounted to anything more than a mere desideratum, was certainly not a valid part of positive
international law in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century’, suggested.73 The ius ad bellum
of conflated just war, for him, was a ‘fatal doctrine’ in contemporary international society since
every war could become global and greatly destructive.74 Although the judge’s use of just war was
slightly ambiguous,  his  argument opposed the conflated natural law just  war and rather looked
towards whether the impugned conduct was of such a nature to threaten the existing order in which
case preventative detention would be allowed. Added to this was his rejection of the posited basis of
68 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:220.
69 Ibid 219. For the approval of the Tokyo IMT on this point, see Tokyo IMT Majority Judgment 25-26.
70 GA Res 95(I) of 1946 also ensured this reliance.
71 Röling Dissent 26-32. See also Boister and Cryer (n 23) 132, 283.
72 Röling Dissent 46. See also R Cryer, ‘Röling in Tokyo A Dignified Dissenter’ (2010) 8 JICJ 1115-1116.
73 Quoted in Boister and Cryer (n 23) 284.
74 BVA Röling, ‘Introduction’ in C Hosoya, N Ando, Y Onuma and R Minear (eds), The Tokyo War Crimes Trial An
International Symposium (Kodansha Ltd 1986) 23-24;  BVA Röling, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond Reflections of a
Peacemonger (Antonio Cassese ed, Polity Press 1993) 57.
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the crimes against the peace. In sum, Röling’s argument is coded as positivist.
Finally, Pal concluded that until 1914 no war was generally deemed to be an international crime
although a distinction between just and unjust wars was made sometimes. He rejected these epithets
as the products of philosophers which never produced any tangible results in international legal
practice.75 For Pal, the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not materially alter this position. The right to wage
war was still a prerogative of states although the laws applicable in war had to be applied fully and
equally. According to Pal, the conflated just war approach seemingly led to the dangerous result that
the victim of an unjust war could rightfully take recourse to means that were unlimited, including
nuclear weapons.76 Despite this lip-service to positivism, Pal built much of his argument around
how Japan’s conduct was defensive as opposed to aggressive, thereby implicitly using natural law
just war theory.77 This means that coding revealed an incongruity between the philosophies used by
Pal regarding just war. Possibly the divide is explained as positivist on the theory adopted and
natural law in the application.
At  Tokyo,  the  just  war  code  also  appeared  in  conjunction  with  the  murder  charges.  The
prosecution’s philosophical basis for these charges was simply that ‘killings in unlawful wars were,
by virtue of the war’s illegality,  murder’.78 That the traditional natural law just  war theory was
intended by the prosecution was confirmed by subsequent academic writings.79 Because, on this
view,  the  Japanese  cause  was  unjust,  liability  for  murder  could  follow.80 The  defence,  per
Takanayagi, argued that the rules of war protect both belligerents regardless of the justness of the
commencement of the war.81 For Takanayagi, ‘lawful’ belligerency could only excuse murder if the
absolute concurrence of all  nations to this  rule existed.  As murder differed from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, such consensus did not exist.82 
Again,  as  with  the  grounding  of  the  crime  of  aggression  charge,  the  selected  prosecutors  and
defence counsel here adopted natural law and positivism as binary opposites. The parties were thus
far consistent with their own earlier philosophical strategies pertaining to the charge of aggression.
75 Pal Dissent 70, 151-152. See, for a similar point, Kopelman (n 34) 410-411; Taylor (n 54).
76 Pal Dissent 1038, 1091. See also Kopelman (n 34) 401.
77 See for example, Pal Dissent 557-558. See also Sellars (n 2) 1096.
78 Boister and Cryer (n 23) 154. See also Tokyo Majority Judgment 34-36; Transcript 425-429; Keenan and Brown (n
4) 64, 119 as well as Pal Dissent 1030. See also Cryer (n 72) 1117-1119.
79 Keenan and Brown (n 4) v, 119.
80 Boister and Cryer (n 23) 157.
81 Transcript 42 197.
82 Ibid 42 252-42 254.
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Again the binary philosophical arguments suggested functionality directing the arguments in order
to bolster or oppose the murder charge.
The IMT majority circumvented this issue ‘as [the murder charges] were seen as cumulative to the
crimes  against  peace charges’.83 The  dissents  of  Jaranilla,  Röling  and Pal  addressed the  matter
directly  and,  in  the  process,  revealed  philosophical  positions  on  the  inter-jurist  level.  Jaranilla
critiqued the finding of the majority on the basis that it vested the viability of murder charges on the
condition of an unlawful war.84 Although his dissent misconstrued the majority’s standpoint (as they
did not accept the legality of the war as a defence85), Jaranilla rejected the traditional just war theory
in favour of the absolute nature of the ius in bello due to fears of escalation if just cause allowed
impunity. The justification for his position was found in reason rather than in posited authority
thereby  constituting  natural  law for  coding.86 Röling  and  Pal  both  invoked  the  posited  Hague
Regulations to argue that every war, irrespective of its legality, was regulated by the ius in bello.87
For Röling basing the  ius in bello on  ius ad bellum ‘would be a negation of the recognition of
war...since in every war in the future belligerents will claim that the enemy is waging an unjust or
illegal war [thereby resulting] in disregard of the rules of warfare’88 and for Pal the whole ‘invading
army would be guilty of murder and the victors in such a war will return to their primitive rights of
total destruction of the vanquished’.89 These arguments opposed the conflated natural law approach
and relied on posited sources, rendering them positivist. These arguments were consistent with their
arguments regarding aggression.
While the majority thus circumvented just war considerations pertaining to the murder charges,
Jaranilla, Röling and Pal disapproved of the ex iniuria non ius oritur just war position. For them the
ius in bello had to be complied with irrespective of the  ius ad bellum. Röling and Pal relied on
posited sources while Jaranilla utilised a moral argument. All three judges favoured the universal
application of the ius in bello due to the realist concern of criminal escalation on the part of those
combatants considered to act without ius ad bellum. 
83 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst,  An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (3rd edn,
CUP 2014) 121 fn 54. See also Tokyo Majority Judgment 36.
84 Jaranilla Dissent 10.
85 Boister and Cryer (n 23) 166-167.
86 Jaranilla Dissent 10 argued that such a theory would ‘shock mankind everywhere and at any time’ which, as far as
justifications go, seems based on natural law.
87 Röling, noted in Boister and Cryer (n 23) 168 footnote 95, invoked academic authority, among which Oppenheim’s
International Law (edited by Lauterpacht) and Alfred Verdross. See Pal Dissent 15, 1030-1038.
88 Quoted, with approval, in Boister and Cryer (n 23) 169.
89 Pal Dissent 1038.
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Prior to discussing the post-Cold War Tribunals and ICC, the post-WWII arguments will be briefly
measured against the rule of law. Just war as code at the post-WWII IMTs mainly emerged from
counsel. The selected prosecutors consistently invoked natural law albeit tempered in a few cases
within  a  Grotian  context  whereas  defence  counsel  took recourse  to  positivism.  The arguments
relative  to  the  role-players  were  thus  not  contradictory  as  required  by  Fullerian  rule  of  law.
Literature has comprehensively proven that aggression was not yet a crime at this time and that the
prosecution  created  a  retrospective  crime.90 Recourse  thus  appeared  to  be  taken  to  these
philosophical arguments in part to address the retrospective desideratum of Fuller’s rule of law.
Since they were essentially  establishing a new field,  arguments in  excess of  lex  lata would be
functionally  inescapable.  The  IMTs  largely  circumvented  these  just  war  arguments  through  a
flexible interpretation of posited sources (which is philosophically relevant under the interpretation
code).  In several dissents at Tokyo, however, positivism was consistently used to undermine the
aggression charge’s basis and to reject the  ex iniuria non ius oritur arguments of the prosecution
regarding  the  murder  charges.  Consistent  and  stable  data  ensured  compliance  with  Fuller’s
requirements and engendered the foreseeable and predictable application of law on this code at
Tokyo. 
Arguably, as a result of international politics and the universal support for the Geneva Conventions,
most  of the post-Cold War Tribunals’ Statutes  focused solely on violations  of the  ius  in  bello.
Despite this lack of jurisdiction over aggression, a significant dataset pertaining to just war emerged
from the ICTY. While a small dataset emerged from the ICTR, only one dictum was found at the
ICC which confirmed the importance of both  ius in bello and  ius ad bellum  based on the Rome
Statute.91 This section focuses on intra-curial consistency at the ICTY.
Despite the ICTY’s lack of jurisdiction over the ius ad bellum, just war considerations appeared in
the Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing
Campaign against  the  Federal  Republic  of  Yugoslavia.  The Report  provided guidelines  for  the
prosecutorial strategy into the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999 and contained
detailed reasoning on its findings.92 Although not strictly within the ambit of the selected cases,93 it
will be briefly considered. 
90 Boister and Cryer (n 23) 136-137.
91 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial
Chamber III’s  “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Concurring
Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji paras 245, 253, 341-344.
92 See generally Moussa (n 44) 985-986.
93 See section 1.2.1.
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Firstly, the Report was the result of just war concerns. The argument was that because NATO’s
resort to force was unlawful, i.e. was not undertaken in self-defence or with the authorisation of the
Security  Council,  all  the  consequent  military  actions  undertaken  by NATO were  also  illegal.94
Secondly, even though the committee did not investigate the ‘fundamental legality of the use of
force by NATO members against the FRY’ because crimes against the peace fall outside the ICTY’s
jurisdiction, the committee did venture a few  obiter comments on just war theory.95 The Report,
reminiscent of the Tokyo dissents, rejected the  ex iniuria non ius oritur argument that ‘the “bad”
side had to comply with the law while the “good” side could violate it at will’. 96 Although the
Report  refrained  from  pronouncing  on  the  ius  ad  bellum regarding  the  NATO  campaign,  it
concluded, in passing, that premising rights  in bello on rights  ad bellum would have an adverse
impact on attempts to alleviate human suffering.97 The Report therefore dovetailed the post-Geneva
Conventions and Additional Protocol international community wherein  ius in bello commitments
are absolute. 
Coding for consistency of philosophy regarding just war in ICTY, and to a lesser extent ICTR,
jurisprudence resulted in a large dataset given their noted lack of jurisdiction over the ius ad bellum.
The arguments generally appeared in relation to tu quoque arguments, which attempted, in a natural
law fashion already known to Grotius, to sidestep responsibility because of equal wrongdoing on
the side of the opponent.98 Against this context, recourse to posited sources without running foul of
the separability thesis proved decisive in the identification of philosophical category.
Already  in  the  Rule  61  Martić decision,  the  principle  of  distinction  was  recognised  as  non-
reciprocal thus excluding traditional just war arguments. The TC supported its position, through
posited authority, by reflecting on the unilateral commitment in article 1 of the Geneva Conventions
to respect and ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances.99 Likewise, in Kupreškić, the
ICTY relied on posited sources to confirm the absolute nature of the ius in bello.100 The defence of
tu quoque was rejected as the duties under IHL were obligations erga omnes.101 For the TC, the tu
94 Final Report (n 44) paras 2, 30.
95 Ibid paras 4, 32-33.
96 Ibid para 32.
97 Ibid para 32.  Commentators like  Moussa (n 44)  985-986 view this as implicitly rejecting the criticism that  the
unauthorised use of force by NATO was illegal.
98 See Grotius (n 35) II.XX.III at 465-466. 
99 Prosecutor v Martić (Decision) IT-95-11-R61 (8 March 1996) para 15.
100 Prosecutor  v  Kupreškić (Judgment)  IT-95-16-T (14  January  2000) paras  516-517  referring  to  the  Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the US v von Leeb case.
101 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) paras 23, 515-517, 765. Prosecutor v Stanišić and
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quoque argument was fundamentally incorrect. It was premised upon IHL as ‘based upon a narrow
bilateral  exchange of rights and obligations’.102 The TC stressed the ‘irrelevance of reciprocity,
particularly in relation to obligations found within [IHL] which have an absolute and non-derogable
character’.103 In sum, for the TC the central principle of IHL was the duty ‘to uphold key tenets of
this  body  of  law regardless  of  the  conduct  of  enemy  combatants’.104 The  TC  emphasised  the
universal nature of the obligations imposed by the ius in bello as a translation of Kant’s categorical
imperative that ‘one ought to fulfill an obligation regardless of whether others comply with it or
disregard it’ into legal norms.105 Although this reference to Kant was likely a rhetorical flourish, it
added support to the Tribunal’s implied finding that compliance with the  ius ad bellum was not
required for duties pertaining to the ius in bello to arise. The duty to comply with the ius in bello
was independent from the duties and rights of others. 
In turn,  this line of argumentation was followed in  Kunarac,106 Vasiljević,107 Simić,108 Blaškić,109
Brđanin,110 Limaj,111 (implicitly in)  Krajišnik,112 Dragomir Milošević,113 Martić114 and  Prlić.115 All
explicitly repeated the reasoning of earlier cases. The Kordić and Čerkez TC dealt with the Bosnian-
Croats’ plea  that  their  belligerent  actions  constituted  actions  of  self-defence  against  Bosnian-
Muslim aggression.116 This plea has been construed to invoke ius ad bellum as  justification for
actions  performed in  bello.  The TC, however,  dealt  with the plea of self-defence as a criminal
defence, questioning whether the defence was valid in the particular case under scrutiny as opposed
to  whether  the  entire  war  was  amenable  to  a  description  of  ‘defensive’ (which  would  have
constituted a just war analysis).117 The TC concluded, however, after considering its own Statute and
Župljanin (Judgment Volume 1 of 3) IT-08-91-T (27 March 2013) para 16; Prosecutor v Mladić (Judgment) IT-09-
92-T (22 November 2017) paras 14, 4198 also rejected tu quoque.
102 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 517.
103 Ibid para 511.
104 Ibid para 511. This was also approved of in Prosecutor v Limaj et al. (Judgment) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005)
para 193.
105 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 518.
106 Prosecutor v  Kunarac,  Kovać and Vuković  (Judgment)  IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) para 580; Prosecutor  v
Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002) paras 87-88.
107 Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) para 31.
108 Prosecutor v Simić, Tadić and Zarić (Judgments) IT-95-9-T (17 October 2003) para 40.
109 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004) para 427.
110 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 131.
111 Prosecutor v Limaj et al. (Judgment) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) para 193.
112 Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006) para 294.
113 Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošević (Judgment) IT-98-29/1-T (12 December 2007) paras 798, 906, 917 refer to Article
49 of Additional Protocol I; Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošević (Judgment) IT-98-29/1-A (12 November 2009) paras
69, 250.
114 Prosecutor v Martić (Judgment) IT-95-11-A (8 October 2008) paras 90, 111, 268-270. 
115 Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment Volume 1 of 6) IT-04-74-T (29 May 2013) para 279.
116 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) ICTY-95-14/2-T (26 February 2001) para 448.
117 Moussa (n 44)  986 as well as  Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez  (Judgment) ICTY-95-14/2-T (26 February 2001)
paras 449-452.
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the Rome Statute of 1998, that ‘military operations in self-defence do not provide a justification for
serious  violations  of  [IHL]’.118 The  Boškoski  and  Tarčulovski AC also  approved  this  argument
emphasising the  ius in bello.119 The AC relied on posited case law and treaties, to find the  ius in
bello absolute even in a case of possible self-defence against insurgents.120 The separation between
ius ad bellum and ius in bello was thus consistently, albeit not always, proven by posited sources.121
At the ICTR the Gacumbitsi TC, reliant on Kupreškić, also rejected the tu quoque argument.122 At
the very least these judgments rejected the (natural law)  ex iniuria non ius oritur and  tu quoque
maxims. In most cases reliance was placed on posited sources with no linkage of law to morality.
Bearing in mind that reliance on posited sources is neither necessary nor sufficient for natural law
(but could be for positivism), the data suggested consistent positivism and is coded accordingly. 
Although the ICTY does not have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, it has still, as is evident
from the preceding discussion, been confronted by just war arguments and has revealed a very
consistent philosophical stance in the process. In keeping with its Statute, Geneva Conventions and
Additional  Protocols  heritage,  the  Tribunal  tended  to  focus  on  violations  of  the  ius  in  bello
regardless  of  an  accused’s  rights  ad bellum.  The  position  adopted,  as  argued,  was consistently
positivist and, moreover, consistently held throughout Tribunal jurisprudence in arguments ranging
from prosecutorial strategy, the substantive violations of the ius in bello to defences (including self-
defence and tu quoque arguments). While natural law need not deny reference to posited sources,
there was a constant refrain from necessarily linking law to morality and negation of historical
natural law maxims.
In passing, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) will be briefly considered.123 The SCSL also
does not have jurisdiction over aggression. Yet a more traditional understanding of the just war
118 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) ICTY-95-14/2-T (26 February 2001) para 452, 827. See, similarly for
the prosecutor’s position, C Del Ponte, Confrontation with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity
(Other Press 2008) 246.
119 Prosecutor v Boškoski and Tarčulovski (Judgment) IT-04-82-A (19 May 2010) para 44. This was supported by
Prosecutor v Đorđević (Public Judgment) IT-05-87/1-T (23 February 2011) para 2053; Prosecutor v Šainović et al
(formerly Milutinović et al) (Judgment) IT-05-87-A (23 January 2014) para 1662.
120 Prosecutor v Boškoski and Tarčulovski (Judgment) IT-04-82-A (19 May 2010) paras 5, 26-51 and the sources cited
in footnote 116. 
121 In some cases, no supporting authority was adduced, see Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003)
para 823; Prosecutor v Galić (Judgment) IT-98-29-T (5 December 2003) paras 145, 765; Prosecutor v Kordić and
Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) paras 812, 1082; Prosecutor v Nshogoza (Judgment) ICTR-
07-91-T (7 July 2009) para 177; Prosecutor v Nshogoza (Judgment) ICTR-2007-91-A (15 March 2010) para 57. See
also  Prosecutor v Gotovina et al (Judgment Volume 1 of 2) IT-06-90-T (15 April 2011) para 13;  Prosecutor v
Mladić (Judgment) IT-09-92-T (22 November 2017) para 14.
122 Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Judgment) ICTR-2001-64-T (17 June 2004) para 165.
123 See section 1.2.1.
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doctrine emerged from Fofana and Kondewa. In a separate opinion Judge Thompson premised his
acceptance of a natural law just cause (thereby exonerating the combatants from violations in bello)
on the fact that a fight ‘for the restoration of democracy and constitutional legitimacy could be
rightly  perceived  as  an  act  of  both  patriotism  and  altruism,  overwhelmingly  compelling
disobedience to a supranational regime of proscriptive norms’.124 The majority, however, rejected
the defence of necessity, which in the court’s view would have enabled pleas of just cause or just
war, in connection with the charged crimes.125 Still,  the notion that the accused engaged in the
armed conflict to  protect the democratically elected government from the rebels endured and was
accepted by the majority in mitigation of sentencing.126 On appeal, just cause also found favour with
Judge Gelaga King. Although denying that he was engaging in just war considerations, he clearly
accepted that the Government forces had a just cause for which to engage the enemy. This led to an
emphasis on the justness of the one party to the conflict’s cause and the injustice of the other side,
i.e. an understanding of the hostilities as being between good and evil.127  However, the majority
quashed this natural law sentiment by maintaining that: 
‘[IHL]  specifically  removes  a  party’s  political  motive  and  the  “justness”  of  a  party’s  cause  from
consideration. The basic distinction and historical separation between jus ad bellum and jus in bello underlies
the desire of States to see that the protections afforded by jus in bello...are “fully applied in all circumstances
to all persons...”’.128
The natural law just war considerations regarding the justness of cause was clearly rejected by the
majority’s  quoted  reliance  on Additional  Protocol  I  for  the  posited equality  of  treatment  of  all
parties  to  an  armed  conflict.  While  the  post-Cold  War  Tribunals  consistently  emphasised  the
absolute nature of the ius in bello, this case shows how support for the conflated just war approach
has endured.  
When ICL judicial bodies were established to adjudicate upon violations ad bellum and/or in bello,
just war reappeared as a construct to explain the relationship between the ius ad bellum and ius in
bello. As a theoretical construct it could potentially add moral weight to arguments and justify the
criminality of aggression despite the dearth of positive law of the time. As a preliminary to its
124 Prosecutor v  Fofana and Kondewa  (Judgment) SCSL-04-14 (2 August 2007) Separate Concurring and Partially
Dissenting Opinion of Hon. Justice Bankole Thompson Filed Pursuant to Article 18 of the Statute para 90.
125 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa (Sentencing) SCSL-04-14 (9 October 2007) para 79.
126 Ibid paras 80-91.
127 Prosecutor v Fofana and Kondewa (Judgment) SCSL-04-14 (28 May 2008) Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge
George Gelaga King, paras 26-31, 90-94. See Cryer (n 47) 252-253.
128 Prosecutor  v  Fofana and Kondewa  (Judgment)  SCSL-04-14 (28  May  2008)  para  530.  The  quote  is  from the
preamble of Additional Protocol I.
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comparison  with  Fuller’s  rule  of  law,  a  brief  consolidation  of  the  trends  identified  in  the
philosophies  used  around  this  code  is  necessary.  In  the  process,  Fuller’s  principle  of  non-
contradictory law will be addressed.129
This code resulted in a large dataset. The selected post-WWII prosecutors slightly favoured the
more traditional conflated natural law form of the theory to justify proceedings against aggression
above  a  Grotian  approach  thereto.  But  hereafter  coding  only  revealed  isolated  support  for  the
conflated natural law version in the separate opinions of two judges at the SCSL. The selected IMT
defence counsel opposed natural law through positivism. The IMTs addressed the just war argument
by ignoring it and deciding the issues at hand through flexible interpretation of treaties. Just war
only appeared in three Tokyo dissents in conjunction with the murder charges. The approach of two
were to  reject  ex iniuria non ius oritur and favour posited sources  while  Jaranilla  rejected the
maxim on the shock its implementation would cause to human consciousness. The ICTY, and to a
much lesser extent, the ICTR, consistently relied on posited sources to separate the ius ad bellum
and the ius in bello. 
As  code,  the  philosophies  used  pertaining  to  just  war  theory,  conformed  to  the  Fullerian
requirements of being created and being public. While the prosecution/defence debate at the post-
WWII IMTs suggested that a conflated natural law just war argument would result in law that fell
foul of Fuller’s prohibition against retrospective law, the IMTs’ response resorted under another
code (i.e. interpretation). Retrospectivity did not appear in the context of just war at the post-Cold
War judiciaries. Apart from the post-WWII prosecution and two judges at the SCSL, the argument
against the conflated natural law just war and, indeed, in favour of the separation of ius ad bellum
and ius in bello was consistent and stable, as required by Fuller’s principles, inter-curially across the
post-WWII  defence,  the  dissenting  Tokyo  judges  and  ICTY.  Post-Geneva  Conventions  and
Additional Protocols, the ICTY’s essentially uniform approach to separate the two can be seen as
ensuring congruence, per Fuller, between the rules of the international society captured in treaties
and their administration by judicial bodies. In sum, the consistent discarding of traditional conflated
just  war  theory,  based  on  posited  sources,  from  the  post-WWII  IMTs  to  the  post-Cold  War
Tribunals, assuredly contributed to the predictability of the application of ICL in these contexts.
This bolstered the rule of law.
129 See section 1.2.3.2. HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (OUP 1968) 181;
LL Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 162; Finnis (n 33) 272.
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2.4 Cosmopolitanism
Cosmopolitanism also traces  its  heritage back to natural  law.  Its  central  tenets  appeared in  the
natural law of the Cynics, Epicureans and Stoics, while it was also expounded by Immanuel Kant.
For the Cynics, the person’s link to rational humanity was its first form of moral affiliation and this
was determinative for the purposes of conduct.130 Diogenes, the Cynic, famously held that he was a
citizen of the world.131 The Stoics elaborated on these views and postulated the idea of the human
inhabiting two cities, i.e. the city into which we are born and the community of ‘human argument
and aspiration’.132 For the Stoics, it was reason which enabled us to be fellow citizens in a world-
state.133 The ethical implications hereof reverberated in Cicero who understood nature to enjoin
everyone to further the good of others because of their status as human beings. One law of nature
governed everyone and, consequently, forbade violence against others.134 Kant continued this theory
when he held that everyone has to be treated as an end unto himself rather than as a means to an
end.135 In sum, the focus of cosmopolitanism is on the fundamental universal values and moral rules
that ought to shape the conduct of people everywhere as well as the transnational duties towards all
people elsewhere.136 
The manner of acceptance or rejection of this code is therefore another indicator of philosophical
category.  Typically,  cosmopolitanism  accepts  ethical  norms  which  derive  their  existence  and
legitimacy from a global ethic. This approach focuses on the moral equality of every human being
and  the  ‘moral  significance  of  all  human  beings  as  part  of  one  ethical  community  with
transboundary  responsibilities  across  the  community’.137 For  cosmopolitanism  the  ‘individual
human being is the relevant “unit” of moral worth, this moral worth should be applied to all human
beings  equally and universally  across  the globe,  regardless  of  an individual’s  place  of  birth  or
affiliation to other local communities’.138 For natural law, these arguments would be inherent, while
positivists would base them on posited laws.
130 MC Nussbaum, ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’ (1997) 5 Journal of Political Philosophy 5.
131 D Laertius, ‘Diogenes’ in RD Hicks (tr), Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Heinemann 1931) VI.63
and for a further example in Stoic literature see M Aurelius, ‘Meditations’ in Irwin Edman (ed),  Marcus Aurelius
and his times (Walter J Black 1945) X.15, VI.44.
132 Nussbaum (n 130) 6-7. See also, for the notion of the two cities, Aurelius (n 131) IV.4, VI.44; LA Seneca, ‘De Otio’
in John Basore (tr), Seneca Moral Essays (Heinemann 1965) 4.1.
133 Aurelius (n 131) IV.4.
134 MT Cicero, ‘De Officiis’ in MT Griffin and EM Atkins (eds), Cicero On Duties (CUP 2009) III.27.
135 Ibid 12.
136 Dower (n 44) 10, 26, 52-71; Nussbaum (n 130) 6.
137 Dower (n 44) 10, 26, 52-61.
138 R Cryer, T Hervey, B Sokhi-Bulley with A Bohm,  Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart
Publishing 2011) 46; Van Blerk (n 28) 9-10.
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Coding for trends in the use of natural law and positivism pertaining to cosmopolitanism at the post-
WWII IMTs revealed a moderate dataset which will subsequently be split into the arguments of
selected counsel, on the one hand, and those from the IMTs, both majority and dissenting opinions
where applicable, on the other. In this way comparisons along the inter-curial dynamic should be
easier to make while not losing the intra-curial dynamic. This will,  in turn, be compared to the
moderate dataset emanating from the post-Cold War judiciaries. 
Three of the selected prosecutors at  Nuremberg,  namely Jackson, Shawcross and De Menthon,
adopted cosmopolitan arguments. Jackson justified piercing the veil of German sovereignty (which,
in effect, the creation of the IMT engendered) on account of the universal concern involved when
world peace was attacked by a rogue member.139 By justifying the IMT thus, Jackson echoed the
cosmopolitanism of Kant that  a  universal  community was established and developed to such a
degree that ‘a violation of laws in one part of the world is felt everywhere’.140 Jackson comparably
justified the IMT’s jurisdiction over Germany’s conduct  vis-a-vis its own citizens on the grounds
that ‘the German mistreatment of Germans is now known to pass in magnitude and savagery any
limits  of  what  is  tolerable  by  modern  civilization.  Other  nations,  by,  silence,  would  take  a
consenting  part  in  such  crimes’.141 This  cosmopolitan  argument,  in  characteristic  natural  law
fashion, implicitly upheld a superior (homogeneous) normative collectivity which could not tolerate
the atrocious actions of the Nazis. State sovereignty was subordinated to a larger, global-state and
its interests. The Nazi atrocities engaged transboundary duties and concern to bring rogue members
back into harmony with the larger collectivity. 
Cosmopolitan ideals were ubiquitous in the opening statement of De Menthon. While his argument
implied that a ‘real international society’ did not yet exist, it teleologically advocated its necessary
establishment. Lasting peace and certain progress for humanity was dependent on ‘the co-operation
of all peoples and through the progressive establishment of a real international society’.142 Such
teleology  characterised  natural  law  arguments  from  Aristotle  to  Aquinas.143 For  De  Menthon
common standards of morality were imperative:
‘There can be no well balanced and enduring nation without a common consent in the essential rules of
139 Jackson (n 52) 103-104. See comparably Jackson (n 54) 9.
140 I Kant, Perpetual Peace A Philosophical Essay (MC Smith tr, George Allen and Unwin 1917) 142 and Nussbaum (n
130) 1 for the rendition of ‘Recht’ as ‘law’ rather than as ‘right’.
141 Jackson (n 52) 127.
142 De Menthon (n 58) 369.
143 See, for e.g. Aristotle, The Politics (TA Sinclair and TJ Saunders trs, Penguin Books 1992) III.vi and Aquinas (n 12)
IaIIae 90.2.
59
social living, without a general standard of behavior before the claims of conscience, without the adherence
of all citizens to identical concepts of good and of evil...There can be no society of nations tomorrow without
an international morality, without a certain community of spiritual civilization, without an identical hierarchy
of values; international law will be called upon to recognize and guarantee the punishment of the gravest
violations of the universally accepted moral laws’.144 
On this  argument,  the  progressive  realisation  of  (in  typical  cosmopolitan  vein,  homogeneous)
international morality was needed for the establishment of a truly international society. De Menthon
linked the Nuremberg proceedings to the realisation of this homogeneous society by arguing that
the progressive establishment of an international society (based on a common morality) and justice
necessitated that those responsible for aggressive war be declared guilty.145 Although he clearly
conceded  that  the  international  community  was  not  yet  based  on  cosmopolitan  values,  his
philosophical allegiance to natural law is firmly evidenced by his pursuit of a universal morality, the
teleological necessity of establishing this global state and the central importance of justice. The IMT
proceedings were, for him, the actualisation of such a cosmopolitan society.
De Menthon further pursued universal morality in terms of an undifferentiated morality reminiscent
of Plato.146 He required a crime, once declared,  to be treated as such regardless of whether the
parties  involved were national  entities or individuals.  This  would evince ‘only one standard of
morality’ applicable to both international and individual relations. Building prescriptions of law,
which  were  recognised  by  the  international  community,  on  this  morality  would  result  in  the
establishment of ‘international justice’.147 
While De Menthon clearly focused on the world-state in the preceding arguments, his arguments
also revealed the local city, as espoused by the Stoics. The Nazis, for De Menthon, rejected a human
brotherhood through their actions.148 This then was a major crime committed by the Nazis against:
‘the  conscience which mankind has  today evolved from his  status  as  a  human being....[which status  is
inspired] by a conception essential to the nature of man. This conception is defined in two complementary
ideas: The dignity of the human being considered in each and every person individually, on the one hand;
and on the other hand, the permanence of the human being considered within the whole of humanity. Every
juridical organization of the human being in a state of civilization proceeds from this essential, two-fold
conception of the individual, in each and in all, the individual and the universal’.149 
144 De Menthon (n 58) 369.
145 Ibid 369-370. That the resort to aggression is typically limited by cosmopolitan thinkers, see Nussbaum (n 130) 11.
146 Plato argued that there existed an undifferentiated justice for the state and man, see  Plato, ‘The Rebublic’ in FM
Cornford (tr), The Republic of Plato (OUP 1955) 54.
147 De Menthon (n 58) 370.
148 Ibid 375.
149 Ibid 407-408.
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The  argument  here  was  cosmopolitan  as  the  recognition  of  the  unity  of  all  individuals,  the
individual’s worth and the dual existence of the individual as individual and as citizen of a greater
collective attests. De Menthon conceded that this universality and homogeneity of individual worth
might  seem based  upon  Christian  doctrine.150 He  noted  that  it  ‘is  a  general  conception  which
imposes  itself  quite  naturally  on  the  spirit’ and  which  existed  in  many  religions  apart  from
Christianity  and,  in fact,  pre-dated Christianity.  It  was  the more secular  understanding of  Kant
which he quoted ‘saying that a human being should always be considered as an end and never a
means’.151 In sum, De Menthon based the normative mission of the IMT and a major crime of the
Nazis on a traditional natural law cosmopolitanism. 
At Tokyo, cosmopolitan arguments appeared in the statements of counsel regarding the world-state
idea as well as the murder charges. Keenan and Brown ‘postulated an objectively existing moral
order as the final medium of international social control. A common morality applies...rooted in the
spiritual dignity,  worth and value of all  men, who constitute a universal brotherhood under the
fatherhood of God’.152 The charge of crimes against the peace could thus be justified inter alia on
the grounds that international society had to be protected from those groups who threatened to harm
it. The theological cosmopolitanism adopted here differed from the secular version proposed by De
Menthon at Nuremberg but both resort under natural law.153  
In order to allay fears that the murder charges were contravening legality,154 Keenan and Brown
inter alia submitted that murder was condemned in every legal system. On this logic, the ubiquitous
acceptance of the crime established its international authority as well.155 This ubiquitous argument
also appeared at Nuremberg in relation to crimes under the jurisdiction of the IMT.156 Takanayagi
rejected this submission as it ‘would provide for a universal domestic crime, which implied the
existence  of  a  (non-existent)  World  State’.157 For  Takanayagi  a  world-state  had  not  yet  been
established. A world-state would have involved the disappearance of international law as it existed
and seen the establishment of a truly universal law. The existing system, he submitted, was still
150 See, for e.g., A Augustine, ‘The City of God against the Pagans’ in RW Dyson (tr),  Augustine The City of God
against the Pagans (CUP 2007) IV.4; XI.1; XIV.4-28.
151 De Menthon (n 58) 408.
152 Keenan and Brown (n 4) 72.
153 Augustine (n 150) IV.4; XI.1; XIV.4-28.
154 See section 3.4.
155 Boister and Cryer (n 23) 158.
156 De Menthon (n 58) 372; C Dubost in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal,
Nuremberg, Vol. XIX:537;  Shawcross (n 57)  448; RA Rudenko in  Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. XII:149; RA Rudenko in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before
the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. XIX:575.
157 Boister and Cryer (n 23) 162. See Transcript 42 251-42 252.
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extremely Eurocentric in character.158 That Takanayagi’s argument resorted more comfortably under
legal positivism is apparent from his ostensible rejection of the universal basis of international law,
the acceptance of its contingent nature and its connection with state.
The selected post-WWII counsel produced a small dataset regarding cosmopolitanism. However,
with  the  exception  of  Takanayagi,  all  other  counsel  analysed  produced  consistent  natural  law
arguments.  Some internal  variety  appeared  with  Jackson implicitly  and De Menthon  explicitly
Kantian. As with the self-reflexive code, Keenan and Brown explicitly adopted theocentric natural
law.
Cosmopolitanism appeared relatively infrequently in the IMT judgments, with coding delivering
one instance at Nuremberg, none in the Tokyo majority judgment and a handful of instances in the
Tokyo  dissents.  Inter-curial  findings  on  consistency  between  post-WWII  judgments  will
accordingly be limited, while intra-curial findings at Tokyo will be more prominent. 
Cosmopolitanism arguably appeared in the Nuremberg dictum that ‘the very essence of the Charter
is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience
imposed by the individual state’.159 This argument separates the duties placed on the individual from
the particular state of which the individual was a citizen and those from a larger collective which
transcended the state. However, rather than the Stoic ideal where the cosmopolitan duties emerged
from humanity’s equal share of reason, the cosmopolitan obligations here were vested on the IMT
Charter. International law, rather than reason, constituted the normative system of the world-state on
this argument. The IMT envisaged a hierarchical relationship between the two levels of obligation
within which the duties towards the larger polity enjoyed preference. This was evidenced when the
Tribunal submitted that prosecution would not be barred against individuals who were authorised by
their states to violate international law.160 While there is a cosmopolitan dual state idea involved
here, the basis thereof is the posited IMT Charter. The envisaged hierarchical duties were based on
the social fact which was the Charter. The converse argument is that this is an example of natural
law because of the essentialist interpretation given, favouring a hierarchical understanding between
the particular law and the (arguably) universal law. Bearing in mind that the statement was made in
the context of disallowing state representatives immunity when they violated international duties,
158 Transcript 42 206, 42 212, 42 244-42 245. This sentiment overlaps with TWAIL, of course, which is discussed in
section 5.3.
159 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:223.
160 Ibid.
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this argument could be seen, at the very least, as a repudiation of Austinian state sovereignty. This
argument  is  probably  towards  the  middle  of  the  natural  law/legal  positivism spectrum,  with  it
inclining more towards the latter given the posited basis of the duties involved. 
Whereas the majority judgment did not engage with it, cosmopolitanism featured in the separate
decisions at Tokyo. Jaranilla used cosmopolitanism to support the existence of individual liability
for  aggressive  war  in  the  absence  of  precedent.  In  language  echoing  Diogenes,  he  found  the
perpetrators  to  be  ‘citizens  of  the  world’ who,  consequently,  ‘are  subject  to  international  law
whether or not  that  law has been made part  of the law of the land’.161 Apart  from the explicit
cosmopolitan sentiment of Diogenes, Jaranilla can be construed as utilising the global brotherhood
argument  to  circumvent  the  (traditional  positivist)  requirement  of  domestic  codification.
Transboundary  duties,  on  this  view,  override  domestic  obligations.  Bernard  likewise  adopted
cosmopolitanism to indicate that ‘crimes committed against the peoples of a particular nation are
also crimes committed against members of the universal community’.162 This view, which echoed
the argument of Jackson above, suggested a homogeneous international community where self and
other share the same values, concern and respect. Both Jaranilla and Bernard thus used natural law
arguments in conjunction with cosmopolitanism.
Röling relied on cosmopolitanism, in a negative sense, to explain why aggressive war was not
criminalised by the international community, i.e. for aggressive war to be recognised as criminal ‘a
community of nations must have developed [which had not] which no longer tolerates violence
between its members, and in which war in a sense acquires the character of civil war’.163 Extra-
curially, Röling argued for the need to work from world unity and interdependence of states rather
than national unity and independence.164 The idea of ‘one world’ had become crucial for survival.165
For him the establishment of ‘one world’ would be to the benefit of all and a moral necessity.166
These  writings  reveal  the  tension  between  the  is  and  the  ought  in  the  judge’s  views  on
cosmopolitanism, while a world-state did not exist, its establishment was desirable. This argument
clearly differs with that presented by De Menthon at  Nuremberg,  which also recognised that a
world-state  was  not  yet  established,  yet  actively  argued  for  its  realisation  through  the  IMT
161 Jaranilla Opinion 18. See D Laertius (n 131) VI.3.
162 Bernard Dissent 2.
163 Röling Dissent 25. Röling (n 27) vii; Röling, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond (n 74) 97 repeated this sentiment extra-
curially. See also Boister and Cryer (n 23) 132.
164 Röling (n 27) xiii.
165 Ibid 6-7.
166 Ibid 126. 
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proceedings. Pal likewise rejected the existence of a world-state as ‘the international community has
not yet developed into “the world commonwealth” and perhaps no particular group of nations can
claim to be the custodian of the “common good”’.167 Pal conceded that the ‘federation of mankind’
was the ‘ideal of the future and perhaps...already pictured in the minds of our generation’.168 But
this ideal did not yet exist and therefore national sovereignty remained the fundamental basis of the
international community.169 While Pal’s anti-colonialism will reappear in section 5.3, he considered
notions like the ‘common good’ as dangerous in a pluralist world. Cosmopolitanism focused on
objective and universal values, which presupposed a homogeneous world. Therefore, while both
Röling and Pal considered cosmopolitanism a normative objective, both rejected the existence of
such a world society in fact. At best this suggests a positivist distinction between expositorial and
censorial jurisprudence.170
Coding for cosmopolitanism thus resulted in a small, inconsistent dataset at the post-WWII IMTs.
The single expression of this code at Nuremberg inclined towards positivism, whereas the Tokyo
majority omitted cosmopolitanism altogether. The individual opinions at Tokyo revealed more data
on the inter-jurist dynamic, but split down the middle as Jaranilla and Bernard accepted a world-
state,  on  the  one  hand,  while  Röling  and  Pal,  dismissed  it  as  not  yet  extant.  Röling  and  Pal,
however,  noted  the  progressive  development  of  a  global  society  as  important  normative
aspiration.171 On the Fullerian rule of law, this constituted inconsistency in philosophy on the inter-
jurist level. The small dataset precluded independent findings on the other rule of law principles.
Coding for consistency in philosophy regarding cosmopolitanism at the post-Cold War Tribunals
produced a moderate dataset, essentially from the ICTY. The ICTR and ICC revealed negligible
data. Consequently, intra-curial findings are limited to the ICTY. This also reduces the comparisons
for patterns between the post-WWII and post-Cold War institutions to counsel, Tokyo and ICTY. 
In the majority of coded post-Cold War cases, cosmopolitanism appeared in conjunction with the
argument that the perpetrated crimes not only threatened the individual, but all  of humanity.  In
Tadić, the ICTY found that the nature of the alleged offences, if proven, ‘do not affect the interests
of one State alone but shock the conscience of mankind’.172 The AC argued that these ‘norms, due to
167 Quoted in Boister and Cryer (n 23) 286. See Pal Dissent 151 and the quotes in Kopelman (n 34) 408. 
168 Pal Dissent 125, 146-147; Kopelman (n 34) 415; Nandy (n 34) 62.
169 Ibid.
170 Austin (n 17) 278; Bentham (n 17) 98-99.
171 For agreement with Röling and Pal by a post-Cold War role-player, see Cassese (n 36) 164.
172 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October
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their highly ethical and moral content, have a universal character, not a territorial one..’.173 This
echoed the Kantian sentiment that ‘a violation of laws in one part of the world is felt everywhere’.174
In Erdemović, the TC similarly argued that ‘crimes against humanity also transcend the individual
because when the individual is assaulted, humanity comes under attack and is negated’.175 These
sentiments were approved by the ICTR in Kambanda.176 On appeal in  Erdemović, McDonald and
Vohrah approvingly quoted Kant on point.177 Extra-curially, McDonald emphasised respect for the
equality of every human being as well as the consequent need for ‘the universal application of
justice and of the law’.178 In Krštić, the AC stressed the transboundary effect of genocide, impacting
all of humanity by destroying a part of the human heritage.179 In the Plavšić sentencing judgment,
the TC took account of the fact that ‘the extent and gravity of such inhumane acts led humanity
itself to come under attack and be negated’.180 At the ICTR, apart from Kambanda mentioned above,
Ntakirutimana argued that genocide and crimes against humanity ‘threaten not only the foundations
of the society in which they are perpetrated but also those of the international community as a
whole’.181 The consistent dialectic between the individual and the whole of humanity premised on
fundamental equality indeed characterised cosmopolitanism from its Stoic inception. In traditional
natural law vein  the shared interest of mankind overrode sovereignty, the world-state’s concerns
surpassed those of the particular state. 
Cosmopolitanism also informed Shahabuddeen’s dictum in the Tadić AC that the ‘mitigation of war
must depend on the parties to it feeling that they belong to a larger whole than their respective tribes
or states, a whole in which the enemy too is comprised, so that the duties arising out of that larger
citizenship are owed even to him’.182 The world-state and its concomitant duties which transcend the
particular state is evident here. This dictum recalls the cosmopolitan ethic set out by Hierocles in his
concentric circle metaphor. In terms of this metaphor, love is stronger in relation to the objects
nearest to oneself and becomes gradually weaker the further away an object is. The layers of objects
1995) para 57.  
173 Ibid quoting 13 March 1950, in Rivista Penale 753, 757 (Sup. Mil. Trib., Italy 1950; unofficial translation).  
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179 Prosecutor v Krštić (Judgment) IT-98-33-A (19 April 2004) para 36.
180 Prosecutor v Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-00-39&40/1-S (27 February 2003) paras 122, 126.
181 Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (Judgment) ICTR-96-10-T & 96-17-T (21 February 2003) para 771.
182 Prosecutor  v  Tadić (Judgment)  IT-94-1-A (15  July  1999) at  150.  The  sentiment  is  Westlake’s  expression  of
Thucydides. For this sentiment in his extra-curial writings, see M Shahabuddeen, International Criminal Justice at
the Yugoslav Tribunal A Judge’s Recollection (OUP 2012) 5.
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proceeds from the self, to the immediate family, to the extended family, neighbours, fellow city-
dwellers, fellow countrymen and, finally, humanity as a whole. It is the ethical task of the person to
bring the level of love felt in relation to those objects furthest away to the same level of intensity as
that felt in relation to the closest objects.183 
Shahabudeen’s dictum further recalled the universal brotherhood idea wherein all people are part of
the same family even those opposing each other in war. This evidenced the (Stoic) cosmopolitan
realisation that politics divided people and that a ‘process of emphatic understanding’ was necessary
to respect the humanity of our enemies.184 On this latter point Marcus Aurelius similarly argued for
the  necessity  of  interpreting  another  person’s  conduct  with  the  understanding that  comes  from
entering into their minds.185 The whole point of Shahabuddeen’s dictum, which further tied it with
Kant’s categorical imperative, was to see enemies as fellow human beings constituting ends unto
themselves and not being merely means to an end.186 By prefacing his separate opinion with this
traditional natural law cosmopolitan argument, Shahabuddeen emphasised its importance. 
Cosmopolitanism finally surfaced when the Kupreškić TC rejected the argument that actions which
were legal in terms of domestic law should not be prosecuted before an international forum because
it ‘does not detract from the fact that these laws were contrary to international legal standards’. 187
On this hierarchical understanding, the international superseded the domestic or, in Stoic parlance,
the world-state overruled the city of birth. The acceptance of a higher, normative standard is clear.
Arguably  this  argument  inclined  towards  positivism  again,  as  it  was  international  law  which
overrode national law. This dictum echoed the sentiment expressed in the Nuremberg IMT.
Although the data was limited, coding for cosmopolitanism at the post-Cold War Tribunals thus led
to  several  consistent  instances  of  natural  law  justifications.  Cosmopolitanism  was  invoked  to
attribute the nature of ICL crimes to the fact that they also threatened the global collective and to
show that the higher law of ICL overrode state sovereignty. 
Coding  for  cosmopolitanism  over  all  the  role-players  resulted  in  a  moderate  dataset.  The
183 Hierocles,  ‘On Appropriate  Acts’  in  I  Ramelli  and  D  Konstan  (trs),  Hierocles  the  Stoic:  Elements  of  Ethics,
Fragments, and Excerpts (Society of Biblical Literature 2009) 91-93.  For an older version of this metaphor, see
Cicero (n 134) I.50-59 and Nussbaum (n 130) 9. 
184 Nussbaum (n 130) 9-10.
185 Aurelius (n 131) VI.53, XI.18.
186 See also how this is explored by Nussbaum (n 130) 10-11 in relation to Marcus Aurelius.
187 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 614.
66
prosecutors at both IMTs consistently adhered to natural law while the defence opposed the natural
law world-state argument. The Nuremberg IMT produced only one arguable instance of positivist
justification  in  relation  to  cosmopolitanism while  the  Tokyo  majority  refrained  from invoking
cosmopolitanism at all.  In the Tokyo dissents,  the judges were split  with Bernard and Jaranilla
adopting natural law while Röling and Pal opposed the existence of a world-state. At the post-Cold
War Tribunals only a few instances appeared, but these overwhelmingly favoured natural law. The
trend across all role-players pertaining to cosmopolitan arguments at the ICL judicial bodies thus
favoured natural law. Since findings on cosmopolitanism were not strictly necessary to fulfil their
mandates, the ICL role-players’ reliance thereon revealed the desire for additional moral authority to
be afforded to the ICL regime.  It also seemed that there was a correlation between the judges’
willingness to accept cosmopolitanism and the degree of development of ICL, i.e. the more ICL
matured, the more the world-state idea attained a real, non-utopian meaning. The perceived unity
was strengthened as ICL developed because at least some principles were (or were perceived to be)
accepted by all. 
Measured  against  Fuller’s  rule  of  law,  the  reliance  on  philosophy  in  connection  with
cosmopolitanism was published and public. The retrospective desideratum possibly explained the
use of philosophy here as natural law cosmopolitanism was used to justify the new regime. Those
opposing cosmopolitanism utilised its absence to explain why certain crimes did not yet exist in
international  life.  A functional  use  of  philosophy  suggested  itself.  Although  not  uniform,  the
reliance  on  natural  law in  conjunction  with  cosmopolitanism was  essentially  stable  and  rarely
contradicted from the post-WWII IMTs to the post-Cold War judiciaries. The other desiderata did
not come into play. Overall consistent reliance was placed on natural law which meant, on Fullerian
rule of law, the application of law was predictable and foreseeable.
2.5 Policy-oriented jurisprudence
Policy-oriented jurisprudence’s affinity to natural law and adversity to positivism will be briefly
elucidated  to  explain  its  inclusion  in  this  chapter.  Policy-oriented  jurisprudence  argues  that
international law is a complex process of decision-making aimed at securing the common interest of
a community.188 In sum, ‘legality flows not from the rule itself but from the policy considerations
leading to the selection of the rule and its application to the particular case’.189 If choice is so central
188 R Higgins, Problems & Process International Law and How We Use It (OUP 1995) 8; S Wiessner and A Willard,
‘Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of
Human Dignity’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 319.
189 M Shahabuddeen, ‘Policy-Oriented Law in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ in LC
Vohrah, F Pocar, Y Featherstone et al (eds),  Man’s Inhumanity to Man Essays on International Law in Honour of
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and choice can inevitably justify reliance on ‘humanitarian, moral and social purposes of law’190 this
approach has much affinity with natural law.191 It also adds a teleological element which is more
easily accommodated under natural law (especially if not directed thereto by posited law but rather
simply the choice reliant on the purposes of law noted above). Consequently, law is a means to an
end as  opposed to  an end in  itself.  The teleological  aim of  policy-oriented jurisprudence  is  to
establish and maintain minimum public order. This public order requires a commitment to human
dignity ‘in which access by all to all the values humans desire is maximised’.192 This universalism
again suggests  natural  law.  The achievement  of  common values are  envisaged to  the extent  of
presupposing a united international community.193 Viewing policy-oriented jurisprudence as part of
natural law has support in literature too.194
In contrast, positivism has been distinguished from the policy-oriented approach because it relies on
policy considerations to interpret and apply the authorised sources of law, on the one hand, while
the  policy-oriented  approach  relies  on  policy  as  ‘the  ultimate  determinant  of  legality  and  in
particular of what is the norm to be applied in any given situation’, on the other. 195 For policy-
oriented jurisprudence, reliance on positive laws ‘carries with it even greater chance of obfuscation
in that no hint of the necessity of choice among rules or policies need be revealed’.196 Essentially the
policy-oriented  approach  suggests  that  discretion  is  always  involved.  In  contrast,  Hartian  ILP
concedes only a penumbra of doubt where discretion is exceptional and ELP would hold arguments
based  on  discretion  to  constitute  law-making.197 Positivism  is  criticised  by  policy-oriented
Antonio Cassese (Kluwer Law International 2003)  894;  Shahabuddeen (n 182) 82-83.  For the view that law is a
process, see JN Moore, ‘Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell’ (1968) 54
Virginia Law Review 667; Higgins (n 188) 7-8.
190 Higgins (n 188) 5.
191 See comparably,  M Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ (1990) 1 European Journal of International
Law 11; A Orakhelashvili, ‘International Law, International Politics and Ideology’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed),
Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 338-339.
192 Wiessner and Willard (n 188) 324-326, 334. See also N Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (OUP 1997)
178, 195-196; WM Reisman, S Wiessner and AR Willard, ‘The New Haven School: A Brief Introduction’ (2007) 32
Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository 576. 
193 Higgins (n 188) 1. See also Wiessner and Willard (n 188) 318. For criticism in this regard, see Duxbury (n 192) 183,
196-198.
194 G Gilmore, The Ages of American Law (Yale University Press 1977) 90; Koskenniemi (n 191) 11; Duxbury (n 192)
176. Higgins (n 188) 10 explicitly sees this as a movement away from positivism.
195 Shahabuddeen (n 189) 892-893; Shahabuddeen (n 182) 82.
196 Moore (n 189) 679.
197 On ILP, see Hart (n 9) 130; Van Blerk (n 28) 43; R Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence (2nd ed, OUP 2003) 99.
On ELP, see J Raz, ‘Postema on Law’s Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons: A Critical Comment’ (1998) 4
Legal Theory 5;  B Simma and A Paulus, ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal
Conflicts: A Positivist View’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 304-305; J Finnis, ‘Natural Law: The
Classical  Tradition’ in  Jules  Coleman  and  Scott  Shapiro  (eds),  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  Jurisprudence  &
Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 8-11; K Himma, ‘Inclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro
(eds),  The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law  (OUP 2002) 140; BH Bix,  Jurisprudence:
Theory and Context (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 50.
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jurisprudence as ‘fixated on the past’ and insensitive to ‘changing and changed contexts’.198 For
policy-oriented jurisprudence political and social contexts must be considered.199 Recourse can be
taken to factors not necessarily based on the social thesis.200 The policy-oriented approach explicitly
rejects  a  strong  understanding  of  the  separability  thesis.  Policy-oriented  approach  has  been
criticised by positivism as conflating law, political science and politics. This results in a confluence
of norms and values which ideologizes international law.201
Coding for philosophical trends pertaining to the policy-oriented approach in the selected ICL cases
resulted in a very small dataset.  It  was clearly not a popular source of justification for judicial
arguments. In fact, the only instances where policy-oriented jurisprudence was utilised were found
in the ICTY. This means that no inter-curial comparison for consistency is possible regarding this
code. Also, since the coding only revealed three instances of policy-oriented jurisprudence, an in-
depth intra-curial analysis is also precluded. Yet its importance as a code for this study is assured as
it  revealed  philosophical  beliefs  on  the  inter-and  intra-jurist  levels.  Its  inclusion  in  ICL
jurisprudence makes its future invocation in ICL literature and judgments possible.202 Finally, this is
the first code which foreshadows the two liberalisms inherent to ICL, viz, criminal law liberalism
and human rights (HR) liberalism.203 Although detailed in section 6.3, the opposition of accused-
centric criminal law liberalism to victim-centred HR liberalism already appears under the policy-
oriented approach.
Turning to  the  seminal  ICTY case  of  the  policy-oriented  approach,  Erdemović,  the  AC had to
determine whether duress existed as an exculpatory ground in ICL to crimes that involved killing
innocents or whether it merely served as a factor to be taken into account during mitigation of
punishment.204 While examining the applicable case law, it became apparent that the position was
unclear.205 McDonald and Vohrah (who formed a plurality with Li) relied on the policy-oriented
approach  to find that ‘...the law should not be the product or slave of logic or intellectual hair-
198 Higgins (n 188) 3; Wiessner and Willard (n 188) 320.
199 Higgins (n 188) 9.
200 Ibid 10.
201 Simma and Paulus (n 197) 305.
202 See,  for  e.g.,  M  Swart,  ‘Judicial  Lawmaking  at  the  ad  hoc  Tribunals:  The  Creative  Use  of  the  Sources  of
International Law and “Adventurous Interpretation”’ (2010) 70 ZaöRV 474.
203 D Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms of International Criminal Law’ in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds)
Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press 2010) 129-135.
204 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment)  IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) para 16 and, ibid, the Joint Opinion of Judges
McDonald and Vohrah para 32.  See also A Fichtelberg, ‘Liberal Values in International Criminal Law A Critique of
Erdemović’ (2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 5.
205 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment)  IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah
paras 55, 67, 72.  
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splitting, but must serve broader normative purposes in light of its social, political and economical
role’.206 The  purpose  of  international  law,  on  this  view  was  ‘the  protection  of  the  weak  and
vulnerable in such a situation where their lives and security are endangered’.207 This was bolstered
by the further consequentialist concern ‘that...the principles of law to which we give credence have
the  appropriate  normative  effect  upon  soldiers  [and]  commanders’.208 Extra-curially,  McDonald
added the  potential  danger  for  society  which  the  recognition  of  duress  as  defence  might  have
engendered  and  that  justice  could  be  better  served  by  means  other  than  allowing  duress  as  a
complete defence.209 For the judges,  teleologically rejecting duress enabled compliance with their
mandated obligation under the ICTY Statute – which entailed the protection of humankind.210 This,
moreover, revealed a preference for victim-centric HR liberalism. 
Analysing this argument for philosophical category potentially engages natural law and ILP. ILP,
through a rule of recognition (RoR) allows validity to be generated or bounded by morality. 211 In
Erdemović the legal validity of policy considerations was not claimed to be generated by morality,
i.e. satisfying some test evaluating its content. Neither was legal validity made dependent on the
violation of a moral standard. Of course, policy considerations cannot claim a direct legal pedigree
either (which also places it beyond posited law for ELP). On the RoR argument under ILP, the
reliance on policy could not constitute positivism. Much more plausible, for ILP, is to understand
Erdemović as a hard case where discretion was exercised in the common interest. It is possible to
see the policy-oriented approach as aimed at the common good (in accordance with Hart212). Where
ILP (or ELP) uses discretion in such hard cases, the argument would move beyond posited law.
Nowhere was this conceded in Erdemović. The arguments about what a judicial body ought to do
normatively were used to justify the adoption of the policy arguments. Since the ventured argument
purported to exist  within the law, this  link of law and what are evidently moral considerations
constituted natural law. 
The better interpretation, then, which complies with Ockham’s razor,213 is that this decision was
206 Ibid para 75. The judges even quoted, ibid para 78, from the policy-oriented views of Rosalyn Higgins.
207 Ibid para 75. Repeated extra-curially by McDonald (n 178) 48.
208 Ibid para 75. See also McDonald (n 178) 48.
209 McDonald (n 178) 48.
210 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment)  IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah
para 88. 
211 NJ McBride and S Steel, Great Debates in Jurisprudence (Palgrave 2014) 53.
212 Hart (n 9) 200; HLA Hart, ‘American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream’
(1977) 11 Georgia Law Review 986; R Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence An Introduction to Legal Theory (3rd
edn, OUP 2012) 120.
213 Romano (n 10) 709 fn 1.
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based on a natural law ‘it stands to reason’ argument premised on the appropriate normative designs
of law. Evidently aware that their recourse to policy would be controversial, McDonald and Vohrah
pre-emptively argued that it ‘would be naive to believe that international law operates and develops
wholly divorced from considerations of social  and economic policy’.214 Furthermore,  the judges
submitted that logically there is no reason why criminal law and criminal policy at international
level should be any less intertwined than at municipal level.215 Indeed, the reliance on policy was
inevitable  due  to  the  unavoidable  ‘relationship  between  law  and  politics’.216 Their  follow-up
argument denying duress ‘in accordance with the spirit’ of IHL confirmed the non-posited source-
based thrust  of  the  approach  adopted.217 Academic  literature,  furthermore,  also  argued that  the
judges adopted a ‘...decidedly anti-positivist, “policy” approach, which, given that it attempts to
derive substantive rules from abstract principle, is more in the deductive/naturalist line of thinking
than the inductive, positivist school’.218
The position of Cassese in Erdemović shows the contrast of the plurality with a positivist approach.
Cassese reverted to positivism to criticise this policy approach as ‘...extraneous to the task of our
Tribunal’  as  well  as  in  conflict  with  the  [legality] principle.219 Cassese  concluded,  and
Shahabuddeen agreed extra-curially,220 that an international court ‘must apply lex lata, that is to say,
the existing rules of international law as they are created through the sources of the international
legal system. If it has instead recourse to policy considerations or moral principles, it acts  ultra
vires’.221 
For Cassese, barring a specific rule prohibiting the defence of duress in cases of murder, the general
rule (that duress can be plead) must apply.222 Fichtelberg ascribed a Dworkinian position to Cassese
here which  focused  on  principle  albeit  clothed  in  a  broader  positivist  tone.223 However,  even
214 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment)  IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah
para 78.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid  para  80.  For  a  critique  of  the  policy-oriented  approach  in  this  case  from a  Dworkinian  perspective,  see
Fichtelberg (n 204) 14.
218 Ibid para 75.  See also Cryer (n 47) 247.
219 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Dissenting Opinion of President Cassese para 11,
49.  See also R Cryer, ‘One Appeal, Two Philosophies, Four Opinions and a Remittal: The Erdemović Case at the
ICTY Appeals Chamber’ (1997) 2 JACL 193, 201-205.
220 Shahabuddeen (n 189) 890-891.
221 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Dissenting Opinion of President Cassese para 49. 
222 R Cryer, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and the Sources of International Law Antonio Cassese’s Contribution to
the Canon’ (2012) 10  Journal of International Criminal Justice 1051. Cassese’s approach was adopted in  Rome
Statute art. 31(1)(d).  See also Cryer (n 47) 249.
223 Fichtelberg (n 204) 15-18.
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Cassese’s approach was arguably not devoid of policy as it ‘takes account of social expectations
more than the rule suggested by the Prosecution and that propounded by the majority. Law is based
on what society can reasonably expect of its members. It should not set intractable standards of
behaviour’.224 This approach, ostensibly, showed sympathy with the accused’s position, conforming
to criminal law liberalism.
The difference between McDonald and Cassese on the inter-jurist dynamic is evident. McDonald
adopted a natural law argument (the policy-oriented approach) which rendered the protection of
those vulnerable in armed conflicts superior to the rights of the accused. Cassese considered people
qua human beings worthy of protection (whether they are accused or victims) and this informed his
view of the judicial function.225 Arguably, the difference between McDonald and Cassese can be
found in several philosophical binaries, including the rights of the collective versus the individual,
policy versus principle (which recalls Dworkin’s argument to this effect226). These binaries, focused
on utilitarianism (maximising the victims) or deontology (imposing punishment for wrong done),
were also reflective of the two liberalisms which pervade ICL, viz, HR liberalism and criminal law
liberalism.227 While it is revisited in section 6.3, it appeared that McDonald favoured the cause of
the victims whereas Cassese tended towards the rights of the accused.
The  final  instance  of  the  policy-oriented  approach  occurred  much  later.228 The  Strugar TC
investigated whether the prohibition of attacks on civilian objects also applied to non-international
armed conflicts (NIACs).229 After the resolution of the jurisdictional question as to whether these
provisions were enforceable by the ICTY, the TC provided little support for the extrapolation of
these rules from international armed conflicts (IACs) to NIACs. However, in a footnote, the TC
quoted from the fons et origo of the policy-oriented approach, McDougal and Wiesner:
‘“The physical characteristics of exercises of violence and their effects upon people and resources are of
course the same, assuming violence of comparable proportions, in an internal as in an international conflict.
It would thus seem fairly obvious that (…) a fundamental policy of minimum unnecessary destruction is
224 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Dissenting Opinion of President Cassese para 47.
See also Cryer (n 219) 193, 204.
225 Cryer (n 222) 1048.  See also WA Schabas, ‘Interpreting the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ in  LC Vohrah, F
Pocar, Y Featherstone  et al (eds),  Man’s Inhumanity to Man Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio
Cassese (Kluwer Law International 2003) 887-888.
226 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 82.
227 Robinson (n 203) 129-135.  This also confirms that legal practitioners have a choice of style to achieve a particular
aim, see M Koskenniemi, ‘Letter to the Editors of the Symposium’ (1999) 93  American Journal of International
Law 356. 
228 Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgment) IT-95-10-A (5 July 2001) Partial Dissenting Opinion of Judge Wald para 14 rejected
a decision on ‘policy grounds’, but this echoed Dworkin (n 226) rather than the policy-oriented approach.
229 Prosecutor v Strugar (Judgment) IT-01-42-T (31 January 2005) paras 224-228.
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equally vital and applicable in one as in the other type of conflict”’.230
Although this invocation of the policy-oriented approach was relegated to a footnote and thus not so
prominent as in  Erdemović, relying on this approach in justification of a position again revealed
natural law. The argument stood to reason (or policy) rather than posited authority. Such a decision
was not made on legal grounds or through RoR direction thereto.
Coding for consistency in philosophy under the policy-oriented approach was precluded by a very
small  dataset,  which  was  limited  to  the  ICTY. However,  congruent  with  part  (ii)  of  SCA,  the
identification  of  philosophy  is  itself  a  finding  on  the  current  thesis.  That  the  policy-oriented
approach, when invoked, was based on natural law was shown. It included normative, teleological
concerns – all dealing with the lex ferenda in excess of lex lata. Its use in Erdemović seemed aimed
at ensuring the vindication of victims and the prosecution of the accused (i.e.  a  functional  use
favouring HR liberalism) although this was opposed on behalf of the accused’s rights (i.e. criminal
law liberalism).  This  matter  will  be revisited  in  section  6.3  in  conjunction  with liberalism.  Its
consistent absence from later jurisprudence (apart from one footnote reference) indicated that it did
not gain a foothold in Tribunal jurisprudence. Possibly its use could be seen as an isolated instance
– an aberration in the chain novel which did not serve the ambitions of the judges, to use Dworkin’s
metaphor.231 However, its existence in ICTY jurisprudence could result in subsequent ICL judicial
bodies invoking it despite its controversial nature.
The small dataset precluded further measurement against the Fullerian rule of law for this study. In
principle, however, extensive use of the policy-oriented approach might have undermined the rule
of law directly as it requires decisions made on policy grounds, which can be seen as the usurpation
of the lawmaker’s function.232 
2.6 Conclusion on historical philosophical codes
Coding for overtly philosophical codes within the broader natural law/positivism framework at the
selected  ICL judicial  bodies  revealed  four,  namely  self-reflexive  statements,  just  war  theory,
cosmopolitanism and the policy-oriented approach. While just war theory resulted in a large dataset,
cosmopolitanism produced a moderate dataset and self-reflexive statements as well as the policy-
230 Ibid para 228 footnote 777 quoting MS McDougal and S Wiessner,  The International Law of War; Transnational
coercion and world public order (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994) 535. See similarly,  Wiessner and Willard (n
188) 318.
231 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986) 228-232.
232 Van Blerk (n 28) 88.
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oriented approach resulted in small  datasets.  In respect  of  the judiciaries,  it  was especially  the
Tokyo IMT and the ICTY which produced large datasets on the codes. 
Specific inter-and intra-curial trends regarding consistency were identified across the selected role-
players. The selected post-WWII prosecutors tended towards natural law (albeit sometimes Grotian)
while defence arguments were consistently positivist and anti-natural law. These positions seemed
congruent  with  their  respective  functions  of  prosecution  and  defence.  The  post-WWII  IMTs
produced consistent datasets both on self-reflexive statements (which was Grotian natural law) and
on just war (positivist), but an inconsistent dataset appeared on cosmopolitanism. The Nuremberg
judicial component was absent in all but one instance (cosmopolitanism). At the post-Cold War
judiciaries,  the ICTY delivered large datasets  on just  war and cosmopolitanism which revealed
consistent positivism and natural law to the respective codes. The policy-oriented approach was
negligible and, consequently, not testable for consistency. Self-reflexive statements were limited,
but consistently based on natural law. Neither the ICTR nor the ICC produced noteworthy data
under these codes. 
The  overall  inter-and  intra-curial  trends  can  now be  identified  for  the  individual  codes  under
historical  philosophical  justifications.  Self-reflexive  statements,  on  the  judicial  level,  tended
towards a Grotian approach favouring natural law. It was, however, a small dataset only and post-
WWII  dominant.  The  limited  data  suggests  that  it  was  exceptional  to  explicitly  state  one’s
philosophical allegiance, to be done when it differed from the dominant thinking. Its subsequent
decline in appearance could therefore suggest acceptance of the dominant (positivist) approach. Due
to lack of data this is speculative, but logic suggests it is compelling. Either way, its limited use
diminishes its threat for rule of law considerations. Just war was not directly addressed by the post-
WWII IMTs in their  majority  decisions,  however,  the individual  pronouncements  thereon were
consistently positivist. The ICTY showed consistent opposition to the ex iniuria non ius oritur and
tu quoque maxims traditionally associated with natural law. The ICTY also consistently supported
the separation of the  ius ad bellum  and the ius in bello based on posited sources. Through this
juxtaposition of its rejection of traditional natural law conflation and reliance on posited sources,
the ICTY data is best construed as positivist.  Cosmopolitanism revealed mixed arguments post-
WWII with Nuremberg and Tokyo (the latter especially in the dissents) divided down the middle. In
the post-Cold War period, however, the data revealed consistency bordering on uniformity in favour
of natural law. Cosmopolitanism was often used to add rhetorical legitimacy to positions.  Finally,
support for the policy-oriented approach was inconsistent. This must be offset against its limited use
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and  appearance  at  the  ICTY  only.  The  understanding  afforded  to  policy  seemed  functional
depending on the preference among the two competing liberalisms involved in ICL.233 
On first impression, the use of philosophy identified in this chapter was inconsistent, contradictory
and unstable (of course, all of which are Fullerian requirements for rule of law) as Grotian natural
law (under the self-reflexive code) vied with positivism (under just war) which vied with natural
law (under  cosmopolitanism)  again  and ended with  a  mixed argument  (i.e.  the  policy-oriented
approach). However, it is suggested that the SCA undertaken in this study untangles the data and
shows the importance of analysing the philosophies relative to the codes which reveal them. In sum,
the  codes  ensure  the  greatest  possible  degree  of  systematisation.  This  also  contextualises  the
suggestions regarding the impact these philosophies have made on the rule of law.
Coding  systematised  the  philosophical  justifications  and  revealed  overall  consistency  in  three,
namely  self-reflexive  statements,  just  war  theory,  cosmopolitanism,  and  inconsistency  in  one
negligibly small code – the policy-oriented approach. Since they appear in different contexts and
pursue different objectives, it is difficult to compare these arguments inter se. Yet predictability and
foreseeability are ensured relative to each code which in turn confirms the rule of law. Only policy-
oriented jurisprudence can ostensibly undermine these tests (failing the non-contradiction test of
Fuller), but its small dataset offsets the possible threat this might hold for the overall rule of law in
ICL judiciaries. It is probably better seen as an aberration in the chain novel of ICL jurisprudence.234
A final pronouncement on the compliance of natural law and legal positivism with the rule of law
must await the end of the next chapter, which concludes the discussion on these theories. 
233 The liberalisms are discussed in section 6.3.
234 Dworkin (n 231) 228-232.
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Chapter 3
Philosophical justifications in material ICL: Sources, crimes, fundamentals of
responsibility and interpretation
3.1 Introduction
Philosophical justifications also appeared in connection with substantive international criminal law
(ICL),  namely  sources  doctrine,  substantive  crimes,  legality  as  principle  of  individual  criminal
responsibility and interpretation techniques. These codes engaged with the ‘nature of laws’ and the
‘relationship of law to...morality’ in relation to the material jurisdiction of ICL judicial bodies.1 Like
chapter 2, this chapter must be understood cognisant of the part A preface on natural law and legal
positivism. The question into consistency of philosophical justification, as is relevant on Fuller’s
rule  of  law standard,  remains  the  main  organising  principle  of  the  data  whereafter  the  rest  of
Fuller’s principles will be tested if engaged. While this chapter’s codes are conceptually distinct, in
practice, they were not hermetically sealed. Some overlap between them was unavoidable. 
As was the case with the policy-oriented approach,2 the tension in ICL between its two constituent
liberalisms,  viz,  accused-centric  criminal  law  liberalism and  victim-centric  human  rights  (HR)
liberalism were relevant for the legality and interpretation codes. This tension will be noted in this
chapter before being detailed in section 6.3.
3.2 ICL sources
Questions  about  which  sources  are  legally  relevant  and  their  theoretical  underpinnings  are  by
definition philosophical.3 Natural law and legal positivism could both be construed as directed to
such ontological questions about what the law is.4 This section considers the patterned use of natural
law and positivism in the selected ICL role-players’ pronouncements on ICL sources, including
their founding instruments, treaties, customary international law (CIL), general principles of law as
well as other sources of law. Not every invocation of these sources was philosophically relevant.
This section omits bare references to sources as authority without any accompanying theoretical
1 Compare the definition of MDA Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn, Thomson Sweet Maxwell
2014) 2 discussed in section 0.2.  See, similarly, R Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence An Introduction to Legal
Theory (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 1.
2 See section 2.5.
3 Wacks (n 1) 1.
4 BH Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 79.
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elucidation.5 Coding for  sources  as  per  part  (ii)  of  systematic  content  analysis  (SCA) required
evidence of theorisation regarding the foundation, justification and application of the sources used.
The  resultant  dataset  was  modest  with  role-players  steering  clear  from  philosophical
pronouncements in relation to sources generally. The coding is presented here per role-player rather
than per type of source.
The overwhelming majority of data coded at the post-WWII IMTs under sources revolved around
the founding instruments. Thus, Jackson invoked the posited framework of the Nuremberg Charter
to establish the legitimacy of the IMT. He emphasised the almost universal consensual basis of the
Charter.6 Consent is of course congruous with the creation of law according to human agency under
positivism. While natural law might accept laws based on consent, that is not the final source of law
(as it could be for positivism) since the overarching principles of natural law emanate from non-
human elements.7 Jackson had something different in mind, however, as the Charter was also the
embodiment of universal wisdom, justice and will of an overwhelming majority of civilised people.8
While such external normative systems suggested natural law, it was presented as only part of the
basis  of  the  Charter  alongside  consent.  The  better  reading  appears  to  be  the  mixed,  Grotian
argument with positivism and natural  law both providing the underpinnings  of the Charter.9 In
contrast, Jackson later used common sense substantively, in typical natural law vein,10 to justify the
extension of law’s full force from the domestic to the international sphere.11 
At  Tokyo,  Keenan  and  Brown were  slightly  more  eclectic  in  their  philosophical  justifications
regarding ICL sources. They argued that the vitality of the founding instruments flowed not from
mutual consent but from the will  of the victor,  which was only constrained by the ‘moral and
juridical restrictions of the natural law’.12 Thus, it was the law of nations and natural law which
limited the IMT. Indeed, these trials rendered the international moral order the cause rather than the
5 LV Prott, The Latent Power of Culture and the International Judge (Professional Books 1979) 177.
6 R Jackson in the  Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol.
II:143.
7 W  Morrison,  Jurisprudence (Cavendish  1997) 4-5,  15-178;  A  van  Blerk,  Jurisprudence  an  Introduction
(Butterworths  Lexisnexis  1998) 6;  BH  Bix,  ‘On  the  Dividing  Line  Between  Natural  Law  Theory  and  Legal
Positivism’ (2000) 75  Notre Dame Law Review 1614-1615;  R Cotterrell,  The Politics of Jurisprudence (2nd edn,
OUP 2003) 115; D Meyerson, Understanding Jurisprudence (Routledge 2007) 33-36; R Cryer, T Hervey, B Sokhi-
Bulley with A Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 2011) 35, 37; Bix (n
4) 69.
8 Jackson (n 6) 143.
9 H Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’ (1946) 23 The British Year Book of International Law
21.
10 Bix (n 4) 145.
11 Jackson (n 6) 99.
12 JB Keenan and BF Brown, Crimes against International Law (Public Affairs Press 1950) 26, 31.
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effect of positive law. Morality and law were intertwined and any attempt to isolate them was ‘a
symptom of juridical schizophrenia caused by the separation of the brain of the lawyer from that of
the human being’.13 While these arguments suggested a preference for natural law, they constituted
a mixed Grotian argument. Like Jackson, Keenan and Brown also invoked reason as substantive
source in law, adding that it would have been illogical if crimes were prevented when they occurred
on the domestic level but not on the international one.14 
The, ostensibly natural law-favoured, Grotian approach also provided the contours of the following
argument. Keenan and Brown first invoked posited sources to confirm the principle of individual
responsibility for violations of the laws and customs of war.15 Then using analogy, and implicitly
invoking the natural law ‘it stands to reason’, they submitted that because individuals had been held
criminally liable for violations of the laws and customs of war it followed that individuals who
contravened other areas of international law, such as the laws of peace and humanity, should also be
held  accountable.16 This  natural  law  had  an  antecedent  in  the  Nuremberg  IMT,  which  the
prosecutors  invoked,  where  the  Tribunal  found  that  ‘for  many  years  past,  however,  military
tribunals have tried and punished individuals guilty of violating the rules of land warfare laid down
by this Convention. In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war are doing that
which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules of the Hague
Convention’.17 The source for the law’s expanded scope in these cases stood to reason, not posited
reason, and therefore constituted natural law thinking.18 By using posited sources, on the one hand,
and expanding the scope of law on the grounds of reason, on the other hand, these arguments again
furnished evidence of a Grotian approach. Bearing in mind that ICL was still rudimentary at this
point, the recourse to substantive reason without posited direction thereto conceded the lack of a
relevant RoR in this scenario. ILP was thus not applicable here. Also, if discretion was allowed
whenever the law did not contain a desired provision, it will make nonsense of the institution of law
and its ‘core of certainty’.19 The prosecutors did not purport to be working outside of the law here,
which would have been necessary for a finding of ILP or ELP hard discretion.
13 Ibid vi.
14 Ibid 5-6.
15 Ibid 123-124 refers  to  Ex parte Quirin 317 US 1;  Yamashita 327 US 1;  Treaty of  Versailles of  1919 and the
Llandovery Castle case.
16 Keenan and Brown (n 12) 124.
17 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal , Nuremberg, Vol. I:221;
Keenan and Brown (n 12) 124-125.
18 See, for e.g., R Cryer, ‘The Philosophy of International Criminal Law’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research
Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 246-247.
19 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961) 130; van Blerk (n 7) 43; Cotterrell (n 7) 99.
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The final two instances of philosophical justifications by the selected Tokyo prosecutors pertained
to CIL and the Martens clause respectively.  Keenan and Brown vested CIL’s power to bind not
solely on consent, but also natural law directly.20 They held that natural law played a significant part
in the ambit and scope of a CIL rule. If a treaty rule concretized a universal natural law principle
then that consequent CIL rule would be general in scope, otherwise the treaty rule would only apply
between  the  signatories.21 This  exhibits  the  traditional  distinction  between  natural  law  and
positivism, i.e. universality versus contingency. Both were accepted as foundation of CIL which
confirmed their Grotian approach.
Finally, Keenan and Brown relied on the Martens clause as reflective of an ethical juridical order
which could serve as a touchstone to determine whether an unforeseen action not expressly covered
by the laws and customs of war breached that body of law and, likewise, whether the waging of an
unjust war had breached an international law rule.22 This argument used the Martens clause as a
normative  source  of  international  law and  not  merely  as  an  aspiration.  Although this  predates
Hartian  ILP,  in  exemplary  ILP fashion,  a  posited  source  incorporated  morality.  Law,  on  this
argument,  could  be  generated  by  morality.23 While  morality  was  the  source  of  war  crimes  for
Keenan and Brown anyway,24 they still worked through the posited source to refer back thereto.
The only coded instance of philosophical argument in the statements of defence counsel pertaining
to  sources  at  the  IMTs,  occurred  at  Tokyo.  Takanayagi  denied  that  the  Potsdam  Declaration
provision that ‘stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited
cruelties upon our prisoners of war’, required the subsequent criminalisation in the Tokyo Charter
of  crimes  against  peace  or  humanity  without  a  specific  pronouncement  thereto.25 This  applied
mutatis mutandis to the Moscow Declaration of 1943 and the Nuremberg Charter as well.26 This
argument was positivist,  i.e.  if criminalisation was not explicitly provided for then it  cannot be
subsequently inferred from the founding instruments. However, if the Charters were taken as the
point of departure, the criminalisation of the disputed crimes would be ensured on posited grounds.
20 Keenan and Brown (n 12) 72-73.
21 Ibid 76-77.
22 Ibid 83. For the Martens clause, see A Cassese, ‘The Martens Clause: Half a Loaf or Simply Pie in the Sky?’ (2000)
11 European Journal of International Law 193; A Cassese, International Law (OUP 2001) 122.
23 Cryer,  Hervey,  Sokhi-Bulley  with  Bohm (n  7)  37;  NJ  McBride  and  S  Steel,  Great  Debates  in  Jurisprudence
(Palgrave  2014)  53.  Cf.  BH  Bix,  ‘Patrolling  the  Boundaries:  Inclusive  Legal  Positivism  and  the  Nature  of
Jurisprudential Debate’ (1999) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 20-21. See also Hart (n 19) 199; S
Shapiro, ‘Was Inclusive Legal Positivism Founded on a Mistake?’ (2009) 22 Ratio Juris 327; Wacks (n 1) 42, 110-
111.
24 Keenan and Brown (n 12) 83.
25 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 122-42 123.
26 Ibid.
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Takanayagi turned to those instruments which preceded and informed the Charters, to also rely on
positivism in an attempt to circumvent the crimes posited in the Charters. 
Coding for consistency of philosophy in ICL sources used by IMT counsel revealed Jackson as split
between natural law and a Grotian approach (which are, of course, not incongruous). Keenan and
Brown were also eclectic,  with their  arguments  pertaining to sources ranging from natural  law
through ILP to Grotian. While their arguments consistently looked beyond the posited law, they
often still included posited sources in their arguments. Their arguments are accordingly probably
best counted as Grotian, since positivism and natural law were used independently and together.27
Takanayagi delivered the only defence instance of this code which, consistent with prior codes,
embodied  positivism.  Findings  on  consistency  between  counsel  were  difficult  given  the  small
datasets involved. At the least, the prosecutors appeared consistent with their expansive arguments
considered  in  chapter  2,  while  the  defence  again  relied  on  positivism.  Foreseeability  and
predictability of justifications were thus assured.
Philosophical justifications pertaining to ICL sources were rare in the jurisprudence of the post-
WWII judiciaries. No instances were coded at Nuremberg apart from the natural law ‘it stands to
reason’ argument noted above in conjunction with Keenan and Brown. The Tokyo IMT ventured
some notable findings regarding its founding instruments which led to several responses from the
dissents. While Jaranilla, Bernard and Röling only responded to the position pertaining to founding
instruments, Pal ventured additional philosophical comments on treaties and CIL. 
The Tokyo majority was quick to point to the several declarations underpinning it as they provided
a posited basis for its creation.28 The IMT considered its Charter as point of departure. Thus, ‘the
law of  the  Charter  is  decisive  and binding on the  Tribunal...In  this  trial  its  members  have  no
jurisdiction except such as is to be found in the Charter’.29 Adopting a position more assertive than
the  majority,  Jaranilla  held  a  judge’s  authority  to  be derived exclusively  from the  Charter  and
consequently that a finding of invalidity pertaining to the Charter would ipso facto void the judge’s
ability  to  pronounce  judgment.30 While  posited  authority  (and  its  attendant  directives)  can  be
27 Lauterpacht (n 9) 21.
28 The Tokyo Majority Judgment 2-6 lists the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, the Instrument of Surrender of 1945 and
the Moscow Conference of 1945. This was supported by Webb Opinion 1.  See also N Boister and R Cryer,  The
Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (OUP 2008) 20-25.
29 Tokyo Majority Judgment 23. See also Boister and Cryer (n 28) 278 for  the view that  the majority adopted a
formalistic approach.
30 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 39. For criticism of Jaranilla’s views see ibid. See Jaranilla Concurring Opinion 28-31.
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conclusive for positivism, traditional natural law will postulate a higher normative system as well.
Both the IMT and Jaranilla clearly accepted the posited authority as determinative. 
Three judges  revealed a less  positivist  understanding of their  judicial  function by rejecting the
necessity of their acceptance of the law of the Charter merely due to their appointments.31 Bernard,
invoking a domestic law analogy, rejected the notion that judicial appointment compelled him to
agree with the entire substantive law which he was tasked to apply. Hence, questions pertaining to
the law had to be entertained.32 Röling likewise found that precluding judges from questioning the
law ‘seems to be not only dangerous for the future but incorrect at this moment’.33 In his dissent, Pal
submitted that they were ‘to find out, by the application of the appropriate rules of international law,
whether the acts constitute any crime under the already existing law, dehors the Declaration, the
Agreement or,  the Charter’.34 These positions suggested that the judicial  function should not be
solely bound by the law as posited. Otherwise the whole enterprise would be the mouthpiece for
whoever  was  in  power.  In  sum,  these  arguments  implied  a  shift  from ‘will’,  with  its  answers
consequent to choice and decision of the person empowered to enact the posited law, to ‘reason’
which entails answers emanating from analysis showing them to be ‘right’.35 Although will and
reason both play a role under natural law and positivism, it has been suggested that will resorts
more with positivism and reason with natural law.36 Bernard,  Röling and Pal appeared to accept
reason rather than the will of the lawmaker as final determinant of their judicial function.
Hereafter, Pal ventured his theoretical understanding pertaining to treaties and CIL. For Pal a ‘rule
of law, once created, must be binding on the states independently of their will, though the creation
of the rule was dependent on its voluntary acceptance by them’.37 With the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
states were the arbiters of whether their action violated the duty under the Pact.38 Consequently, the
obligation under the Pact was dependent on the subjects’ right to self-preservation. This removed
the Pact from the realm of law for Pal.39 In the absence of a vertical authoritative structure with
overwhelming  power,  only  equal  states,  guided  by  their  self-interest,  determined  their  own
compliance with the Pact.40 Pal conceded that the rule of law in the international community was
31 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 37-40.
32 Bernard Dissent 9-10. See also Boister and Cryer (n 28) 38.
33 Röling Dissent 4-5.
34 Pal Dissent 26, 34-36, 1004. 
35 Bix (n 4) 143.
36 Ibid 144-145 and fn 5.
37 Pal Dissent 91, 222.
38 Ibid 91.
39 Ibid 91-96.
40 Explicitly conceded, ibid, at 1008, 1012.
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often threatened because the binding force of law emanated from the will of the subjects of the very
same law destined to apply to them. For law to be created, the subjects thereof should not be the
‘sole judge of the applicability of any individual rule to its case’.41 In classic Austinian fashion, it
became necessary to have a conceptual distinction between sovereign and subject to have a working
system of law.42 This also tied into Pal’s views on realism which are discussed in section 6.2.
In relation to CIL, Pal rejected the argument, which later reappeared at the post-Cold War Tribunals,
that  CIL could  crystallise  due to  common popular  conviction.  For  him,  CIL only  become law
relevant to a court if there was usage as well.43 Possibly this also suggested a reason/will divide.44
On this construction  opinio iuris represents ‘reason’ and  usus ‘will’. If, as noted earlier,45 natural
law  follows  reason  and  positivism  follows  will  generally,  Pal’s  argument  refrains  from
subordinating will to reason. Simply, he refused to entertain a more flexible approach to sources
than what was allowed under traditional posited international law. 
Across the post-WWII judiciaries, inconsistency thus appeared in their philosophical justifications
relating to sources. The selected prosecutors were arguably Grotian with an inclination to favour
natural law. The defence counsel produced a negligible dataset, but what appeared was positivist.
The IMTs were inconsistent, with the majorities delivering negligible (contradictory on the inter-
curial dynamic) datasets and the individual judges at Tokyo split down the middle (the inter-jurist
dynamic). Accordingly, no pattern appeared. Possibly, there was an ostensible instrumentalism at
work  as  the  arguments  were  functionally  aimed  at  legitimating  the  charges  (Nuremberg  IMT,
Keenan and Brown) and the  IMTs (Jackson,  Keenan and Brown,  Tokyo majority,  Jaranilla)  or
testing  their  legitimacy  (Bernard,  Röling,  Pal).  This  somewhat  lessened  the  adverse  impact  of
inconsistency on the rule of law for the post-WWII judicial bodies. The other Fullerian principles
were not involved.
Coding for compliance with rule of law in the philosophical justifications pertaining to ICL sources
at the post-Cold War judiciaries resulted in a dataset essentially limited to the ICTY. Akayesu at the
ICTR was a possible exception, since using the travaux preparatoires to conclude that the Genocide
Convention protected all stable and permanent groups could be construed as a natural law approach
hidden  with  positivist  argumentation.  However,  since  the  decision  relied  on  an  incorrect
41 Pal Dissent 101-102.
42 J Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray 1832) 267-269. See also Van Blerk (n 7) 32. 
43 Pal Dissent 126-128.
44 Bix (n 4) 143.
45 Ibid 144-145 and fn 5.
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understanding  of  the  Convention  this  was  not  counted  for  coding  purposes.46 The  relevant
arguments at the ICTY revolved around the substantive use of reason, CIL, the Martens clause and
general principles of law.
Whereas the selected post-WWII counsel relied on reason to justify the scope of crimes justiciable
beyond war crimes,  the issue confronting the post-Cold War world related to  the difference in
regulation  between  international  armed  conflicts  (IACs)  and  non-international  armed  conflicts
(NIACs).  This  tension  was  addressed  by  the  ICTY’s  reliance  in  Tadić upon  ‘elementary
considerations  of  humanity’ and  ‘common  sense’ to  conclude  that  ‘[w]hat  is  inhumane,  and
consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil
strife’.47 Cassese took recourse to reason arguing:
‘Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals,
churches, museums or private property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when
two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from enacting the same bans or providing the same
protection when armed violence has erupted “only” within the territory of a sovereign State?’48
Although the sentiment was bolstered by reference to state practice  vis-a-vis human rights post-
WWII, the underlying sentiment was undeniably shaped by natural law.49 The justification stood to
reason rather  than  to  posited  legal  authority.  This  justification  was  echoed  in  an  extra-judicial
context when McDonald submitted that there ‘is no moral justification, and no truly persuasive
legal reason, for treating perpetrators of atrocities committed in internal conflicts more leniently
than those engaged in international wars’.50 These conclusions, although possibly morally correct,
relied on a natural law argument,  ‘...i.e.  one based purely on reason, rather than the traditional
sources  of international law’.51 Cassese admitted that they ‘were breaking new ground. You go
beyond the  black  letter  of  the  law because  you look  at  the  spirit  of  the  law’.52 The  positivist
response to this line of argument might be that logically speaking it could be difficult to justify
46 See Cryer (n 18) 251 on Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 561. See also WA
Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn, CUP 2011) 105.
47 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October
1995) para 119. See also Cryer (n 18) 247. The language, of course, recalls the Martens clause, but it was not
invoked.
48 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October
1995) para 97.
49 R Cryer, ‘International Criminal Tribunals and the Sources of International Law Antonio Cassese’s Contribution to
the Canon’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1050.
50 GK McDonald, ‘The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture: The Changing Nature of the Laws of War’ (1998)
156 Military Law Review 37.
51 Cryer (n 18) 246-247.
52 A Cassese,  ‘The Judge:  Interview with Antonio Cassese’ in  Heikelina Verrijn  Stuart  and  Marlise Simons,  The
Prosecutor and the Judge: Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese: Interviews and Writings  (Amsterdam University
Press 2009) 53.
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different legal regimes to address IACs and NIACs but that this was the route followed by states in
the relevant treaties.53 
The post-Cold War Tribunals, in particular, have been held to eschew usus in favour of opinio iuris
in the traditional two-pronged determination of CIL.54 While such a development might arguably
have become the conventional manner in which to establish CIL,55 the post-Cold War role-players
showed  that,  on  their  understanding,  this  exceeded  posited  law.  Indeed,  prior  to  his  judicial
appointment at the ICTY, Meron observed a trend to elevate ‘noble humanitarian principles’ to rules
of CIL even in the case of scant supporting state practice. Such an approach conflated the ought
with the is, the lex ferenda with the lex lata: 
‘The teleological desire to solidify the humanizing content of the humanitarian norms clearly affects the
judicial attitudes underlying the “legislative” character of the judicial process. Given the scarcity of actual
practice, it may well be that, in reality, tribunals have been guided, and are likely to continue to be guided, by
the degree of offensiveness of certain acts to human dignity; the more heinous the act, the more the tribunal
will assume that it violates not only a moral principle of humanity but also a positive norm of customary
law’.56
The juxtaposition of teleology, conflation of lex ferenda and lex lata and the degree of offensiveness
of an act to human dignity all suggest moral considerations in excess of positivism. The possible
argument,  ventured  under  Pal  above,  that  ‘will’ and  ‘reason’ attach  to  usus and  opinio  iuris
respectively and that  ‘will’ was subsumed by ‘reason’ can also be ventured here.  Again,  ‘will’
reverberates more with positivism and ‘reason’ more with natural law.57
This  more  flexible  understanding of  CIL,  based  on ‘the  degree  of  offensiveness’ of  the  act  in
question, influenced the  Kupreškić  case. However, here the Tribunal emphasised  opinio iuris  and
downplayed  usus  by invoking the Martens clause.58 While Keenan and Brown anticipated ILP at
53 Cryer (n 18) 247. This culminated in a substantive war crimes provision in the Rome Statute, see Schabas (n 46)
124-125.
54 M Swart, ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of the Sources of International Law and
“Adventurous Interpretation”’ (2010) 70 ZaöRV 464. See, for e.g., Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošević (Judgment) IT-
98-29/1-A (12 November 2009) Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu Daqun para 10.
55 B Simma and A Paulus,  ‘The Responsibility  of  Individuals  for  Human Rights  Abuses in  Internal  Conflicts:  A
Positivist View’ (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 306-310.
56 T Meron, ‘The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law’ (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 361. See
also T Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94  American Journal of International Law 244;
L.M Nicholls, ‘The Humanitarian Monarchy Legislates: The International Committee of the Red Cross and its 161
Rules of Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law
247.
57 Bix (n 4) 144-145 and fn 5.
58 Prosecutor  v  Kupreškić (Judgment)  IT-95-16-T (14  January  2000)  para  527.  See  also  A  Nell,  International
Humanitarian Law against the background of custom and humanity (LL.M Research dissertation at the University
of the Free State 2010) 201-203.
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Tokyo,  at  the  ICTY (which  post-dated  Hart)  law  could  be  generated,  on  ILP,  through  moral
directives embodied in the Martens clause. Despite scant state practice, the Kupreškić  TC found
reprisals against the civilian population to be unlawful based on the Martens clause and elementary
considerations  of  humanity.59 The  principles  of  humanity  and  dictates  of  public  conscience,
contained in the clause, could crystallise opinio iuris when usus was insufficient.60 For Meron, the
Martens clause epitomized the humanitarian and humanizing strand in IHL. This clause’s rhetorical
language  and  ethical  sentiment  ‘exerts  a  strong  pull  towards  normativity’.61 However,  Meron
criticised Cassese for invoking the Martens clause in the particular circumstances of Kupreškić to
wholly circumvent a lack of  usus and crystallise opinio iuris  despite ‘diverse views of states and
commentators’.62 Writing prior to his appointment to the ICTY, Meron’s own views are obscured
behind reportage  and  critique.  However,  he  clearly  noted  the  extent  Kupreškić’s ILP exceeded
posited law.
In  contrast  to  these  decisions,  the  ICTY adhered  to  a  maligned  positivism  in  Vasiljević  by
maintaining that only CIL could vest criminal liability (which was incorrect vis-a-vis the authority
at the Tribunal63):
‘If [CIL] does not provide for a sufficiently precise definition of a crime listed in the Statute, the Trial
Chamber would have no choice but to refrain from exercising its jurisdiction over it, regardless of the fact
that the crime is listed as a punishable offence in the Statute. This is so because,... anything contained in the
statute of the court in excess of existing [CIL] would be a utilisation of power and not of law’.64
Besides reason and CIL, general principles of law revealed philosophy at the ICTY. In a separate
opinion, Sidhwa reflected that mostly ‘[international law] seeks to keep itself free of rigid, strict and
inflexible national rules and principles where they tend to be dogmatic or obstruct a fair, liberal or
equitable approach to a problem...’.65 Evidently, international law was to be guided by normative
59 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) paras 524-536.  Arts. 63/62/142/158 respectively
of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 contain the clause.  See also Cryer (n 49) 1052-1054.
60 Prosecutor  v  Kupreškić (Judgment)  IT-95-16-T (14  January  2000) paras  525-527.  See  also  MN  Hayashi,  ‘The
Martens Clause and Military Necessity’ in Howard Hensel (ed), The Legitimate Use of Military Force The Just War
Tradition and the Customary Law of Armed Conflict (Ashgate Publishing Limited 2008) 147-148.
61 Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (n 56) 245. See also T Meron, ‘The Martens Clause, Principles of
Humanity and Dictates of Public Conscience’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 79; M Swart, ‘Is
There a Text in This Court? The Purposive Method of Interpretation and the ad hoc Tribunals’ (2010) 70 ZaöRV
770.
62 Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (n 56) 250.
63 See, for e.g., Prosecutor v Galić (Judgment) IT-98-29-A (30 November 2006) paras 83-98; A Cassese,‘Black Letter
Lawyering  v.  Constructive Interpretation The  Vasiljevic  Case’ (2004) 2  Journal of International Criminal Justice
265; Cryer (n 18) 250-251.
64 Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) para 202.
65 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October
1995) Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa para 11.
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considerations as fairness and equity overrode rigid regulation. Non-posited values held sway over
posited sources in traditional natural law vein. Likewise, in an attempt to clarify the question of
consent in relation to rape charges, Kunarac ostensibly embraced a ‘spirit of law’ notion as it would
‘...not...identify a specific legal provision which is adopted by a majority of legal systems but to
consider...whether it is possible to identify certain basic principles or...“common denominators”, in
those  legal  systems  which  embody  the  principles which  must  be  adopted  in  the  international
context’.66 This  argument  favoured  the  essence  above  the  form.  The  TC found the  underlying
principle  which  united  the  various  legal  systems  to  be  the  penalising  of  violations  of  sexual
autonomy.67 The more malleable principle thus searched for recalled the common denominators
central to the Roman ius gentium.68 This argument could also be construed as Dworkinian based on
the centrality of principle as opposed to rule.69 In sum, general principles are a recognised positive
source of international law, but here the argument was for something less concrete and rather more
abstract and universal without RoR direction thereto. 
Although the dataset was modest, coding for philosophical justifications pertaining to sources at the
ICTY revealed a somewhat more consistent pattern in favour of natural law than at the post-WWII
IMTs. It has been suggested that ‘perfect positivism is impossible where [CIL] remains an integral
source of ICL’.70 This is arguably borne out from the ICTY data. The coded instances suggested a
desire for greater flexibility surrounding sources in order to ensure material jurisdiction and greater
protection for victims. 
The overall dataset was not very large, yet the reliance on sources was abundant – this shows that
Tribunals rarely bolstered their understanding of sources through philosophy. The post-WWII IMTs’
data  was  mixed  with  both  natural  law and positivism used.  Neither  approach  enjoyed  a  clear
ascendancy under the judiciaries but the general trend between the prosecutors and defence as one
between  natural  law  and  positivism  remained  intact  (albeit  with  the  prosecutors  increasingly
favouring natural law alongside positivism in a Grotian approach). At the post-Cold War Tribunals,
which meant essentially the ICTY, the utilisation of sources – where philosophy was undoubtedly
present – revealed mostly natural law. Issues never adjudicated previously arose before the ICTY
66 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) para 439. The ‘common
denominators’ notion is from Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 178.
67 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković  (Judgment) IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) paras 440-457.
68 See DH van Zyl, Justice and Equity in Cicero (Academica 1991) 90-93.
69 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 22-28.
70 B  Van  Schaak,  ‘Crimen  Sine  Lege:  Judicial  Lawmaking  at  the  Intersection  of  Law  and  Morals’ (2008)  97
Georgetown Law Journal 138. See also F Pocar, ‘Criminal Proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (2006) 5 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 91.
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which invited the coalescing of  lex lata and  lex ferenda.  The overall trend under this code when
viewed holistically from the post-WWII IMTs to the ICTY was therefore mixed, but slanted more
towards natural law (especially when including counsel). To sum up the coded data against Fuller’s
desiderata: philosophical category was established and made public. Some degree of philosophical
contradiction  existed  at  the  post-WWII  IMTs,  whereas  the  position  in  the  ICTY  was  more
consistent. The desideratum of non-contradiction could be addressed, however, by noting the code’s
rarity  (whether  at  the  IMTs  or  the  ICTY)  and  its  consistent  functional  objective  to  justify
institutional  legitimacy  or  to  ensure  material  jurisdiction  through  broad  understandings  of  the
sources to be applied. Some degree of predictability and foreseeability thus existed. None of the
other desiderata had a noteworthy impact on the coded data. 
3.3 Substantive crimes
Coding now turns toward the ICL role-players’ understanding of the philosophical underpinnings of
the  crimes  they  deal  with.  This  code  considers  the  patterned  use  of  philosophical  arguments
regarding the nature and basis  of  these crimes.  Like the previous  code on sources,  substantive
crimes delivered a small dataset. It will also be structured around the post-WWII IMTs and the post-
Cold War Tribunals as respective clusters. 
From  the  Nuremberg  counsel,  only  Shawcross  and  De  Menthon  ventured  philosophical
understandings of crimes. Shawcross invoked posited sources to suggest aggression’s criminality in
international  law.  However,  conceding  that  the  criminality  was  not  as  well  established  as  the
forbidden nature thereof, he additionally resorted to natural law to argue that the criminalisation
was fully consistent with justice, common sense and the overarching aims of international law.71
This ostensibly was a belt and braces justification as aggression was considered criminal in terms of
posited sources, but in case of doubt natural law also supported it. The cumulative use of natural
law and positivism suggested a Grotian approach.
De Menthon requested that the Nuremberg IMT ‘qualify juridically as crimes,  both the war of
aggression  itself  and  those  acts  in  violation  of  the  morality  and  of  the  laws  of  all  civilized
countries’.72 The calculated and malevolent violation ‘against spirit’, which flowed naturally from
71 H Shawcross in  Trial  of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal ,  Nuremberg, Vol.
III:94-104 for sources cited. 
72 F de Menthon in  Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol.
V:370.
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Nazi ideology, underpinned the Nazi crimes.73 De Menthon also included a discussion on ‘crimes
against the human status’.74 For him, turning human beings into means rather than ends resulted
from  the  animalistic  understanding  of  man  proposed  by  the  Nazis.75 Although  vaguely  these
‘criminal acts were committed in violation of...[especially] the Hague Convention’,76 the posited
basis thereof was negligible in comparison to the exposure to the wicked regime which abased man
and saw a return to barbarism. The resultant inhumanity, premised on race, become a principle or ‘a
doctrine of disintegration of modern society’ necessarily leading to aggressive war and systematic
criminality  therein.77 The  implication  was  that  the  violation  of  civilisation’s  basic  values  was
unacceptable and represented a strong (natural law) basis to justify jurisdiction over the crimes of
aggression and humanity. Implicit in this argument is the natural law notion that by proving the sin,
one proves the crime as the crime inevitably follows the sin.78
At Tokyo, in addition to the IMT Charter, Keenan relied on the Kellogg-Briand Pact and Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to establish the posited illegality of aggression. Like the Nuremberg
argument, the broader interpretation needed to show illegality exceeded strict positivism.79 Keenan
and Brown expressly argued that  natural  law is  ‘essential  to  afford materials  for  a  satisfactory
definition’.80 They suggested that  criminality  could be ascertained by establishing which nation
wrongfully, ‘in a moral sense’, began to assault another thereby threatening the common good of
international society.81 The defence, per Takanayagi, analysed the posited sources, relied on by the
prosecutors, to prove that their provisions did not support said criminalisation.82 The natural law-
positivism dialectic between the prosecutors and defence was thus perpetuated on this argument at
Tokyo.
Although genocide was not charged in the post-WWII trials and the Genocide Convention was only
created  in  1948,  it  was  debated  by  persons  who  had  participated  in  the  post-WWII  trials.
Interestingly, Brown, juridical consultant at Tokyo, presented testimony on the Convention in 1950
and continued, as was done at Tokyo, to stress the natural law basis of international law. For him,
the basis of genocide was found in the writings of scholastic natural lawyers. This crime was to be
73 Ibid 373-375.
74 Ibid 406.
75 Ibid 406-412.
76 Ibid 412.
77 Ibid 378.
78 Ibid 378-379.
79 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 120-121. See also Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 415-419.
80 Keenan and Brown (n 12) 58. 
81 Ibid.
82 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 144-42 159.
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understood based on the ‘concept of the spiritual, mental, biological, and moral solidarity of the
human race, and on the ideal of the Brotherhood of Man’.83 Injustice arose because the persons
targeted for destruction were innocent in terms of natural law. It was the ‘inviolable sacredness of
the human beings’ which led to  the moral  and juridical  values  of the group which were to be
protected in terms of the Convention.84
Congruent with earlier codes, therefore, the post-WWII prosecutors showed consistent preference
for natural law in their arguments pertaining to sources. The selected defence counsel also remained
consistently  positivist  in  their  argumentation.  On the  rule  of  law argument  pursued here,  such
consistency ensured predictability and foreseeability of position adopted by the respective parties.
However, the small dataset meant that these are limited findings.
Turning to the IMTs, as noted under the just war code,85 the Nuremberg IMT attempted to base the
crime of aggression on the posited Kellogg-Briand Pact. The IMT’s conclusion that ‘the solemn
renunciation of  war  as an instrument  of national  policy necessarily  involves [the illegality  and
criminality  thereof]’,86 suggested  an  interpretation  in  excess  of  strict  positivism.  Moving  from
renunciation to illegality to criminality without explicit posited provisions to that effect, inclined the
basis for this crime towards natural law despite reliance on a posited source.
The Tokyo majority  primarily  directed its  philosophical  justifications under  the code of  crimes
towards  aggression.  It  found itself  bound by its  Charter  and,  siding with  the  prosecution  (and
Nuremberg judgment), ascribed the illegality of aggression to the Kellogg-Briand Pact based on an
expansive reading.87 The majority, however, seemed to depart further from positivism as it omitted
to furnish a clear definition of aggression, apparently amenable to the suggestion that a judge can
easily  function  in  the  absence  of  a  precise  definition.88 Pal  responded to  this  in  a  way which
juxtaposed the philosophies at play:
‘One of the most essential attributes of law is its predictability. It is perhaps this predictability which makes
justice according to law preferable to justice without law,—legislative or executive justice. The excellence of
justice according to law rests upon the fact that judges are not free to render decision based purely upon their
83 Keenan and Brown (n 12) 164-165 presenting testimony to the Subcommittee on Genocide of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Cf. A Augustine, ‘The City of God against the Pagans’ in RW Dyson (tr), Augustine The City
of God against the Pagans (CUP 2007) IV.4, XI.1, XIV.4-28 on the world-state.
84 Keenan and Brown (n 12) 166.
85 See section 2.3.
86 Tokyo Majority Judgment 25.
87 Ibid 120-121.
88 Ibid 122-124.
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personal predilections and peculiar dispositions, no matter how good or how wise they may be. To leave the
aggressive character of war to be determined according to “the popular sense” or “the general moral  sense”
of the humanity is to rob the law of its predictability.’89
Pal’s  argument  favoured predictability  rather  than the moral  sense of humanity.  This  sentiment
opposes the common sense and morality usually associated with natural law as substantive sources
of law. It could be seen as favouring the  lex lata rather than the lex ferenda. More generally,  Pal
rejected  the  crime  of  aggression  on  the  ‘appeals  to  the  developed  character  of  international
community, to the laws of nature as also to a widening sense of humanity’ because they still had ‘to
pass through some adequate social process in order to develop into law’.90 Pal doubted whether the
claim of natural law ‘that its doctrines should be accepted as positive law is at all sustainable’.91
Finally, after a thorough review of the relevant extant posited law, Pal concluded that the criminality
of the charge was not established during the impugned period.92 Pal’s clear positivism contributes to
delineating the natural law argument of the majority because it sharpens the contrast between them.
The  other  dissenting  judges  were  not  homogeneous  in  their  findings  on  the  criminal  basis  of
aggression  either.  As  Webb  found  the  Kellogg-Briand  Pact  too  indeterminate  to  conclude  that
aggression was a crime, he turned to natural law. In a draft of his reasons for judgment, relying on
Cicero, he considered aggression to be contrary to ‘the dictates of right reason’.93 In his final draft
judgment, however, he considered the justiciability of aggression during the time in question not to
be unequivocal. He began by basing the aggression charges on declarations of the Assembly of the
League of Nations and the Sixth Pan-American Conference, before adopting a broad interpretation
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact,  to  conclude that  the illegality  of  aggression was intended.94 In  his
separate opinion, he followed the majority vesting criminalisation on the Pact as well as Japan’s
agreement to the criminalisation. Still ambiguous, he reiterated his draft judgment view that the
criminality of aggression could be based on natural law.95 This dialectic between posited sources
and natural law suggested a Grotian approach.
For Bernard the foundations of the crime of aggression were in natural law. In a draft document he
ascribed the condemnation of aggressive wars (which predated WWII) and liability for punishment
89 Pal Dissent 234-235.
90 Ibid 131, 133. See also Boister and Cryer (n 28) 131.
91 Pal Dissent 150. See also Boister and Cryer (n 28) 131.
92 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 285. See ibid at 121-124 for his views on the Kellogg-Briand Pact. See also Pal Dissent 69-
153.
93 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 130 and the sources in footnote 138.
94 Webb Separate Opinion 3.
95 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 130 and footnote 139. See also Webb Separate Opinion 6.
90
of the perpetrators to universal conscience.96 In his dissent, he based the criminality of aggression
on the fact that ‘war is and always has been a crime in the eyes of reason and universal conscience –
expressions of natural law upon which an international tribunal can and must base itself to judge the
conduct of the accused’.97 
In contrast to both Webb and Bernard, yet in agreement with Pal, Röling relied on positivism to
establish  whether  crimes  against  peace  had  become  justiciable.  Therefore,  the  judge  inquired
whether  various  international  instruments  and  institutions  changed  the  position  of  positive
international  law,  which  had  historically  accepted  war  as  legitimate.98 On  his  analysis  these
instruments did not establish criminality. The crime against peace was found to have developed only
after 194399 and culminated in the provisions of the London Agreement of 1945.100
The post-WWII judiciaries thus delivered an inconsistent dataset. The Nuremberg IMT delivered a
negligible  dataset  while  the  Tokyo IMT produced an  inconsistent  dataset  with  natural  law,  the
Grotian approach and positivism all supported. Sense could possibly be made of the inconsistency
by  noting  that  the  natural  law  and  Grotian  arguments  attempted  to  legitimate  the  crime  of
aggression (majority, Webb and Bernard) while the positivist arguments tended to undermine the
legal status of this crime (Röling and Pal). Added to this, the small dataset must be noted too.
Like the sources code, only the ICTY amongst the post-Cold War bodies delivered data on crimes.
While the majority of data pertained to crimes against humanity, a single justification on genocide
was also ventured. The dataset was accordingly very small. The subsequent discussion will follow
the genocide and crimes against humanity arguments as respective focal points.
The Stakić AC questioned whether the group targeted for genocide could be defined negatively as
was  done in  Jelisić.101 The  approach of  the  majority  can  be illuminatingly  contrasted  with  the
dissent of Shahabuddeen. The majority, reliant on posited materials and a literal interpretation of
Article 4 of the ICTY Statute, rejected the negative definition.102 Consequently, genocide could not
96 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 130 and footnote 143.
97 Bernard Dissent 10.
98 Röling Dissent 11-14.
99 During which Stalin gave a speech commemorating the 26th anniversary of the Revolution, the Cairo Conferences
Statement was issued and the Report of Commission I of the London International Assembly was handed down.
100 Röling Dissent 17-33, 41-44.
101 See Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgment) IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999) para 71 which based its finding on the purpose
of the Genocide Convention and the Final Report of the Commission of Experts established under SC Res. 780
(1992) para 96.
102 Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006) paras 20-22.
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be committed against non-Serbs, but rather had to be proven against Bosnian-Muslims and Bosnian-
Croats  separately.103 Shahabuddeen  exceeded  these  posited  materials  and  invoked  a  purposive
argument.  ‘Belonging  to  a  “group”  other  than  that  of  the  perpetrator’  was  sufficient  for
Shahabuddeen,  despite  the drafting history of the Genocide Convention which pointed towards
specific  groups,  as  it  would  better  facilitate  the  liberation  of  mankind  from  the  scourge  of
genocide.104 Reliance on such teleology without RoR direction thereto and, seemingly, contrary to
posited materials suggested natural law.105 This approach also clearly contrasts with the majority.
In Stakić, wherein Schomburg presided, the TC revisited the displacement across a national border
requirement of deportation under Article 5(d) of the ICTY Statute. In the process, the TC relied on
the  dictionary  meaning  of  the  term  as  well  as  Roman  law  to  base  the  reason  for  criminal
responsibility  in  ‘forcibly  removing...individuals  from  the  territory...in  which  they  have  been
lawfully present...and not the destination resulting from such a removal’.106 Aware of its departure
from earlier  ICTY jurisprudence,  the TC further argued that persisting with the national border
requirement ‘would not sufficiently take into account the broader meaning of the word, the initial
concept, the legislator’s purpose and the sense and spirit of the norm’.107 Before the AC could render
judgment on Stakić, the Brđanin TC rejected the reliance on these policy considerations rather than
on law: 
‘While  [Stakić]...may  advance  excellent  policy  arguments  in  favour  of  dispensing  with  a  cross-border
element for the crime of deportation, the [TC] is not convinced that this reflects [CIL] as it stood at the
relevant time. It is [CIL], and not policy, which the [TC] is bound to apply’.108
The Stakić AC responded by considering extant treaties, case law and CIL to find that deportation
required  the  crossing  of  a de  jure or,  in  certain  cases,  a  de  facto border.  It  rejected  the  TC
submission that crossing ‘constantly changing front-lines’ might constitute deportation for want of
evidence under CIL.109 The policy arguments adopted by the Stakić TC were thus critiqued by both
the AC and Brđanin TC because it ostensibly exceeded posited legal sources.
103 Ibid para 36.
104 Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006) Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen
paras 11-13, 17 also supporting the Final Report of the Commission of Experts (n 101) para 96.
105 RWM Dias, Jurisprudence (3rd edn, Butterworths 1970) 381; BH Bix, ‘Natural Law: The Modern Tradition’ in Jules
Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 66, 98.
See also Hart (n 19) 184-188.
106 Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) paras 674-677.
107 Ibid para 684.
108 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 542.
109 Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006) paras 300-302. However, see the opposite view, ibid,
Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen paras 56, 69-72.
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Two months after  judgment in the  Stakić AC, Schomburg revisited the matter in  his  dissent  in
Naletilić and Martinović. Continuing from his earlier arguments, he noted that the formal cross-
border requirement would practically impede deportation’s existence in the former Yugoslavia.110
For Schomburg the crime had ‘to take into account social developments in a globalized world and
should not be based on a formalistic-historical understanding of jurisprudence’.111 Posited authority
was thus again circumvented in favour of teleological and policy considerations. Although strictly
part of the interpretation code, it bears noting that Schomburg invoked the Vienna Convention on
the Law of  Treaties  (VCLT)  to  substantiate  his  understanding of  deportation  on a  teleological,
literal, systematic and value-oriented construction thereof.112 While the initial argument inclined to
natural law, the latter reliance on the VCLT to refer to values suggested ILP. However, given his
earlier argument in the Stakić TC, this recourse to the VCLT seemed presentational at best. This was
therefore  a  consistently  natural  law  argument  in  excess  of  posited  sources  which  was  finally
bolstered through a posited source on interpretation techniques.  
The dataset at the ICTY was small and, on mere numbers, ostensibly evenly split. However, the data
revealed consistent support for positivism from the majorities. The exception occurred in the Stakić
TC  wherein  Schomburg  presided.  The  natural  law  arguments  appeared  in  dissents  (of  which
Schomburg was one thereby confirming some intra-jurist consistency).
Overall, coding for philosophical justifications in relation to substantive crimes produced a small
dataset  which  was  inconsistent  for  purposes  of  the  rule  of  law.  The  post-WWII  IMTs  again
essentially repeated the familiar pattern between the selected prosecutors and defence counsel as
between natural law and positivism respectively. This cannot be overstated though as the datasets
were small.  In both IMT judgments  aggression was based on a  natural  law reading of  posited
sources. The separate opinions at Tokyo, however, were evenly split between positivism and natural
law.  The  post-Cold  War  dataset  was  extremely  small  and  ostensibly  revealed  contradictory
justifications. On the intra-jurist level Schomburg consistently used natural law, while, on the inter-
jurist level Shahabuddeen was consistent with Schomburg. Sense can be made of the mixed results
if one recognises that the majority decisions consistently favoured positivism whereas the dissents
favoured natural law. 
110 Prosecutor v Naletilić and Martinović (Judgment) IT-98-34-A (3 May 2006) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Schomburg paras 16-18.
111 Ibid para 19. See also Prosecutor v Simić, Tadić and Zarić (Judgments) IT-95-9-T (17 October 2003) para 130. 
112 Prosecutor v Naletilić and Martinović (Judgment) IT-98-34-A (3 May 2006) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Schomburg paras 22-29.
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Considering  the  ICL  jurisprudence  against  the  Fullerian  requirements  overall,  naturally  the
justifications  were  established  and  public.  The  dataset  was,  however,  somewhat  contradictory
whether intra-curially (Tokyo IMT; possibly ICTY) or inter-curially (post-WWII measured against
post-Cold War). Although these positions were not quickly changed, they did vary from time to
time. The other desiderata did not apply.  Bearing in mind the total amount of ICL jurisprudence,
judiciaries rarely utilised philosophy in connection with substantive crimes, which removes much of
its threat for the rule of law. The contradictory views might be understood on the basis that the
Tokyo  role-players  were  confronted  by  a  charge  with  a  tenuous  basis  in  posited  law.  The
contradictions  in  the  ICTY can  be  understood  mindful  of  the  majority-minority  divide.  If  the
majority views are considered there is a broadly consistent support for positivism. In sum, while
they exerted some pressure on the rule of law, these justifications did not undermine predictability
and foreseeability in ICL.
3.4 Legality as principle of international criminal responsibility 
Legality is directly relevant under Fuller’s rule of law desideratum against retrospectivity which
necessitated coding for philosophy used in conjunction with it.113 The legality principle consists of
nullem crimen sine lege  and nulla poena sine lege, i.e. criminalisation and penalisation prior to
criminal  prosecution  (hereafter  ‘legality’  or  ‘NCSL’).114 NCSL  protects  against  arbitrary,
retrospective accusations and has, unsurprisingly, often been invoked by the defence at ICL judicial
bodies.115 The  first  codification  of  this  principle  in  international  law occurred  in  the  Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, i.e. after the Nuremberg and Tokyo judgments.116
Subsequent international human rights (IHR) instruments also adopted the rule.117 Apart from the
ICC Statute, the  legality principle is absent from ICL statutes. Thus, although contained in many
domestic  legal systems as well  as IHR instruments,  its  full  incorporation into ICL is  yet  to be
attained.118 The lack of a robust legality rule in ICL has been attributed to the dawn of the field
113 LL Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 51-62.
114 Van Schaak (n 70) 121. See also SL Paulson, ‘Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg’ (1975) 4  Philosophy &
Public Affairs 151; M Shahabuddeen, ‘Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive Development
of Law?’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1008.
115 See, for e.g., Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1
(2 October 1995) paras 139-141; Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction)  IT-94-1 (2 October 1995)  Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa para 72;  Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić,
Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) paras 107-115; 173.
116 Article 11(2). 
117 E.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 15(1).
118 Van Schaak (n 70) 122-123. Contrast ICC Statute art. 22(1) and 24(2) with  the pronouncement in  Prosecutor v
Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 403. 
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when charters were laying down new rules of law.119 Because the legality principle itself is a rather
recently posited rule and not ubiquitous in ICL instruments, the Tribunals’ understanding of its
foundation and nature often revealed philosophy. Furthermore, how its imperatives were dealt with
was also important, i.e. were they complied with strictly or circumvented. Both the principle of
NCSL itself and the reaction to its directives were revelatory of positivism and natural law. This
code, like policy and interpretation,120 will also be shown to anticipate the two liberalisms in ICL,
namely  victim-centred  (HR  liberalism)  and  accused-centred  (criminal  law  liberalism).121 The
analysis will be per jurisdiction due to the size of the respective datasets. 
At Nuremberg, Jackson premised his arguments on the authoritative nature of the Charter (which
for Rudenko was conclusive122) yet anticipated the charge that the Charter embodied law which was
not ‘authoritatively declared at the time [the accused] did the acts it condemns’.123 Bearing in mind
that NCSL was not yet codified in international law at this stage, Jackson used the defendants’
disregard for and abuse of law as justification for removing them from the ambit of NCSL.124 This
suggested a natural law tu quoque sentiment.125 For Jackson retrospective law hindered people to
‘be protected in relying upon the law at the time they act’.126 Accordingly, because the Nazi accused
did not follow the law, they could not enjoy the protection of the law at the time of their actions. 127
By considering the underlying purpose of legality, Jackson removed the accused from the ambit of
NCSL.
In contrast, Jackson also suggested that: ‘The refuge of the defendants can be only their hope that
international law will lag so far behind the moral sense of mankind that conduct which is crime in
the moral sense must be regarded as innocent in law’.128 Implicit here, the law-as-it-is may differ
from the law-as-it-ought-to-be in traditional positivist vein.  
Lastly, Jackson noted (ostensibly anticipating the Hartian development from primitive to full legal
119 Van Schaak (n 70) 123.
120 See sections 2.5 and 3.5 respectively.
121 See section 6.3 and D Robinson, ‘A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’ (2013) 26 Leiden
Journal of International Law 148-149.
122 RA Rudenko in  Trial  of  the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal ,  Nuremberg,  Vol.
XII:148.
123 Jackson (n 6) 143.
124 Ibid 144.
125 For tu quoque as natural law defence, see H Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (Francis Kelsey tr, Clarendon
Press 1925) II.XX.III at 465-466. 
126 Jackson (n 6) 144.
127 Ibid 144. See also KC Moghalu, Global Justice The Politics of War Crimes Trials (Stanford Security Studies 2008)
37.
128 Jackson (n 6) 155.
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system through secondary rules of adjudication129) that the Nuremberg Charter marked a transition
where ‘men ceased to punish crime by “hue and cry” and began to let reason [and evidence and
law]  and  inquiry  govern  punishment’.130 Simply,  such  a  development  –  where  law and  reason
overrode  force  –  overruled  the  matter of  whether  the  Charter  originated  or  merely  recorded
crimes.131 This suggested that new law was better than no law or force. In the process arguments of
retrospectivity  were  weakened.  Retrospectivity  faced  a  chicken  and  egg  problem  here  since
retrospectivity had to be in conjunction with something and so receded when that something was
being established (and was perceived as an improvement of the status quo). This argument, which
emphasised  the development  of  ICL beyond its  primitive state  into  a  more  sophisticated  form,
strongly anticipated Hart. The most balanced interpretation of Jackson’s overall argument is thus the
mixed,  Grotian  approach,  wherein  natural  law and positvism are  both  used,  but  here  inclining
towards positivism.
Shawcross likewise anticipated Hart as rather than create a new crime or penalty, the Nuremberg
Charter  merely  enabled  a  competent  court  to  pronounce  judgment  where  the  international
machinery was previously lacking. Moreover, if this was retroactive lawmaking, Shawcross still
approved it as ‘fully consistent with...higher justice’ and an emanation of ‘the world’s sense of
justice’.132 This  argument  also  looked  to  the  increased  sophistication  of  the  ICL system whilst
bolstering such development with natural law concerns. Again this argument could be construed as
Grotian because it anticipated Hartian positivism while additionally invoking natural law.
Criticisms of the ‘lack of written texts to justify the penal [provisions to be applied by the IMT]’
moved  De  Menthon  to  argue  that  crimes  against  humanity  were  essentially  common  crimes,
recognised  by  the  laws  of  all  states,  which  were  merely  directed  at  political  objectives  and
undertaken  in  a  systematic  manner.133 This  argument  was  echoed  by  Dubost,  Shawcross  and
Rudenko.134 Emphasising the universal nature of the crimes to circumvent the lack of their posited
basis pointed to natural law. This is especially clear when the opposition to such universality of
129 Hart (n 19) 89-96.
130 R Jackson  in  Trial  of  the  Major  War  Criminals  Before  the  International  Military  Tribunal,  Nuremberg,  Vol.
XIX:398.
131 Ibid.
132 Shawcross (n 71) 106.
133 De Menthon (n 72) 372.
134 C Dubost in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. XIX:537;
H Shawcross in  Trial  of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal ,  Nuremberg, Vol.
XIX:448; Rudenko (n 122) 149; RA Rudenko in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. XIX:575.
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domestic crimes from defence counsel is borne in mind.135
The Nuremberg IMT engaged with legality in connection with the crime of aggression. The defence
contended that no sovereign had criminalised aggressive war at the time of WWII, that no legal
instrument defined the crime nor prescribed the penalty for its perpetration and that no judicial body
had been appointed for its vindication.136 The IMT responded that NCSL  ‘is not a limitation of
sovereignty,  but  is  in  general a  principle  of  justice’.137 Legality  was  not  a  posited  principle
compelling  compliance.  Still,  congruent  with  NCSL directives,  the  IMT investigated  whether
aggression had become criminalised in posited international law. It relied on its own Charter to
confirm the criminality and illegality thereof before considering the extent to which aggression was
considered a crime prior to the London Agreement.138 The IMT invoked various posited sources, but
then  proceeded  to  read  them  in  a  very  flexible  manner  where  logic  dictated  the  constructed
meanings.139 The IMT further referred to several ‘posited’ instruments which, however, were either
not ratified, only at draft stage or merely declarations.140 The reading afforded to these sources also
exceeded the confines the text allowed. In sum, if the philosophical position of the IMT can be
called positivist in this regard, it is at best only presentational positivism. The IMT supported this
notional positivism with explicit natural law when it argued that it is just to punish those who attack
neighbouring countries in violation of treaties and assurances because ‘the attacker must know that
he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong
were allowed to go unpunished’.141 The IMT thus used an ‘it stands to reason’ argument in addition
to its presentational positivism to dictate the necessity of punishment for perpetrators of aggression.
Finally,  the  Tribunal  reasoned by analogy to indicate  that  despite  the  absence  of  criminalising
provisions, the rules contained in the Hague Convention had been enforced by military tribunals
and, consequently, ‘those who wage aggressive war are doing that which is equally illegal, and of
much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules of the Hague Convention’.142 This type of
analogical reasoning would hardly commend itself to a strict positivist and is therefore counted here
as natural law.143 
135 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 162. See Transcript 42 251-42 252.
136 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:219.
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid 219-221.
140 Ibid 221-222.
141 Ibid  219.  See  also  T Meron,  The Making  of  International  Criminal  Justice  A View From the  Bench Selected
Speeches (OUP 2011) 94, 111.
142 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:221.
See also Van Schaak (n 70) 128.
143 For agreement, see Moghalu (n 127) 35.
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In sum, counsel fell into the usual natural law-positivist divide as has been the case with previous
codes. The Nuremberg IMT relied, in positivist fashion, on its own charter, a qualification of NCSL
as a principle of justice (which implied it might be overridden as not formally posited) and through
a perusal of extant posited codifications such as the Kellogg-Briand Pact to support the prohibition
of aggression. However, natural law underpinned the IMT’s approach as substantive reason justified
punishment and the posited sources invoked were, in some cases, not yet authoritative and, in other
cases, read in a flexible,  expansive manner which rendered this positivism merely presentational.
Overall, the Nuremberg data thus confirmed consistent natural law justifications in conjunction with
NCSL.  While  this  ensured  compliance  with  Fuller’s  non-contradiction  principle,  the  ‘Hartian’
arguments of Jackson and Shawcross best explains why this loose understanding of NCSL did not
undermine  retrospectivity  for  rule  of  law purposes:  the  Nuremberg  proceedings  constituted  the
secondary rules needed to mature a primitive system into a full legal system.144
Natural law also shaped the argument of Keenan and Brown at Tokyo. For them the prohibition
against retroactive law did not allow the leaders of any nation to perpetrate a ‘criminally unjust
war’.145 A criminally unjust war was mala in se  and thus prosecutable. This quintessential natural
law  subordinated  strict  legality  to  substantive  justice.146 Legality  concerns  were  also  partly
responsible  for  the  (unprecedented)  murder  charges.  By  arguing  that  murder  was  universally
condemned in  legal  systems everywhere,  and therefore  by  analogy applied  to  the  international
sphere,  the  prosecution  relied  on  the  contention  that  murder  was  a  ubiquitous  rather  than  a
contingent rule to justify its inclusion.147 
Keenan conceded that individual responsibility for violations of international law perpetrated by
persons in an official capacity was without precedent. However, the necessity of such trials was
justified on the  basis  that  the very existence  of  civilisation  was at  stake.148 This,  coupled with
Keenan’s claims that ‘the art of destruction has proceeded to such a state that the world cannot wait
upon the debating of legal trivialities’ and ‘the first universally recognised doctrine is that self-
preservation is the first law of nature’, confirmed his natural law.149 The IMT was cast as defender
144 Hart (n 19) 89-96.
145 Keenan and Brown (n 12) vi.
146 A Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 2003) 22, 139-145.
147 See Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 424. See also Boister and Cryer (n 28) 158.
148 Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 459.
149 Ibid 460-461. See  T Hobbes,  Leviathan (R Tuck tr, Cambridge University Press 2007) 91; T Aquinas, ‘Summa
Theologiae’ in RW Dyson (tr), Aquinas Political Writings (Cambridge University Press 2008) IaIIae 94.2 for self-
preservation in natural law arguments.
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of the self-preservation of the international community and this justified its jurisdiction despite lack
of positive law. 
 
Keenan and Brown added that NCSL was not contravened at Tokyo. In the absence of a world
constitution, for them, the Charter could not have contravened any express or implicit constitutional
provision dealing with NCSL. They reiterated that NCSL was not yet a rule of positive law in the
international community at this stage as it existed on the ‘juridical or natural law plane’.150 On their
natural law the issue was whether a particular act was criminal in terms of ‘ius, custom and the
objective  moral  order’ at  the  time  of  its  commission.  Because  the  accused  contravened  these
normative  systems,  the  subsequent  criminalisation  and  penalisation  of  their  actions  would  be
legitimate. Natural law regarded ‘the substance and not the shadow’. It sought to attain the purpose
behind NCSL which was to protect the innocent from injustice.151 Legality, on this view, emerged
only  to  redress  the  resultant  inequity  when  morals  were  separated  from  law.152 In  sum,  the
positivism adopted  by the  defence  was  criticised  for  taking pre-existing  lex as  its  cue  for  the
application of NCSL, whereas the prosecution’s natural law took pre-existing ius as its cue.153 While
there is arguably a Grotian suggestion here with lex and ius coexisting, the argument is clearly in
favour of ius, as opposed to the defence emphasis on lex, to circumvent NCSL. Such preference for
ius is completely congruous with traditional natural law.
Even when Keenan completed his argument by mentioning the posited recognition of the illegality
of Article 5 crimes, he undercut it by suggesting that regardless of the form by which this state of
affairs  was  created,  ‘it  was  with  the  full  realisation  that  the  dictates  of  humanity  and  the
requirements of civilisation demanded that these offences be recognised as such and placed beyond
the pale of civilised conduct’.154 The posited form of the crimes was downplayed in an argument
implicitly premised on the Martens clause and thus anticipating ILP. Even if the reliance on the
Martens clause is fully credited as ILP, undercutting the posited form of the crimes is congruent
with the overwhelming earlier natural law arguments.
 
Consistent with earlier codes, the defence adopted a strict positivist approach when it noted that the
universal (domestic) criminalisation of murder did not transform it  into a separate international
150 Keenan and Brown (n 12) 47.
151 Ibid 47-49.
152 Ibid 51.
153 Ibid 56.
154 Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 395-396.
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crime.155 Takanayagi  argued that  justice was ‘to be administered by established legal  rules  and
principles, not according to the sense of right and justice of the judge, however good or wise he may
be’.156 This  positivism  emphasised  the  lex  lata over  the  lex  ferenda and  law  over  morality.
Takayanagi’s final address pertaining to NCSL reiterated this:
‘Criminal law is a common consciousness of obligation coupled with an obligation to suffer penalties if it is
disregarded...The absence, as a patent fact of any such common penal consequences, prevents the existence
of such a penal  law. Whether there ought  or ought  not  to be such a consciousness of penal  liability is
irrelevant. In the absence of such a law, the imposition of such a law, the imposition of such penalties would
be nothing but unlawful violence’.157
In the absence of explicit penal provisions for what had hitherto been unjusticiable political action,
there was no ‘common consciousness of obligation to suffer the arbitrary penalties of military law
in case the obligations of international law are broken’.158 Takanayagi argued that NCSL was crucial
for  the  proper  administration  of  justice.159 As  its  incorporation  into  ICL  was  questionable,
Takanayagi also recognised the utility of vesting the NCSL rule on a universalist basis. Seemingly
Takanayagi accepted that NCSL should have been, rather than was, part of international law.160 This
was confirmed by his  admission that  NCSL was not  a  technical  rule  but  rather  one vested  on
‘natural and universal justice’.161 Thus, while he based NCSL on natural law by emphasising its
universal, pre-posited yet binding nature, its directive moved Takanayagi into positivism, i.e. no
crime nor punishment without posited provisions to this effect. 
The Tokyo IMT, like its  Nuremberg counterpart,  understood NCSL to be merely a principle of
justice.162 Patrick, MacDougall and Northcroft adopted a natural law understanding of the NCSL
principle  as  ‘rules  of  policy  or  law  susceptible  of  variation  or  modification  according  to  the
circumstances  within  the  limits  of  justice’.163 Bernard  likewise  jettisoned  a  strict  positivist
understanding of NCSL since the principle, in his view, served as a guideline in a system lacking a
constitutional order where retrospective laws were possible.164 Röling found NCSL to be ‘a rule of
155 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 161.
156 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 129. This reminds of Aristotle’s rejection of Plato’s philosopher-king
for which see AH Chroust, ‘Aristotle’s Criticism of Plato’s “Philosopher-King”’ (1968) 111 Rheinisches Museum für
Philologie Neue Folge 16-22. See similarly Pal Dissent 234-235 discussed above under substantive crimes in section
3.3.
157 Quoted in Boister and Cryer (n 28) 275-276. See also Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 111-42 112
reveals ‘unlawful’ to have been ‘lawless’. 
158 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 111-42 112. For Hart’s views on obligation, see Hart (n 19) 79-88.
159 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 129-42 132.
160 Ibid 42 133; 42 224.
161 Ibid 42 224.
162 Tokyo Majority Judgment 25-26.
163 Quoted in Boister and Cryer (n 28) 138.
164 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 138. See also Bernard Dissent 11 for an implicit rejection of NCSL from a natural law point
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policy,  valid  only if  expressly adopted’ and ‘an expression of political  wisdom, not  necessarily
applicable  in  present  international  relations...[which  may]  if  circumstances  necessitate  it,  be
disregarded’.165 Jaranilla decided to address the NCSL principle by distinguishing domestic law
from international law and submitting that the two should not be equated. Accordingly, even in the
absence of legislation Jaranilla found that a court may justifiably ‘punish acts universally accepted
as contrary to the law of nations’.166 That he was adopting natural law was confirmed by his reliance
on cosmopolitanism to conclude that the law should apply irrespective of territorial acceptance or
not.167 
In  contrast,  Pal  regarded the IMT obligated  to  ‘disregard  the provisions  of  the  Charter  if  they
diverged from pre-existing international law’.168 A tribunal which jettisoned NCSL would represent
a manifestation of power:
‘The  so-called  trial  held  according  to  the  definition  of  crime  now  given  by  the  victors  obliterates  the
centuries of civilization which stretch between us and the summary slaying of the defeated in a war. A trial
with law thus proscribed will only be a sham employment of legal process for the satisfaction of a thirst for
revenge. It does not correspond to any idea of justice’.169
Pal explicitly considered the (natural  law) issue of whether immorality  should be equated with
criminality. Clearly Japan’s conduct in Manchuria would ‘not...be applauded by the world’, yet Pal
found in light of the prevailing international law that ‘it would be difficult to condemn the [conduct]
as criminal’.170 Immorality and criminality were clearly separate on this  view which revealed a
predilection for traditional positivism against traditional natural law.
Overall  at  Tokyo,  Keenan and Brown,  Takanayagi  and the majority  vested the basis  of  NCSL
consistently  on justice,  i.e.  it  was  not  yet  a  posited rule.  Whereas  Keenan and Brown and the
majority also rejected rigid reliance on positivist sources in compliance with NCSL’s directives,
Takanayagi and Pal suggested the converse. The overall consistent approach was to accept NCSL as
a flexible principle which was subservient to the need to punish conduct mala in se.  Morality thus
dictated  whether  reliance  would  be  placed on NCSL.  The natural  law of  the  Tokyo IMT was
of view.
165 Röling Dissent 44-45. See also BVA Röling, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond Reflections of a Peacemonger (Antonio
Cassese ed, Polity Press 1993) 68-69.
166 Jaranilla Concurring Opinion 18.
167 Ibid.
168 Van Schaak (n 70) 132.
169 Pal Dissent 37.
170 Pal Dissent 483.
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consistent with that adopted at Nuremberg. On the post-WWII inter-curial dynamic, predictability
and foreseeability was ensured even though natural law was constantly used – the functional aim to
ensure jurisdiction remained consistent throughout. The Hartian maturation of the ICL system could
still explain why the Tokyo IMT did not contravene the retrospective desideratum of Fuller. 171 The
overarching support for natural law meant the vindication of victims’ rights (i.e. HR liberalism)
whereas  the  positivism of  the  defence  and Pal  ensured  greater  protection  for  the  accused  (i.e.
criminal law liberalism). Liberalism will be revisited in section 6.3.
Moving the scrutiny of NCSL as a code for philosophical position to the post-Cold War judicial
bodies, it needs reiteration that NCSL was codified in IHR instruments such as the UDHR in 1948
and the ICCPR in 1966. In ICL, as stated above, it was only in the 1998 ICC Statute that this
principle was codified. It is against this backdrop that the pronouncements of the judicial bodies of
this period have to be understood. Also the dataset does not purport to include every reference to
NCSL ventured  by the  role-players,  but  it  embodies  those  justifications  where  philosophy was
involved. Of course, consistency in philosophy remains the main structuring element. 
The  Erdemović TC raised legality on own initiative while considering Article 24(1) of the ICTY
Statute pertaining to sentencing. The TC utilised an argument in favour of substantive justice rather
than strict legality when it found that ‘...there is nothing absolute in that principle [of legality]. Its
operation  may  be  affected  by  other  principles  whose  recognition  concerns  equally  important
interests of justice’.172 Clearly, by supporting such a position, the TC echoed the positions of the
post-WWII IMTs. Legality was merely part of several principles applicable to give effect to justice
without definitive posited authority thereto.
In  Delalić,  the defence  argued that  vesting criminal  responsibility  on common article  3  of  the
Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  would  violate  NCSL under  Article  15  of  the  ICCPR.  Despite
uncertainty  ‘to  what  extent  [NCSL had]  been  admitted  as  part  of  international  legal  practice,
separate and apart from the existence of the national legal systems’,173 the TC inter alia relied on
Article 15(2) of the ICCPR to argue that the ‘purpose of this principle is to prevent the prosecution
and punishment of an individual for acts which he reasonably believed to be lawful at the time of
their commission. It strains credibility to contend that the accused would not recognise the criminal
171 Hart (n 19) 89-96.
172 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment)  IT-96-22-T (29  November 1996)  para 38 quoting  Rauter 16  ILR,
1949, 526 at 542-3 (Special Appeals Court, Netherlands).
173 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 403.  
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nature of the acts alleged in the Indictment’.174 Evidently, the posited basis of NCSL in ICL was not
yet  attained  and,  based  on  posited  materials  from IHR,  the  TC  subordinated  the  form of  the
principle  to  its  purpose.  This  approach  to  NCSL  was  supported  on  appeal  with  additional
corroboration from the posited Nuremberg IMT dicta that NCSL was a principle of justice and that
the obviousness of the wrong committed justified the punishment.175 Posited sources, which could
be construed as merely presentational, thus justified a departure from legality’s directives. 
In Krnojelac, the TC did not address the basis of legality, but accepted that its directives prevented
the introduction of a new and additional prohibited purpose pertaining to torture on the teleological
grounds that “the primary purpose of humanitarian law is  to  safeguard human dignity”.176 This
finding implicitly suggested that Furundžija and Kvočka exceeded legality on this point, the former
utilising teleology and the latter relying on the posited precedent thus established.177 In the context
of crimes against humanity, Mrkšić also subordinated teleological expansion to the requirements of
legality.178 These arguments suggest a preference for the  lex lata above the  lex ferenda which is
traditionally more typical of positivism. Yet, this approach was not consistently maintained in ICTY
jurisprudence. Not long after  Krnojelac, the TC (in a decision) relied on teleology to circumvent
NCSL. Consequently the object and purpose of ICL was invoked to prioritize accountability for
violations of international law against a NCSL argument that liability for superiors for acts of their
subordinates in NIACs was not yet established.179 However,  this approach was criticised by the
defence:
‘The protection of humanity and preservation of world order as the overriding aims of IHL cannot serve as a
basis to criminalise behaviour beyond the existing law. There would be no limits on the scope of IHL if the
only guiding criterion was whether the prosecution was broadly in the interests of the spirit of IHL. Where
the rights of the accused in a criminal  trial  are concerned,  utmost respect  for legality,  for  certainty and
foreseeability of the law is required’.180
174 Ibid paras 311-313. For the same argument in a different context, see Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-A (22
March 2006) Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen para 67.
175 Prosecutor v  Delalić,  Mučić,  Delić  and Landžo (Judgment)  IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) 293 footnote 1398
referring to Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg,
Vol.  I:219. See  also  Prosecutor  v  Milutinović,  Sainović  &  Ojdanić (Decision  on  Dragoljub  Ojdanić’s  Motion
Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003) para 37; Van Schaak (n 70) 140
for a comparable finding.
176 Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25-T (15 March 2002) para 186 quoting the purpose from Prosecutor v
Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 162.
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IT-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001) paras 141, 152, 157.
178 Prosecutor v Mrkšić, Radić and Šljivančanin (Judgment) IT-95-13/1-T (27 September 2007) para 460.
179 Van Schaak  (n  70)  141-145;  Prosecutor  v  Hadžihasanović,  Alagić  & Kubura (Decision  on  Joint  Challenge to
Jurisdiction) IT-01-47-PT (12 November 2002) paras 62-64, 97-101, 112-119, 172-73.
180 See Prosecutor  v  Hadžihasanović,  Alagić  & Kubura  (Interlocutory  Appeal  on  Decision  on  Joint  Challenge  to
Jurisdiction) IT-01-47-PT (27 November 2002) para 25.  See also Van Schaak (n 70) 144.
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This argument evidenced the tension between the rights of the accused and those of the victims.
These two aspects of liberalism are revisited in section 6.3. Here existing posited law was held to be
necessary for the protection of accused rights while expansive teleological arguments, based on a
common morality, were downplayed. Positivism was preferred above natural law. 
 
In later ICTY cases a tendency developed to show a degree of deference to the directives of NCSL.
As mentioned above, under sources, the  Vasiljević TC incorrectly premised criminal liability on
prior criminalisation in customary law.181 Moreover, criminalisation could only occur if the CIL
prohibition was sufficiently precise and accessible at the particular time.182 Thus, although it was
identified in the Statute, the TC rejected the charges for ‘violence to life and person’ for lack of CIL
support. To enforce ‘anything contained in the statute of a court in excess of existing [CIL] would
be a utilisation of power and not of law’.183 The Blaškić AC continued in the same vein that NCSL,
which was based on IHR sources, required a crime to be proscribed at the time of its commission by
a rule of CIL above and beyond its existence in the ICTY Statute.184 Although the criminalisation of
the crime of terror was accepted by both the Galić AC and the Dragomir Milošević AC, the posited
basis of these findings were questioned in the dissents of Schomburg and Daqun respectively. Thus
Schomburg held in the Galić AC: ‘It would be detrimental not only to the Tribunal but also to the
future development of [ICL] and international criminal jurisdiction if our jurisprudence gave the
appearance  of  inventing  crimes  –  thus  highly  politicizing  its  function  –  where  the  conduct  in
question was not without any doubt penalized at the time when it took place’.185 For Daqun terror
could not be criminalised merely because it was serious: ‘“it is precisely when the acts are abhorrent
and deeply shocking that the principle of legality must be most stridently applied, to ensure that a
defendant  is  not  convicted out  of  disgust  rather  than evidence,  or  of  a  non-existent  crime”’.186
Clearly siding with positivism, lex lata rather than lex ferenda,  Daqun submitted that despite ‘the
need for such a crime, I cannot agree that the offence has been criminalised under [CIL]’.187
181 Section 3.2.
182 Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) paras 193-198.
183 Ibid paras 202-204.
184 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004) para 141.
185 Prosecutor v Galić (Judgment) IT-98-29-A (30 November 2006) Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Schomburg para 21.
186 Prosecutor  v  Dragomir  Milošević (Judgment)  IT-98-29/1-A (12  November  2009) Partly  Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Liu Daqun paras 1-5 quoting  Prosecutor v Norman  (Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of
Jurisdiction Child Recruitment) SCSL-2004-14-A (31 May 2004) para 12.
187 Prosecutor  v  Dragomir  Milošević (Judgment)  IT-98-29/1-A (12  November  2009) Partly  Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Liu Daqun para 29 footnote 59.
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Despite its dearth of judgments to date, the ICC produced one coded instance revealing philosophy
under NCSL. In  Katanga,  the TC vested NCSL on its  Statute and argued NCSL’s directives to
emphasise the law-as-it-is rather than law-as-it-ought-to-be:
‘Contrary to the founding texts of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, the Statute explicitly enshrines
the principle of legality...The primary task of the bench in criminal cases is the application and interpretation
of  the  law  but,  under  no  circumstances,  creation  of  the  law,  since  the  sole  purpose  of  the  bench’s
interpretative activity is to impart meaning to existing law’.188
This argument was congruous with the later ICTY judgments emphasising the lex lata rather than
the  lex  ferenda.  This  positivism was further  confirmed when any teleological  interpretation ‘to
create a body of law extraneous to the terms of the treaty’ was rejected.189 Added here was the
posited basis of the legality principle in the ICC Statute. 
The  SCSL also  engaged  with  legality  and  will  be  briefly  considered.190 In  the  Norman Child
Soldiers opinion,  the  AC gave  a  brief  overview  of  state  practice  to  indicate  that  enlisting  or
recruiting child soldiers was a war crime under CIL prior to its adoption in the  Rome Statute in
1998. The majority indicated that the prohibition reflected (what might be construed as natural
law191)  ‘important  values’,  yet  still  attempted  to  base  the  prohibition  on  positive  law.192 In  a
dissenting  opinion,  Robertson  argued  that  NCSL should  not  be  circumvented  to  ‘criminalise
conduct  which  [judges]  regard  as  seriously  anti-social  or  immoral,  but  which  have  not  been
outlawed by legislation or by established categories of common-law crimes’.193 For the majority,
therefore, morality played a role as to criminality, whereas Robertson rejected such a view as in
excess of positive law.
For purposes of this exposition all the post-Cold War ICL institutions are considered together for
consistency of  argument  as  they all  adjudicated  under  the  IHR codifications  of  NCSL and the
limited dataset from the ICC did not necessitate a separate finding. The ICTY showed an internal
shift from (natural law) substantive justice to (posited) strict legality.194 Its earlier cases tended to
188 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (7 March 2014)
paras 51-52.
189 Ibid paras 54-55.
190 See section 1.2.1.
191 As, for e.g., does Cryer (n 18) 252.
192 Prosecutor v Norman  (Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction Child Recruitment) SCSL-
2004-14-A (31 May 2004) paras 10-24, 28-29.
193 Prosecutor v Norman  (Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction Child Recruitment) SCSL-
2004-14-A (31 May 2004) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Robertson para 12.
194 Cassese (n 146) 22, 139-145.
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reflect on the non-posited basis of the principle and, consequently, to not strictly comply with its
directives. This shifted under later jurisprudence which increasingly reflected the posited basis of
the  principle,  albeit  under  IHR,  and  advocated  strict(er)  compliance  with  its  directives.  This
culminated in the ICC finding in Katanga wherein its posited statutory commitment to NCSL was
acknowledged. No data was coded from the ICTR and the inconsistent dataset from the SCSL was
only  illustrative.  As  with  the  post-WWII  IMTs,  the  circumvention  of  NCSL tended  to  favour
victims through easier findings of guilt (HR liberalism) while strict compliance tended to favour
accused (criminal law liberalism).
Coding for Fullerian consistency in philosophical category through NCSL produced a large dataset.
Although the principle of NCSL has been described as the defence’s strongest suit,195 matters are
complicated in the international arena where NCSL was only codified after the IMTs in IHR and
only  codified  in  ICL in  1998.  Therefore,  both  justifications  regarding  the  nature  of  NCSL as
principle  and justifications  regarding its  directives revealed philosophy.  Several  trends emerged
from ICL jurisprudence. The basis of NCSL as principle was consistently vested on justice (not
based  on  any  RoR)  throughout  the  post-WWII  IMTs  (including  selected  prosecutors,  defence
counsel and judges). This justification dovetailed the lack of codification of the principle in ICL at
the time. It also continued in the early cases of the ICTY before giving ground, in later cases, to
arguments emphasising its posited status (albeit in IHR). Regarding its directives, NCSL was often
subordinated  in  the  post-WWII  IMTs  to  substantive  justice.  Only  the  Tokyo  defence  and  Pal
required the utmost compliance with its directives. Also the IMT majorities took account of the
directives, but natural law and presentational positivism, which ensured flexible readings of extant
sources, circumvented them. At the ICTY there was an initial continuation of this flexible approach
to the NCSL directives.196 This showed that modern judicial bodies, at times, equated the ‘historical
international  condemnation  of  a  practice  with  its  criminalisation’.197 However,  the  ICTY
jurisprudence  increasingly adopted stricter  understandings  of  the directives  of  NCSL with later
cases  consistently  respectful  thereto.  This  culminated  in  the  ICC  which  also  adopted  a  strict
positivist understanding of both the basis of NCSL and its directives. 
 
This code directly engaged Fuller’s requirement of retrospectivity which takes on added importance
in the case of criminal law.198 While retrospectivity was clearly not in issue from the later ICTY
195 Cryer (n 18) 254.
196 See, for e.g., Van Schaak (n 70) 140-158. 
197 Van Schaak (n 70) 150. 
198 Fuller (n 113) 57-60.
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judgments on, the tension for this desideratum revolves around the post-WWII IMTs and the earlier
ICTY jurisprudence with their reliance on natural law. Jackson’s argument may be repeated that the
Nuremberg Charter marked a transition where ‘men ceased to punish crime by “hue and cry” and
began  to  let  reason  and  inquiry  govern  punishment’.199 Even  if,  for  argument’s  sake,  these
endeavours constituted retrospective law, new law was better than no law or force. Retrospectivity
can only be in conjunction with something, not when that something is being created. The IMTs and
early ICTY were essentially involved in establishing ICL. This development, in conjunction with
the increased – and later consistent – deference to NCSL, does not fall foul of the retrospectivity
desideratum  although  it  does  pressure  it.  On  Hartian  grounds  these  developments  could  be
construed as the emergence of secondary rules which, along with the primary rules of obligation,
indicated  the  maturation  of  a  legal  system.200 None  of  the  other  rule  of  law  principles  were
problematic in this case. The change in philosophical trend that occurred happened gradually and
was thereafter  consistently  adopted.  As was indicated throughout,  the flexible  understanding of
NCSL favoured  HR  liberalism  while  the  strict  understanding  thereof  supported  criminal  law
liberalism.201
3.5 Interpretation
Certain  interpretation  techniques  can  resonate  with  different  philosophies  thereby  necessitating
coding for them in this study.202 ELP, which holds morality to always be extra-legal, would tend to
rely on interpretation  techniques  that  ostensibly  did  not  require  interpretation  of  morality.  This
would give effect to the  lex lata rather than legislating afresh.203 For ILP, which could consider
morality part of the law through RoR direction thereto, techniques of interpretation more amenable
to using morality would be appealing.204 ILP and natural law could coincide, but natural law could
invoke morality  even without any posited authority thereto.205 Interpretation,  therefore,  revealed
philosophy at times. This code overlapped with sources and substantive crimes, but a case is made
here for a conceptual distinction between the three. This code, like NCSL, also exhibited the two
liberalisms because it tended to follow victim-or accused-centric approaches. While the post-WWII
IMTs  produced  no  instances  of  this  code  beyond  the  expansive  (natural  law)  interpretation,
199 Jackson (n 130) 398.
200 Hart (n 19) 89-96.
201 See section 6.3.
202 L Du Plessis, Re-Interpretation of Statutes (LexisNexis 2002) 89-119; Van Blerk (n 7) 217-230.
203 Bix (n 23) 32.
204 Ibid.
205 Dias (n 105) 383; D Beyleveld and R Brownsword, ‘The Practical Difference between Natural-Law Theory and
Legal Positivism’ (1985) 5  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 4; B Reynolds, ‘Natural Law versus Positivism: The
Fundamental Conflict’ (1993) 13  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 448; Cotterrell (n 7)  115;  Meyerson (n 7)  43;
Wacks (n 1) 10, 32.   
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discussed above, afforded to posited materials in the criminalisation of aggression, the post-Cold
War judicial bodies produced significant datasets. Subsequently, the ICTY and ICTR are discussed
together and the ICC separately for inter-curial comparison. 
At the post-Cold War Tribunals, philosophical underpinnings of interpretation were visible around
several  cluster  arguments,  namely  general  explanations  of  interpretation,  interpretation  built  on
human  dignity,  interpretations  revolving  around  the  protected  person  requirement  and
interpretations about JCE. The discussion on consistency of philosophy at the ICTY and ICTR will
follow these clusters rather than jurisprudence chronology for argumentative coherence. 
The first cluster pertains to general explanations of interpretation. Reliant on domestic case law, the
literal,  golden  and  mischief  rules  of  interpretation  were  noted  by  the  Delalić  TC.206 The  TC
favoured teleology since  a  ‘reasonable  as  well  as  a  purposive  interpretation,’ which  frequently
adjusts to the ever-changing forms of criminal conduct, was required.207 Although strict construction
was  the  starting  point,  it  was  ‘not  violated  by  giving  the  expression  its  full  meaning  or  the
alternative meaning which is more consonant with the legislative intent and best effectuates such
intent’.208 Since this approach was vested on posited domestic case law, it is coded as positivist.  
In his  Alekšovski TC dissent, Rodrigues adopted a literal interpretation of Article 2 of the ICTY
Statute, pertaining to grave breaches, to reject the international nature of the armed conflict as a
prerequisite element. While the protected person and property requirements, which emanated from
the Geneva Conventions,  were expressly included in the Statute,  the international nature of the
conflict was not.  A contrario if it was not written it was not required.209 The judge supported this
position through its congruence with the objectives of the ICTY to prosecute persons in ‘accordance
with the provisions imposed upon it by the Statute and not by any other legislative instrument’. 210
This extremely positivist approach (i.e. only what was explicitly written in the ICTY Statute was to
be  followed)  resulted  –  in  this  instance  –  in  an  increased  likelihood  of  conviction  (since  less
elements were required).
206 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) paras 161-165, 170. 
207 Ibid para 170. 
208 Ibid para 412. See also WA Schabas, ‘Interpreting the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals’ in LC Vohrah, F Pocar, Y
Featherstone  et al (eds),  Man’s Inhumanity to Man Essays on International Law in Honour of Antonio Cassese
(Kluwer Law International 2003) 852-855.
209 Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment) IT-95-14/1-T (25 June 1999) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rodrigues paras 29-
43.
210 Ibid para 43, 54. 
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In  contrast  to  these  positivist  arguments,  the  Alekšovski AC  stated  that  when  it  interpreted  a
provision, ‘it is merely identifying what the proper interpretation of that provision has always been,
even though not previously expressed that way’.211 This was approved and followed by a series of
ICTY and ICTR cases.212 It revealed the modernist belief in an enduring single true interpretation
despite prior misunderstandings. The language used is reminiscent of Finnis’ comparison of natural
law principles with mathematics principles which are perennial even though not always correctly
understood.213 This gives the interpreter significant leeway to shape a provision which could easily
exceed ILP and venture into natural law territory. The general principle here was not based on any
posited support either and is coded as natural law. 
Finally  under  the first  cluster,  in  Akayesu,  the prosecution raised issues  which would not have
impacted the verdict reached by the TC. In a dissent, Nieto-Navia rejected the majority’s argument
that it possessed ‘discretionary power to entertain such appeals’.214 In his opinion Article 24 of the
ICTR Statute was clear:
‘According to [Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT], the text of a treaty (in this case, the Statute) must be
presumed to be the authentic expression of the intent of the parties. Consequently, the ‘interpreter’ cannot set
aside the text of the document, with a view to consulting its ‘spirit,’ nor read into it “what [it] do[es] not,
expressly or by implication contain”’.215
This  approach  could  be  construed  as  ELP to  favour  a  stricter  interpretation  and  critique  the
majority’s broader one. Any consideration in excess of the treaty’s text would be unacceptable. This
approach sees teleology as an exception rather than the rule in contrast to Delalić wherein teleology
was preferred,216 but in conformity with Rodrigues in  Alekšovski,  where the Statute’s provisions
were conclusive.217 These general explications on interpretation revealed inconsistent natural law
211 Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment on Appeal) IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000) para 135. See Shahabuddeen (n 114)
1012-1013.
212 Prosecutor  v  Delalić,  Mučić,  Delić  and  Landžo  (Judgment)  IT-96-21-A (20  February  2001) paras  575-576;
Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29 November 2002) para 196; Prosecutor v Milutinović, Sainović &
Ojdanić (Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction: Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-
AR72 (21 May 2003) para 37; Prosecutor v Kordić & Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) para
310;  Prosecutor  v  Stakić (Judgment)  IT-97-24-A  (22  March  2006)  Partly  Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judge
Shahabuddeen paras 35-39;  Prosecutor v Ntagerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe (Judgment) ICTR-99-46-A (7
July 2006) para 127. See also M Shahabuddeen, International Criminal Justice at the Yugoslav Tribunal A Judge’s
Recollection (OUP 2012) 73.
213 J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980) 24.
214 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment on Appeal) ICTR-96-4-T (1 June 2001) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia
para 5.
215 Ibid.
216 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 170.
217 Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment) IT-95-14/1-T (25 June 1999) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rodrigues paras 29-
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and positivism.
The next cluster of philosophical justifications of interpretation revolved around the principle of
human dignity and its protection.  The  Furundžija TC argued that the ‘fundamental principle of
protecting human dignity...favours broadening the definition of rape’.218 Human dignity (which the
TC emphasised as the ‘basic underpinning and indeed the very raison d’être of [IHL and IHR]’219)
was  the  value,  the  protection  of  which  served  as  the  normative  standard  through  which  the
particular rules of IHL had to be understood and interpreted. Since there was no posited reference to
this  principle,  this  approach  seemed  in  excess  of  posited  authority  (and  thus  not  ILP).  This
suggested natural law. The Delalić AC continued the preference for teleology, by considering the
purpose of the Geneva Conventions to protect human dignity, to support the dissolution of the IAC
versus NIAC distinction. In contrast to its TC, under the first cluster argument, the AC ventured no
posited sources for this argument apart from a throwaway reference to Article 15(2) of the ICCPR
aimed at the general basis of the relevant crimes.220 Comparably, the  Alekšovski TC’s analysis of
common Article 3 used the underlying purpose of the Geneva Conventions, i.e. ‘the humanitarian
one of protecting the individual qua human being’ as the qualifying standard for the right of humane
treatment, which was not elaborated, thereby vesting the rule (humane treatment) on a particular
goal (protecting the individual in its capacity as human being).221 This teleological understanding of
the Convention was also not based on any posited authority.  The Kupreškić TC argued that broad
definitions of ‘civilian’ and ‘population’ were intended in the context of the rules prohibiting crimes
against humanity. These rules purported to ‘safeguard basic human values by banning atrocities
directed against human dignity’.222 The TC expanded these safeguards beyond civilians since ‘these
rules may be held to possess a broader humanitarian scope and purpose than those prohibiting war
crimes’.223 For the TC this justified a broad interpretation of Article 5, notwithstanding the explicit
limitation laid down in it, since the ‘limitation in Article 5 constitutes a departure from [CIL]’.224 By
extending  these  protections  to  combatants,  the  TC  reiterated  its  humanitarian  objectives  –
combatants were also human beings with value. On strict posited law, the drafters of the Statute
could have intended the more limited protection. In the Akayesu appeal, the Tribunal attempted to
clarify the ambit of civilian responsibility for violations of IHL in terms of Article 4 through a
218 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 184.
219 Ibid para 183.
220 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) paras 173-172.
221 Prosecutor  v  Alekšovski (Judgment)  IT-95-14/1-T  (25  June  1999)  para  49.  See  J  Hospers,  An Introduction  to
Philosophical Analysis (3rd edn, Routledge 1990) 350. 
222 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 547.
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teleological  construction  of  its  progenitor  provision,  namely  common  article  3  of  the  Geneva
Conventions. A reading of the ICRC Commentaries led to the finding that the ‘protection of victims
is...the core notion of common Article 3’ and led to the AC arguing that ‘the minimum protection
provided for victims under common Article 3 implies necessarily effective punishment on persons
who violate  it’.225 The AC utilised  the  VCLT to  justify  its  investigation  into  purpose,226 which
renders this approach ILP. The second cluster of interpretation arguments was consistently based on
natural  law,  with  only  Akayesu  reflecting  ILP.  This  revealed  an  underlying  concern  for  the
protection of victims which embodied HR liberalism.
The third cluster of philosophical arguments about interpretation, revolved around the protected
person requirement under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute pertaining to the grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions.  Article 4(1) of the Geneva Conventions defined protected persons as those
persons who ‘find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the
conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’. However, crucially for the Tadić AC
‘in  modern  inter-ethnic  armed  conflicts...new  States  are  often  created  during  the  conflict  and
ethnicity rather than nationality may become the grounds for allegiance...In such conflicts,...the text
and the drafting history..., and more importantly, the Convention’s object and purpose suggest that
allegiance to a Party to the conflict and, correspondingly, control by this Party over persons in a
given territory, may be regarded as the crucial test’.227 This expansive argument, wherein substance
surpassed form, was subsequently followed and repeated in a series of cases.228 In the absence of
posited RoR direction thereto, this argument suggested natural law. Moral considerations dictated
the legal position without a basis thereof in posited legal materials. This was ostensibly confirmed
225 Prosecutor  v  Akayesu  (Judgment  on  Appeal)  ICTR-96-4-T  (1  June  2001)  paras  432-443.  This  approach  was
followed with approval in Prosecutor v Musema (Judgment) ICTR-96-13-T (27 January 2000) para 274 as well as
Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 360.
226 Prosecutor  v  Akayesu  (Judgment  on  Appeal)  ICTR-96-4-T (1  June  2001)  para  433  footnote  799.  Ostensibly,
Prosecutor v Nyiramasuhuko et al (Judgment) ICTR-98-42-A (14 December 2015) para 2137 used the VCLT to
consider ordinary and contextual meaning in Article 3 of the ICTR Statute, but Prosecutor v Nyiramasuhuko et al
(Judgment) ICTR-98-42-A (14 December 2015) Dissenting and Separate Opinions of Judge Agius para 33 found
neither to have been used.
227 Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) para 166. See generally also, ibid, paras 164-169.
228 Although it must be noted that this argument was already pursued in Prosecutor v Rajić (Review of the Indictment
pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-95-12-R61 (13 September 1996) paras 35-37. Cases
that followed included, Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998)
paras 259-266;  Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgment)  IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999) para 70;  Prosecutor v  Blaškić
(Judgment) IT-95-14-T (3 March 2000) paras 125-145; Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment on Appeal) IT-95-14/1-A
(24  March  2000) paras  150-152;  Prosecutor  v  Delalić,  Mučić,  Delić  and  Landžo (Judgment)  IT-96-21-A (20
February 2001) paras 73-83;  Prosecutor v Kordić  and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-T (26 February 2001) paras
152-154; Prosecutor v Naletilić and Martinović (Judgment) IT-98-34-T (31 March 2003) paras 205-207; Prosecutor
v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 125; Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-
14/2-A (17 December 2004) paras 322-331; Prosecutor v Naletilić and Martinović (Judgment) IT-98-34-A (3 May
2006) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg para 20; Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment Volume 1
0f 6) IT-04-74-T (29 May 2013) para 100.
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when  Meron ascribed the more flexible interpretation to the ‘respect for human rights and for a
humanitarian interpretation’ which overrode a ‘literal and legalistic approach’.229 The subsequent
cases, however, relied on their predecessors for posited support despite embodying such expansive
arguments.  The  underlying  expansive  argument  continued  the  support  for  the  victims  of
international crimes (HR liberalism).
Finally, coding for philosophy through interpretation delivered results in conjunction with JCE as a
form of  criminal  responsibility  under  Article  7(1)  of  the  ICTY Statute.  Through  a  syllogistic
argument  based on the purpose of the ICTY Statute,  the  Tadić AC ‘read in’ a  further  form of
criminal participation. The AC submitted that ‘the Statute intends to extend the jurisdiction of the
International Tribunal to...all those who have engaged in serious violations of [IHL], whatever the
manner  in  which  they  may  have  perpetrated,  or  participated  in  the  perpetration  of  those
violations’.230 The AC equated the moral blameworthiness of such participants in JCEs with those
persons  actually  performing  the  impugned  acts.231 Although  these  arguments  exceeded  posited
sources,  the  AC bolstered  its  findings  with  CIL.232 The  outcome  of  the  argument  suggested  a
Grotian approach, considering both natural law and posited sources, at most.  Once the precedent
was created by Tadić, the subsequent cases simply relied on their posited predecessor.233 The Tadić
reasoning was implicitly reiterated when the Krajišnik AC rejected the defence contention that JCE
had  no  textual  basis  in  the  ICTY Statute  because  they  neglected  to  address  the  teleological
interpretation of the Statute. The fact that this ground of liability was also, in the ACs view, found in
CIL assured its applicability.234
The support intra-curially for JCE was not unanimous. Although it recognised the existence of JCE,
the Stakić TC was clearly uncomfortable with the concept and rather opted for co-perpetratorship.235
The Stakić AC, however, rejected co-perpetratorship as neither vested on CIL nor on the Tribunal’s
229 Meron (n 141) 53.
230 Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) paras 189-190. See also Robinson (n 121) 119-124.
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11-A (8 October 2008) para 80. See also Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001) para
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jurisprudence.  The AC found JCE to be established thus.236 Schomburg, who presided over  the
Stakić TC, again argued for the inclusion of co-perpetratorship in a separate opinion in the Simić et
al AC. The appeal for the inclusion of this mode of liability relied on a belt and braces approach still
concerned with the posited pedigree of JCE,  since ‘co-perpetratorship suits  the needs of  [ICL]
particularly  well’ and ‘reflects  existing  law at  least  since  the point  in  time when both  ad hoc
Tribunals  were vested with jurisdiction  ratione temporis’.237 In the  Martić AC, Schomburg again
noted the lack of posited basis for JCE in the Statute. He submitted that interpretation in excess of
the ‘explicit and exhaustive wording of Article 7’ could be construed as a contravention of NCSL.238
For Schomburg, a disservice is done to international justice when forms of individual responsibility
lack  ‘the necessary  explicit  basis  in  the Statute  of  the [ICTY]’.239 In  Šešelj,  Antonetti  likewise
expressed scepticism of JCE as he rejected group responsibility.240 He favoured strict construction
rather than the crafting of constructs to fill a void of prosecutorial investigation.241 These views
juxtapose with the majorities who adopted JCE. It clearly shows that JCE reasoning was held by
several judges to exceed the posited law and be problematic because of this fact.242 The contrast
between Tadić‘s Grotian approach and the positivism in the later cases is evident. While the overall
data  may  be  counted  as  positivist,  the  initial  argument  upon  which  the  later  cases  relied  was
expansive and controversial.  Subsequent cases, purporting to rely on the original argument as a
posited progenitor, merely perpetuated this expansive argument. These differences again reflected
the divide in ICL between human rights liberalism and criminal law liberalism as more expansive
interpretation  (which  JCE  was)  would  tend  to  vindicate  the  rights  of  victims  while  stricter
interpretation would tend to look after accused rights more.243
Coding  for  consistency  of  philosophical  justification  in  interpretation  techniques  at  the  ICC
delivered  a  moderate  dataset.  The  majority  of  cases  adopted  a  plain  meaning  approach  to
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Tolimir (Judgment) IT-05-88/2-A (8 April 2015) Separate and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Antonetti p 96.
241 Ibid  p  181-182.  See  also  Prosecutor  v  Tolimir (Judgment)  IT-05-88/2-A (8  April  2015)  Separate  and Partially
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Antonetti p 102.
242 Prosecutor v Tolimir (Judgment) IT-05-88/2-T (12 December 2012) para 886 for the defence view thus.
243 Robinson (n 121) 129-135. See also GP Fletcher and JD Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal
Law in the Darfur Case’ (2005) 3 JICJ 548-550. See section 6.3.
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interpretation.244 In a few instances this was contextualised against the object and purpose of the
provision.245 In one instance the ICC, reliant on the VCLT, welded these considerations together so
that ‘ordinary meaning...context...object and purpose...form a whole’.246 While this suggested ILP,
the  court  denied  that  the  aim  of  the  Statute  allowed  extraneous  law  in  excess  of  literal
interpretation.247 Moreover, while the object and purpose could be considered, it was further limited
by NCSL.248 In two instances teleological reasoning was rejected in favour of plain meaning. Thus,
in a decision,  the reliance on ‘social  alarm’ by the TC was found without posited basis  and in
Ngudjolo, Van Den Wyngaert subjected teleology to strict construction for criminal responsibility.249
Only one instance was coded where teleology was preferred. This was Odio Benito’s argument that
the prohibition of child recruitment ought to hold regardless of the nature of the group performing
the recruitment. This was in conflict with the majority who restated the posited statutory framework
of the ICC to reiterate the separation of IAC and NIAC.250 Teleology was clearly not very popular at
the  ICC thus  far.  The  Court  has  tended  to  favour  the  plain  meaning  approach.  Subordinating
teleology to plain meaning seemed to suggest a positivist (possibly even ELP) rather than a natural
244 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March
2012) paras 600-608, 979;  Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute)
ICC-01/04-02/12 (18 December 2012) Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van Den Wyngaert para 11; Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5 (1 December 2014) Separate
Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford paras 7, 13; Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr
Thomas  Lubanga  Dyilo  against  his  conviction)  ICC-01/04-01/06  A 5  (1  December  2014)  para  277;  Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction) ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5
(1  December  2014)  Partially  Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judge  Sang-Hyun  Song  paras  3-9;  Prosecutor  v  Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the “Decision on Sentence pursuant
to Article 76 of the Statute”) ICC-01/04-01/06 A 4 A 6 (1 December 2014) paras 62-64; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre
Bemba  Gombo (Judgment  pursuant  to  Article  74  of  the  Statute)  ICC-01/05-01/08  (21  March  2016)  para  75;
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-01/08 (21
March 2016) Separate Opinion of Judge Kuniko Ozaki para 27. 
245 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March
2012) paras 601, 979; Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo
against his conviction) ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5 (1 December 2014) para 277; Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment on the
appeal of Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction) ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5 (1 December 2014) Partially
Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judge Sang-Hyun Song paras  3-9;  Prosecutor  v  Jean-Pierre  Bemba  Gombo (Judgment
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-01/08 (21 March 2016) para 75; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji
paras 110-116, 139.
246 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (7 March 2014)
para 45.
247 Ibid paras 54-55.
248 Ibid paras 43-51. See, ibid, at para 1122 for interpretation encompassing the purpose and object of Statute. See also
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-01/08 (21
March 2016) para 77.
249 Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the Prosecutor’s
Application  for  Warrants  of  Arrest,  Article  58’ ICC-01-04 (13  July  2006)  para  66,  72;  Prosecutor  v  Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-02/12 (18 December 2012) Concurring
Opinion of Judge Christine Van Den Wyngaert paras 16-19. See also Cryer (n 18) 256-257. 
250 Thomas Lubanga Dyilo  (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012)  para
539;  Thomas Lubanga Dyilo  (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March 2012)
Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito para 13.
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law (or  even ILP) approach.251 By favouring  stricter  adherence  to  plain  meaning,  the  rights  of
accused seemed to be preferred (i.e. criminal law liberalism). For rule of law purposes here, the
favouring of posited law was consistent.
Interpretation as code revealed a large dataset at the ICTY and ICC. The ICTR revealed a negligible
dataset. The query into consistency for rule of law will thus revolve around the ICTY and ICC data.
In the ICTY, pronouncements on interpretation were often made to justify exceeding the bounds of
the text. Teleological interpretation was ubiquitous. Literal interpretation was occasionally invoked
to oppose expansive strategies argued for by colleagues. Based on the explicit pronouncements, it
would  be  safe  to  agree  with  Van  Schaak’s  submission  that  the  ICTY,  at  times,  ‘...evince  a
“normative bias” visible  in other  forms of international legal discourse favouring “international
legal completeness, predictability, coherence, and dynamism” at the expense of strict textualism or
deference to the prior intentions of states. This quest for coherence often leads to decisions that
render [ICL] a more comprehensive and holistic body of law’.252 Underpinning all the ICTY data
was a victim-centred, expansive interpretation. While the general understandings of interpretation
were mixed, human dignity as principle and the expansive interpretations afforded to ‘protected
persons’ and JCE consistently favoured the victims (HR liberalism).
In contrast,  the ICC revealed consistent support for literal interpretation.  This was not uniform,
however, and a few instances of broader, holistic interpretations appeared. The contrast between the
ICC and the ICTY (on the inter-curial dynamic) was, however, stark. The ICTY was much more
amenable to expansive natural law (protecting victims) whereas the ICC was more circumspect and
strictly positivist (ensuring greater protection for the accused). Bearing in mind the limited natural
law in the interpretation of the post-WWII IMTs, the overall shift in philosophy under this code was
from  expansive  (victim-centric)  natural  law  (both  the  IMTs  and  ad  hoc  Tribunals)  to  stricter
(accused-centric) positivism (at the ICC).
Formally on Fuller’s rule of law considerations, these instances were articulated and public. As with
the legality code, early expansive arguments gave way to consistent positivism (in particular inter-
curially from the ICTY to the ICC). The shift was not rapid or frequent, thereby complying with
Fuller’s  principle  to  this  effect.  Expansive  interpretation  pressurised  the  retrospective  principle
251 Bix (n 23) 32.
252 Van Schaak (n 70) 155.  See also Schabas (n 208) 886-887. See, for example, Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October 1995) paras 97, 119 and 126.
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initially.  This  coincided  with  greater  concern  for  the  victims  of  international  crimes  (i.e.  HR
liberalism). However, as the trend increasingly moved towards strict construction (especially at the
ICC),  greater  protection  was  afforded  to  the  accused  (i.e.  criminal  law  liberalism)  thereby
undermining  some  of  the  initial  tension  exerted  on  the  retrospective  desideratum.  Throughout
foreseeability and predictability of law’s application was attained provided the respective support
for victims and accused was understood.  
3.6 Conclusions on material ICL
Coding for consistency of philosophy in material ICL within the broader natural law/positivism
framework at the selected ICL judicial bodies revealed four codes, namely ICL sources, substantive
crimes, NCSL and interpretation. While NCSL and interpretation resulted in large datasets, sources
and crimes produced moderate datasets at best. Both the Tokyo IMT and the ICTY provided large
datasets.  The ICTR dataset  was negligible  in  contrast  possibly because its  material  jurisdiction
resulted in more evidence-based findings as opposed to legal-theoretical discussion.
Specific  inter-and  intra-curial  trends  in  consistency  per  role-player  under  material  ICL  were
identified.  Congruent with the historical philosophical codes in chapter 2, the selected post-WWII
prosecutors and defence counsel consistently utilised natural law and positivism respectively. While
the defence were essentially uniform in their  positivism, the prosecutors’ natural law was more
often interspersed  with Grotian  arguments  than  was the  case  under  the  historical  philosophical
codes.  The  post-WWII  IMTs  produced  an  inconsistent  dataset  with  the  Nuremberg  judicial
component negligible in all  but two instances (NCSL and interpretation).  At the post-Cold War
judiciaries  the ICTY delivered large  datasets  on NCSL and interpretation which  showed initial
support for natural law before settling into positivism (albeit with later interpretation relying on
earlier expansive constructions as posited authority). Crimes delivered an inconsistent dataset while
sources revealed natural law. The ICC only delivered a noteworthy dataset regarding interpretation
which embodied consistent positivism. 
The  overall  inter-and  intra-curial  trends  for  the  individual  codes  under  material  ICL  can
subsequently  be  identified.  Looking  at  the  selected  role-players  holistically,  substantive  crimes
produced  an  inconsistent  dataset.  Philosophical  justifications  pertaining  to  substantive  crimes
remained inconsistent  whether  the post-WWII IMTs and post-Cold War bodies (which,  for this
code,  was  limited  to  the  ICTY)  were  considered  together  (inter-curially)  or  separately  (intra-
curially). Possibly at the ICTY consistency could be found in the respective support for positivism
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and natural law from the majorities and dissents. ICL sources revealed a trend from inconsistency at
the  post-WWII  IMTs  to  more  generally  consistent  natural  law arguments  at  the  ICTY.  While
philosophical pronouncements were ventured on substantive crimes and ICL sources,  given the
frequent invocation of crimes and sources in ICL, the datasets were limited. Limited datasets could
explain the ensuing inconsistencies. The NCSL and interpretation codes revealed dynamism as both
suggested a trend in ICL jurisprudence from natural  law to positivism. Such dynamism can be
explained on the basis of the new field of law which was being fleshed out. This also corresponds to
Cassese’s  dictum that substantive justice was gradually giving way to strict legality in ICL.253 As
was  noted,  especially  regarding  NCSL and  interpretation,  the  movement  from  natural  law  to
positivism  (already  within  the  ICTY  under  NCSL  and  from  the  ICTY  to  the  ICC  under
interpretation) also appeared to suggest a shift from victim-centric to accused-centric sensitivities.
These two liberalisms are detailed in section 6.3.
The  inconsistent  arguments  surrounding  ICL sources  and  substantive  crimes  arguably  did  not
undermine the rule of law. Consistency is difficult to establish in moderate or small datasets. The
arguments adopted could, moreover, have been foreseeable on functional grounds, i.e. to ensure
jurisdiction through a particular source, over a crime or to undermine it depending on the role-
player  involved.  Whether  the  first  expansive  arguments  under  NCSL and  interpretation  were
foreseeable  is  debatable  and  thus  exerted  some  pressure  on  the  rule  of  law  (especially  the
retrospective  principle).  This  was  somewhat  curtailed  with  later  Tribunals  decisions  either
consistently following earlier ones (e.g. interpretation at the ICTY) in line with predictable victim-
centred  concerns  or  because  stricter  accused-centred  sensitivities  became  the  norm  (e.g.
interpretation from ICTY to ICC or the maturation of NCSL in the ICTY or its inclusion in the ICC
Statute).
3.7 Conclusions on the philosophical categories of natural law and legal positivism under
part A
The scrutiny next turns to the impact natural law and legal positivism as philosophical categories in
ICL jurisprudence made on the rule of law. Whether one agrees with the distinction between natural
law and positivism in the abstract or not,254 the coded data showed two different ways of thinking in
ICL jurisprudence – one reliant on posited authority as final,  the other looking towards higher,
external  values  without  posited authority  thereto.  Thus,  coding suggested that  in  a newer legal
253 Cassese (n 146) 142-143.
254 For which see preface to part A.
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system, such as ICL, the theoretical distinction between natural law and positivism might still be
vital and have something to contribute to juxtapose and label different justifications. 
Coding for natural law and positivism in ICL jurisprudence revealed that both were invoked from
time to time individually or together in a Grotian manner. Positivism appeared in the guises of ILP
and  ELP.  SCA enabled  a  systematisation  of  natural  law  and  positivist  justifications  in  ICL
jurisprudence. Absent a method of systematisation these justifications would otherwise just have
presented  a  jumble  of  philosophies.  Questions  into  consistency,  rule  of  law  and,  eventually,
legitimacy would not be possible in relation to such an unordered mixture of data. This is true for
the overarching philosophies considered in this study as well as natural law and positivism under
part A. The argument throughout this thesis is that consistency and its corollary inquiries are only
intelligible pursuits relative to some systematisation. For natural law and positivism, consistency is
better  understood  relative  to  individual  codes  as  coding  made  the  data  intelligible  through
systematisation. 
Overall findings can now be ventured on the consistency of use of natural law and positivism as
philosophical categories intra-and inter-curially in ICL jurisprudence. The post-WWII prosecutors
adopted consistent natural law (with some Grotian leanings to use both natural law and positivism)
on just war and NCSL, consistent natural law on cosmopolitanism and substantive crimes and a
consistent Grotian approach to ICL sources. Self-reflexive statements produced a negligible dataset.
Overall, the evidence suggested that the post-WWII prosecutors favoured natural law with some
reliance  on  a  Grotian  approach.  The  post-WWII  defence  counsel  utilised  consistent,  almost
uniform,  positivism  and  opposition  to  natural  law  throughout  the  self-reflexive,  just  war,
cosmopolitan, ICL sources, substantive crimes and NCSL codes. Only the acceptance of the natural
law basis of NCSL prevented complete positivism. The dialectic between the selected prosecutors
and  defence  counsel  as  between  natural  law  and  legal  positivism  was  thus  evidenced.  Their
respective functional aims to prosecute or defend ostensibly explained their respective positions.
On the intra-jurist level, over all the codes, Jackson mainly adopted a Grotian approach with a slant
towards natural law. Keenan and Brown firmly favoured natural law with a slant towards a Grotian
approach. Shawcross adopted a Grotian approach with some natural law. Arguably this position was
influenced  through  Sir  Hersch  Lauterpacht’s  involvement  with  the  British  Prosecution.255 De
255 K  Sellars, ‘Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo’ (2011) 21  European Journal of International Law 1087
discussed the collaboration between Shawcross and Lauterpacht as well.
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Menthon consistently  adopted natural  law arguments.  Finally,  prosecutors  Dubost  and Rudenko
produced  negligible  datasets.  Despite  the  overarching  consistency  in  the  defence  arguments,
Jahreiss’ positivism was based on a small datatset whereas Takanayagi was consistently positivist
over a much larger dataset (only conceding the natural law basis of NCSL).
Collectively the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMTs, including dissents, relied on consistent natural law
arguments pertaining to NCSL and interpretation (which was a small dataset). A Grotian approach
leaning towards natural law appeared in relation to self-reflexive statements. The IMTs adopted
positivism regarding just war. Hereafter, inconsistent arguments pertaining to cosmopolitanism and
substantive sources appeared. ICL crimes also appeared inconsistent but another small dataset was
at play. On closer analysis of ICL crimes, both IMT majorities adopted natural law (in isolated
instances)  with  the  Tokyo dissents  offering  inconsistent  arguments.  Tokyo dominated  the  post-
WWII datasets on the natural law/positivism codes and the preceeding findings could be presented
as  the  Tokyo  position  too.  Nuremberg’s  data  was  insufficient  to  change  the  Tokyo data  when
compared  inter-curially.  Nuremberg  only  revealed  isolated  instances  of  natural  law,  under  ICL
sources,  interpretation  and substantive  crimes,  and arguably  positivism under  cosmopolitanism.
Only on NCSL did Nuremberg reveal a trend favouring natural law. Separating the IMTs into their
respective majority findings did not repay effort as neither produced datasets in excess of a few
isolated instances. The holistic reading is therefore most comprehensive and shows the arguments to
be generally inconsistent. 
On the inter-and intra-jurist level across all codes, several consistency findings could be ventured at
Tokyo  with  its  number  of  self-contained  dissents.  Bernard  and  Jaranilla  consistently  favoured
natural law. Webb, in turn, consistently utilised the Grotian approach. Röling oscillated between
natural law and positivism (proving the finding of Boister and Cryer to this effect256). On the chapter
2 and 3 codes, Pal consistently invoked positivism (which proves part of Kopelman’s thesis257). This
did not exhaust his philosophical musings, however, and his reliance on TWAIL follows in section
5.3. 
Overall  at  the  post-Cold  War  bodies,  the  ICTY adopted  consistent  natural  law regarding  self-
reflexive statements,  ICL sources and cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism was almost uniformly
256 Boister and Cryer (n 28) 283-285; Cryer (n 18) 243.
257 E Kopelman, ‘Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial’
(1991) 23 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 411-418. See also A Nandy, ‘The Other
Within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on Culpability’ (1992) 23 New Literary History 60.
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natural  law.  Just  war  was  essentially  based  on  uniform  positivism.  Inconsistent  arguments
accompanied the policy-oriented approach, but this was a small dataset. ICL crimes were ostensibly
also  inconsistent.  However,  another  small  dataset  was  involved  of  which  sense  can  be  made
cognisant that the majorities consistently used positivism and the dissents consistently favoured
natural law. Two codes at the ICTY suggested dynamic trends. NCSL began with isolated natural
law instances but was thereafter consistently positivist while interpretation revealed a trend from
natural  law to  ostensible  positivism.  The  fact  persisted,  on  interpretation,  that  later  positivism
furthered the earlier expansive natural law interpretation. The ICTR produced a negligible dataset
on natural law and positivism. Not too much can be read into its findings as they did not constitute
trends. Isolated instances under just war, NCSL and interpretation advised against pronouncements
on trends. However, multiple instances of natural law were coded under cosmopolitanism. The ICC
produced noteworthy datasets under only NCSL and interpretation. On both counts the approach
was consistently positivist. 
While the study does not purport to investigate individual post-Cold War trends, the intra-and inter-
jurist arguments pertaining to Cassese and McDonald are ventured here as illustrative for future
research. Accordingly, the desire to humanise ICL may explain and clarify some of the ostensible
inconsistencies in the Erdemović and Tadić judgments of Cassese.258 In Erdemović, Cassese argued
that  the  accused  should  at  least  be  able  to  plead  duress.  He  utilised  positivism  and  rejected
McDonald and Vohrah’s policy-oriented approach. In  Tadić, on the other hand, he supported the
conflation of ICL applicable to IACs and NIACs through natural law. Again the humanization of the
law suggested this extension of protection. This ties into the tension between accused-centred and
victim-centred forms of ICL liberalism, which are discussed in section 6.3. Suffice it here to note
Cassese exhibited sensitivity to both branches, while McDonald and Vohrah’s approach inclined
towards the victims. Apart from the policy code, NCSL and interpretation (with their shift from
expansive  natural  law  to  stricter  positivism)  also  reflected  a  movement  from  victim-centric
liberalism to accused-centric liberalism in ICL.
Over all the ICL role-players, coding revealed that philosophical justifications pertaining to the self-
reflexive, just war, cosmopolitan, ICL sources, NCSL and interpretation codes were significant. The
policy-oriented and substantive crimes datasets  were too small  for purposes of overall  findings.
What follows focuses on the judiciaries rather than the selected prosecutors and defence counsel
258 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Dissenting Opinion of President Cassese paras 11,
49;  Prosecutor  v  Tadić (Decision on  the  Defence  Motion  for  Interlocutory  Appeal  on Jurisdiction)  IT-94-1 (2
October 1995) paras 97, 119. For Cassese’s role in Tadić, see Cassese (n 52) 53 and Cryer (n 49) 1048-1057.
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since they were clearly divided into a natural law versus positivism divide. Accordingly, the self-
reflexive code consistently revealed Grotian natural law (albeit in a small dataset), just war was
consistently positivist,  cosmopolitanism and ICL sources were mixed to natural law, NCSL and
interpretation were dynamic with early natural law giving way to consistent later positivism.
Although mixed, the general trend in ICTY justifications seemed to follow Cassese’s dictum that
substantive justice was gradually giving way to strict legality in ICL.259 While natural law was often
used  in  early  jurisprudence,  there  was  a  gradual  shift  to  positivism as  the  body  of  ICL was
established. Perhaps it is significant that later ICTY jurisprudence produced very little data on the
part A codes – philosophy tended to appear proportionately to the newness of the regime. 
Despite the overall mixed use of natural law and positivism across the various codes, it is suggested
that the rule of law was not thereby undermined. The most important Fullerian desiderata under part
A of the study into natural law and positivism apart  from non-contradictory justifications were
retrospectivity and frequent change. This study’s coded data under natural law and legal positivism
proves that ICL jurisprudence was mostly predictable and foreseeable provided the legal subject
understood which codes (or synonymously ‘indicators’ or ‘arguments’) might apply to his case.
Predictability was also possibly assured early on due to consistent natural law-based support for HR
liberalism, i.e.  protecting victims. Just  because the present systematisation might not have been
ventured before does not mean that it cannot make sense of the justifications offered.  The trends
intra-code  were  consistent  enough  (regarding  the  larger  datasets)  to  ensure  foreseeability  and
predictability of law. The justifications did thus not change too fast as required by Fullerian rule of
law. This was confirmed with the separate testing of each coded use of philosophy against the rule
of law desiderata. The finding pertaining to legitimacy will await the overall conclusion. 
259 Cassese (n 146) 142-143.
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Part B
Utilitarianism and Deontology as philosophical categories for coding in the
selected international criminal law role-players 
This  preface to  chapter  4 briefly  explains  the substantive understanding afforded to  the ethical
theories coded for consistency in this study and contextualises them.1 As a point of departure, ethics
can be subdivided into virtue ethics, which focuses on the character of an individual, and ethics
pertaining to conduct.2 Coding revealed that the theories pertaining to conduct, whether the nature
or  consequences  thereof,  rather  than  virtue  ethics,  dominated  ICL discourse.  Ethical  theories
pertaining to conduct may be divided along two lines of inquiry, namely the study of the good and
the study of the right.3 This division reflects where the locus of value may be placed, namely in the
consequences of an act or in the act itself.4 
The study of the good investigates which objectives are to be pursued and attempts to justify its
selection. For the study of the good, the good is primary and right actions are those that promote the
initially established good. This view is teleological and right action becomes a means to an end.5
Such  theories  are  consequentialist  as  right  follows  from  the  consequences  of  an  act.
Consequentialism can be subdivided depending on the axiology informing it.  Utilitarianism is a
form of consequentialism.6 Utilitarianism shifts the focus from the welfare of the individual to that
of society as a whole. The aim is to maximise utility (encapsulated in the maxim ‘pursuing the
greatest  good  for  the  greatest  number’).7 Utilitarianism thus  comprises  two  aspects,  namely  a
consequentialist  principle  and  a  utility  principle.  The  consequentialist  principle  means  that  the
rightness or wrongness of an act is determined through its consequences while the utility principle
1 This chapter will collectively refer to deontology and utilitarianism as ‘ethical theories’. See LP Pojman (ed), Moral
Philosophy: A Reader (Hackett Publishing 1993) xi; BH Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (7th edn, Sweet &
Maxwell 2015) 125 footnote 1.
2 J Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (3rd edn, Routledge 1990) 349-350; Pojman (n 1) xiv.
3 Hospers (n 2) 350. See also LP Pojman (n 1) 112.
4 Pojman (n 1) 112; J Deigh, ‘Ethics’ in Robert Audi (ed),  The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd edn, CUP
2001) 287.
5 Hospers (n 2) 350; Pojman (n 1) xiv; Deigh (n 4) 287. See also R Cryer, H Friman, D Robinson and E Wilmshurst,
An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (CUP 2014) 29; Bix (n 1) 125. 
6 Although it was not necessary on the data to adopt the distinction here, for the subdivision of utilitarianism into rule
and act utilitarianism, see LP Pojman (n 1) 113; R Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence An Introduction to Legal
Theory (3rd edn,  OUP 2012) 214;  M Freeman,  Lloyd’s  Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn,  Thomson Sweet
Maxwell  2014)  197  footnote  12.  For  utilitarianism as  consequentialist,  see  Hospers  (n  2)  357;  D Meyerson,
Understanding Jurisprudence (Routledge 2007) 119-120; Bix (n 1) 128.
7 See generally JS  Mill,  Utilitarianism (Parker, Son and Bourn 1863) 24;  Hospers (n 2)  354;  Deigh (n 4) 287;  J
Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Dover 2007) 1.II-III, 1.VI;  N Dower, The
Ethics of War and Peace Cosmopolitan and Other Perspectives (Polity Press 2009) 75; Bix (n 1) 128.
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means a particular type of state (such as pleasure or happiness8) is the only thing good in itself.9
Utilitarianism is notorious because it is often impossible to accurately anticipate the consequences
of a particular action as it requires.10 
Conversely, the study of the right is concerned with determining the right and wrong actions of the
individual and provides justifications for its findings.11 The study of the right first establishes what
an individual may or may not do and the good follows (or may follow) from this. Hence, achieving
the good is either the result of right actions or incidental to them. This view is deontological as it is
duty  driven.12 While  two  types  of  deontology  have  been  identified,  namely  intuitionism  and
rationalism, for coding in ICL jurisprudence only rationalist deontology will be considered. This is
the  version  which  uses  a  second-order  principle  to  generate  first-order  principles,  e.g.  the
categorical imperative of Kant.13 Kant’s categorical imperative entails that the individual should act
so  that  ‘the  maxim of  your  action...could  become a  universal  rule  of  human  conduct’.14 Kant
presented a second formulation, namely that every rational being exists as an end and must never be
treated as a mere means alone. Because each person is to be respected as an autonomous agent,
right and wrong actions are not entirely dependent on the particular action’s consequences (as is the
case with utilitarianism).15 Respect should be afforded to every human being on the basis of their
rational capacity. Justice is an important corollary notion. It confirms that people should be treated
as they deserve and in accordance with their just deserts. To be justly treated is more important than
to maximise happiness (contrary to utilitarianism). Punishment, for example, is inflicted because it
is deserved and not because others would be happier seeing it inflicted.16 
The relationship between these ethical theories and the other philosophies in this thesis requires
brief  consideration.  Historically,  utilitarianism  has  been  utilised  in  conjunction  with  legal
positivism.17 However,  it  remains  analytically  independent  from  positivism  and  is  coded
8 For the distinction between eudaimonistic utilitarianism (pleasure) and hedonistic utilitarianism (happiness),  see
Pojman (n 1) 112-113. 
9 Pojman (n 1) 112.
10 Hospers (n 2) 354-357. See generally Dower (n 7) 74; Wacks (n 6) 216; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n
5) 32. 
11 Hospers (n 2) 35; Pojman (n 1) xiv; Bix (n 1) 125.
12 Hospers (n 2) 350; Deigh (n 4) 287; Wacks (n 6) 214.
13 Pojman (n 1) 155.
14 I Kant,  Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (Dover 2005) 38. See also Hospers (n 2)  356-357;
Dower (n 7) 75-76. 
15 Kant (n 14) 45-46. See also Hospers (n 2) 357; CR Snyman, Criminal Law (4th edn, Butterworths 2002) 18; Dower
(n 7) 75-76; Bix (n 1) 126.
16 Hospers (n 2) 358. See also Snyman (n 15) 18; Meyerson (n 6) 124; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 5)
30. 
17 A van  Blerk,  Jurisprudence  an  Introduction (Butterworths  Lexisnexis  1998)  27;  Freeman  (n  6)  196-198.  See
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accordingly.  Deontology and utilitarianism are also relevant  for  the discussion on liberalism as
systemic  philosophy  in  section  6.3.  As  was  noted  under  the  policy-oriented,  NCSL  and
interpretation codes,18 ICL liberalism consists of human rights (HR) liberalism and criminal law
liberalism. Whereas the former focuses more on the position of victims, the latter focuses on the
accused.19 Utilitarianism tends to consider communal (inclusive of victims’) interests rather than
that of the perpetrator and so often revealed HR liberalism. Deontology focuses on the just deserts
and moral autonomy of the accused which usually inclines towards criminal law liberalism.
Since consistency in philosophical argument remains the pivotal (albeit not exclusive) rule of law
requirement in this thesis, the interrelationship between utilitarianism and deontology is important.
While it was argued in part A that natural law and legal positivism exist on a spectrum, deontology
and utilitarianism do not exist on an unbroken spectrum. Natural law and legal positivism are able
to assimilate aspects of the other while the ethical theories’ coexistence is a matter of compatibility
(which is comparable to the coexistence of natural law and positivism under the Grotian tradition).20
The compatibility  of  utilitarianism and deontology has  been convincingly  argued by Hart  who
separated the levels on which these principles function in relation to sentencing in particular. Thus,
the benefit  to society in enforcing certain rules of law (i.e. utilitarianism) serves as the general
justifying  aim  of  punishment  whereas  deontology  serves  the  principle  of  distribution  (i.e.
determining who deserves punishment).21 Coding for compliance with the rule of law desideratum
of  non-contradiction  necessarily  took  place  against  this  possibility  of  compatibility  regarding
sentencing. 
generally Bentham (n 7); J Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John Murray 1832).
18 See sections 2.5, 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
19 D Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms of International Criminal Law’ in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds)
Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press 2010) 129-135. See also GP Fletcher and
JD Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’ (2005) 3 JICJ 540, 544.
20 See, for e.g., Hospers (n 2) 368; Snyman (n 15) 22-23.
21 HLA Hart,  Punishment  and  Responsibility (Oxford  1968)  9.  See  also  Snyman  (n  15) 22-23;  Cryer,  Friman,
Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 5) 29-30 on the combination theory.
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Chapter 4
Ethical theories in ICL jurisprudence: Self-reflexive statements and purposes of
sentencing
4.1 Introduction
Coding  for  consistency  of  utilitarianism  and  deontology  in  this  study  occurred  through  self-
reflexive  justifications  and  through  sentencing  purposes.  Since  the  dataset  was  moderate  in
comparison with that under part A, coding in such a manner also ensured a more coherent narrative
and presentation. Combining the sentencing purposes, in particular, meant the Hartian compatibility
between the theories could be better reflected while still  juxtaposing them and measuring them
against  the  Fullerian  rule  of  law  in  the  broader  context  of  foreseeability  and  predictability.
Consistency of philosophy remained the organising principle of the data.
4.2 Self-reflexive statements on ethical theories
Utilitarianism and deontology appeared in several justifications relying on characteristic aspects of
each respective theory.  These explicit  arguments, like those under part A, are consolidated here
under the self-reflexive code. As was noted in section 2.2, conceptually this code may reveal any
philosophy. Coding for utilitarianism in ICL judgments revealed justifications relating to the greater
good  for  the  greater  number,  maximising  utility,  treating  persons  as  means  to  ends,1 and  the
consideration  of  outcomes  and consequences.  Deontology,  on  the  other  hand,  was  coded  from
arguments treating persons as ends unto themselves and concerns about moral agency. Due to a
small dataset, the post-WWII IMTs were considered together, while the ICTY was the only post-
Cold War role-player to contribute data. Once consistency is determined per role-player, patterns
inter-curially will be analysed.
At Nuremberg, Jackson utilised both utilitarianism and deontology to support the IMT’s legitimacy
and counter the charge, related to Fullerian rule of law, of retrospectivity of the proceedings. Firstly,
adopting utilitarianism: 
‘The rule of law in the world, flouted by the lawlessness incited by these defendants, had to be restored at the
cost to my country of over a million casualties, not to mention those of other nations. I cannot subscribe to
the perverted reasoning that  society may advance and strengthen the rule  of  law by the expenditure of
morally innocent lives but that progress in the law may never be made at the price of morally guilty lives’.2
1 Which reappears under dehumanisation, discussed in section 6.3.
2 R Jackson in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. II: 147.
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On this justification, the teleological objective to maximise utility, which would be rendered by
advancing the international rule of law, determined the action advocated for. The balancing of moral
guilty against innocent lives evidenced an argument in excess of treating individuals as ends unto
themselves as required by deontology.3 
In contrast to this utilitarianism, Jackson also justified the proceedings by suggesting that ‘fair and
dispassionate hearings’ are the ‘best-known protection to any man with a defense worthy of being
heard’.4 Law was preferable to summary executions.5 These statements implicitly recognised that
justice would be better served through the recognition of the dignity and liberty of the accused.
Humans were to be treated as ends unto themselves. Jackson indicated that the defendants had a
chance to defend themselves before the Tribunal in contrast to how they curtailed the similar right
of their fellow countrymen.6 Effectively, the IMT extended to the defendants that which they had
not  afforded  others.  Moreover,  Jackson  conceded  that  ‘the  record  on  which  we  judge  these
defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow’.7 The Allies had to treat the
defendants the same way they would want for themselves. The IMT, therefore, represented the first
categorical imperative of Kant.8 
The only other post-WWII instance of self-reflexive ethical theories was coded from Jaranilla at
Tokyo. In his concurring opinion, Jaranilla responded to the defence argument that the actions of the
accused paled in comparison to the use of the atomic bombs by the Allies. Jaranilla replied that the
end justified the means. In the absence of the atomic bombs, the war, he argued, would have been
prolonged, leading to more destruction and death as compared to the situation after the use of the
atomic bomb. In sum, any means was justified to bring about the end of the war.9 The utilitarian
greater good for the greater number was visible in this argument.10 In consequentialist fashion, the
3 J  Hospers,  An  Introduction  to  Philosophical  Analysis (3rd edn,  Routledge  1990) 358.  See  also  D  Meyerson,
Understanding  Jurisprudence (Routledge  2007) 124;  R  Cryer,  H Friman,  D  Robinson and  E  Wilmshurst,  An
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (CUP 2014) 30. 
4 Jackson (n 2) 102.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Jackson (n 2) 101. See the similar contours of justice in Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the
appeal  of  Mr Jean-Pierre  Bemba Gombo against  Trial  Chamber  III’s  “Judgment  pursuant  to  Article  74  of  the
Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji para 24.
8 I Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (Dover 2005) 38. See also Hospers (n 3) 356-357; N
Dower, The Ethics of War and Peace Cosmopolitan and Other Perspectives (Polity Press 2009) 75-76.
9 Jaranilla Concurring Opinion 25.
10 JS Mill,  Utilitarianism (Parker, Son and Bourn 1863) 24; J Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation (Dover 2007) 1.II-III, 1.VI. See generally Hospers (n 3) 354; J Deigh, ‘Ethics’ in Robert Audi (ed),
The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd edn, CUP 2001) 287; Dower (n 8) 75; BH Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory
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objective determined the correct course of action.11 This finding jettisoned the second formulation
of Kant’s categorical imperative to treat humans as ends unto themselves.12 
Coding for self-reflexive justifications in ethical theories at the post-WWII IMTs thus resulted in a
small  dataset.  The  size  of  the  dataset  precluded  firm  findings  on  consistency  for  rule  of  law
purposes. Jackson used both utilitarianism and deontology while Jaranilla utilised utilitarianism.
Jackson’s reliance on both philosophies appeared to be inconsistent. As will be discussed in section
6.3, Jackson’s inconsistency can be viewed as a manifestation of the victim-centric versus accused-
centric approaches in HR and criminal law liberalism.13 His aim to add rhetorical support for the
IMT’s legitimacy at least revealed a common objective underpinning both positions.
While more instances of self-reflexive ethical theories appeared in the post-Cold War judgments,
they were essentially limited to the ICTY. The coded data pertained to the plea of duress as a
defence;  the  pronouncements  on  the  possible  hierarchy  in  the  crimes  over  which  the  ICTY
exercised  jurisdiction  as  well  as  responsibility  for  crimes.  The  subsequent  discussion  revolves
around consistency of philosophy within these clusters for ease of narrative.
The plea of duress as a defence to the killing of innocents in  Erdemović was addressed through
ethical theories.14 Cassese resorted in part to utilitarianism, when he considered the acceptability of
duress as defence. Although he conceded that proportionality might ‘never be satisfied where the
accused is saving his own life at the expense of his victim...: how can a judge satisfy himself that
the death of one person is a lesser evil than the death of another?’, he foresaw duress as a plausible
defence  in  cases  where  the  victim  would  have  died  regardless  of  the  perpetrator’s  actions.15
Cassese’s  reasoning  revealed  a  consequential  query,  concerned  with  a  numerical  (and  moral)
balancing between one person’s life and another. Stephen, likewise, argued that ‘where resistance to
the demand will not avert the evil but will only add to it, the person under duress also suffering that
evil,  proportionality  does  not  enter  into  the  equation’.16 For  Stephen,  a  doctrinaire  rejection  of
and Context (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 128.
11 Hospers (n 3) 350. See also LP Pojman (ed), Moral Philosophy: A Reader (Hackett Publishing 1993) xiv; Deigh (n
10) 287; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 29; Bix (n 10) 125.  
12 Kant (n 8) 45-46. See also Hospers (n 3) 357; Dower (n 8) 75-76; Bix (n 10) 126.
13 In section 6.3 the opposing aims, on systemic level, will be discussed. See D Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms of
International Criminal Law’ in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds) Future Perspectives on International
Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press 2010) 129-135.
14 In addition to the policy argument considered in section 2.5.
15 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Dissenting Opinion of President Cassese para 42.
[Emphasis in original.]
16 Prosecutor  v  Erdemović  (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7  October  1997) Separate  and  Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judge
Stephen paras 61-62.
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duress  in  cases  involving  the  killing  of  innocents  could  potentially  deny  justice,  which  was
troublesome.17 Stephen’s objective to avert evil determined the action to allow the defence of duress
to the accused. This conforms to the study of the good associated with utilitarianism.18
Conversely,  McDonald and Vohrah argued, in  response to what they saw as their  counterparts’
utilitarianism, that their approach did ‘not involve a balancing of harms for and against killing but
rests upon an application in the context of [international humanitarian law (IHL)] of the rule that
duress does not justify or excuse the killing of an innocent person’.19 If the judges’ earlier policy-
oriented argument is taken into account,20 it seems that their invocation here of what seems like
positivism, in opposition to Cassese and Stephen’s utilitarianism, is problematic. By invoking the
policy-oriented approach the judges invoked another (moral) philosophical position to achieve the
opposite result argued for by Cassese and Stephen, who based their discussions on utilitarianism.
Which approach is to be preferred comes down to conflicting views on whether ICL’s objectives are
accused or victim-centric.21 Li also rejected utilitarianism as it  could be abused to justify every
single perpetrator in the group who participated in the mass killings.  For him, there existed no
(posited)  authority  for  such  a  proposition.22 Impliedly,  for  Li,  someone  had  to  be  morally
blameworthy in the case of the collective killing of innocents. He concluded by noting the lack of
posited  support  for  the  utilitarian  approach proposed by Cassese and Stephen.23 While  Li  thus
opposed utilitarianism, his  insistence on someone being blameworthy for contravention of duty
suggested deontology.
 
Questions  pertaining  to  the  possible  hierarchical  understanding  of  substantive  ICL crimes  also
raised ethical theories generally. McDonald and Vohrah considered crimes against humanity to be
intrinsically more serious than war crimes. This distinction rested upon the belief that war crimes
were essentially directed at an ‘immediate protected object’ whereas crimes against humanity due to
‘their  heinousness  and  magnitude...constitute  egregious  attacks  on  human  dignity,  on  the  very
notion  of  humaneness.  They  consequently  affect,  or  should  affect,  each  and  every  member  of
17 Ibid.
18 Hospers (n 3) 350. See also Pojman (n 11) xiv; Deigh (n 10) 287; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 29;
Bix (n 10) 125. 
19 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah
para 80. See also in this regard  GK McDonald, ‘The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture: The Changing
Nature of the Laws of War’ (1998) 156 Military Law Review 48-49.
20 Discussed in section 2.5.
21 Robinson (n 13) 129-135 and section 6.3.
22 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li para
11.
23 Ibid.
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mankind’.24 Such arguments about the seriousness of an action looks at the action rather than the
goal to be attained through punishment. This suggested deontology.25 While the number of victims
might be what distinguishes a war crime from a crime against humanity, the argument never moved
from act to goal and so did not constitute utilitarianism.  Cassese’s arguments that crimes against
humanity were of a ‘greater magnitude’ as compared to war crimes,  on the one hand, and that
deterrence of these more grievous crimes through a heavier sanction was important, on the other
hand, indicated such an explicit  acceptance of both deontological and utilitarian rationales.26 Li
again utilised deontology by arguing that the gravity of an act was determined by the act itself and
the harm was identical regardless of classification or animus.27 The Furundžija AC, reliant on Tadić,
resolved this uncertainty as, in principle, there was no distinction in seriousness between crimes
against humanity and war crimes either in the ICTY Statute, Rules or in CIL.28 However, Vohrah
disagreed: ‘When all things are equal...the injury to society would necessarily be greater if a crime
against  humanity  has  occurred’.29 This  view  echoed  his  earlier  argument  in  Erdemović  and
concerned the inherent egregiousness of the impugned action. 
Ethical  theories  next  appeared  in  conjunction  with  superior  responsibility  and  duty.  The
determination of whether superior responsibility was based on the failure of the superior to act or
whether the criminality of the subordinate was transferred to the superior was ostensibly resolved
through deontology. In the Alekšovski TC, the ICTY sided with the International Law Commission
(ILC) as ‘“an individual incurs criminal responsibility for the failure to act only when there is a
legal obligation to act”’.30 In sum, ‘superior responsibility derives directly from the failure of the
person against whom the complaint is directed to honour an obligation’.31 The point is for a superior
to be treated as an end unto himself (punished for his own individual guilt) rather than as a means to
24 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment) IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) Joint Opinion of Judges McDonald and Vohrah
para 21. For the initial concurrence with this hierarchical view of the crimes to be tried, see  Prosecutor v  Tadić
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-1-Tbis-R117 (11 November 1999) paras 28-29. For the rejection of such a hierarchical
view of the crimes to be punished, see Prosecutor v Erdemović (Judgment) IT-96-22 (7 October 1997) Separate and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li paras 18-26;  Prosecutor v  Tadić (Sentencing Judgment)  IT-94-1-Tbis-R117 (11
November 1999) Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson pp. 2-10 and, authoritatively, Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgment
in Sentencing Appeals)  IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis  (26  January 2000) para 69 (and also Judge Shahabuddeen’s
Separate Opinion therein).
25 Hospers (n 3) 367; Bix (n 10) 127.
26 Prosecutor v  Tadić (Judgment  in Sentencing Appeals)  IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis  (26  January 2000) Separate
Opinion of Judge Cassese para 15.  
27 R Cryer, ‘One Appeal, Two Philosophies, Four Opinions and a Remittal: The Erdemović Case at the ICTY Appeals
Chamber’ (1997) 2 JACL 199.
28 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment)  IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000)  paras 240-243 referring to  Prosecutor v Tadić
(Judgment in Sentencing Appeals) IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis (26 January 2000) para 69.
29 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000) Separate Declaration of Judge Lal Chand  Vohrah
para 6.
30 Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment) IT-95-14/1-T (25 June 1999) para 72.
31 Ibid.
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an end (vicariously punished for the guilt of others).32 This was the justificatory argument of the
Krnojelac AC, the  Halilović TC and Shahabuddeen in the  Orić AC as well.33 However, absent a
crime of ‘failure to exercise control’, it has been argued that superiors, guilty of the failure to punish
standard,34 have in fact been held responsible and stigmatised for the crimes committed by their
subordinates,  namely war crimes and crimes against humanity.35 At the ICC, Judge Eboe-Osuji
attempted to address this partial undermining of deontology through ostensible vicarious liability,
by  suggesting  that  complicity  better  explained  command  responsibility  for  the  crime  of  the
subordinate.36 
Coding for ethical theories self-reflexively used resulted in a negligible dataset at the post-WWII
IMTs and a  moderate  dataset  at  the ICTY. No instances  of  self-reflexive ethical  theories  were
identified at the ICTR and only an isolated instance at the ICC. On the Fullerian rule of law, the
dataset delivered inconsistent support for both theories whether on the horizontal dynamics, namely
the post-WWII IMTs (due to its negligible size) and the post-Cold War Tribunals respectively, or
holistically  over  all  the  jurisdictions  considered.  These  inconsistencies  might  be  due  to  a
contradiction over the appropriate understanding of whether ICL as institution is victim or accused-
centric.37 No other Fullerian desiderata were applicable. A final finding on the consequent impact on
the rule of law will, however, only be possible at the end of this chapter. Ethical theories continued
as a crucial element of penology, to which the scrutiny now turns.
4.3 Ethical theories in punishment
4.3.1 Preliminary observations
Ethical theories were most often coded from sentencing purposes.38 Sentencing purposes have been
connected to utilitarianism, deontology or a combination theory respectively.39 Hart’s understanding
32 Kant (n 8) 45-46. See also Hospers (n 3) 357; Dower (n 8) 75-76; Bix (n 10) 126.
33 Prosecutor v Halilović (Judgment) IT-01-48-T (16 November 2005) paras 42, 54; Prosecutor v Orić (Judgment) IT-
03-68-A (3 July 2008) Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen para 24. See also Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-
97-25-A (17 September 2003) para 171.
34 See, for e.g., Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) para 839.
35 For the explicit variance between assertions and practice, see Robinson (n 13) 124-129, footnote 96. For an example
of such responsibility, see Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25-A (17 September 2003) para 180.
36 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial
Chamber III’s  “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Concurring
Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji paras 191-209 also invoking Grotius in support.
37 See also Robinson (n 13) 129-135 and section 6.3.
38 See  SS  Terblanche,  The  Guide  to  Sentencing  in  South  Africa (Butterworths  1999)  177  footnote  202  for  the
interchangeable nature of ‘purposes’, ‘objects’, ‘goals’, ‘aspects’, ‘effects’, ‘ends’ or ‘elements’ of punishment as
labels in a domestic context. 
39 Hospers (n 3) 367; Terblanche (n 38) 197; R Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence An Introduction to Legal Theory
(3rd edn, OUP 2012) 272; Bix (n 10) 125-130.
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of utilitarianism and deontology as serving, respectively, the general justifying aim of punishment
and  the  principle  of  distribution  underpins  the  compatibility  of  these  theories  for  sentencing
purposes.40 The combination theory is often presented as an amalgamation of the first two theories.
The subsequent discussions are therefore cumulatively applicable to it.41 It bears noting that some
form  of  principled  balancing  between  the  theories  remains  important  for  predictability  and
foreseeability which are, of course, central to the rule of law.42 Before investigating the coded data,
this preliminary discussion will briefly reflect on how sentencing purposes embody utilitarianism
and deontology respectively. This will explain how these ethical theories were identified through
coding for sentencing rationales.
Utilitarian penal theory is future-oriented and punishment aims to achieve objectives like reducing
pain and increasing happiness.43 Punishment is therefore a means to another objective.44 Utilitarian
sentencing considerations include deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation and taking account of
the effects  of  the  crimes on victims  or  society.45 Deterrence  can be divided into  particular  and
general deterrence. Particular deterrence aims to deter the punished person from breaking the law
again while general deterrence aims to deter others from breaking the law in future.46 By keeping a
perpetrator in detention, future crimes are prevented. Incapacitation is therefore linked to individual
deterrence.47 Rehabilitation constitutes another utilitarian factor as it is a future-oriented objective to
maximise utility by reintroducing the perpetrator into society, which in turn no longer needs to fear
him.48 Justifications  of  punishment  based  on  the  effects  of  crimes  on  victims  or  society  per
definition look towards consequences beyond the act.49 This reflects the essence of utilitarianism.
On the other hand, deontological penal theory often revolves around retribution.50 Retribution as
40 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford 1968) 9. See CR Snyman, Criminal Law (4th edn, Butterworths
2002) 22-23; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 29-30 on the combination theory. See also preface to
part B in this study.
41 Snyman (n 40) 13, 22-23.
42 M Damaška, ‘What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?’ (2008) 83 Chicago-Kent Law Review 339. See
also section 1.2.3.2.
43 Terblanche (n 38) 200; Snyman (n 40) 13; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 29.
44 Snyman (n 40) 13.
45 Hospers (n 3) 367. See generally Terblanche (n 38) 197, 200-201; Snyman (n 40) 13; Wacks (n 39) 273-276; Cryer,
Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 32-41; Bix (n 10) 125-129. 
46 Hospers  (n  3)  367;  Terblanche (n  38) 178-186;  Snyman (n 40)  13,  19-21;  Wacks  (n  39)  276;  Cryer,  Friman,
Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 32; Bix (n 10) 128-129. 
47 Hospers  (n  3)  367;  Terblanche (n 38) 178-186;  Snyman (n  40)  13,  18-19; Wacks (n  39)  276; Cryer,  Friman,
Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 35.  However, see  Bix (n 10) 129-130 for the classification of incapacitation as
neither deontology or utilitarian.
48 See generally Hospers (n 3) 367; Terblanche (n 38) 187-190; Snyman (n 40) 13, 21-22; Wacks (n 39) 276; Cryer,
Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 35; Bix (n 10) 129.  
49 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 37-41.
50 Some, like L Alexander, ‘The Philosophy of Criminal Law’ in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford
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penal theory is past-oriented – punishment is imposed because a perpetrator committed or attempted
to commit a wrong act or omission.51 Punishment is justified in itself as an end or just desert.52 On
this  view,  a  wrongdoer  obtains  an  unjustifiable  advantage  by  renouncing  a  duty  which  others
willingly  assumed.  The  law  has  to  restore  the  ensuing  imbalance.53 Some  have  argued  that
retribution is neither a true ‘purpose’ of punishment nor a factor which independently influences
sentence.54 Depending on the understanding afforded thereto, retribution might simply mean the
‘imposition  of  an  appropriate  sentence’  which  ensures  its  permanent  relevance.55 In  ICL
jurisprudence,  retribution has  usually  been understood as just  deserts  and expressing the moral
outrage of society,56 fitting punishment to crime57 and, rarely, embodying vengeance.58 
 
Denunciation  and moral  outrage  have,  somewhat  inconsistently,  been linked to  retribution.59 A
sentencing purpose like denunciation  engages both with the offender and the broader community
Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (OUP 2002) 816-817 have distinguished between strong and weak
retributivism depending  on  whether  negative  desert  is  a  sufficient  condition  for  punishment  or  whether  good
consequences  are  also  required.  This  study  will  jettison  these  labels  as  all  data  would  devolve  into  weak
retributivism. The notion of ‘combination’ or ‘mixed’ theory addresses the same interaction between retribution and
other purposes without running them together. Alexander, ibid, at footnote 1, concedes this point.
51 Hospers (n 3) 368. See also Snyman (n 40) 13; Alexander (n 50)  816; Bix (n 10) 126.
52 Snyman (n 40) 13-14.
53 Ibid 14.
54 Terblanche (n 38) 190; Snyman (n 40) 15.
55 Terblanche (n 38) 195; Snyman (n 40) 15-16. See Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment Volume 4 of 6) IT-04-74-T (29
May 2013) para 1276; Prosecutor v Popović et al (Judgment) IT-05-88-A (30 January 2015) para 1968.
56 For  retribution  as  just  deserts  rather  than  vengeance,  see Jackson  (n  2)  101;  Pal  Dissent  216  (for  whom the
determination of which was beyond the Tribunal); Prosecutor v Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-96-22-T (29
November 1996) para 65. See also T Meron, The Making of International Criminal Justice A View From the Bench
Selected Speeches (OUP 2011) 96. For the distinction of retribution from revenge because it ‘duly express[ed] the
outrage of the international community’, see  Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment)  IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000)
para 185; Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi (Judgment and Sentence) ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016)
para 67. Erdemović and  Alekšovski were supported in  Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003)
para 900; Prosecutor v Simić, Tadić and Zarić (Judgments) IT-95-9-T (17 October 2003) para 1059; Prosecutor v
Banović (Judgment) IT-02-65/1-S (28 October 2003) para 34; Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment)
IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) para 140; Prosecutor v Deronjić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004)
paras 143, 150, 154;  Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 1090;  Prosecutor v
Kordić  and  Čerkez (Judgment)  IT-95-14/2-A (17  December  2004)  para  1075;  Prosecutor  v  Dragan  Nikolić
(Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-94-02-A (4 February 2005) para 46; Prosecutor v Bralo (Sentencing Judgment)
IT-95-17-S (7 December 2005) para 22; Prosecutor v Hadžihasanović (Judgment) IT-01-47-T (15 March 2006) para
2071; Prosecutor v Orić (Judgment) IT-03-68-T (30 June 2006) para 719; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-
39-T (27 September 2006) para 1135;  Prosecutor v Bralo (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-95-17-A (2 April
2007) para 82; Prosecutor v Martić (Judgment) IT-95-11-T (12 June 2007) para 484; Prosecutor v Delić (Judgment)
IT-04-83-T (15 September 2008) para 559; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-A (17 March 2009) paras
775, 804. 
57 For retribution as ‘punishment of an offender for his specific criminal conduct’, see Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać
and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002) para 385; Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29
November 2002) para 273.
58 For retribution as revenge and rejected as such, see Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-
96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 1231.
See also Terblanche (n 38) 190. For retribution as vengeance, see Genesis 9:6; Exodus 21:23-25.
59 Terblanche (n 38) 190-193, 199. See also  Snyman (n 40) 15 footnote 12, 16-17;  Cryer,  Friman, Robinson and
Wilmshurst (n 3) 36. But see Bix (n 10) 129-130.
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about the wrong committed and so may  embody utilitarianism alongside deontology.60 As noted
earlier, deontology and utilitarianism are not incompatible in relation to sentencing considerations.61
For purposes of coding for compliance with Fullerian rule of law, any preferences between the aims
are significant. To reiterate, it is not an essay on ethical theories in the abstract which is pursued
here but rather ethical theories as used and supported in ICL jurisprudence. After these preliminary
findings on the contours of the relevant  sentencing purposes,  the scrutiny will  now turn to  the
substantive sentencing purposes in ICL jurisprudence.
4.3.2 Sentencing purposes
The  close  link  between  the  ethical  theories  for  sentencing,  alongside  the  possibility  of  a
combination theory, necessitated coding for the various sentencing purposes together.  This fully
revealed the cadence in support for the respective theories, which is important for the rule of law.
While the dataset was small at the post-WWII IMTs, the datasets at the post-Cold War judicial
bodies were large.
 
A largely  consistent  dataset  appeared  at  the  post-WWII  IMTs.  At  Nuremberg,  Jackson utilised
utilitarianism to suggest that the accused’s fate as individuals was not as important as the fact that
they had to be punished as examples.62 Although this argument ties into the philosophical category
of liberalism,63 the prosecution of these defendants was considered to serve as an implicit deterrent
for future war-time atrocities.64 The consequential aims of the trial were stressed in the process.
Moreover, in contrast to Kantian deontology, the accused became a means to an end.65
At the Tokyo IMT deterrence served as one of the main sentencing rationales.66 Early in his opening
statement, Keenan revealed a preference for deterrence as opposed to the ‘small meaner purpose of
vengeance or retaliation’.67 This viewpoint marks a preference for utilitarianism as opposed to the
lex talionis. However, it bears noting that the prosecutor equated retribution with vengeance and
retaliation. This, as was seen earlier, is not the aim of modern deontology.68
60 See generally Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 36-37, Bix (n 10) 129-130. Terblanche (n 38) 190-193,
199; Snyman (n 40) 16-17 links denunciation and moral outrage to deontology.
61 Hart (n 40) 9. See also Terblanche (n 38) 201-202; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 30.
62 Jackson (n 2) 99.
63 See section 6.3.
64 For this type of use of deterrence, see Terblanche (n 38) 179.
65 Kant (n 8) 45-46. See also Wacks (n 39) 215-216; Bix (n 10) 126. 
66 N Boister and R Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (OUP 2008) 247.
67 Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 387.
68 Terblanche (n 38) 192-193; Bix (n 10) 126.
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Although neither of the IMTs discussed the purposes of sentencing in their majority judgments, it
has been suggested, in relation to the Tokyo IMT – but the argument would apply to Nuremberg too
– that retribution was the supreme sentencing objective as the imposition of the death penalty and
life imprisonment attested.69 Although the Tokyo majority did not venture comments on sentencing
rationales,  a  few instances  thereof  were  coded  from the  individual  opinions.  Webb  recognised
deterrence as the most important objective of punishment. For him, imprisonment for life could
have greater deterrent effect for persons like the accused as compared to summary execution.70
Röling argued that ‘the justification for prosecuting aggression, in spite of the fact that it was not
previously criminal, was that the defendants were dangerous and their influence on Japan had to be
excluded by their imprisonment’.71 This view valued the criminalisation of aggression because of its
incapacitating, i.e. consequentialist, effect. The punishment looked toward the future rather than at
the specific crime committed. In sum, utilitarianism transcended deontology in Röling’s dictum.
At  the  post-WWII  IMTs  the  only  explicitly  articulated  sentencing  purposes  were  consistently
utilitarian.  Utilitarian  arguments  were  found  in  Jackson,  Keenan,  Webb  and  Röling.  Although
academic interpretation suggested retributive underpinnings of the post-WWII IMTs as a whole, the
post-WWII role-players did not explicitly make this  point.  By utilising utilitarianism, they also
seemed to support victims’ interests in the liberalism divide between victims and accused.72 The
small dataset, however, meant that these findings should not be over-emphasised. 
Coding for philosophy in sentencing purposes delivered a large dataset from the post-Cold War
Tribunals wherein Fullerian rule of law was directly engaged. As a preliminary, the Tribunals often
repeated earlier posited law, that retribution and deterrence must be considered for sentencing, as
authority but took the matter no further.73 In some instances these purposes were cited without any
69 WA Schabas,  The UN International Criminal Tribunals The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (CUP
2006) 8; Boister and Cryer  (n 66) 247. Webb, ibid at 260, found the purpose to satisfy the ‘moral indignation of the
community’ to be a subsidiary one.  
70 Webb Separate Opinion 17. See also Boister and Cryer  (n 66) 256; 259.
71 Röling Dissent 50. See also Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 35. 
72 Robinson (n 13) 129-134.
73 For the central importance of retribution and deterrence as purposes in sentencing at the ICTY, see  Prosecutor v
Tadić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-1-T (14 July 1997) para 61; Prosecutor v Tadić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-1-
Tbis-R117 (11 November 1999) para 9, Prosecutor v Jelisić (Judgment) IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999) para 116;
Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 848; Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) IT-95-
14-T (3 March 2000) paras 761-762;  Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment)  IT-96-21-A (20
February 2001) para 806,  Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001)
paras  838  and  857;  Prosecutor  v  Kordić  and  Čerkez (Judgment)  IT-95-14/2-T (26  February  2001)  para  847;
Prosecutor v Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/1-S (31 July 2001) para 28; Prosecutor v Krštić (Judgment)
IT-98-33-T (2 August 2001) para 693; Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001) paras 699,
701;  Prosecutor  v  Krnojelac (Judgment)  IT-97-25-T  (15  March  2002)  para  508;  Prosecutor  v  Milan  Simić
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/2-S (17 October 2002) para 33; Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-T (29
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authority.74 The ICC also alluded to these purposes, vesting them on its Statute but without much
further  philosophical  discussion.75 These ‘tonsorial  and  agglutinative’76 uses  of  philosophically
sensitive  concepts,  i.e.  merely  repeating earlier  case  law  without  accompanying  reasoning,
ostensibly failed at least the ‘public’ or ‘clarity’ requirements of Fullerian rule of law.77 In other
words, it was unclear how much weight these factors were afforded respectively or whether their
use was only rhetorical. While the rule of law in this regard competes with other factors such as
expedience, a final evaluation will only be possible at the end of this chapter. 
November 2002) para 273; Prosecutor v Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-00-39 & 40/1-S (27 February 2003) para
22;  Prosecutor v Naletilić and Martinović (Judgment) IT-98-34-T (31 March 2003) para 739; Prosecutor v Stakić
(Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) para 900;  Prosecutor v Simić, Tadić and Zarić (Judgments) IT-95-9-T (17
October  2003)  para  1059; Prosecutor  v  Banović (Judgment)  IT-02-65/1-S  (28  October  2003)  paras  33-34;
Prosecutor  v  Nikolić (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-02-60/1-S  (2  December  2003)  para  85;  Prosecutor  v  Galić
(Judgment) IT-98-29-T (5 December 2003) para 757; Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-2-
S (18 December 2003) para 132; Prosecutor v Češić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-10/1-S (11 March 2004) paras 22-
26;  Prosecutor  v  Miodrag Jokić (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-01-42/1-S  (18  March  2004)  para  30;  Prosecutor  v
Deronjić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004) para 142; Prosecutor v Mrđa (Sentencing Judgment)
IT-02-59-S (31 March 2004) para 13;  Prosecutor v Babić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-03-72-S (29 June 2004) para
43; Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 1090; Prosecutor v Strugar (Judgment)
IT-01-42-T (31 January 2005) para 458;  Prosecutor v Deronjić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-02-61-A (20
July 2005) para 136; Prosecutor v Limaj et al. (Judgment) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) para 723; Prosecutor v
Bralo (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-17-S (7 December 2005) para 22; Prosecutor v Hadžihasanović (Judgment) IT-
01-47-T (15 March 2006) paras 2070-2073; Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006) paras 375,
402; Prosecutor v Orić (Judgment) IT-03-68-T (30 June 2006) para 718; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-
39-T (27 September 2006) para 1134;  Prosecutor v Bralo (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-95-17-A (2 April
2007) para 82;  Prosecutor v Zelenović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-96-23/2-S (4 April 2007) para 31;  Prosecutor v
Mrkšić, Radić and Šljivančanin (Judgment) IT-95-13/1-T (27 September 2007) para 683;  Prosecutor v Dragomir
Milošević  (Judgment) IT-98-29/1-T (12 December 2007) para 987;  Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj
(Judgment) IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008) para 484; Prosecutor v Boškoski and Tarčulovski (Judgment) IT-04-82-T (10
July 2008)  para 587;  Prosecutor  v  Delić (Judgment)  IT-04-83-T (15 September 2008) para  559;  Prosecutor  v
Krajišnik (Judgment)  IT-00-39-A (17  March  2009)  para  775;  Prosecutor  v  Mrkšić,  Radić  and  Šljivančanin
(Judgment) IT-95-13/1-A (5 May 2009) para 415; Prosecutor v Lukić and Lukić (Judgment) IT-98-32/1-T (20 July
2009) para 1049; Prosecutor v Đorđević (Public Judgment) IT-05-87/1-T (23 February 2011) para 2204; Prosecutor
v Perišić (Judgment) IT-04-81-T (6 September 2011) para 1794.
For the central importance of retribution and deterrence as purposes in sentencing at the ICTR, see also Prosecutor v
Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-23-S (4 September 1998) para 28; Prosecutor v Akayesu (Sentencing
Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 October 1998) page 4;  Prosecutor v Serushago (Sentence) ICTR-98-39-S (5 February
1999) para 20; Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Sentence) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) para 2; Prosecutor
v Rutaganda (Judgment) ICTR-96-3-T (6 December 1999) para 456; Prosecutor v Musema (Judgment) ICTR-96-
13-T (27 January 2000) para 986; Prosecutor v Ruggiu (Judgment) ICTR-97-32-I (1 June 2000) para 33; Prosecutor
v Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (Judgment) ICTR-96-10-T & 96-17-T (21 February 2003) para 772; Prosecutor
v Semanza (Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 554; Prosecutor v Niyitegeka (Judgment) ICTR-96-14-T
(16 May 2003) para 484; Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-99-52-T (3
December 2003) para 1095; Prosecutor v Muhimana (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-95-1B-T (28 April 2005) para
588; Prosecutor v Kamuhanda (Judgment) ICTR 99-54A-A (19 September 2005) para 351; Prosecutor v Serugendo
(Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-2005-84-I (12 June 2006) para 33;  Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze
(Judgment)  ICTR-99-52-A (28 November 2007) para 1057;  Prosecutor v  Bikindi  (Judgment)  ICTR-01-72-T (2
December 2008) para 443;  Prosecutor v Zigiranyirazo  (Judgment) ICTR-01-73-T (18 December 2008) para 449;
Prosecutor  v  Rukundo  (Judgment)  ICTR-2001-70-T  (27  February  2009)  para  593;  Prosecutor  v  Nshogoza
(Judgment)  ICTR-07-91-T (7 July 2009) para 216;  Prosecutor v  Bikindi  (Judgment)  ICTR-01-72-A (18 March
2010) para 198;  Prosecutor v Kanyarukiga  (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-2002-78-T (1 November 2010) para
669;  Prosecutor  v  Hategekimana  (Judgment  and  Sentence)  ICTR-00-55B-T  (6  December  2010)  para  732;
Prosecutor v Ndindiliyimana et al (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-00-56-T (17 May 2011) para 2174.
74 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Sentence) ICTR-96-4-T (2 October 1998) p 4; Prosecutor v Simba (Judgment and Sentence)
ICTR-2001-76-T (13 December 2005) para 429; Prosecutor v Nzabirinda (Sentencing Judgment) ICTR-2001-77-T
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Post-Cold  War  jurisprudence  proved  the  truth  of  Hart’s  contention  that  deontology  and
utilitarianism are not mutually exclusive in sentencing.78 At times retribution and deterrence both
appeared and enjoyed apparent equal weight during sentencing considerations. Illustratively, the
Furundžjia TC argued that a perpetrator ‘must be punished because he broke the law’ and ‘so that
he  and others  will  no  longer  break  the  law’.79 Krštić supported  the  proper  labelling  of  acts  as
genocide on the grounds of attaching stigma to the perpetrators and to serve as a warning for future
wrongdoers.80 Krajišnik argued that deterrence and retribution are both served through a sentence
which is proportional to the gravity of the wrongdoing.81 The Galić AC also noted retribution and
deterrence for purposes of sentencing, but relegated both equally as factors that ‘must not be given
undue weight in the overall assessment of the sentences to be imposed...The TC’s duty remains to
tailor the penalty to fit the individual circumstances of the accused and the gravity of the crime’.82
While also ascribing equal value to retribution and deterrence, this view opposed those cases where
retribution was understood as  ‘a  fair  and balanced approach to  the exaction of punishment  for
wrongdoing’.83 
(23 February 2007) para 49; Prosecutor v Rugambarara (Sentencing Judgment) ICTR-00-59-T (16 November 2007)
para 11; Prosecutor v GAA (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-07-90-R77-I (4 December 2007) para 8;  Prosecutor v
Karera (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-01-74-T (7 December 2007) para 571; Prosecutor v Nchamihigo (Judgment
and Sentence)  ICTR-01-63-T (12 November 2008) para 383;  Prosecutor  v  Bagasora (Judgment  and Sentence)
ICTR-98-41-T (18 December 2008) para 2260; Prosecutor v Kalimanzira (Judgment) ICTR-05-88-T (22 June 2009)
para 741;  Prosecutor v Renzaho  (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-31-T (14 July 2009) para 814;  Prosecutor v
Bagaragaza  (Sentencing  Judgment)  ICTR-2005-86-S  (17  November  2009)  para  28;  Prosecutor  v  Muvunyi
(Judgment) ICTR-00-55A-T (11 February 2010) para 135; Prosecutor v Setako (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-04-
81-T (25 February 2010) para 494; Prosecutor v Munyakazi (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-36A-T (5 July 2010)
para  510;  Prosecutor  v  Ntawukulilyayo  (Judgment  and  Sentence)  ICTR-05-82-T  (3  August  2010)  para  463;
Prosecutor v Gatete (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-2000-61-T (31 March 2011) para 670.
75 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (23
May 2014) paras 37-38 based deterrence on its Statute, but not punishment and condemnation. Prosecutor v Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-01/08 (21 June 2016)
para 10 based both deterrence and retribution on its Statute.
76 See the tonsorial and agglutinative style noted by  LV Prott,  The Latent Power of Culture and the International
Judge (Professional Books 1979) 177.
77 See  similarly  R  Henham,  ‘The  Philosophical  Foundations  of  International  Sentencing’ (2003)  1  Journal  of
International Criminal Justice 69.
78 Hart (n 40) 9.
79 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 288. See Schabas (n 69) 556.
80 Prosecutor v Krštić (Judgment) IT-98-33-A (19 April 2004) para 37. For reference to stigma and deterrence, see also
Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 290; Prosecutor v Rajić (Judgment) IT-
95-12-S (8 May 2006) para 69.
81 Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-A (17 March 2009) paras 776-777. Supported in Prosecutor v Karadžić
(Public  redacted  version  of  Judgment  issued  on  24  March  2016)  IT-95-5/18-T  (24  March  2016)  para  6025;
Prosecutor v Mladić (Judgment) IT-09-92-T (22 November 2017) para 5182.
82 Prosecutor v Galić (Judgment) IT-98-29-A (30 November 2006) para 442.
83 Prosecutor v Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/1-S (31 July 2001) para 29. See similarly,  Prosecutor v
Kambanda (Judgment  and  Sentence)  ICTR-97-23-S  (4  September  1998)  para  58;  Prosecutor  v  Milan  Simić
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/2-S (17 October 2002) para 33;  Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana
(Judgment)  ICTR-96-10-T  &  96-17-T  (21  February  2003)  paras  773-774;  Prosecutor  v  Plavšić (Sentencing
Judgment) IT-00-39 & 40/1-S (27 February 2003) para 23; Prosecutor v Naletilić and Martinović (Judgment) IT-98-
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The Tribunals often stressed deterrence alongside other sentencing purposes like retribution.84 Yet,
at times, the respective sentencing rationales were afforded varying degrees of prominence against
the other.  Sometimes deterrence was favoured.  Writing extra-curially,  Meron suggested that the
budgetary costs involved in the post-Cold War Tribunals compelled the argument that the benefit of
these Tribunals had to exceed retribution and also encompass deterrence.85 Thus in Čelebići, general
and particular deterrence were emphasised as the TC considered deterrence to ‘probably [be]  the
most important factor in the assessment of appropriate sentences for violations of [IHL]’.86 At the
ICTR,  Kayishema and Ruzindana,  Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana and  Ndindabahizi noted the
well-established  principles  of  retribution,  deterrence  and  the  protection  of  society  before  re-
34-T (31 March 2003) para 739;  Prosecutor v Banović (Judgment) IT-02-65/1-S (28 October 2003) paras 33-34;
Prosecutor v Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-S (2 December 2003) paras 86-87;  Prosecutor v Brđanin
(Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 1090;  Prosecutor v Strugar (Judgment) IT-01-42-T (31 January
2005) para 458; Prosecutor v Limaj et al. (Judgment) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) para 723; Prosecutor v Bralo
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-17-S (7 December 2005) para 22; Prosecutor v Orić (Judgment) IT-03-68-T (30 June
2006)  para  719;  Prosecutor  v  Bralo (Judgment  on  Sentencing  Appeal)  IT-95-17-A (2  April  2007)  para  82;
Prosecutor v Zelenović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-96-23/2-S (4 April 2007) para 32; Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Balaj
and Brahimaj (Judgment)  IT-04-84-T (3  April  2008)  para 485;  Prosecutor  v  Delić (Judgment)  IT-04-83-T (15
September 2008) para 559. See also, Terblanche (n 38) 191 and authorities cited there; Snyman (n 40) 16.
84 For the ICTY see Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) paras 900-901, 909; Prosecutor v
Banović (Judgment)  IT-02-65/1-S  (28  October  2003)  paras  33-34;  Prosecutor  v  Dragan  Nikolić (Sentencing
Judgment) IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) paras 134-138; Prosecutor v Deronjić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-61-S
(30 March 2004) paras 144-148; Prosecutor v Mrđa (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-59-S (31 March 2004) para 16;
Prosecutor v Babić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-03-72-S (29 June 2004) para 45; Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-
99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 1091;  Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December
2004) paras 1076-1078;  Prosecutor v Blagojević and Jokić (Judgment) IT-02-60-T (17 January 2005) paras 821-
822; Prosecutor v Strugar (Judgment) IT-01-42-T (31 January 2005) para 458; Prosecutor v Limaj et al. (Judgment)
IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) para 723;  Prosecutor v Bralo (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-17-S (7 December
2005) para 22; Prosecutor v Hadžihasanović (Judgment) IT-01-47-T (15 March 2006) para 2072; Prosecutor v Orić
(Judgment)  IT-03-68-T (30 June 2006) para 720;  Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-T (27 September
2006) paras 1136-1137;  Prosecutor v Zelenović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-96-23/2-S (4 April 2007) paras 33-34;
Prosecutor v Martić (Judgment) IT-95-11-T (12 June 2007) para 484; Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj
(Judgment) IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008) paras 486-487;  Prosecutor v Delić (Judgment) IT-04-83-T (15 September
2008) para 559;  Prosecutor v Milutinović et al (Judgment Volume 3 of 4) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) paras
1144-1146; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-A (17 March 2009) paras 776, 802, 805;  Prosecutor v
Mrkšić, Radić and Šljivančanin (Judgment) IT-95-13/1-A (5 May 2009) para 415;  Prosecutor v Lukić and Lukić
(Judgment) IT-98-32/1-T (20 July 2009) para 1081;  Prosecutor v Popović et al (Judgment) IT-05-88-T (10 June
2010) paras 2128-2130; Prosecutor v Gotovina et al (Judgment Volume 2 of 2) IT-06-90-T (15 April 2011) paras
2594-2597; Prosecutor  v  Perišić  (Judgment)  IT-04-81-T (6  September  2011)  para  1796;  Prosecutor  v  Tolimir
(Judgment) IT-05-88/2-T (12 December 2012) paras 1209-1211;  Prosecutor v Stanišić and Župljanin (Judgment
Volume 2 of 3) IT-08-91-T (27 March 2013) paras 889-891; Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment Volume 4 of 6) IT-
04-74-T (29 May 2013) paras 1275-1277; Prosecutor v Đorđević (Public Judgment) IT-05-87/1-A (27 January 2014)
para 974; Prosecutor v Karadžić (Public redacted version of Judgment issued on 24 March 2016) IT-95-5/18-T (24
March 2016) paras 6025-6026; Prosecutor v Mladić (Judgment) IT-09-92-T (22 November 2017) paras 5181-5183.
For  the  ICTR  see Prosecutor  v  Kayishema  and  Ruzindana (Sentence)  ICTR-95-1-T  (21  May  1999)  para  2;
Prosecutor v Kamuhanda (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR 99-54A-T (22 January 2003) paras 753-754; Prosecutor v
Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (Judgment) ICTR-96-10-T & 96-17-T (21 February 2003) para 772; Prosecutor v
Niyitegeka (Judgment) ICTR-96-14-T (16 May 2003) para 484; Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Judgment) ICTR-98-44A-T
(1 December 2003) paras 944-945; Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi (Judgment) ICTR-2001-714 (15 July 2004) para 498;
Prosecutor v Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-95-1C-T (14 March 2005) paras 110-112.
85 Meron (n 56) 149.
86 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 1234. 
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emphasising specific deterrence ‘so  as to demonstrate “that the international community [is] not
ready to tolerate serious violations of [IHL] and human rights”’.87 Deterrence also found favour with
individual judges at the ICTY. Thus  Schomburg, in an individual opinion in  Blaškić, argued for
special  emphasis  on  general  deterrence  ‘as  an  aggravating  factor  in  finding  the  appropriate
sentence’.88 In  Stakić,  Dragan  Nikolić and  Deronjić,  over  all  of  which  Schomburg  presided,
deterrence was emphasised, whether individual or general, as of paramount importance.89 
Later cases shifted the importance afforded to deterrence as a principle which may be taken into
account yet should not be afforded ‘undue prominence in the overall assessment of the sentences to
be imposed on persons convicted by the International Tribunal’.90 This was furthered by  several
Chambers favourably juxtaposing retribution to deterrence.91 The Todorović TC, for e.g., favoured
the retributive imperative of imposing a penalty proportionate to the gravity of the crime above
general deterrence because of its basis in the ICTY Statute and Rules.92 This line of reasoning was
followed in Plavšić.93 
87 Prosecutor  v  Kayishema  and  Ruzindana (Sentence)  ICTR-95-1-T  (21  May  1999) para  2; Prosecutor  v
Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (Judgment) ICTR-96-10-T & 96-17-T (21 February 2003) para 772. Prosecutor v
Ndindabahizi (Judgment) ICTR-2001-714 (15 July 2004) para 498 refers to Prosecutor v Kambanda (Judgment and
Sentence) ICTR-97-23-S (4 September 1998) para 28 which was endorsed in Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment on
Appeal) IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000) para 185 but the emphasis on deterrence was Ndindabahizi’s own. 
88 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004) Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg.
89 Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) paras 900-901; Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Sentencing
Judgment) IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) paras 134-138; Prosecutor v Deronjić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-61-S
(30  March  2004)  paras  144-148;  Prosecutor  v  Deronjić (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-02-61-S  (30  March  2004)
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg para 19. 
90 Prosecutor v Tadić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9-T (26 January 2000) para 48; Prosecutor v Nikolić (Sentencing
Judgment)  IT-02-60/1-S (2 December 2003) para 90; Prosecutor v Češić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-10/1-S (11
March 2004) paras 25-26; Prosecutor v Miodrag Jokić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-01-42/1-S (18 March 2004) paras
33-34; Prosecutor v Mrđa  (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-59-S (31 March 2004) paras 16-17;  Prosecutor v Babić
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-03-72-S (29 June 2004) para 45; Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Judgment on Sentencing
Appeal) IT-94-02-A (4 February 2005) para 46;  Prosecutor v Martić (Judgment) IT-95-11-T (12 June 2007) para
484; Prosecutor v Milutinović et al (Judgment Volume 3 of 4) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para 1146; Prosecutor
v Popović et al (Judgment) IT-05-88-T (10 June 2010) para 2129; Prosecutor v Tolimir (Judgment) IT-05-88/2-T (12
December 2012) para 1210; Prosecutor v Stanišić and Župljanin (Judgment Volume 2 of 3) IT-08-91-T (27 March
2013) para 891; Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment Volume 4 of 6) IT-04-74-T (29 May 2013) para 1277.
91 Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment) IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000) para 185. This approach was also supported in
Prosecutor v Simić, Tadić and Zarić (Judgments) IT-95-9-T (17 October 2003) para 1059;  Prosecutor v Dragan
Nikolić (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-94-2-S  (18  December  2003)  para  140;  Prosecutor  v  Deronjić (Sentencing
Judgment) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004) paras 143, 150; Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September
2004) para 1090;  Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-94-02-A (4 February 2005)
para  46;  Prosecutor  v  Bralo (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-95-17-S  (7  December  2005)  para  22;  Prosecutor  v
Hadžihasanović (Judgment) IT-01-47-T (15 March 2006) para 2071; Prosecutor v Orić (Judgment) IT-03-68-T (30
June 2006) para 719; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006) para 1135; Prosecutor v
Bralo (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-95-17-A (2 April 2007) para 82; Prosecutor v Martić (Judgment) IT-95-
11-T  (12  June  2007)  para  484;  Prosecutor  v  Delić (Judgment)  IT-04-83-T  (15  September  2008)  para  559;
Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-A (17 March 2009) para 775.
92 Prosecutor v Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/1-S (31 July 2001) para 30. Compare Snyman (n 40) 16.
93 Prosecutor v Plavšić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-00-39 & 40/1-S (27 February 2003) paras 23-25.
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Deontology  criticises  the  (utilitarian)  use  of  punishment  which  rendered  perpetrators  the  mere
means through which to deter future crimes.94 This critique was essentially the position in Kunarac
where, paying lip-service to both (general) deterrence and retribution, the TC submitted, in favour
of  retribution,  that  ‘a  sentence should in  principle  be imposed on an offender  for  his  culpable
conduct – it may be unfair to impose a sentence on an offender greater than is appropriate to that
conduct solely in the  belief  that it  will deter others’.95 This revealed Kant’s requirement to treat
people as ends rather than means.96 This sentiment was essentially approved in Češić, Jokić, Mrđa,
Babić and  Krajišnik when the TC reiterated that:  ‘imposing upon one person a higher sentence
merely for the purpose of deterring others would be unfair to the convicted person, and would
ultimately weaken the respect for the legal order as a whole’.97 
The  dataset  pertaining  to  deterrence  and  retribution  was  therefore  inconsistent  for  rule  of  law
purposes.  Both  enjoyed prominence  at  different  times.  Sometimes  both  were  favoured  equally.
While utilitarianism and deontology are not incompatible, such an uneven justificatory narrative
does  ostensibly  raise  concerns  of  cherry-picking.98 However,  deterrence  and  retribution  do  not
exhaust  the  sentencing  purposes  utilised  at  the  selected  ICL judicial  bodies.  Subsequently,  the
secondary  purposes  of  incapacitation,  didactic  function,  denunciation  and  the  effects  of  the
impugned conduct on victims and society will be considered. Only after all the sentencing purposes
have been considered will findings on consistency of ethical theories be ventured.
Incapacitation as a utilitarian sentencing factor found favour with the Čelebići TC: ‘The protection
of  society  often  involves  long  sentences  of  imprisonment  to  protect  society  from  the  hostile,
predatory conduct of the guilty accused’.99 The protection of society as sentencing rationale was also
upheld at  the ICTR in a long series of cases.100 Incapacitation in this  guise is  firmly linked to
94 Hospers (n 3) 358; Snyman (n 40) 18-21; Meyerson (n 3) 124; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 30.
95 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) paras 840-841.
96 Kant (n 8) 45-46. See also Bix (n 10) 126.
97 Prosecutor v Češić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-10/1-S (11 March 2004) paras 25-26; Prosecutor v Miodrag Jokić
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-01-42/1-S (18 March 2004) para 34. Although here in a slight paraphrase, Prosecutor v
Mrđa (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-59-S (31 March 2004) para 17; Prosecutor v Babić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-
03-72-S (29 June 2004) para 45; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006) para 1137. See
also Prosecutor v Obrenović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/2-S (10 December 2003) paras 46, 152.
98 See  generally  Henham (n  77)  69;  Schabas  (n  69)  556;  MB Harmon  and  F  Gaynor,  ‘Ordinary  Sentences  for
Extraordinary Crimes’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 691-692; Robinson (n 13) 129-135 and
section 6.3 in this study.
99 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) para 1232. 
100 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Sentence) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) para 2;  Prosecutor v Semanza
(Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 554;  Prosecutor v Niyitegeka  (Judgment) ICTR-96-14-T (16 May
2003) para 484; Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-99-52-T (3 December
2003)  para  1095;  Prosecutor  v  GAA  (Judgment  and  Sentence)  ICTR-07-90-R77-I  (4  December  2007)  para  8;
Prosecutor  v  Karera  (Judgment  and  Sentence)  ICTR-01-74-T  (7  December  2007)  para  571;  Prosecutor  v
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individual deterrence and the protection of society. These aims are utilitarian and future-oriented.101
Conversely, in both Kunarac and Krnojelac the TC rejected the imposition of a longer sentence in
order to remove a convicted person from society and thereby to safeguard society from possible
future crimes committed by the convict.102 The TC found that such ‘preventative detainment’, in the
absence of proof of likelihood that the convict will commit violations of IHL again, would neither
be fair nor reasonable as a general sentencing factor.103 Comparably, the  Hadžihasanović TC held
the  objectives  to  ‘protect  society  by  incapacitating  persons  considered  dangerous,  while  also
reflecting public disapproval and making it possible for the convicted person to return to society at a
later  date’,104 only  to  be  of  relative  significance.  By  downplaying  incapacitation,  Kunarac,
Krnojelac and Hadžihasanović revealed deontology because the individual was to be treated as an
end rather than a means. This stands in contrast to the utilitarianism in Čelebići and the ICTR cases.
The aim of reassuring the public that the legal system is being efficiently implemented and enforced
was  mentioned  in  several  ICTY and  ICTR cases  as  a  sentencing  purpose.105 Reprobation  and
affirmative prevention has been construed as pursuing the same objective, namely ‘to reassure the
public that the legal system has been upheld and to  influence the public not to violate this legal
system’.106 Closely linked is the didactic (or educative) function of sentencing, namely ‘conveying
the message that rules of [IHL] have to be obeyed under all circumstances. In doing so, the sentence
seeks  to  internalise  these  rules  and the moral  demands they  are  based on in  the  minds of  the
public’.107 This sentiment ‘that globally accepted laws and rules have to be obeyed by everybody’
was  also  repeated  in  Dragan  Nikolić,  Deronjić and  Krajišnik requiring  internal  acceptance
Nchamihigo  (Judgment  and  Sentence)  ICTR-01-63-T  (12  November  2008)  para  383;  Prosecutor  v  Bagasora
(Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-98-41-T (18 December 2008) para 2260; Prosecutor v Kalimanzira  (Judgment)
ICTR-05-88-T (22 June 2009) para 741;  Prosecutor v Renzaho  (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-31-T (14 July
2009) para 814; Prosecutor v Bagaragaza (Sentencing Judgment) ICTR-2005-86-S (17 November 2009) para 28;
Prosecutor v Setako (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-04-81-T (25 February 2010) para 494; Prosecutor v Munyakazi
(Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-36A-T (5 July 2010) para 510;  Prosecutor v Ntawukulilyayo  (Judgment and
Sentence) ICTR-05-82-T (3 August 2010) para 463; Prosecutor v Gatete (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-2000-61-T
(31 March 2011) para 670.
101 See Snyman (n 40) 18-19; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 35. However, see Bix (n 10) 129-130 for
the classification of incapacitation as neither deontology or utilitarian.
102 Prosecutor v  Kunarac,  Kovać and Vuković (Judgment)  IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) para 843;  Prosecutor v
Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25-T (15 March 2002) para 508.
103 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) para 843.
104 Prosecutor v Hadžihasanović (Judgment) IT-01-47-T (15 March 2006) para 2073.
105 Prosecutor  v  Blaškić (Judgment)  IT-95-14-A (29  July  2004)  para  678.  Also  in  Prosecutor  v  Dragan  Nikolić
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) para 139; Prosecutor v Deronjić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-
02-61-S (30 March 2004) para 149; Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 1091;
Prosecutor v Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-95-1C-T (14 March 2005) para 112.
106 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) para 1081. See also Prosecutor v
Mladić  (Judgment)  IT-09-92-T  (22  November  2017)  para  5183. See  generally  Cryer,  Friman,  Robinson  and
Wilmshurst (n 3) 36-37. 
107 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) paras 1080-1081.
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reminiscent of Hart as this ‘fundamental rule fosters the internalisation of these laws and rules in the
minds of  legislators  and the general  public’.108 Both  Brđanin and  Orić TCs also contained the
sentiment yet without any Hartian internalisation overtones.109 In Kordić and Čerkez the educative
function of sentencing was linked to the need ‘to demonstrate the fallacy of the old Roman principle
of  inter arma silent leges...in relation to the crimes under the [ICTY’s] jurisdiction’.110 While the
philosophical  basis  of  the  educative  function  has  been  debated,  in  these  concrete  ICL cases
utilitarianism was evident.111 Throughout the coded cases the broader public had to be reassured that
the law was being properly enforced and educated about the rules of ICL. These concerns embody
the essence of utilitarianism directed at maximising (future) happiness.
The, arguably utilitarian, didactic objective needs to be compared with the denunciation rationale.
While  some have classified  denunciation  of  criminal  conduct  as  deontological,  sources  are  not
uniform and it is probably a form of the combination theory.112 The data coded here tended to accept
denunciation  consistently,  but  repeated  the  fluctuation  in  basing  it  either  on  retribution  or
utilitarianism (especially through deterrence). 
The  international  community’s  opprobrium  was  cast  as  the  substance  of  retribution  by  the
Alekšovski AC, which was supported by several cases, thus: ‘a sentence of the International Tribunal
should make plain the condemnation of the international community of the behaviour in question
and show “that the international community was not ready to tolerate serious violations of [IHL]
and human rights”’.113 Retribution was to be distinguished from revenge precisely because it ‘duly
108 Prosecutor  v  Dragan  Nikolić (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-94-2-S  (18  December  2003)  para  139;  Prosecutor  v
Deronjić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004) para 149; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-
39-A (17 March 2009) paras 802, 807. For internalisation, see HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961) 108-113.
109 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 1091; Prosecutor v Orić (Judgment) IT-03-
68-T (30 June 2006) para 720.
110 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) para 1082.
111 Bix (n 10) 129-130 classified the educative function as neither deontological nor utilitarian. However, see  Cryer,
Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 36.
112 Terblanche (n  38) 190-193 and  Snyman  (n  40)  16-17 link  moral  outrage  and  denunciation  to  retribution,  i.e.
deontology. However, Cryer,  Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst  (n 3) 36-37 linked denunciation and education
while Bix (n 10) 129-130 classified the denunciation function as neither deontological nor utilitarian. 
113 Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment) IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000) para 185. See also  Prosecutor v Obrenović
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/2-S (10 December 2003) para 50;  Prosecutor v Češić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-
95-10/1-S (11 March 2004) para 23;  Prosecutor v Miodrag Jokić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-01-42/1-S (18 March
2004) para 31; Prosecutor v Mrđa (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-59-S (31 March 2004) para 14; Prosecutor v Babić
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-03-72-S (29 June 2004) para 44; Prosecutor v Blagojević and Jokić (Judgment) IT-02-60-
T (17 January 2005) para 818; Prosecutor v Bralo (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-17-S (7 December 2005) para 22;
Prosecutor v Bralo (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-95-17-A (2 April 2007) para 82;  Prosecutor v Zelenović
(Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-96-23/2-S  (4  April  2007)  para  32;  Prosecutor  v  Haradinaj,  Balaj  and  Brahimaj
(Judgment) IT-04-84-T (3 April 2008) para 485;  Prosecutor v Perišić (Judgment) IT-04-81-T (6 September 2011)
para 1795; Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment Volume 4 of 6) IT-04-74-T (29 May 2013) para 1275.
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express[es] the outrage of the international community’.114 This communal element to punishment
was approved, in the context of war crimes and other serious violations of IHL, when Furundžija,
relying on Erdemović, held ‘public reprobation and stigmatisation by the international community,
which would thereby express its indignation over heinous crimes and denounce the perpetrators, as
one of the essential functions of a prison sentence..’.115 Reprobation and stigmatisation were held to
be important sentencing factors in the  Kordić and Čerkez AC as well as in several ICTR cases,
including Ntakirutimana and Semanza.116 
In several ICTR cases,  denunciation was supplemented with or linked to utilitarian concerns.117
Gacumbitsi argued that ‘it is of the utmost importance that the international community condemn
the  said  offences  in  a  manner  that  will  prevent  a  repetition  of  those  crimes..’.118 Rutaganira
submitted that: ‘Retribution is the expression of the social disapproval attached to a criminal act and
to its perpetrator and demands punishment for the latter for what he has done...Retribution meets the
need for justice and may also appease the anger caused by the crime to the victims and within the
community as a whole’.119 Likewise in a contempt case, the ICTR argued for general deterrence and
114 Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment) IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000) para 185. This approach was also supported in
Prosecutor v Simić, Tadić and Zarić (Judgments) IT-95-9-T (17 October 2003) para 1059;  Prosecutor v Dragan
Nikolić (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-94-2-S  (18  December  2003)  para  140;  Prosecutor  v  Deronjić (Sentencing
Judgment) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004) paras 143, 150; Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September
2004) para 1090;  Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-94-02-A (4 February 2005)
para  46;  Prosecutor  v  Bralo (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-95-17-S  (7  December  2005)  para  22;  Prosecutor  v
Hadžihasanović (Judgment) IT-01-47-T (15 March 2006) para 2071; Prosecutor v Orić (Judgment) IT-03-68-T (30
June 2006) para 719; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006) para 1135; Prosecutor v
Bralo (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-95-17-A (2 April 2007) para 82; Prosecutor v Martić (Judgment) IT-95-
11-T  (12  June  2007)  para  484;  Prosecutor  v  Delić (Judgment)  IT-04-83-T  (15  September  2008)  para  559;
Prosecutor v Milutinović et al (Judgment Volume 3 of 4) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para 1145; Prosecutor v
Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-A (17 March 2009) para 775; Prosecutor v Popović et al (Judgment) IT-05-88-T (10
June 2010) para 2128; Prosecutor v Gotovina et al (Judgment Volume 2 of 2) IT-06-90-T (15 April 2011) para 2595;
Prosecutor v Tolimir (Judgment) IT-05-88/2-T (12 December 2012) para 1209; Prosecutor v Stanišić and Župljanin
(Judgment Volume 2 of 3) IT-08-91-T (27 March 2013) para 890; Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment Volume 4 of 6)
IT-04-74-T (29 May 2013) para 1276;  Prosecutor v Đorđević (Public Judgment) IT-05-87/1-A (27 January 2014)
para 974; Prosecutor v Karadžić (Public redacted version of Judgment issued on 24 March 2016) IT-95-5/18-T (24
March 2016) para 6026; Prosecutor v Mladić (Judgment) IT-09-92-T (22 November 2017) para 5182.
115 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 289. See also Prosecutor v Erdemović
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-96-22-T (29 November 1996) para 65; Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) IT-95-14-A (29
July 2004) para 678.
116 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004)  para 1081. See also Prosecutor v
Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (Judgment) ICTR-96-10-T & 96-17-T (21 February 2003) para 772; Prosecutor v
Semanza (Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 554.
117 For the link between denunciation and deterrence, see Prosecutor v Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-
23-S (4 September 1998) para 28; Prosecutor v Serushago (Sentence) ICTR-98-39-S (5 February 1999) para 20;
Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgment) ICTR-96-3-T (6 December 1999) para 456; Prosecutor v Musema (Judgment)
ICTR-96-13-T (27 January 2000) para 986; Prosecutor v Niyitegeka (Judgment) ICTR-96-14-T (16 May 2003) para
484; Prosecutor v Karera (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-01-74-T (7 December 2007) para 571. At the ICTY, see
Prosecutor v Đorđević (Public Judgment) IT-05-87/1-A (27 January 2014) para 974.
118 Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Judgment) ICTR-2001-64-T (17 June 2004) para 336.
119 Prosecutor v Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-95-1C-T (14 March 2005) para 108.
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denunciation in order to maintain the ‘integrity of the administration of justice’.120 In sum, the data
on denunciation reflected the same ambiguity on its philosophical basis as was found in literature.121
Nothing really turned on whether denunciation was vested on deontology or utilitarianism as the
ensuing  aims  were,  like  the  relationship  between  the  educative  purpose  and  the  denunciation
rationale, not in conflict. The proposed aims, focused on denouncing whether in its desert-allocating
sense or its communal context, were complementary as per the combination envisaged by Hart.122 
Utilitarianism also appeared through the sentencing purpose of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation was
considered twice in  Erdemović by two differently constituted TCs due to its remit on appeal. The
TC of  first  instance  subordinated  rehabilitation  to  deterrence.123 In  passing,  Stakić linked these
utilitarian  rationales  since  ‘deterrence  refers  to  the  attempt  to  integrate  or  to  reintegrate  those
persons who believe themselves to be beyond the reach of [ICL]’.124 The  Erdemović TC of final
instance argued that the accused was ‘reformable and should be given a second chance to start his
life afresh upon release, whilst still young enough to do so’.125 Rehabilitation as utilitarian rationale
was therefore invoked and applied. Doubt was expressed by Kunarac (and approved by Krnojelac)
as to whether rehabilitation was a significantly important sentencing factor in ICL proceedings.126
The Kordić and Čerkez AC likewise downplayed the utility of rehabilitation as a sentencing factor
due to the heinous nature of the crimes usually brought to trial.127 Still, in that case the accused was
considered to have good rehabilitative prospects.128 Rehabilitation was noted in relation to guilty
pleas. Thus, the Nikolić TC noted how ‘the process of coming face-to-face with the statements of
victims’ could make ‘it less likely that if given an opportunity to act in a discriminatory manner
again, an accused would do so’.129 In a few cases at the ICTR, rehabilitation was implemented. In
120 Prosecutor v GAA (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-07-90-R77-I (4 December 2007) para 10. See also Prosecutor v
Nshogoza (Judgment) ICTR-07-91-T (7 July 2009) paras 218-219.
121 To repeat, Terblanche (n 38) 190-193 and Snyman (n 40) 16-17 link moral outrage and denunciation to retribution,
i.e. deontology. However, Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 36-37 linked denunciation and education
while Bix (n 10) 129-130 classified the denunciation function as neither deontological nor utilitarian. 
122 Hart (n 40) 9. See also section 4.3.1.
123 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-96-22-T (29 November 1996) para 66.
124 Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) para 902.
125 Prosecutor v Erdemović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-96-22-Tbis (5 March 1998) para 16.
126 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) para 844. This principle was
also considered and rejected in Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25-T (15 March 2002) para 508.
127 Prosecutor v  Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) para 1079. This sentiment was
provided as authority in Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) para
133;  Prosecutor  v  Deronjić (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-02-61-S  (30  March  2004)  para  143  and  approved  in
Prosecutor v Deronjić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-02-61-A (20 July 2005) para 136.
128 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez (Judgment) IT-95-14/2-A (17 December 2004) para 1091. See also Prosecutor v
Obrenović (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-02-60/2-S  (10  December  2003)  para  146  for  approval  of  accused’s
rehabilitation prospects. 
129 Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-S (2 December 2003) para 93; Prosecutor v Češić
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-10/1-S (11 March 2004) para 27; Prosecutor v Miodrag Jokić (Sentencing Judgment)
IT-01-42/1-S (18 March 2004) paras 35-36.
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Bisengimana, Nzabirinda, Rugambarara and Bagaraza the TC mitigated the accused’s sentence due
to their  respective rehabilitative prospects on the grounds of remorse and family situation.130 In
Seromba,  rehabilitation was considered in conjunction with the accused’s young age.131 Overall
rehabilitation was utilised from time to time in several cases at both the ICTY and the ICTR as a
secondary principle to be considered for purposes of sentencing.132 Its use tended to be determined
by the facts of each case and in accordance with judicial discretion.
130 Prosecutor  v  Bisengimana (Judgment  and  Sentence)  ICTR-00-60-T  (13  April  2006)  para  144;  Prosecutor  v
Nzabirinda (Sentencing  Judgment)  ICTR-2001-77-T  (23  February  2007)  para  81;  Prosecutor  v  Rugambarara
(Sentencing  Judgment)  ICTR-00-59-T  (16  November  2007)  para  39;  Prosecutor  v  Bagaragaza (Sentencing
Judgment) ICTR-2005-86-S (17 November 2009) para 37.
131 Prosecutor v Seromba  (Judgment) ICTR-2001-66-I (13 December 2006) para 399.
132 At the ICTY, see Prosecutor v Furundžija  (Judgment)  IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 291;  Prosecutor v
Delalić,  Mučić,  Delić  and  Landžo  (Judgment)  IT-96-21-A (20  February  2001)  para  806,  Prosecutor  v  Krštić
(Judgment)  IT-98-33-T (2 August  2001) para 704;  Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment)  IT-98-30/1-T (2 November
2001) paras 703-704; Prosecutor v Banović (Judgment) IT-02-65/1-S (28 October 2003) para 76; Prosecutor v Galić
(Judgment) IT-98-29-T (5 December 2003) para 757; Prosecutor v Obrenović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/2-S
(10 December 2003) paras 53, 143, 146; Prosecutor v Deronjić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004)
Separate Opinion of Judge Mumba paras 2-3;  Prosecutor v Mrđa (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-59-S (31 March
2004)  para  18;  Prosecutor  v  Babić  (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-03-72-S  (29  June  2004)  para  46;  Prosecutor  v
Blagojević  and  Jokić (Judgment)  IT-02-60-T  (17  January  2005)  paras  817,  824;  Prosecutor  v  Limaj  et  al.
(Judgment) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) para 723 footnote 2420; Prosecutor v Bralo (Sentencing Judgment) IT-
95-17-S (7 December 2005) para 22; Prosecutor v Hadžihasanović (Judgment) IT-01-47-T (15 March 2006) paras
2073, 2080; Prosecutor v Rajić (Judgment) IT-95-12-S (8 May 2006) para 71; Prosecutor v Orić (Judgment) IT-03-
68-T (30 June 2006) para 721;  Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006) para 1138;
Prosecutor v Zelenović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-96-23/2-S (4 April 2007) para 35; Prosecutor v Martić (Judgment)
IT-95-11-T (12 June 2007) para 484;  Prosecutor v Dragomir Milošević  (Judgment) IT-98-29/1-T (12 December
2007) para 987;  Prosecutor v  Haradinaj,  Balaj  and Brahimaj (Judgment) IT-04-84-T (3 April  2008) para 488;
Prosecutor v Delić (Judgment) IT-04-83-T (15 September 2008) para 559; Prosecutor v Milutinović et al (Judgment
Volume 3 of 4) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para 1146; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-A (17 March
2009) paras 802, 806; Prosecutor v Popović et al (Judgment) IT-05-88-T (10 June 2010) para 2130; Prosecutor v
Gotovina et al (Judgment Volume 2 of 2) IT-06-90-T (15 April 2011) para 2598; Prosecutor v Perišić (Judgment) IT-
04-81-T (6 September 2011) para 1796;  Prosecutor v Tolimir (Judgment) IT-05-88/2-T (12 December 2012) para
1211; Prosecutor v Popović et  al (Judgment)  IT-05-88-A (30 January 2015) para 1966;  Prosecutor v Karadžić
(Public  redacted  version  of  Judgment  issued  on  24  March  2016)  IT-95-5/18-T  (24  March  2016)  para  6025;
Prosecutor v Mladić (Judgment) IT-09-92-T (22 November 2017) para 5181.
At the ICTR, see  Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Sentence) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999) paras 2, 26;
Prosecutor  v  Ruggiu (Judgment)  ICTR-97-32-I  (1  June  2000)  para  33;  Prosecutor  v  Ntakirutimana  and
Ntakirutimana (Judgment)  ICTR-96-10-T  &  96-17-T  (21  February  2003)  para  776;  Prosecutor  v  Semanza
(Judgment) ICTR-97-20-T (15 May 2003) para 554;  Prosecutor v Niyitegeka (Judgment) ICTR-96-14-T (16 May
2003) para 484; Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-99-52-T (3 December
2003) para 1095;  Prosecutor v Ndindabahizi (Judgment) ICTR-2001-714 (15 July 2004) para 498;  Prosecutor v
Rutaganira (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-95-1C-T (14 March 2005) para 113; Prosecutor v Serugendo (Judgment
and Sentence) ICTR-2005-84-I (12 June 2006) para 33; Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (Judgment)
ICTR-99-52-A (28 November 2007) para 1057; Prosecutor v GAA (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-07-90-R77-I (4
December 2007) para 8; Prosecutor v Karera (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-01-74-T (7 December 2007) para 571;
Prosecutor v Nchamihigo (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-01-63-T (12 November 2008) para 383;  Prosecutor v
Bikindi (Judgment) ICTR-01-72-T (2 December 2008) para 443; Prosecutor v Zigiranyirazo (Judgment) ICTR-01-
73-T (18 December 2008) para 449; Prosecutor v Rukundo (Judgment) ICTR-2001-70-T (27 February 2009) para
593;  Prosecutor  v  Kalimanzira (Judgment)  ICTR-05-88-T  (22  June  2009)  para  741;  Prosecutor  v  Renzaho
(Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-31-T (14 July 2009) para 814; Prosecutor v Bagaragaza (Sentencing Judgment)
ICTR-2005-86-S (17 November 2009) para 28;  Prosecutor v Setako (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-04-81-T (25
February 2010) para 494;  Prosecutor v Munyakazi (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-97-36A-T (5 July 2010) para
510; Prosecutor v Ntawukulilyayo (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-05-82-T (3 August 2010) para 463; Prosecutor v
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The  post-Cold  War  Tribunals  have,  in  part,  quantified  punishment  in  accordance  with  the
consequences of the particular conduct on immediate and remote victims. Such a consequential
approach  is,  of  course,  characteristic  of  utilitarianism.133 These  cases  may  be  presented  on  a
spectrum from narrower (only effects on immediate victims taken into account) to broader (effects
on  more  remote  victims  also  taken  into  account)  versions  thereof.134 On  the  broader  version,
utilitarianism converged with cosmopolitanism and especially  the concentric  circle  metaphor of
Hierocles.135 In  a  few  instances,  the  post-bellum contributions  of  an  accused  to  peace  and
reconciliation were also considered.136
    
The TC favoured the narrower consequential argument in both Kunarac and Krnojelac. While the
consequences for the immediate victims were considered relevant in sentencing, the effects of the
crime on third persons were  not.137  The  Todorović TC accepted a guilty plea in mitigation for a
variety  of  reasons,  including  that  it  ‘relieves  victims  and  witnesses  of  the  necessity  of  giving
evidence with the attendant stress which this may incur’.138 Various subsequent judgments echoed
these sentiments.139 The ICTR in  Bizimungu likewise took the direct consequences of crimes on
victims into  account  for  purposes  of  punishment.140 The  Krnojelac AC (and followed in  Rajić)
extended the ambit of possible victims who might have suffered from the impugned conduct as it
accepted that ‘even where no blood relationships have been established, a trier of fact would be
right to presume that the accused knew that his victim did not live cut off from the world but had
established bonds with others’.141 Likewise, the Kvočka TC sought to assess the seriousness of the
Kanyarukiga (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-2002-78-T (1 November 2010) para 669; Prosecutor v Hategekimana
(Judgment  and  Sentence)  ICTR-00-55B-T (6  December  2010)  para  732;  Prosecutor  v  Gatete (Judgment  and
Sentence) ICTR-2000-61-T (31 March 2011) para 670.
133 See generally Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 37-41 who view this as a broader goal of ICL.
134 Which  is  unsurprising  granted  that  demarcating  consequences  is  one  of  utilitarianism’s  main  difficulties,  see
Hospers (n 3) 354-355.
135 Hierocles,  ‘On Appropriate  Acts’  in  I  Ramelli  and  D  Konstan  (trs),  Hierocles  the  Stoic:  Elements  of  Ethics,
Fragments, and Excerpts (Society of Biblical Literature 2009) 91-93. See also section 2.4.
136 Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst (n 3) 40. See also GK McDonald, ‘Reflections on the Contributions of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’ (2001) 24 Hastings International & Comparative Law
Review 156.
137 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) para 852. This argument is
repeated in Prosecutor v Krnojelac (Judgment) IT-97-25-T (15 March 2002) para 512.
138 Prosecutor v Todorović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/1-S (31 July 2001) para 80.
139 For  approval  of  sparing  witnesses  from  reliving  the  trauma  by  testifying,  see  Prosecutor  v  Dragan  Nikolic
(Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) para 121; Prosecutor v Cesic (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-
10/1-S (11 March 2004) paras 58-59; Prosecutor v Miodrag Jokic (Sentencing Judgment) IT-01-42/1-S (18 March
2004) paras  76-77;  Prosecutor v  Deronjic (Sentencing Judgment)  IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004) paras 134, 241;
Prosecutor v Mrda (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-59-S (31 March 2004) para 78;  Prosecutor v Bralo (Sentencing
Judgment) IT-95-17-S (7 December 2005) paras 62, 64. 
140 Prosecutor v Bizimungu et al (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-99-50-T (30 September 2011) para 1991.
141 Prosecutor  v  Krnojelac (Judgment)  IT-97-25-A (17  September  2003)  para  260.  See  also Prosecutor  v  Rajić
(Judgment) IT-95-12-S (8 May 2006) paras 92-93; Prosecutor v Milutinović et al (Judgment Volume 3 of 4) IT-05-
87-T (26 February 2009) para 1147; Prosecutor v Popović et al (Judgment) IT-05-88-T (10 June 2010) para 2151;
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offence with reference to the consequences thereof for victims as well as the ‘effect of the crimes on
the broader targeted group’.142 
Hereafter, the ICTY adopted the broader consequentialist view more consistently.  Obrenović and
later  Blagojević and Jokić noted that ‘punishment must therefore reflect both the calls for justice
from the persons who have – directly or indirectly – been victims of the crimes, as well as respond
to the call from the international community as a whole to end impunity for massive human rights
violations and crimes committed during armed conflicts’.143 Momir Nikolić argued that a sentence
had to reflect the calls of justice from the immediate victims as well as the indirect victims, i.e. ‘the
international community as a whole’.144 In Dragan Nikolić the ‘brutality,  the number of crimes
committed and the underlying intention to humiliate and degrade’ justified a finding that ‘it is not
only reasonable and responsible, but also necessary in the interests of the victims, their relatives and
the international community,  to impose a higher sentence..’.145 That ‘the families of the victims
suffered severe pain from the loss of their relatives’ was to be considered in the determination of the
seriousness of the crimes in Mrđa.146 In Vasiljević, the AC accepted the TC’s approach to take ‘the
long  term  effect  of  the  trauma  still  suffered  by  [particular]  witnesses...into  account  as  an
aggravating factor’.147 In sentencing  Bralo,  the TC considered the individual direct and indirect
victims’ testimony, before concluding that ‘these statements paint a picture of shattered lives and
livelihoods, and of tremendous ongoing pain and trauma’.148 The Krajišnik TC afforded the ‘utmost
importance’  to  the  consequences  of  the  accused’s  crimes  which  would  ‘persist  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina for decades, affecting hundreds of thousands of people’.149
In  a  few  instances,  the  effects  of  the  accused’s  actions  post-bellum on  their  societies  were
considered as well. In Plavsić, the TC ascribed much weight to the accused’s role and contribution
Prosecutor v Đorđević  (Public Judgment) IT-05-87/1-T (23 February 2011) para 2215;  Prosecutor v Stanišić and
Župljanin (Judgment  Volume  2  of  3)  IT-08-91-T (27  March  2013)  para  892;  Prosecutor  v  Đorđević (Public
Judgment) IT-05-87/1-A (27 January 2014) para 971; Prosecutor v Popović et al (Judgment) IT-05-88-A (30 January
2015) para 1992.
142 Prosecutor v Kvočka (Judgment) IT-98-30/1-T (2 November 2001) paras 699-702. See also  Prosecutor v Galić
(Judgment) IT-98-29-T (5 December 2003) para 758; Prosecutor v Tolimir (Judgment) IT-05-88/2-T (12 December
2012) para 1218; Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment Volume 4 of 6) IT-04-74-T (29 May 2013) paras 1303-1305;
Prosecutor v Karadžić (Public redacted version of Judgment issued on 24 March 2016) IT-95-5/18-T (24 March
2016) paras 6046-6050 for these consequential concerns in determination of the gravity of the offence.
143 Prosecutor v Obrenović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/2-S (10 December 2003) para 45; Prosecutor v Blagojević
and Jokić (Judgment) IT-02-60-T (17 January 2005) para 814.
144 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-S (2 December 2003) para 82.
145 Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) para 281.
146 Prosecutor v Mrđa (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-59-S (31 March 2004) para 40.
147 Prosecutor v Vasiljević (Judgment) IT-98-32-A (25 February 2004) para 167.
148 Prosecutor v Bralo (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-17-S (7 December 2005) para 40.
149 Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-T (27 September 2006) para 1151.
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to the re-establishment of peace in the Republika Srpska.150 The TC evaluation of the guilty plea
thus considered the utilitarian benefits from the accused’s post-conflict conduct. Deronjić likewise
suggested  that  the  accused’s  ‘contribution  to  peace  and  security’ through  his  guilty  plea  and
contribution to factual findings had to be balanced against the ‘gravity of the crimes...In doing so, it
is for this [TC] to come as close as possible to justice for both victims and their relatives and the
Accused, justice being of paramount importance for the restoration and maintenance of peace’.151 
While  the  effects  of  crimes  on  victims  were  thus  often  taken  into  account,  the  fluctuating
demarcation of the consequences to be considered dovetailed the inherent tension on this point
which exists in utilitarianism. There was thus some internal variance in the utilitarianism used.152 
Turning to the ICC, a noteworthy dataset was coded bearing in mind the limited output of the Court
to date. Deterrence, based on the ICC Statute, was considered as sentencing factor in Lubanga and
Katanga.153 In Bemba the TC, following Krajišnik, accepted both general and specific deterrence as
sentencing rationales.154 Al Mahdi also considered both forms of deterrence. Moreover, Al Mahdi’s
guilt admission was considered to possibly have a ‘deterrent effect on others tempted to commit
similar acts’.155 The support for utilitarian rationales continued when rehabilitation was accepted as
secondary  consideration  in  two  cases.  The  Bemba TC  accepted  rehabilitation  as  a  relevant
sentencing provision, but advised against affording it undue weight in light of ‘serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a whole’.156 Al Mahdi concurred with this view and, in
light of the facts of the case, considered the accused’s likeliness to successfully reintegrate into
society.157 Odio Benito, in a dissent, argued that  ‘trial proceedings should also attend to the harm
suffered  by  the  victims  as  a  result  of  the  crimes  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court’.158 She
150 Prosecutor v Plavsić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-00-39 & 40/1-S (27 February 2003) paras 85-94, 110.
151 Prosecutor v Deronjić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-61-S (30 March 2004) para 4. For the criticism of this aim to
restore  peace  as  optimistic  and  utopian,  see  E  Vulliamy,  The  War  is  Dead,  Long  Live  the  War  Bosnia:  The
Reckoning (The Bodely Head 2012) 226.
152 Hospers (n 3) 354-357. See generally Dower (n 8) 74; Wacks (n 39) 216; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst
(n 3) 32.
153 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06
(10 July 2012) para 16; Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute)
ICC-01/04-01/07 (23 May 2014) paras 37-38. See also WA Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal
Court (4th edn, CUP 2011) 60-61.
154 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-
01/08 (21 June 2016) para 11.
155 Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi (Judgment and Sentence) ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016) paras 67,
100.
156 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-
01/08 (21 June 2016) para 11.
157 Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi (Judgment and Sentence) ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016) paras 67, 97.
158 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March
2012) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito para 8.
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disagreed  with  the  majority’s  neglect  to  consider  the  damage  caused  to  the  victims  and  their
families (especially in relation to the punishments and sexual violence inflicted).159 In particular, she
pointed out that the crimes’ consequences extended to future generations, the victims’ families as
well  as  the  children  born  from sexual  violence.160 In  Katanga,  Bemba and  Al  Mahdi the  ICC
subscribed  to  a  sentence  which  could  acknowledge  the  harm to  victims.161 The  Al  Mahdi TC
accepted a  guilt  admission as potentially furthering peace and reconciliation ‘by alleviating the
victims’ moral suffering through acknowledgement of the significance of the destruction’.162 These
overwhelming utilitarian arguments were slightly offset by the more deontological rationale that the
expression of society’s condemnation for a criminal act needed consideration in  Katanga,  Bemba
and Al Mahdi.163
As was noted throughout  this  code,  deontological  and utilitarian  sentencing purposes  are  often
compatible.164 This  is  even more so if  retribution is  simply taken to mean that  punishment  for
wrongdoing is justified.165 However, ICL jurisprudence often understood retribution as more than
that.  The  fact  that  retribution  and  utilitarian  rationales  were  often  juxtaposed,  confirmed  an
understanding of retribution in excess of mere justification for punishment. 
The post-WWII IMTs produced a small dataset but, whenever ethical theory was explicitly argued,
it was consistently utilitarian. The ICC produced a significant dataset, given its total output to date,
which was also consistently utilitarian. In these instances no rule of law concerns appeared. The
post-Cold War Tribunals’ dataset, in particular at the ICTY, was significant. Many of the post-Cold
War references  to  ethical  theories  were  no more  than  ‘tonsorial  and agglutinative’,  i.e.  merely
accepting the law as set out in earlier case law.166 This raised questions about whether the purposes
were merely invoked for rhetorical support or whether they substantively impacted sentencing. Yet,
despite the  ‘tonsorial and agglutinative’ use of sentencing purposes, the post-Cold War Tribunals
159 Ibid paras 2, 6.
160 Ibid para 19.
161 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (23
May 2014) paras 37-38; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the
Statute)  ICC-01/05-01/08 (21 June 2016) paras  11,  32;  Prosecutor  v  Ahmad al  Faqi  al  Mahdi (Judgment  and
Sentence) ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016) para 67.
162 Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi (Judgment and Sentence) ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016) para 100.
163 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (23
May 2014) paras 37-38; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the
Statute) ICC-01/05-01/08 (21 June 2016) para 11; Prosecutor v Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi (Judgment and Sentence)
ICC-01/12-01/15 (27 September 2016) para 67.
164 Hart  (n  40)  9.  See  also  Snyman  (n  40) 22-23;  Cryer,  Friman,  Robinson  and  Wilmshurst  (n  3) 29-30  on  the
combination theory.
165 Terblanche (n 38) 190-195.
166 For the tonsorial and agglutinative style, see Prott (n 76) 177; section 1.2.2.
148
produced a large substantive dataset as well. Oscillation in support for deontology and utilitarianism
alongside some variance within the individual sentencing purposes were visible which ostensibly
pressurised the Fullerian rule of law requirement of non-contradictory justifications.167 
The most  significant  challenge to  consistency of ethical  theory in  the post-Cold War Tribunals
revolved around retribution and deterrence. The oscillation in preference between them, on the one
hand,  or  the  cumulative  support  of  both  equally,  on  the  other  hand,  embodied  an  apparent
contradiction. Even accepting the possibility of a combination theory as well as judicial discretion
to  individualise  sentence,  these  positions  are  in  conflict.  There  was  no  clear  evidence  of  an
overarching  framework  guiding  the  selections,  which  suggested  that  these  positions  were
inconsistently held.168 This also filtered into the incapacitation purpose. While incapacitation was
generally accepted, a deontological critique thereof was also visible. The use of the other purposes
was  explainable  on  the  combination  theory  or  through  judicial  discretion  to  individualise
punishment.  The didactic  aims of  punishment  as  coded from the selected cases  were linked to
utilitarianism and the denunciation of wrong conduct linked to the combination theory. While their
respective  support  seemed  motivated  by  rhetorical  considerations  rather  than  a  principled
framework of some sort, both can be held simultaneously without contradiction. Rehabilitation was
sometimes taken into account but usually relegated to secondary significance. While this suggested
fluctuation in support for utilitarianism, the imperative to individualise punishment may explain
said variance.169 Again some variance appeared in the range of effects on victims taken into account
from immediate victims to broader humanity to societal concerns, but this was at most a fluctuation
within a utilitarian purpose which has stabilised in favour of the broader category.170 
Coding for compliance with the Fullerian desiderata in this chapter is ostensibly a delicate exercise.
The philosophical  categories  are  not  incompatible  – the argument  in  literature for  combination
theories attests to this fact.171 The ICL judiciaries have thus taken into account factors that were in
their  discretionary  powers  to  do.  Moreover,  there  is  the  further  discretionary  impact  of
individualising punishment on the facts of a particular case. However, the concern revolved around
retribution  and  deterrence.  Elevating  one  rationale  above  another  (and  later  reversing  the
167 See Henham (n 77) 83 on the variance between utilitarian purposes.
168 Snyman (n 40) 22-23; Henham (n 77) 69.
169 For agreement on rehabilitation, see Harmon and Gaynor (n 98) 693.
170 Hospers (n 3) 354-357. See generally Dower (n 8) 74; Wacks (n 39) 216; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst
(n 3) 32.
171 Hart  (n  40)  9.  See  also  Snyman  (n  40) 22-23;  Cryer,  Friman,  Robinson  and  Wilmshurst  (n  3) 29-30  on  the
combination theory.
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preference) without any framework directive thereto is problematic.172 Preferring one purpose to
another when they were broadly-speaking compatible raises questions. Without  an explanation of
the framework within which such preferences were made a lack of clarity may be identified.173 The
amount of tonsorial and agglutinative uses of the sentencing purposes noted compounds the lack of
clarity problem. A further concern appears as to whether the purposes of sentencing were only
added for rhetorical effect. 
The lack of clarity is also reflected in literature. Thus – despite coded data in this study revealing
many  instances  of  utilitarianism  –  some  observers  have  suggested  a  pervasive  retributive
undercurrent  still  endures  in  ICTY jurisprudence  which  needs  to  be  supplanted  with  a  victim-
focused approach.174 Conversely, some observers have opposed utilitarian rationales in favour of
denunciatory  purposes.175 Others  have  labelled  Tribunal  use  of  retribution  as  ‘uneven’  and
unsatisfactory’.176 Another commentary suggested that utilitarianism underpinned the Tribunals.177
Still  others have identified consistency through several purposes which are firmly predictive of
sentence length.178 Such variances in interpretation are precisely due to the lack of clarity caused by
the omission of some overarching framework regarding the relative importance of the sentencing
purposes. This raises further rule of law concerns, apart from clarity, as the justificatory apparatus
presented was not truly ‘public’ beyond the rhetorical presentation of philosophical arguments.  It
seems  more  than  coincidental  that  the  philosophical  categories  utilised  in  conjunction  with
sentencing,  specifically  pertaining  to  retribution  and  deterrence,  should  be  found  somewhat
inconsistent here and that the ICL judiciaries are at times criticised for inconsistent sentencing as
well.179 Possibly,  the  variance  and  inability  to  postulate  an  overarching  framework  can  be  a
consequence of the opposing views on what an appropriate understanding of ICL should be, viz,
victim-focused (which deterrence tends to be) or accused-centric (which retribution tends to be).180
This will be revisited in section 6.3.  It is, however, suggested that, on the matter of sentencing
purposes, more could be done about clarifying the weight afforded to the respective purposes.
172 Snyman (n 40) 23;  R Henham, ‘Developing Contextualized Rationales for Sentencing in International Criminal
Trials’ (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 774; Damaška (n 42) 339.
173 Henham (n 77) 69; Harmon and Gaynor (n 98) 691-692; Henham (n 172) 758, 774; Damaška (n 42) 331, 339.
174 Henham (n 77) 72, 84; Henham (n 172) 757-759.
175 Damaška (n 42) 344-345.
176 Harmon and Gaynor (n 98) 692.
177 Schabas (n 69) 556-558.
178 J Meernik, ‘Sentencing Rationales and Judicial Decision Making at the International Criminal Tribunals’ (2011) 92
Social Science Quarterly 588-606.
179 Henham (n 77) 69; Harmon and Gaynor (n 98) 691-692; Henham (n 172) 758.
180 Robinson (n 13) 129-135.
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However, this matter pertains to the exact contours of the sentences to be imposed, an aspect about
which moral agents need not have exact predictability and foreseeability to be able to direct their
actions and therefore to ensure compliance with the formal rule of law. The rule of law simply
cannot be dependent on the exact contours of sentencing being always known in advance. This will
undermine judicial discretion and the ability to fit punishment to crime. The certainty of punishment
and the pre-existence of a penal provision, which have been complied with by the selected ICL
judicial  bodies  throughout,  have  sufficiently  ensured  foreseeability  and  predictability  in  the
administration of law.181 In sum, while the rule of law principle of clarity has been pressurised by
somewhat inconsistent ethical theories in sentencing considerations, the rule of law has endured.182
There  are  grounds  here,  however,  upon  which  improvements  can  be  made  for  purposes  of
institutional legitimacy.
4.4 Conclusion on the ethical theories of utilitarianism and deontology under part B
Coding for consistency of ethical theories in the selected ICL jurisdictions produced two codes,
namely self-reflexive justifications and sentencing purposes. While the overall dataset at the post-
WWII IMTs was small, the dataset at the post-Cold War Tribunals and the ICTY, in particular, was
large. The ICC did not produce data on the first code, but it delivered a noteworthy dataset on
sentencing purposes. 
With the exception of constant utilitarianism under sentencing purposes at the post-WWII IMTs and
the  ICC,  consistency  in  justifications  utilising  ethical  theories  was  absent  at  the  selected  ICL
judicial bodies. Preferential support for either deontology or utilitarianism appeared alongside the
equal support of both. This was true of both self-reflexive justifications and sentencing purposes.
Accordingly, inconsistency emerges whether these codes are considered cumulatively or separately.
The matter  is  complicated,  especially  in  relation to  sentencing purposes,  by the fact  that  these
ethical theories are compatible. In the context of sentencing, Hart pointed out that utilitarianism and
deontology can coexist.183 Judicial discretion and the need to individualise punishment cloud the
preference afforded to certain purposes, like rehabilitation, as well. 
Turning to the individual codes, self-reflexive justifications resulted in a small dataset which was
inconsistent.  Functional  objectives  might  explain  the  differing  positions  of  Jackson,  Cassese,
181 See, for example, Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 290. 
182 Of course,  per LL Fuller,  The Morality of  Law (Yale University Press 1969) 53 complete compliance with the
desiderata is not required.
183 Hart (n 40) 9.
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McDonald and Vohrah.  Thus, Jackson utilised both utilitarianism and deontology to add rhetorical
support  for the legitimacy of the IMT. Cassese’s utilitarianism was opposed by McDonald and
Vohrah which was consistent with their respective focal concerns on the accused and the victims
respectively.184 Ascribing superior responsibility to a failure of duty constituted deontology, but in
the absence of a crime ‘failure to punish’ it  seemed that liability,  in such instances, was rather
vicarious.185 These inconsistencies reflected the broader  tension within liberalism as to what an
appropriate understanding of ICL should be.186 This tension will be considered in section 6.3. For
purposes of the self-reflexive statements, however, the inconsistency endures. With a small dataset
involved, the inconsistency should, however, not be over-emphasised.
 
In the context of sentencing purposes, the concern for the rule of law is not so much the use of both
ethical  theories,187 but  the  lack  of  any  overarching  theoretical  framework  for  doing  so.
Deontological and utilitarian sentencing purposes are often compatible,188 but their cumulative use
in sentencing seemed like a belt-and-braces approach which required but never received an overall
framework.189 Sometimes punishment theories were merely reiterated rhetorically with no or bare
reference to authority, despite the fact that their inclusion implied the whole of their philosophical
apparatus too. This pressurised the rule of law requirement of justification having to be public. 
Arguing that deontology and utilitarianism can be used in a combination theory does not resolve the
oscillation in their respective prominence revealed through coding. This fluctuation was especially
pronounced between retribution and deterrence (and for and against incapacitation to an extent).
The other  purposes  of  sentencing  could  either  co-exist  because  they  addressed  complementary
concerns (education, denunciation) or were delineated relative to sentencing discretion and the need
to  individualise  punishment  (rehabilitation).  The  purpose  of  taking  into  account  the  effects  of
crimes  on  victims  was  generally  compatible  with  the  other  rationales  but  showed  the  typical
utilitarian difficulty of consistent demarcation.190 It is therefore at the specific intersection between
deontology and utilitarianism under  the  sentencing purposes  of  retribution  and deterrence  (and
184 See section 2.5 above.
185 Robinson (n 13) 125. This argument applies to the failure to punish rather than the failure to prevent.
186 Ibid 129-135.
187 This has been the concern for other studies, (such as  Henham (n 77) 72, 84;  Henham (n 172) 757-759) but the
argument here pertains to rule of law rather than to whether one theory is better than the other. 
188 Hart  (n  40)  9.  See  also  Snyman  (n  40) 22-23;  Cryer,  Friman,  Robinson  and  Wilmshurst  (n  3) 29-30  on  the
combination theory.
189 Snyman (n 40) 23. See also Henham (n 77) 69; Harmon and Gaynor (n 98) 691-692; Henham (n 172) 758; Damaška
(n 42) 339.
190 Hospers (n 3) 354-357. See generally Dower (n 8) 74; Wacks (n 39) 216; Cryer, Friman, Robinson and Wilmshurst
(n 3) 32.
152
arguably incapacitation) that the rule of law principle of clarity was pressurised. While the exact
scope of punishment need not be known beforehand for purposes of the formal rule of law, the lack
of clarity in the prominence afforded to the respective sentencing purposes can be improved upon
here.191 In  sum,  if  the  rule  of  law  exists  as  a  matter  of  degree,192 clarifying  the  overarching
framework  of  these  sentencing  purposes  could  enhance  foreseeability  and  predictability  in  the
administration of ICL. It is especially the morality of aspiration, i.e. the excellence towards which
good law strives, which will be improved.193 This would also benefit outcome-based legitimacy
which, in turn, should improve the possibility of consent legitimacy. 
191 See comparably Henham (n 172) 758; Harmon and Gaynor (n 98) 691-692.
192 Fuller (n 182) 42-45, 122-123, 145; J Raz,  The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press
1979) 211-222; J Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press 1980) 276-281 noted that legal systems
and the rule of law exist as a matter of degree.
193 Fuller (n 182) 43.
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Part C
Critical approaches as philosophical category for coding in the selected
international criminal law role-players 
Some  philosophical  justifications  were  coded  in  the  selected  ICL jurisprudence  which  can  be
labelled ‘critical  approaches’. Particular care is required with the label of ‘critical  approaches’.1
‘Critical approaches’ is not the only possible label to include the approaches discussed in chapter 5,
but it  has support in academic literature.2 It  will  be used here as an umbrella concept.  Briefly,
critical approaches ‘can be described as a “will to knowledge”...to know how things work and why,
not simply how we are told they are supposed to work’.3 Critical scholarship critiques the system
under scrutiny to establish what is authentic in that system and what not.4 In legal discourse, this
calls  for  a renewed scrutiny into the premises  and beliefs  which underpin the law,  legal  rules,
procedures and institutions. 
The critical approaches identified in ICL jurisprudence included feminism, antecedents to Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and generic Other-based arguments. This preface
contextualises these approaches and briefly explains them. A more detailed exposition on them will
precede the individual sections below because coding occurred directly. The ensuing discussions
aim, like in previous chapters, to explain the philosophies as they were subjectively relevant for the
coding and ensuing classification of ICL justifications against the Fullerian rule of law framework
of the study.
While  critical  approaches  are  not  necessarily  postmodern,  they  have  taken  inspiration  from
postmodernism from time to time.5 Concepts posited as universally valid often need investigation to
ascertain whether universality is truly embodied or not.6 Postmodernism aids in the undermining of
a  master  narrative,  but  does  not  attempt  to  show  the  truth  of  any  alternative.  Arguably
1 R  Cryer, T Hervey, B Sokhi-Bulley with A Bohm,  Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart
Publishing 2011) 59-60.
2 R Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence (2nd edn, OUP 2003) 211; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 1)
59-60; BH Bix,  Jurisprudence: Theory and Context  (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 237 uses ‘modern critical
perspectives’ but also refers to ‘critical approaches’. 
3 Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 1) 59-60. The phrase is from Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality.
4 Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 1) 60.
5 M Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn, Thomson Sweet Maxwell 2014) 1189, 1197; Bix (n 2)
287-288.
6 A Anghie and BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal
Conflict’ in Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds), The Methods of International Law (ASIL 2004) 210.
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postmodernism is best used to stress the social conditioning of existing thinking.7 Postmodernism,
through its  valuation  of  difference  and plurality,  further  contributes  to  giving  a  voice  to  those
previously marginalised by requiring the recognition of ‘the unique identity of particular individuals
or groups’.8 Against this background, feminism and TWAIL, as specific types of critical approaches,
can both be labelled ‘outsider jurisprudence’.9 Both approaches oppose a dominant, master narrative
of perspectives, values and their ensuing effects on particular outsider groups. Law is seen by both
as systematically oppressive to women and the Third World respectively.10
Before briefly considering feminism and TWAIL, and as it culminates in a separate code on critical
technique, ‘othering’ requires elucidation. This term can be used as either a noun or a verb. As a
noun it connotes ‘a person or group of people who are different from oneself’.11 Used as a verb, it
means ‘to distinguish, label, categorize, name, identify, place and exclude those who do not fit a
societal norm’.12 In sum, ‘“othering” is the process that makes the other’.13 This process occurs
through frequently pointing out those characteristics of a group which differ from the norm in a
particular way.14 Othering can be used in different ways depending on objective and point of view.
7 D Meyerson, Understanding Jurisprudence (Routledge 2007) 106. See also R Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence
An Introduction to Legal Theory (3rd edn, OUP 2012) 287; Bix (n 2) 288. The relativity of truth has been noted in
post-Cold War jurisprudence, e.g., Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Judgment) ICTR-95-1-T (21 May 1999)
para 32; Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) paras 20-21; Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Judgment)
ICTR-98-44A-T  (1  December  2003)  para  61;  Prosecutor  v  Nikolić (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-02-60/1-S  (2
December 2003) paras 84, 91; Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolic (Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003)
para  122;  Prosecutor  v  Deronjic (Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-02-61-S  (30  March  2004)  para  135;  Prosecutor  v
Blagojević and Jokić (Judgment) IT-02-60-T (17 January 2005) para 820;  Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Judgment on
Appeal) ICTR-2001-64-A (7 July 2006) para 32; Prosecutor v Krajišnik (Judgment) IT-00-39-T (27 September
2006) para 717;  Prosecutor v Milutinović et al (Judgment Volume 1 of 4) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009) para 4;
Prosecutor v  Perišić  (Judgment)  IT-04-81-T (6 September 2011) paras  410-411;  Prosecutor  v  Lukić and Lukić
(Judgment)  IT-98-32/1-A (4  December 2012) paras  260,  396;  Prosecutor  v  Mathieu  Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-02/12 (18 December 2012) para 36; Prosecutor v Đorđević (Public
Judgment) IT-05-87/1-A (27 January 2014) para 143; Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment pursuant to Article
74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (7 March 2014) para 70. 
8 Meyerson (n 7) 107.
9 M Khosla, ‘The TWAIL Discourse: The Emergence of a New Phase’ (2007) 9 International Community Law Review
292 and footnote 6; Bix (n 2) 242. 
10 See generally,  H Charlesworth, C Chinkin and S Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ (1991) 85
American Journal of International Law 616-618; L Eslava and S Pahuja, ‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial: TWAIL and
the Everyday Life of International Law’ (2012) 45 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 195; Bix (n 2) 242-243.
For the congruence of CRT and TWAIL, see M Mutua, ‘Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an
Insider-Outsider’ (2000) 45 Villanova Law Review 851-853.
11 A Mountz, ‘The Other’ in Carolyn Gallaher, Carl Dahlman, Mary Gilmartin, Alison Mountz and Peter Shirlow (eds),
Key Concepts in Political Geography (Sage 2009) 328.  
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.  Othering  the  opponent  has  underlined  many  conflicts,  see  BVA Röling, The  Tokyo  Trial  and  Beyond
Reflections of a Peacemonger (Antonio Cassese ed, Polity Press 1993) 24; R Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil
The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Arrow Books 2004) 513; S Drakulić,  They Wouldn’t Hurt a Fly (Hachete
Digital  2004)  chapter  13. See  also  HC  Kelman  and  VL Hamilton,  Crimes  of  Obedience:  Toward  a  Social
Psychology of Authority and Responsibility (1989), p 163 quoted in Prosecutor v Tadić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-
94-1-T (14 July 1997) para 72.
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Self can oppose Other to point out deviant behaviour or to marginalise. Other, in turn, can oppose
Self to undermine the privileged position assumed by Self or to advocate for the value of plurality
and difference.
Coding  revealed  feminism,  antecedents  to  TWAIL15 and  generic  instances  of  othering  in  ICL
justifications. Both feminism and TWAIL are specialised forms of the Self/Other separation as both
link to a marginalised Other.16 While feminism focuses on women, TWAIL emphasises the Third
World.17 Overlap  occurs  between  the  approaches  through  Third  World  Feminism,  but  this
encompasses neither the entirety of feminism nor TWAIL. Feminism is internally varied (which is
typical for critical approaches), but common themes include that the viewpoint and interests of men
have been favoured in theory and practice.18 Feminism in law seeks to reveal the consequences of
law’s ostensible gender neutrality.19 TWAIL is likewise internally varied yet aims to ‘understand,
deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international law as a medium for the creation and perpetuation
of a racialized hierarchy of international norms and institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to
Europeans’.20 TWAIL reveals how those in  power can use international  law as  an instrument.21
Finally,  instances  of  othering  along  a  Self/Other  axis  appeared  which  were  not  linked  to  the
categories of gender or the Third World. They encompassed both arguments of Self opposing Other
and Other opposing Self for the purposes enumerated above.
As with previous chapters, the coded data is structured around the Fullerian principle requiring
consistent (or non-contradictory) justifications. The essential question is whether the justifications
ventured  were  foreseeable  and  predictable.  Further,  as  with  the  policy-oriented,  NCSL,
interpretation and ethical theory codes,22 the two liberalisms inherent to ICL could be identified, at
times, in the chapter 5 data. This discussion will be continued in section 6.3.
15 As is explained in section 5.3, ‘TWAIL’ could simply be used as label because it has support in literature to classify
e.g. Pal thus. The arguments noted were congruous with TWAIL. This arguably justifies using ‘TWAIL’ here, but
because TWAIL formally only appeared after Tokyo, the label ‘antecedents to TWAIL’ will be used throughout.
16 For feminism, see KT Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 831; Cotterrell (n 2) 242-
243. For TWAIL see Anghie and Chimni (n 6) 192-193; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 1) 69; Eslava
and Pahuja (n 10) 202.
17 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright (n 10) 616-618.
18 Freeman (n 5) 1080-1081; Bix (n 2) 243. 
19 H Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ in Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds),  The
Methods of International Law (ASIL 2004) 180; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 1) 63.
20 M Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 31; A Anghie, ‘What is
TWAIL: Comment’ (2000) 94 ASIL Proceedings 39. See generally, Khosla (n 9) 295; A Anghie, ‘TWAIL: Past and
Future’ (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 480. 
21 Khosla (n 9) 304. See also  KC Moghalu,  Global Justice The Politics of  War Crimes Trials (Stanford Security
Studies 2008) 14.
22 See sections 2.5, 3.4, 3.5 and the preface to part B respectively.
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Chapter 5
Critical approaches in ICL jurisprudence: Feminism, antecedents to Third
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and generic othering in ICL
jurisprudence
5.1 Introduction
For purposes of this study, coding for critical approaches revealed three philosophical categories,
namely  feminism,  antecedents  to  Third  World  Approaches  to  International  Law  (TWAIL)  and
generic arguments pertaining to othering. Coding for Fullerian consistency revealed limited datasets
in all categories. Nonetheless, the appearance of such critical theories are noteworthy because they
can reflect a change in the intellectual zeitgeist of a community. They engage the interest-based
extra-curial dynamic which weighs the philosophical positions of the ICL judicial bodies against the
interests of the broader international community.1 The subsequent sections introduce the respective
approaches  in  some detail  before  considering  the  coded  data.  This  is  necessary  because  these
philosophical categories were directly coded for.
5.2 Feminism
Feminism reveals international law to be a gendered system.2 On this understanding women are
traditionally subordinated to men. Feminism attempts to give a voice to women as a previously
marginalised group.3 The identification of past or present exploitation, the empowerment of women
and the transformation of patriarchal institutions are paramount for feminism.4 
Feminists are not unified and different strands exist.5 Literature reveals various strands of feminism,
1 See section 1.2.3.1.
2 H Charlesworth, C Chinkin and S Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ (1991) 85 American Journal
of International Law 615, 621.
3 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright (n 2) 621.
4 A van Blerk,  Jurisprudence an Introduction (Butterworths Lexisnexis 1998) 171;  MA Fineman, ‘Feminist Legal
Theory’ (2005) 13 Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law 14.  
5 Charlesworth,  Chinkin and Wright (n 2) 621;  Van Blerk (n 3) 173; D Meyerson,  Understanding Jurisprudence
(Routledge 2007) 173-189; R Cryer, T Hervey, B Sokhi-Bulley with A Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and
International Law (Hart Publishing 2011)  63;  R Wacks,  Understanding Jurisprudence An Introduction to Legal
Theory (3rd edn,  OUP 2012) 300; M Freeman,  Lloyd’s  Introduction to  Jurisprudence (9th edn,  Thomson Sweet
Maxwell 2014) 1082; BH Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 244.  
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including  liberal,6 difference,7 radical8 and  postmodern.9 Because  ICL  arguments  lacked  the
requisite  nuance,  it  was  not  possible  to  distinguish  between  different  feminist  strands  through
coding. Some observers have, in any case, questioned such fragmentation on the basis that no single
method is sufficient when a concrete issue needs to be addressed.10 This also applies to judicial
pronouncements.  Common to  all  strands,  however,  were  responses  ‘to  the  inherent  or  socially
constructed differences between men and women,’11 the analysis  of law’s  role  in  ‘constructing,
maintaining, reinforcing and perpetuating patriarchy and [looking] at ways in which this patriarchy
can be undermined and ultimately eliminated’.12 These common understandings served as the basis
for philosophy identification under part (ii) of SCA.
Identification of feminism in ICL further occurred through the techniques of feminism.  Feminist
legal methods attempt to understand and reveal oppressive structures in society. Asking the woman
question was particularly important for this study.13 Briefly,  the woman question in law ‘means
examining how the law fails to take into account the experiences and values that seem more typical
of women than of men, for whatever reason, or how existing legal standards and concepts might
disadvantage women’.14 Silences can be as noteworthy as positive rules and rhetorical structures.15
The pervasive silence of women in international law is of special importance to feminism.16 This
does not mean the complete absence of women in international law, but may entail that when they
are included it is in a curtailed manner reducing them to victims, potential or actual mothers all in
need of  protection.17 This  method was most  evident  in  ICL judgments.  Outside observers  have
further utilised methods like consciousness-raising18 and feminist practical reasoning,19 but these
have not been as visible in the pronouncements of ICL role-players which is the subject matter of
6 PA Cain,  ‘Feminism and the  Limits  of  Equality’ (1990)  24  Georgia  Law Review 829.  See  also  W Morrison,
Jurisprudence (Cavendish 1997) 486-488; Fineman (n 4) 13-16; Meyerson (n 5) 174-175; Wacks (n 5) 302-303.  
7 Cain (n 6) 835-836; Morrison (n 6) 497-504; Fineman (n 4) 16-17; Meyerson (n 5) 181-183; Wacks (n 5) 306-308. 
8 Cain (n 6) 831-837; Morrison (n 6) 488-494; Fineman (n 4) 15-16; Meyerson (n 5) 185-187; Wacks (n 5) 303-308.  
9 KT Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 834-835, 877; Morrison (n 6) 511-512; Van
Blerk (n 4) 179-183;  R Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence (2nd edn, OUP 2003) 224-228; Meyerson (n 5) 187-
188; Wacks (n 5) 305-306.
10 H Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ in Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds),  The
Methods of International Law (ASIL 2004) 161.
11 Bix (n 5) 244. See also Morrison (n 6) 480-483.
12 Charlesworth, Chinkin and Wright (n 2) 621; Meyerson (n 5) 173; Freeman (n 5) 1081 .
13 Freeman (n 5) 1092.
14 Bartlett (n 9) 837; Van Blerk (n 4) 186-187.
15 Charlesworth (n 10) 162.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid 162-163.
18 See, for e.g., CA MacKinnon, ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory’ (1982) 7 Signs
519 et seq. Ibid at 543 she defines it as ‘the collective critical reconstitution of the meaning of women’s social
experience, as women live through it’. See also Bartlett (n 9) 863-864.
19 Feminist  practical  reasoning  argues  that  individual  fact-finding  often  surpasses  universal  principles  and
generalisations as it affords more respect to difference. See Bartlett (n 9) 849.
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this study. The applicable methods dovetailed the gradual maturation of the ICL regime. Thus, the
rudimentary techniques of feminism were utilised most prominently in a regime which was still
developing. 
Turning towards the coded data, both post-WWII IMTs were criticised for their failures to properly
prosecute rape and sexual violence. Rape was neither listed in the respective Charters nor charged
as a separate offence.20 It has been argued that rape was not formally prosecuted at Nuremberg
because  some  of  the  Allied  soldiers  were  similarly  guilty  of  raping  women.  From a  feminist
perspective  this  can  be  seen  as  ‘an  example  of  the  banality  of  evil  in  militarised  patriarchal
culture’.21 Asking the woman question, therefore, revealed the silence regarding female protection at
Nuremberg.  This  silence  also emerged in  relation  to  the  evidence  accepted  at  the  Tokyo IMT.
Categories  of  victims  like  the  so-called  comfort  women  were  ignored  in  the  judgment.22 This
neglect can be ascribed, in feminist terms, ‘to the privatisation of sexual violence in patriarchal
culture’.23
Although only a few external critiques expose the philosophical position in relation to women at the
post-WWII IMTs,  this  is  understandable as  the  issue revolved around the silences  which were
revealed  through  the  woman  question.  Because  of  the  nature  of  feminism,  such  silences  were
relevant to expose the hidden consequences of the ostensible gender neutrality in law.24 At the IMTs,
feminism was thus consistently neglected. This revealed a lack of concern with women as victims
which would contrast with human rights (HR) liberalism.25 On the formal rule of law, there was
congruence  between  the  (lack  of)  rules  and  their  administration.26 The  ensuing  consistency
contributed to foreseeability and predictability, but revealed the limits of formal rule of law in lieu
of substantive rule of law.
With some exception, before the 1990s sexual violence in war was often invisible or trivialised or
justified as inevitable.27 This position has changed as coding for feminism at the post-Cold War
Tribunals shows. Both the ICTY and ICTR were influenced by feminism in developing sensitivity
20 R Copelon, ‘Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into International Criminal Law’
(2000) 46 McGill Law Journal 221.
21 Ibid 222.
22 N Boister  and  R Cryer,  The Tokyo  International  Military  Tribunal:  A Reappraisal (OUP 2008)  313.  See  also
Copelon (n 20) 221-223.
23 Copelon (n 20) 223.
24 Charlesworth (n 10) 159; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 5) 63.
25 See section 6.3.
26 Fuller’s 8th principle, see section 1.2.3.2.
27 Copelon (n 20) 220.
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and  pertinent  recognition  for  gender-based  crimes  for  which  they  were  lauded.28 Feminism is,
however, layered and the shift is still part of the first steps to improve the position of women. 29
External  critiques  have  revealed  continued  gendered  biases.  Nonetheless,  the  persistence  of
challenges does not undo the progressive shift in favour of women which has been identified. 
At the ICTY, the candidature of female judges received support from the women’s HR movement.
Two of the first elected female judges, McDonald and Odio-Benito were credited with playing a
leading  role  in  making  the  Tribunal’s  evidentiary  rules  more  sensitive  to  witnesses  in  sexual
violence cases.30 In  Tadić, like the ICTR’s  Akayesu later, the first papers filed noted the rape of
women at Omarska prison as no more than a background matter. Civil society noted this and filed
an amicus brief which, among others, noted the failure to hold the accused accountable for rape.
This, of course, revealed the silence imposed on women by the proceedings. Odio-Benito also noted
the absence of sexual violence charges.31 Under such pressures the resultant indictment did contain
charges of rape, but these charges were later dropped because of the unwillingness of the witness to
testify absent full  protection.32 In the Rule 61 proceedings against  Dragan Nikolić,  the TC also
evidenced feminism, by inviting the prosecution to consider amending the indictment in light of
evidence that rape and sexual violence occurred against women and girls during their detention at
Sušica camp.33 These early instances revealed that  feminist civil society and the Tribunal judges
significantly impacted the jurisprudence of the ICTY (and, as will be seen below, the ICTR) and
commenced the process to address the previous silence afforded to women in ICL.
The Furundžjia  TC  and  AC  both  delved  into  feminist  arguments,  the  TC  regarding  the
categorisation of rape and the AC regarding a charge of bias.  The TC argued that categorising
forcible oral sex as rape did not fall foul of the legality principle even where the indicted acts would
have been (merely) classified as sexual assault in some domestic jurisdictions, including that of the
accused. The impugned acts were in any event criminal. Moreover, as long as the sentence was
imposed on the ‘factual basis of coercive oral sex’ and the relevant statutory provisions ‘then [the
accused] is not adversely affected by the categorisation of forced oral sex as rape rather than as
28 D Buss, ‘Performing Legal Order: Some Feminist Thoughts on International Criminal Law’ (2011) 11 International
Criminal Law Review 409.
29 Charlesworth (n 10) 159 et seq.
30 Copelon (n 20) 228; KD  Askin, ‘Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR’ (2005) 3  Journal of International
Criminal Justice 1009.
31 Copelon (n 20) 229.
32 Ibid 230.
33 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-94-
2-R61 (20 October 1995) paras 32-33. See also WA Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals The Former
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone (CUP 2006) 374.
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sexual assault’.34 This finding was justified on the fact that war transformed actions which could
have been classed as sexual assault  as an aggravated form thereof as well as the imperative to
protect human dignity.35 The accused’s ‘only complaint can be that a greater stigma attaches to
being a convicted rapist rather than a convicted sexual assailant’.36 The TC addressed this type of
sentiment by submitting that ‘any such concern is amply outweighed by the fundamental principle
of protecting human dignity, a principle which favours broadening the definition of rape’.37 The
desire that a crime which specifically affects women be correctly and comprehensively labelled so
that the appropriate level of opprobrium could be brought to bear on the impugned conduct was
congruous with feminist concerns. 
Feminist  considerations  appeared  in  the  Furundžjia AC  regarding  whether  Judge  Mumba  was
impartial or gave the appearance of bias due to her pre-ICTY involvement with the United Nations
Commission on the Status of Women (the UNCSW).38 The UNCSW primarily worked for ‘social
change which promotes and protects the human rights of women’.39 The AC emphasised that, while
it reflected the definition proposed by the Expert Group Meeting, the expanded understanding of
rape adopted in this particular case was based on earlier case law. On this argument, Mumba was
not shown to be biased.40 The issue soon turned to whether she gave the appearance of bias. The AC
submitted as bottom-line that ‘even if Judge Mumba sought to implement the relevant objectives of
the  UNCSW,  those  goals  merely  reflected  the  objectives  of  the  United  Nations,  and  were
contemplated by the Security Council resolutions leading to the establishment of the Tribunal’.41
Furthermore, the eligibility criteria of ICTY judges required experience in international law which
would include knowledge of HR law obtained from working at  the UNCSW.42 Concern for the
vulnerability of women was thus found per curiam to have pervaded the UN, the ICTY and the
eligibility  requirements of its  judges.43 The silence afforded to  women at  the post-WWII IMTs
stands in stark contrast to this pervasive recognition of their position.
In Kunarac, the prosecutor charged rape and outrages against human dignity separately. This was
34 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 184.
35 M Swart, ‘Judicial Lawmaking at the ad hoc Tribunals: The Creative Use of the Sources of International Law and
“Adventurous Interpretation”’ (2010) 70 ZaöRV 467-468.
36 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-T (10 December 1998) para 184.
37 Ibid.
38 Prosecutor v Furundžija (Judgment) IT-95-17/1-A (21 July 2000) para 164.
39 Ibid para 166.
40 Ibid para 211.
41 Ibid para 201.
42 Ibid para 205.
43 As well as the prosecutor, see C  Del Ponte,  Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and the Culture of
Impunity (Other Press 2008) 31.
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the case even though the prosecutor acknowledged that ‘rape could have and has been classified as
an outrage upon personal dignity’.44 The desire to label the crime properly, i.e. to reveal its sexual
nature,  seemed to  coincide with the feminist  approach to  reveal  gendered silences.  The proper
labelling  showed  sensitivity  to  the  vulnerability  of  women,  thereby  linking  this  argument  to
feminism. The separate existence of rape as war crime was further confirmed by the AC.45 That
feminism influenced the legal outcome in Kunarac has been confirmed by academic observers.46
In several cases the violence to female detainees or their unique experience of certain crimes were
emphasised in particular. In Dragan Nikolić, the TC emphasised the fact that the accused subjected
the female detainees, in particular, to humiliating and degrading treatment at  Sušica Camp.47 Both
Stakić and  Brđanin noted that for ‘a  woman, rape is by far the ultimate offence, sometimes even
worse than death because it  brings shame on her’.48 Likewise in  Bralo,  the TC emphasised the
position of women in that ‘[IHL], along with basic principles of humanity, require that individuals
who are detained during an armed conflict must be treated humanely, and that the rape and torture
of a woman in this context is a most heinous crime requiring unequivocal condemnation’.49 The TC
then proceeded to recall the particular heinous details of a particular rape committed by the accused.
The TC concluded on an even firmer feminist note that: ‘These actions demonstrate a desire to
debase and terrify a vulnerable woman, who was at the  complete mercy of her captors’.50 While
these  sentiments  consistently  reiterated  the  consequences  of  violence  for  women,  there  might
simultaneously be feminist concerns surrounding Stakić and Brđanin. Both linked women’s identity
to the arguably outdated notion of modesty. While that is a possible critique for external feminist
observers, the overall increase in sensitivity for women’s plight was evident. 
Turning to the ICTR, the discussion on feminism essentially revolved around Akayesu. Despite the
inclusion of sexual violence under the crime of genocide in the ICTR Statute, the Akayesu case, like
Tadić, initially went to trial without charges or evidence of rape. The prosecutor claimed that ‘it was
impossible to document rape because women wouldn’t talk about it’.51 This unwillingness on the
part  of  the  prosecutors  to  amend  the  indictment  persisted  despite  the  evidence  on  this  matter
44 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23-T (22 February 2001) para 554.
45 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Kovać and Vuković (Judgment) IT-96-23/1-A (12 June 2002) para 195.
46 Buss (n 28) 410.
47 Prosecutor v Dragan Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-94-2-S (18 December 2003) paras 194-195, 213.
48 Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) para 803; Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T
(1 September 2004) para 1009.
49 Prosecutor v Bralo (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-17-S (7 December 2005) para 33.
50 Ibid para 34.
51 Copelon (n 20) 224-225; Askin (n 30) 1009; Schabas (n 33) 372.
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extracted through Judge Pillay’s questioning.52 However, the indictment was eventually amended to
include allegations of sexual violence. The prosecution contended that the testimony of a certain
witness motivated their renewed investigation into sexual violence in the area under scrutiny. The
accused countered that this amendment was the result of ‘pressure from the women’s movement and
women in Rwanda,  whom he described as “worked up to agree that they have been raped”’.53
Indeed, several civil society bodies, working for the betterment of women, exerted pressure on the
prosecutor to charge the gender crimes.54 The TC addressed these viewpoints in the judgment in the
following manner:
‘The Chamber understands that the amendment of the indictment resulted from the spontaneous testimony of
sexual violence by Witness J and Witness H during the course of this trial and the subsequent investigation of
the Prosecution, rather than from public pressure. Nevertheless, the Chamber takes note of the interest shown
in this issue by non-governmental organizations, which it considers as indicative of public concern over the
historical exclusion of rape and other forms of sexual violence from the investigation and prosecution of war
crimes.  The  investigation  and presentation  of  evidence  relating  to  sexual  violence  is  in  the  interest  of
justice’.55
The TC evidently accepted the prosecution’s argument but firmly supported the feminist project of
civil society as ‘in the interest of justice’. This concern with woman’s protection was clear in the
Akayesu judgment as the sexual violence charges, in particular, were emphasised throughout.56 Like
its  Yugoslav  counterpart,  these  first  attempts  to  reflect  feminist  sensitivities  were  not  beyond
reproach on that selfsame front. The TC finding that rape was an act of genocide if committed with
the intention to destroy a specific group was understood as continuing the notion of women as
cultural  objects.57 This  represents  a  dissatisfaction  with  the  gendered  nature  of  the  law as  ‘the
violation  of  the  woman’s  body is  secondary  to  the  humiliation  of  the  group’.58 Observers  are,
however,  not unanimous on this  point.59 The gendered nature of law,  including ICL, cannot be
gainsaid.  The recognition of  the position of women was the first  step away from the previous
silences even if much work is still to be done. For purposes of this study, this counts as an instance
of feminism even if the protection afforded could be refined.
52 Copelon (n 20) 225.
53 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) paras 42, 417, 448. See generally Askin (n 30)
1009; R  Cryer,  ‘The  Philosophy  of  International  Criminal  Law’ in  Alexander  Orakhelashvili  (ed),  Research
Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 261.
54 Copelon (n 20) 225-226. For further confirmation of the role feminists played in the Akayesu judgment, see Buss (n
28) 410; BN Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (CUP 2008) 61-62.
55 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment) ICTR-96-4-T (2 September 1998) para 417.
56 Ibid paras 731-734.
57 Charlesworth (n 10) 172.
58 Ibid.
59 See, for example, Copelon (n 20) 228; Buss (n 28) 413.
163
On appeal, Akayesu continued the argument that Judge Pillay had not been impartial during the trial
when asking certain witnesses questions pertaining to sexual violence. However, the AC rejected
these claims when taking the Judge’s comments into account in their context – they were the logical
consequence  of  earlier  questions  on  crimes  against  humanity.60 Feminist  concerns  thus  still
animated the accused’s argument on appeal. 
While only a few instances of feminist considerations were noted at the post-Cold War Tribunals,
this was because of study design focusing on articulated instances of philosophical justificatory
arguments. Later on, charges concerning crimes against women became normal and so required less
direct  argument.61 The  initial  cases  showed  consistent  support  for  feminist  concerns  even  if
international organisations had to get involved. Such involvement, however, revealed the interest-
based extra-curial  dynamic at  work. The judicial  bodies internalised and reflected a shift in the
communal  zeitgeist  regarding  the  commitment  to  the  legal  protection  afforded to  women.  The
harmonisation of curial and communal standards of protection for women would also comply with
Fullerian rule of law. The shift in position was not frequent and, more importantly, foreseeable and
predictable. 
Feminism also appeared in a few cases at the ICC. Although the prosecution in Lubanga presented
evidence of sexual violence, it  had omitted charging the accused accordingly. The TC relegated
these arguments to constitute context to the charged acts and refrained from directly attributing
responsibility for them.62 Judge Odio Benito took this passivity to task as she wanted the sexual
nature  of  the  crimes  incorporated  into  the  ‘participation  in  hostilities’.63 Otherwise  this  critical
aspect of the crime would be invisible and those who systematically suffer from sexual violence in
the context of enlistment, conscription and participation would not be protected.64 This, of course,
exemplified the typical feminist concern with gendered silence and the unbalanced impact of the
law. Odio Benito also noted the gendered-dimension of sexual violence against children in armed
groups. Thus ‘unwanted pregnancies for girls...often lead to maternal or infant’s deaths, disease,
60 Prosecutor v Akayesu  (Judgment on Appeal) ICTR-96-4-T (1 June 2001) paras 195-200. However, see J  Wessel,
‘Judicial  Policy-Making  at  the  International  Criminal  Court:  An Institutional  Guide  to  Analyzing  International
Adjudication (2006) 44 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 392.
61 See, for e.g., the discussion and cases noted in the Review of the Sexual Violence Elements of the Judgments of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugolsavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the
Special  Court  for  Sierra  Leone  in  the  Light  of  Security  Council  Resolution  1820
<www.icty.org/x/file/Outreach/sv_files/DPKO_report_sexual_violence.pdf> accessed 28 June 2018.
62 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March
2012) paras 889-896, 913.
63 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06 (14 March
2012) Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Odio Benito paras 16-17.
64 Ibid.
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HIV, psychological traumatisation and social isolation’.65 While sexual violence is an element of
enlistment  and  conscription,  sexual  violence  and  enslavement  are  distinct  and  separate  crimes
which could have been considered separately if the prosecution presented charges accordingly.66
The TC, in sentencing, likewise reproached the prosecution as it ‘strongly deprecates the attitude of
the former Prosecutor in relation to the issue of sexual violence’ which was limited to statements in
the  opening  and  closing  submissions  rather  than  inclusion  in  the  charges.67 Strong  feminist
sentiments were thus visible in Odio Benito as she was specifically concerned with the gendered
implications of the prosecution omission while  the TC also revealed feminist  sympathies in its
disapproval of the prosecution’s attitude towards sexual violence.
Finally, dealing with the rape charges in Bemba, the TC considered various expert testimonies on
the particular consequences of rape on women before finding the crimes committed to be very
grave. The psychological and social consequences of women in the DRC were considered.68 The
Court devoted some time to discuss the particular problems facing women who had been raped as
evidenced by several experts. This showed feminist sensitivities in contrast with the IMT silences
discussed earlier.
In its limited output to date, the ICC has ostensibly continued the post-Cold War trend to advocate
the position of women.  This, of course, continued the embodiment in legal institutions of the shift
sensitive to the gendered-dimension of international crimes. Similarly, the use of these justifications
was consistent, predictable and foreseeable per the Fullerian requirements. The difference from the
position at the post-WWII IMTs could not be more stark.  
Coding for feminism revealed a shift in trend across the selected ICL judgments. External feminist
critiques revealed the post-WWII IMTs’ omission pertaining to feminist concerns and the lack of
proper prosecution for the crimes of rape and sexual violence. Under the influence of feminist civil
society, there occurred a significant paradigm shift in this regard at the post-Cold War Tribunals.
Thus the ICTY, ICTR and, based on its limited output, the ICC have revealed sensitivity to the need
for improving the protections afforded to women in war as well as to particularise the protection
afforded in line with the specific vulnerabilities of women. The subsequent protections showed HR
65 Ibid paras 13, 20
66 Ibid paras 20-21.
67 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/06
(10 July 2012) para 60.
68 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute) ICC-01/05-
01/08 (21 June 2016) paras 36-40.
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liberalism as  women’s  position as  victims  was considered  in  particular.  While  there is  nothing
intrinsic in feminism which attaches it to the interests of victims in ICL, in ICL jurisprudence, to
date, this was the context in which it appeared.69
On the coded data, it was the earlier cases at the ICTY (Tadić,  Furundžjia), ICTR (Akayesu) and
ICC (Lubanga)  wherein feminist  arguments  were most  prominent  and consistently  made.  Once
‘normalised’ as standard, it became less necessary to argue this matter – prosecutors increasingly
prosecuted crimes against women, without the need for further accompanying justifications. A more
balanced, but by no means perfect, approach to women’s protection ensued. The protection afforded
through feminism can be compared to the levels of an excavation. Initially at the IMTs no specific
protection existed for women. After the initial obstacles at the post-Cold War Tribunals, the tenuous
position of women was at least identified and some protection afforded. Yet, a feminist critique of
existing protections is still possible.70 The initial silence might have been overcome, but much still
needs to be done on the deepest levels of excavation.71 For, e.g., at both the ICTY and the ICC
sexual violence is only addressed against the context of a widespread, systematic, or large-scale
attack, i.e. when the community is threatened by destruction.72 Nonetheless, for purposes of this
study, the articulated justificatory narratives revealed feminism. Just because the protection sought
was not yet completely attained did not render the initial arguments any less feminist.
When this limited dataset is measured against the rule of law, it is revealed that the post-Cold War
judicial  bodies,  under  the influence of  civil  society,  reflected a  change in  accordance  with  the
zeitgeist  of  the  international  community.  Bringing  the  law  into  accordance  with  society’s
expectations, on what is labelled the  interest-based extra-curial dynamic in this study,73 does not
adversely affect predictability and foreseeability.74 None of the Fullerian desiderata are contravened.
The shift which occurred was gradual and in line with the broader zeitgeist of the international
society. It was also not a matter of retrospective law. Protections which had existed, but were often
neglected,  were  now  just  being  explicitly  recognised  again.  Finally,  once  the  protection  was
afforded it became a consistent aspect of Tribunal jurisprudence.
69 This is revisited in section 6.3.
70 Charlesworth (n 10) 159 et seq.
71 Ibid 161-162.
72 Ibid 171.
73 See section 1.2.3.1.
74 For R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977) 43 legal principles can develop from ‘a
sense of appropriateness developed in the profession and public over time’.
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5.3 Antecedents to TWAIL
For critical approaches, it is imperative to reveal the ‘situatedness’ of law.  For some, the formal,
abstract and universal nature of international law was, and remains, a construct of European states
for the purpose of domination and enforcing their conceptions of law.75 In short, the universality of
international law is  geographic rather than normative.76 An example of such a view is  TWAIL,
which  investigates  how  present  arrangements  reflect  and/or  perpetuate  colonial  relations  by
subjecting and/or silencing people from the Global ‘South’ and ‘Third’ World.77 
Because  such  sentiments  in  ICL appeared  at  the  Tokyo  IMT,  in  particular  in  the  relationship
between the Allies and Japan, a brief explanation of ‘Third World’ is necessary. Sometimes ‘Third
World’ is used as a synonym for ‘less-developed’, ‘developing’, ‘underdeveloped countries’ or ‘the
South’.78 Traditionally  African,  Asian  and Latin  American  countries  are  juxtaposed  as  ‘lagging
behind the ‘West’, ‘North’, ‘First World’ or ‘developed countries’.79 Some observers use ‘Third
World’ to mean ‘the Rest and not merely the West’.80 The ‘Third World’ has referred to a political
coalition.81 ‘Third World’ can also be construed as a ‘social movement’ of the poor against the rich
or the weak opposing the strong.82 All of these understandings can be criticised on grounds, for e.g.,
of essentialising the Third World.83 Mickelson attempted to circumvent some of these issues by
arguing holistically for the Third World as ‘occupying a historically constituted,  alternative and
oppositional stance within the international system’.84 Thus, whatever the objective status of Japan
was, in the case of the Tokyo proceedings, the Western Allies assumed the role of arbiter over it.
This forcefully juxtaposed West and East in a manner which ostensibly raised the TWAIL-type
75 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 206 for the Eurocentric nature of international law and Webb Separate
Opinion 10 for support of the view that Christian civilisation was essentially responsible for international law. See
also BVA Röling, International Law in an Expanded World (Djambatan, 1960) 10-11; M Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’
(2000)  94  American  Society  of  International  Law  Proceedings 31-33;  M  Mutua,  ‘Critical  Race  Theory  and
International  Law:  The  View  of  an  Insider-Outsider’ (2000)  45  Villanova  Law  Review 843-845;  E  Jouannet,
‘Universalism and Imperialism: The True-False Paradox of International Law?’ (2007) 18  European Journal of
International  Law  380-391;  M  Khosla,  ‘The  TWAIL Discourse:  The  Emergence  of  a  New  Phase’ (2007)  9
International Community Law Review 296. 
76 Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (n 75) 31 fn 1; Mutua, ‘Critical Race Theory and International Law’ (n 75) 844.
77 Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (n 75) 36, 38; A Anghie and BS Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law
and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflict’ in Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds), The Methods
of International Law (ASIL 2004) 186; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 5) 69.
78 K  Mickelson,  ‘Rhetoric  and  Rage:  Third  World  Voices  in  International  Legal  Discourse’ (1998)  16  Wisconsin
International Law Journal 356. See also  L  Eslava and S Pahuja,  ‘Beyond the (Post)Colonial:  TWAIL and the
Everyday Life of International Law’ (2012) 45 Verfassung und Recht in Übersee VRÜ 196.
79 Mickelson (n 78) 356.
80 See OC Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, Methodology, or Both?’
(2008) 10 International Community Law Review 377.
81 Ibid 357.
82 Ibid.
83 Mickelson (n 78) 357-359.
84 Ibid 360.
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concerns just mentioned. 
TWAIL aims to reactively guard against lingering (Western) hegemony and proactively improve the
situation of the Third World.85 TWAIL is  concerned about  the lived experience of Third World
peoples and not merely the States which represent them.86 TWAIL aims to ensure that international
law is  genuinely  based  on  justice  rather  than  power.87 Importantly,  TWAIL does  not  deny  the
importance of international law, but only seeks to expose its singularly Eurocentric bias and realign
it  to be more inclusive of the values of the Third World.88 Some observers even formulate this
negatively,  namely that  TWAIL’s  novelty resides  less in  a  ‘critical  third world voice...[than]  in
intervening within the dominant discourses of international law, particularly within North America,
Australia and Europe’.89
Although TWAIL scholarship abounds in internal variations, there exists unity in its commitment to
oppose the unjust global order.90 The variety in TWAIL projects, however, enables challenges in
excess of international law and colonialism as the determinants of power relations. TWAIL can
oppose the ‘hegemony of the dominant narratives of international law...along many axes – race,
class,  gender,  sex,  ethnicity..’.91 In  the  context  of  early  ICL at  Tokyo,  the  matter  of  race  was
particularly relevant.
While the benefits  for taxonomical consistency of using the label ‘TWAIL’ for scholarship that
started in the 1960s (or arguably even earlier) and progressed into the future cannot be gainsaid,
there are dangers involved as well pertaining to watering down the label.92 For some, TWAIL can be
subdivided  into  TWAIL I,  which  embodies  scholarship  of  the  period  directly  subsequent  to
decolonisation, and TWAIL II, which embodies more contemporary scholarship.93 TWAIL I focused
on the ‘nation-state  and the manner  in  which the powerful  nations used international  law as  a
85 Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (n 75) 31; JT Gathi, ‘TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network,
and a Tentative Bibliography’ (2011) 3 Trade, Law and Development 30.
86 Anghie and Chimni (n 77) 186.
87 A Anghie, ‘What is TWAIL: Comment’ (2000) 94 ASIL Proceedings 40; Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (n 75) 36, 38;
Anghie and Chimni (n 77) 202.
88 Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (n 75) 36. See also Anghie and Chimni (n 77) 202; Gathi (n 85) 38-39.
89 Anghie and Chimni (n 77) 202; Gathi (n 85) 35.
90 Mickelson (n 78) 353; Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (n 75) 36; Anghie and Chimni (n 77) 185-186; Okafor (n 80) 375;
A Anghie, ‘TWAIL: Past and Future’ (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 480; Gathi (n 85) 27; Eslava
and Pahuja (n 78) 195.
91 Gathi (n 85) 37.
92 Mickelson (n 78) 360-361.
93 K Mickelson, ‘Taking Stock of TWAIL Histories’ (2008) 10  International Community Law Review 360. See also
Anghie and Chimni (n 77) 186-195.
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vehicle of oppression to serve their hegemonic ends and self-interest.’94 TWAIL II centres around
how international organisations, globalisation and development continued the hierarchies created by
international law.95 Yet, the distinction between TWAIL I and II is not universally accepted. On such
a view, TWAIL as a movement commenced in 1997 with its first conference at the Harvard Law
School.96 On this view, ‘TWAIL would be seen as part of a Third World tradition of international
law scholarship rather than the overarching framework into which all Third World scholarship can
be fit’.97 Nothing in this study turns on whether ‘TWAIL I’ is accepted as a label or TWAIL is
merely seen as part of a larger Third World scholarship on international law and that is accepted as
the  appropriate  label.  The  post-WWII  arguments  coded  in  the  selected  ICL  pronouncements
embody elements characteristic of what became TWAIL. This necessitated discussing them within
this context. Moreover, Pal, who was the central role-player under this philosophical category, has
been linked to TWAIL proper in literature.98 Yet, to reflect that TWAIL was not yet established, this
section uses ‘antecedents to TWAIL’ as label.99
In  addition  to  Pal,  such  sentiments  antecedent  to  TWAIL  pervaded  the  arguments  of  selected
counsel and Röling at Tokyo. In typical TWAIL vein, the arguments raised concerns about Western
hegemony  (here  West-East  rather  than  contemporary  North-South100),  the  power  differential
between West and East and giving a voice to those marginalised in the international community.
While the resultant dataset was small, questions into rule of law consistency intra-curially at Tokyo
could be pursued. Also, TWAIL engaged with the rule of law generally as interest vied with law. 
Turning to counsel first,  it  has been argued by external observers that the legal ideas, staff and
historical ideas relied on by the Tokyo IMT were marked by Eurocentrism.101 To illustrate how
cultural  underpinnings influenced prosecutorial  strategy,  for example,  reference can be made to
94 Anghie and Chimni (n 77) 187; Khosla (n 75) 297. 
95 Khosla (n 75) 293, 298.
96 Ibid 356.
97 Ibid 361-362.
98 Gathi (n 85) 35-37 for Pal’s resistance as a third world judge; K Sellars, ‘Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo’
(2011) 21 European Journal of International Law 1095 reads Pal as reflective of ‘third-worldist sentiment’. 
99 E Kopelman, ‘Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial’
(1991) 23 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 428-431 also reads Pal as a precursor to
TWAIL  because  the  ‘implications  of  his  arguments  were  not  understood  as  an  alternative  ‘Third  World’
perspective...until almost a decade after he wrote’. See also Boister and Cryer (n 22) 287-288.
100 Eslava  and Pahuja (n  78) 196-197 identified  several  other  binaries,  including North-South,  before finding that
TWAIL focuses on ‘“the governed” no matter where they are spatially located’.
101 C Hosoya, N Ando, Y Onuma and R Minear, ‘Preface’ in C Hosoya, N Ando, Y Onuma and R Minear (eds),  The
Tokyo War Crimes Trial An International Symposium (Kodansha Ltd 1986) 10. That the difference in case selection
between Tokyo and Nuremberg has also been read in such a manner, see Awaya, ‘In the Shadows of the Tokyo Trial’
in  C Hosoya, N Ando, Y Onuma and R Minear (eds),  The Tokyo War Crimes Trial An International Symposium
(Kodansha Ltd 1986) 85; Boister and Cryer (n 22) 313.
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Keenan’s reliance on theocentric natural law when he argued for ‘“values which are immutable and
eternal” in the light of the “the Christian-Judaic absolutes of good and evil”, and further invoked a
“universal brotherhood under the fatherhood of God” in his effort to legitimate the international
jurisdiction’.102 Keenan  and  Brown  persisted  with  this  homogeneous  understanding  of  the
international community’s ethical structure.103 While Christianity might not have been completely
alien to the Japanese as Boister and Cryer have argued, it is true, however, that the natural law
adopted by the prosecution was not sensitive to cultural particularities and embodied a very partial
understanding of the entire enterprise.104 This problem is compounded by the general critique that
natural law can mean different things to different people so ‘in Tokyo it also became clear that the
law that the American Keenan deemed natural, was not natural law to the French dissenting Justice
Bernard.’105 At minimum, the prosecutors were perpetuating the Western narrative at the expense of
any alternative.  
The Tokyo defence retorted ‘that the Allies, in their attempts to put people on trial were arrogating
to themselves the role of universal arbiter, and in doing so were violating their own principles of
civilisation’.106 Takanayagi’s argument, as noted in section 2.4, which rejected the existence of a
homogeneous international community might be recalled here too.107 The Tokyo defence brought a
motion that requested the IMT to require the ‘considered opinions of the world’s highest authorities
on morals and right conduct, and of the chief exponents of human wisdom’.108 The Allies’ right to
speak on behalf of a homogeneous, unified civilisation was thus questioned.
Besides creating the impression that there were two different legal regimes applicable to the victors
(West) and vanquished (East), the imposition of the death penalty at Tokyo was seen by Takanayagi
as  a  hindrance  to  building  a  world  wherein  law  as  opposed  to  power  reigned  supreme.  The
imposition of the death penalty would transform the convicted into martyrs in the cause of ensuring
freedom  for  Asia.109 The  defence  rejection  of  the  death  penalty  at  Tokyo  revealed  a  colonial
overtone: ‘Future generations of Oriental people, and the whole of mankind will remember that
102 S Nimaga, ‘An International Conscience Collective? A Durkeimian Analysis of International Criminal Law’  (2007)
7  International  Criminal  Law  Review 612.  The  references  are  to  JB  Keenan  and  BF Brown,  Crimes  against
International Law (Public Affairs Press 1950)  vi, vii, 72. 
103 Keenan and Brown (n 102) 138.
104 See generally Boister and Cryer (n 22) 294-295.
105 Nimaga (n 102) 613. See also preface to part A; Van Blerk (n 4) 3.
106 Boister and Cryer (n 22) 277.
107 Transcript 42 206, 42 212, 42 244-42 245. 
108 Boister and Cryer (n 22) 277 refers to IMTFE Paper 148 (15) 12 June 1946. See also H Grotius, De Iure Belli ac
Pacis Libri Tres (Francis Kelsey tr, Clarendon Press 1925) Prolegomena 40.
109 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 282-42 283.
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“Western statesmen and generals had never been penalized during the preceding three centuries for
their aggressions on Eastern lands”’.110 This statement emphasised the hegemony of West over East.
In sum, the IMT prosecutors argued for homogeneity and universality in international legal life
based on an extrapolation of their own values while the defence counsel argued for plurality and
tried to show the power differential and hegemony at play in the proceedings. These arguments
remained consistent (and thus foreseeable and predictable) for rule of law purposes and congruent
with their respective aims to prosecute or defend.
Turning to the Tokyo judgment, the first question relevant to TWAIL pertained to whether Japan
formed part  of  ‘civilisation’.  Rather  than  expound an abstract  conception  of  world  society,  the
majority referred to those treaties which Japan had ratified. Accordingly, the Japanese ratification of
treaties such as the Hague Convention, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Covenant of the League of
Nations led to the finding that ‘for many years prior to the year 1930, Japan had claimed a place
among the civilized communities of the world’.111 This approach seemed instrumental as it ensured
that Japan would be held accountable for the perpetrated atrocities. Such an approach attempted to
establish  a  homogeneous  international  community  on  an  ostensible  neutral  ground,  i.e.  the
ratification  of  treaties.  Yet,  the  majority  judgment  neglected  to  reveal  the  discrepancy  in  the
application of the incurred obligations between East and West. It fell to the individual judges to
point out this fact.
Turning to the individual judges at Tokyo, both Pal and Röling produced noteworthy data.  Pal’s
dissent, in particular, will be analysed in some depth. He accused the Allies of contravening the very
rules they now wanted to impose.112 In the process he opposed colonialism, noted the hegemony of
the West and suggested the need for cultural sensitivity all of which are congruent with what has
been labelled TWAIL. These arguments will now be considered in turn.
Pal  exhibited  clear  anti-colonialist  sentiments.113 He rejected  the  ‘widening sense  of  humanity’
argued for in international life on the basis that the powerful states continued to dominate their
110 Quoted in Boister and Cryer (n 22) 251. See Transcript  of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 282 for the slightly
different version given at trial.
111 Tokyo IMT Majority Judgment 38-82 refers to numerous treaties signed. See also Boister and Cryer (n 22) 279-280,
293.
112 A Nandy, ‘The Other Within:  The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on Culpability’ (1992) 23  New
Literary History 49.
113 Kopelman (n 99)  418-423;  BVA Röling, The Tokyo  Trial  and Beyond Reflections of  a  Peacemonger (Antonio
Cassese ed, Polity Press 1993) 28; Boister and Cryer (n 22) 287; WA Schabas, An Introduction to the International
Criminal Court (4th edn, CUP 2011) 7. See Gathi (n 85) 38 on centrality of colonisation in TWAIL.
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colonies.114 The unfairness  underpinning the  fact that  the  Allies  could  charge  the  accused with
aggression yet obtain and maintain colonies by using force engendered sympathy in Pal for the right
of colonized peoples to free themselves by using force.115 He considered the establishment of peace
on the post-WWII status quo to be dangerous. Establishing peace on the post-WWII status quo
would petrify the subjugated position of a great many states. For Pal ‘the present age is faced with
not only the menace of totalitarianism but also the actual plague of imperialism’.116 Accordingly, Pal
opposed the colonial consequences of maintaining the status quo of the international community.117
He argued that ‘peoples under colonial rule could not be expected “to submit to eternal domination
only in the name of peace”’.118 For Pal, ‘anti-colonial justice took precedence over peace rather than
peace  taking  precedence  over  justice’.119 The  overall  thrust  of  this  anti-colonial  argument  is
congruous with TWAIL, but also suggested a movement towards traditional just war thinking.120 
In addition to colonialism, Pal reacted to Western hegemony. He perceived the IMT proceedings as
an attempt by the US to fashion the international legal community in its own image.121 Ostensibly a
position of inferiority was given to Japan through the proceedings, implying perhaps that they were
not as civilised as the West.122 Reliant on a tu quoque argument, Pal pointed out the absurdity of the
Allies prosecuting Japan for acts of aggression which they had committed with impunity not long
before. Pal argued that ‘domination of one nation by another’ was not yet a crime in international
law. Otherwise ‘the entire international community would be a community of criminal races’.123
Interests in the East were mostly obtained by Western Powers through armed violence prior to 1914.
Few, if any, of these conflicts would comply with the test for being a ‘just war’. 124 Pal resolved this
by noting the Western hypocrisy behind the charge of aggression’s criminality: ‘Instead of saying
that all the powerful nations were living a criminal life I would prefer to hold that international
society did not develop before the Second World War so as to make this taint a crime’. 125 For Pal,
the  Japanese  committed  as  much or  as  less  a  crime as  the  West  did  in  setting  up  its  colonial
interests. The TWAIL undercurrent lies in the differential treatment afforded to the East when it
114 Pal Dissent 136, 234. See also Boister and Cryer (n 22) 131.
115 Boister and Cryer (n 22) 287. See also Hosoya, Ando, Onuma and Minear (n 101) 10.
116 Pal Dissent 238-239.
117 A consequence Pal, Dissent at 238, understood to flow from Jackson’s argument that “whatever grievances a nation
may have, however objectionable it  finds the status quo, aggressive warfare is an illegal means for settling those
grievances or for altering those conditions”. See Sellars (n 98) 1096.
118 Pal Dissent 239; Gathi (n 85) 36.
119 Sellars (n 98) 1096; Gathi (n 85) 36.
120 Sellars (n 98) 1096. See section 2.3.
121 Kopelman (n 99) 374-375, 380.
122 Anghie and Chimni (n 77) 192.
123 Pal Dissent 225.
124 Ibid 70.
125 Ibid 137, 246.
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acted in the same manner as the West. 
Pal  frequently  pointed  out  how  the  West  exploited  the  East  in  general.  The  tenor  of  these
submissions were often scathing. He observed ‘that the so-called Western interests in the Eastern
Hemisphere  were  mostly founded on the past  success  of  these  western  people  in  “transmuting
military  violence  into  commercial profit”’.126 Likewise,  the  Western  intervention  in  China  was
justified on the essential inability of that country to look after its own interests. These interests were
defined by Western standards.127 The West also forcefully penetrated Japan, according to Pal, and
provided Japan with the  very  example  of  how to  conduct  international  affairs:  ‘the  Empire  of
Japan...entered, or, more correctly, was made to enter, again into relations with the outer world,
under the terms of treaties obtained by the Western Powers from her by methods which, when later
on imitated by Japan in relation to her neighbours, were characterized by these very treaty powers
as aggressive’.128 Pal continued: ‘Even if we assume that everything that was done by the Western
Powers during this period was done by them with a “noble purpose of a pure heart” and only to give
Japan the blessings of western intercourse,  the method adopted in doing this  was certainly not
agreeable to Japan. In international law, however, it was only “the peaceful opening” of Japan’.129
Pal  here  anticipates TWAIL in  its  anti-Eurocentricity  format,  opposing  Western  hegemony and
hypocrisy.130 The  scathing  undercurrent  in  these  sentiments  recalls  the  importance  afforded  to
rhetoric in TWAIL.131 
Pal suggested that Japan had only emulated the Western Powers to obtain scarce material resources
from foreign territories. However, Japan commenced these pursuits  ‘at a time when neither of the
two essential assets, “a free-hand” for their ability and a worldwide field, was any longer available
to them’.132 This is, of course, another accusation aimed at the West which had already appropriated
foreign territories for itself. What was allowed for the West was denied to the East. This reflects the
power  differential  and  hegemony  which  TWAIL opposes.  The  real  responsibility  for  Japan’s
actions,  according  to  Pal,  attached  to  those  statesmen  who  set  Japan  ‘upon  the  stream  of
westernization and had done so, at a moment when the stream was sweeping towards a goal which
was a mystery even to the people of the West themselves’.133 Pal set up Japan (and the East) as
126 Ibid 279.
127 Ibid 380.
128 Ibid 785-785(1).
129 Ibid.
130 Mutua, ‘Critical Race Theory and International Law’ (n 75) 844.
131 Mickelson (n 78) 417-419.
132 Pal Dissent 874-875.
133 Ibid.
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following in the footsteps of the West and then being suddenly berated for doing exactly what the
West  itself  had  done.  If  the  West  could  protect  its  interests  in  the  East  by  extending  ‘their
reservation of the right of self-defence to the protection of such interests as well while signing the
Pact of Paris’, Japan’s rights in China had to be measured by the same standard.134 The West was
presented as dishonest, inconsistent and lacking integrity. Essentially the West was now measuring
the Japanese against a standard it had contravened itself. Moreover, the argument implied that the
West was the example for Japan’s actions or, at the very least, Japan did no more (and were thus no
more or less guilty) than the West. 
The  third  aspect  of  Pal’s  dissent,  which  anticipated  TWAIL,  was  Pal’s  cultural  sensitivity.
Considering the Japanese treatment  of POWs, Pal noted two factors  to understand the position
adopted:  ‘One  is  the  fundamental  difference  between  the  Japanese  and  the  Western  view  of
surrender, – the “shame” or the “honour” of surrender. And the other is the overwhelmingly large
number of surrenders which Japan had to face during the Pacific War’.135 Sensitivity to cultural
differences  is  completely  congruous  with  TWAIL thinking.  While  not  justifying  the  atrocious
conduct,  it  explained  ‘their  conduct  without  ascribing  the  same  to  government  policy’.136 His
recognition of cultural difference was not to exonerate, but to provide another plausible explanation
for Japanese conduct apart from an overarching governmental conspiracy. 
Pal’s philosophical arguments were not homogeneous. Several observers have noted this fact.137 His
views overlapped with ‘pan-Asianism and anti-communism, with the non-aligned movement over
anti-colonialism and self-determination, and with Western anti-militarists over American foreign
policies’.138 While  some  link  his  thought  with  positivism  or  natural  law,139 the  statements
anticipating TWAIL are often a central pivot around which the other approaches revolve.
Moving away from Pal, Röling was also aware of the East-West divide at the Tokyo IMT. For him,
invoking natural law was dangerous due to natural law’s link to the colonial project. Accordingly,
after he jettisoned just war theory as part of 19th and early 20th century positive international law, he
submitted:
134 Pal Dissent 548; Kopelman (n 99) 421.
135 Ibid 1140.
136 Ibid 1144-1145.
137 Kopelman (n 99) 411-424; Nandy (n 112) 60; Boister and Cryer (n 22) 289-291; Sellars (n 98) 1096, 1110; Gathi (n
85) 36-37.
138 Sellars (n 98) 1110.
139 See for example Kopelman (n 99) 411-424; Sellars (n 98) 1096. See sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4.
174
‘Nor  do I  feel  I  can quote  Grotius,  Gentili  and Vattel  in  the  trial  of  Japanese aggression...I  hesitate  to
approach the Far East in our effort to determine the criminality of aggression with quotations from idealists
and philosophers of the very period when our heroes and soldiers were conquering its territories in what
could hardly be called a defensive war’.140
This  concession recognised the dialectic  tension between East  and West  embodied in  the IMT
proceedings.  Röling  showed  respect  for  the  marginalised  Other  (East)  by  refraining  from
assimilating  it  into  the  standards  and  authorities  of  the  Self  (West).141 Extra-curially,  Röling
conceded that international law was historically a ‘product of European Christian civilization’.142
The  question  for  him  was  whether  this  law  could  ‘meet  with  respect,  accord  and  intrinsic
acceptance in the expanded world’.143 This argument revealed the belief that values are situated and
may be a means of imposing further hegemony if care was not taken. Röling noted how power and
interest  were  hidden  elements  in  positive  law.  Law  then  tended  to  serve  the  interests  of  the
powerful. European international law could be and was thus challenged.144 Such sentiments again
anticipated the TWAIL challenge to hegemony in international law.
In sum, the individual opinions of Pal and Röling at Tokyo revealed anti-colonial sentiments which
resonate with contemporary TWAIL arguments. Pal, in particular, pointed out how the Tokyo IMT
was a manifestation of Western hegemony over the East. Japan had merely imitated the actions of
the West and was no more or less guilty then its accusers. Congruous with later TWAIL arguments,
Pal and Röling both showed awareness of the power and interest which underpinned the law and
proceedings at Tokyo. 
Apart from external critiques about bias towards prosecuting nationals from African states at the
ICC, no data appeared regarding TWAIL at the other post-Cold War Tribunals.145 As this study
focuses on pronouncements by the selected role-players, these external observations are only noted
here and will be revisited in chapter 7. 
In conclusion,  sentiments anticipating TWAIL emerged intra-curially at  Tokyo. The prosecution
140 Quoted in Boister and Cryer (n 22) 292.
141 See section 5.4.
142 Röling (n 75) 10-11. 
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid 15, 68. 
145 See, for e.g., A Cassese, ‘Soliloqui’ in Heikelina Verrijn Stuart and Marlise Simons, The Prosecutor and the Judge:
Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese: Interviews and Writings (Amsterdam University Press  2009) 174. See
section 0.2.
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argued for a world society premised on universal values whereas the defence noted the cultural
plurality which made up that community. Anticipating TWAIL, Pal and Röling argued from the
premise of a pluralist world society upon which universal natural law could not be enforced. Pal
went  further  and  showed  that  Japan  was  merely  following  the  example  set  by  the  West.  The
distinction in juridical reaction to these respective actions of East and West (i.e. prosecuting Japan
but not the Allies) could only be ascribed to hegemony. It was an important theme in Pal’s dissent to
point out the unfairness of the proceedings and to constantly note the equal guilt (or, equal lack of
blameworthiness depending on the point of view) of the Allies. 
While the overall dataset was too fragmentary for measurement against the Fullerian desiderata,
consistency can be sought relative to the Tokyo IMT (intra-curially) which was the sole role-player
to deliver data on the antecedents to TWAIL. Although the dataset was mixed, it inclined towards
the critical approaches. As with feminism, TWAIL-type arguments are not conceptually linked to
either HR or criminal law liberalism. Its use at Tokyo was in relation to the position of the accused,
i.e. criminal law liberalism.146
Questions of systemic hegemony, which TWAIL and its antecedents attempt to expose, challenges
the rule of law. These arguments also challenge the perceived legitimacy of ICL directly because the
administration  of  law is  seen  to  be  biased.  These  concerns  are  tied  into  institutional  concerns
pertaining to who controls the judicial body, which is not itself a matter for judges to decide. This
further ties into concerns of realism which are coded in section 6.2. Accusations of such hegemony
has reappeared regarding the ICC cases, at present, solely from Africa.147 While this concern needs
to be addressed on an institutional level,148 the Tokyo arguments might be seen as a guiding light for
what the judiciary might do to alleviate the situation. For such critical arguments to enter opinions
contributed  to  transparency.  The  Tokyo  judges  showed  critical  self-awareness  of  their  own
institution’s unjustified biases and noted them. It is difficult to see, on such an institutional issue,
what more the judiciary could have done in an attempt to try and safeguard the rule of law. Put
another way, at the very least, the use of TWAIL-type arguments here did not undermine the rule of
law. More likely, such arguments to oppose systemic bias probably engages a ‘thicker’, substantive
version of the rule of law than is pursued in this study.149
146 See section 6.3.
147 See section 0.2. Cassese (n 145) 176; Cryer (n 53) 262.
148 Institutional rule of law is not the focus here per section 1.2.3.2.
149 See section 1.2.3.2.
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5.4 Generic instances of othering along the Self/Other axis
Since this section coded for the generic instances where Self and Other were juxtaposed, othering
will  be  briefly  contextualised.  Othering  emerged  as  a  generalisation  of  Hegel’s  master-slave
dialectic.150 Depending on the approach, the aim might either be to synthesise the dialectic tension
or to leave the tension unresolved. Thus, othering also entails a matter of perspective, i.e. looking
from the vantage point of Self at Other or looking from the vantage point of Other at Self. As noted
in the preface, Self opposes Other either to marginalise Other or because Other exhibited deviant
behaviour.151 The objective of such an argument might be to justify a return to homogeneity or unity,
by resolving (or  synthesising)  the difference between Self  and Other.  On the second approach,
Other opposes Self to value plurality, the equal worth and dignity of Other and/or undermine the
privileged position of Self. The designated Other might attempt to break down the particular binary
Self relied on to establish its superiority. If the binary is shown to be false, it takes the ‘right’ away
from  Self  to  dictate  to  the  Other.  Postmodernism  has  especially  emphasised  difference  and
deconstructed  binaries,  but  in  a  manner  to  celebrate  otherness.  The  aim  was  to  move  the
marginalised to the centre of debate and consideration.152 This was also the aims of feminism and
TWAIL discussed earlier vis-a-vis women and the Third World. 
Coding for  critical  techniques  revealed  some inductive  instances  from the  research  data  where
othering occurred without being linked to marginalisation based on gender or the ‘Third World’.
These instances revolved around an ‘in’ or ‘Self’ group and a diametrically oppositional ‘out’ or
‘Other’ group linked to the more general aims of othering. The prominent instance was from Self to
underline Other’s deviant behaviour and so add support for the legal proceedings undertaken. The
second main instance revolved around Other trying to undermine the privileged position of Self.
This section investigated these generic arguments along the Self-Other axis in ICL jurisprudence
because it revealed philosophical justifications as per part (ii) of SCA and the first point of study
significance. 
Illustratively  then,  Jackson  distinguished  between  ‘us’ and  ‘them’ in  his  opening  speech  at
Nuremberg.  He also distinguished the Nazis from other  Germans.153 Jackson submitted that the
150 See SQ Jensen, ‘Othering, Identify Formation and Agency’ (2011) 2 Qualitative Studies 64; L Brons, ‘Othering, an
Analysis’ (2015) 6 Transcience 69.
151 See, for e.g., Jensen (n 150) 65; Brons (n 150) 84.
152 A Mountz, ‘The Other’ in Carolyn Gallaher, Carl Dahlman, Mary Gilmartin, Alison Mountz and Peter Shirlow (eds),
Key Concepts in Political Geography (Sage 2009) 330.
153 R Jackson in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. II:102-
103.
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Nazis ‘took from the German people all those dignities and freedoms that we hold natural and
inalienable rights in  every human being’.154 Thus,  in language reminiscent  of Lockean inherent
rights,  he opposed the  disregard of  fundamental  rights  by the Nazis.  Rights  and liberties  were
juxtaposed  against  tyranny  and  bondage.  The  Nazi  atrocities  threatened  ‘civilization’  which
required  immediate  and  firm  response.155 On  this  last  point  the  Russian  prosecutor  Rudenko
seemingly agreed.156 Civilisation had been subjected to the aberrant conduct of a rogue Outsider.
Such an attack on the unified collective could of course not be allowed and was invoked to enhance
the legitimacy of the unprecedented legal proceedings being adopted. Jackson’s discussion on the
centralised control of the Nazi Party led to a comment on the character of the German people which
firmly distinguished between the Allies and the Germans:
‘They inculcated and practiced the Führerprinzip which centralized control of the Party and of the Party
controlled State over the lives and thought of the German  people,  who are accustomed to look upon the
German State, by whomever controlled, with a mysticism that is incomprehensible to my people’.157
By relying on religious wording (i.e. mysticism) Jackson indicated the cult-like nature of German
politics.  On this  argument,  the Nazis  and the German people – i.e.  the ‘them’ – are  set  up as
irrational in opposition to the rational ‘us’ who find such mysticism ‘incomprehensible’. 
For Jackson, the Allies ‘charge guilt on planned and intended conduct that involves moral as well as
legal wrong...It is not because they yielded to the normal frailties of human beings that we accuse
them. It is their abnormal and inhuman conduct which brings them to this bar’.158 Jackson ‘othered’
the defendants,  on the first  category based on aberrant behaviour,  by indicating that they were
charged precisely because they did not act in the manner of normal human beings, but rather in an
abnormal and inhuman way.159 Jackson’s line of argument also seemed to underline that the Nazis’
conduct was so opposite to normal human actions that they had to be seen as expelled from the
human species. This type of reasoning would analogise the Nazis to the pirates and slave traders of
old – two of the cases where universal jurisdiction could have been invoked.160 It seems as though
Jackson was suggesting something similar here. The dichotomy of the human and inhuman or the
civilised and barbarian clearly attempted to enhance the IMT’s claim to exercise jurisdiction in this
154 Ibid 100.
155 Ibid. See J Locke, Two Treatises of Government (P Laslett ed, CUP 2008) 270-271.
156 RA Rudenko in  Trial  of  the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal ,  Nuremberg,  Vol.
XII:169.
157 Jackson (n 153) 131.
158 Ibid 102.
159 Ibid.
160 J Dugard, International Law A South African Perspective (3rd edn, Juta 2005) 157.
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case. 
In a continued reliance on opposites, Jackson used a law-abiding versus a lawless binary to further
separate the camps of the civilised, moral Allies (acting as prosecutors) and the bestial, inhuman
and immoral  Nazi defendants.161 When he referred to the Nazi  legal  system it  was to  show its
‘otherness’ and to expose its frequent use of ‘every sanction that any legitimate state could exercise
and many that it could not’.162 In particular, he noted that the atrocities committed against the Jews
were usually not sanctioned by law, but sometimes even the law was used as an instrument to
engender evil.163 In his brief account of the historical rise to power of the Nazi Party in Germany,
Jackson contrasted the different ideological understandings in Nazism and the ‘western world’ on
matters of politics as the divide between power and democracy.164 He underlined the difference
between the Self (Allies) and the Other (Nazis) when he suggested that ‘four great nations, flushed
with victory and stung with injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive
enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid
to Reason’.165 Jackson contrasted power to reason/law here thus explaining why the Allies affording
the  Nazi  defendants  their  day  in  court  was  to  be  welcomed.166 This  argument  was  echoed  by
Rudenko.167 
The French prosecutors, de Menthon and de Ribes, also provided instances of othering to point out
the unacceptable behaviour of the defendants.  De Menthon used his role as prosecutor for war
crimes in Western Europe to contrast the values of those powers which he represented and those of
the Nazis.168 He circumvented the victor’s justice critique through othering:
‘After that gigantic struggle where two ideologies, two conceptions of life were at grips, in the name of the
people whom we represent here and in the name of the great human hope for which they have so greatly
suffered, so greatly fought, we can without fear and with a clean conscience rise as accusers of the leaders of
Nazi Germany’.169
161 Jackson (n 153) 105, 130, 144. 
162 Ibid 108.
163 Ibid 120.
164 Ibid 107-108.
165 Ibid 99.
166 R Jackson  in  Trial  of  the  Major  War  Criminals  Before  the  International  Military  Tribunal,  Nuremberg,  Vol.
XIX:399.
167 RA Rudenko in  Trial  of  the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal ,  Nuremberg,  Vol.
XIX:570.
168 F de Menthon in  Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol.
V:369, 423.
169 Ibid 425.
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In closing for France, De Ribes, juxtaposed justice and force arguing that the Nazis adopted the
latter while international society had been systematically infiltrated by the former.170 Again, like
Jackson and De Menthon, these arguments revealed the accused’s conduct to be beyond the pale.
In sum, the prosecutors used othering to separate Self and Other based on Other’s deviant conduct.
Self and Other were linked to respectively ‘liberty’ v ‘bondage’, ‘rational’ v ‘irrational’, ‘normal’ v
‘abnormal’, ‘civilised’ v ‘barbarian’, ‘law-abiding’ v ‘lawless’, ‘reason’ v ‘power’, ‘democracy’ v
‘power’  and  ‘justice’  v  ‘force’.  By  differentiating  Self  and  Other  through  their  respective
embodiment  of  desired  and  undesired  attributes,  the  prosecutors  could  suggest  that  the  legal
proceedings against the accused were appropriate to dissolve Other back into Self.
Similar to Jackson, De Menthon and De Ribes, at the Tokyo IMT Keenan also set the trial up as a
corrective measure on behalf of what was plainly assumed to be a homogeneous civilisation:
‘this is no ordinary trial, for here we are waging a part of the determined battle of civilization to preserve the
entire world from destruction...A very few throughout the world, including these accused, tried to take the
law into their own hands and to force their will upon mankind. They declared war on civilization’.171
By taking the law into their own hands, the accused ostracised themselves from civilisation and this
justified the intervention of the Tokyo IMT for Keenan. The prosecution deemed the IMT justified
irrespective  of  the  tenability  of  positivist  arguments  thereto  since  ‘civilisation  and  humanity
demanded that such a trial be held’.172 Several binaries were visible in Keenan’s argument above
where the Allies embody the first and the Japanese the second set, i.e. ‘preservers’ v ‘destroyers’,
‘peace-loving’ v ‘usurpers’, ‘many’ v ‘few’ and ‘law’ v ‘power’. Keenan postulated the trial as a
contrast between those (Japan) who use human lives as a mere means to an end and those (us) who
value human life as a matter of utmost sanctity.173 Consistent with Jackson, De Menthon and De
Ribes at Nuremberg, Keenan also employed the first category of othering, to bring Other back into
line with Self.
The defence at Tokyo, per Takanayagi, reacted to this by attempting to disprove the implied notion
that the international community was homogeneous.174 This embodied the second argument where
170 AC De Ribes in  Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal,  Nuremberg, Vol.
XIX:534-535.
171 Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 384-386 and quoted in Boister and Cryer (n 22) 274.
172 Quoted in Boister and Cryer (n 22) 275. See also Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 391.
173 Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 464-465.
174 See section 2.4.
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Other aims to value plurality and difference so that the Other can exist alongside the Self. What
followed was a ‘stinging rebuke to the idea that civilisation was at a stage where criminal law could
be deduced from ideas of societal necessity’.175 Takanayagi recognised that ‘aggressor’ is a label
which belligerents hurl at one another ‘in self-righteousness and for purposes of soliciting public
sympathy’.176 However,  because no cosmopolitan super-state  existed,  the introduction of a  new
principle (for e.g., that aggression was criminal) needed careful examination.177 For Takanayagi the
requested change in international law would perpetuate conflict and uncertainty for posterity. This
culminated in his implicit equation of the Allies’ and Nazis’ approach to new law: 
‘It is well known that Karl Schmidt and others in Germany attempted to build up new international law to
suit the political exigencies of the Third Reich. That attempt has been looked down upon as unworthy of the
glorious traditions of the legal profession as it means the subservience of law to politics’.178
Takanayagi likened the present effort of the Allies to redraw international law to those attempts of
the Nazis to achieve something similar. He was equating the Allies with the Nazis in this instance,
something which he knew would have been despicable to them. This was not the only instance
where Takanayagi equated the sworn enemies either. A principle utilised by Keenan which seemed
congruous with ‘sound popular feeling’ was criticised by Takanayagi for being no different and as
malleable as Nazi laws which relied on the ‘sound popular feeling’ of presiding officers to further
cruel  and  oppressive  decisions.179 By  equating  the  Allied  and  Nazi  actions  in  relation  to  the
development of international law, Takanayagi attempted to undermine the Allied claim to Self as no
better than that of the Nazis. By accusing the Allies of acting in precisely the manner they rejected
against a group they had othered, their preferred position as Self was undermined. If Self and Other
were not different, Self could not justify its punishment of the Other on those grounds.
The final instance of othering echoed Takanayagi’s and emerged from the dissent of Pal at Tokyo.
Ostensibly Pal equated the rationale given by the German Emperor after WWI in justification of the
atrocious methods used and those reasons furnished post-WWII by the Allies in justification of the
dropping of the atomic bombs. In the process, Pal revealed a vehement anti-colonial undertone and
argued that the Allies were no more civilised, i.e. no more justified to assume the mantle of Self,
175 Boister and Cryer (n 22) 276. See also Y Onuma, ‘The Tokyo Trial: Between Law and Politics’ in C Hosoya, N
Ando, Y Onuma and R Minear (eds),  The Tokyo War Crimes Trial An International Symposium (Kodansha Ltd
1986) 46-47.
176 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42225-42229. 
177 Ibid.
178 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42229. See, ibid, 42 132-42 133 for a similar argument equating the Allies
and Nazis. See also Boister and Cryer (n 22) 276. 
179 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 131-42 133; Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 435.
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than the Germans after WWI and therefore no different, i.e. equally guilty.180 In fact, the lack of
distinction between the Allies and the accused before the IMT was significant enough for Pal to take
aim at the legitimacy of the Allies to pronounce judgment on the Japanese:
‘It would be sufficient for my present purpose to say that if any indiscriminate destruction of civilian life and
property is still illegitimate in warfare, then, in the Pacific war, this decision to use the atom bomb is the only
near approach to the directives of the German Emperor during the first world war and of the Nazi leaders
during the second world war. Nothing like this could be traced to the credit of the present accused’.181
Like Takanayagi, this argument attempted to undermine the privileged position the Self adopted by
first  equating  it  to  a  third  despised  Other  (from a  different  yet  related  context)  and  secondly
contrasting  it  to  the  present  Other.  In  the process,  the  roles  were essentially  reversed  with the
present Other postulated as morally superior to the Self. This would imply that the present Other
becomes Self and the initial Self has become the Other. 
Othering  was,  therefore,  frequently  relied  on  as  technique  by  counsel  before  the  post-WWII
Tribunals. The arguments of prosecutors like Jackson, De Menthon, De Ribes and Keenan favoured
Self and attempted to bring the Other back into line with the Self. The aim was ostensibly to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction over the accused. The use of othering was consistent between the various
prosecutors.  Defence  counsel,  like  Takanayagi,  of  course,  attacked  this  position  head-on  by
questioning  whether  the  Self  and  Other  differed  on  the  grounds  offered.  Thereby,  he  tried  to
undermine  the  suggested  binaries  and  consequently  destroy  the  right  of  Self  to  undertake
proceedings against the accused. Very few instances of othering occurred in the ICL judicial bodies
under  investigation.  Pal,  similar  to  Takanayagi,  also  undermined  the  basis  of  Self  and  thus
undermined the Allies’ right to charge the accused with aggression. Owing to the limited dataset
from the judiciary, no comments can be ventured on consistency of philosophical position. Despite
not being significant for rule of law considerations, othering as critical technique required noting for
the research question (per SCA part (ii)) into the identification of philosophies used by ICL judicial
bodies. Othering was important as a rhetorical device and utilised by the post-WWII prosecutors to
justify the proceedings. This elicited a response from the defence and Pal to emphasise the Other. 
5.5 Conclusion on the critical approaches of feminism, antecedents to TWAIL and generic
instances of othering under part C
The  critical  approaches  of  feminism,  antecedents  to  TWAIL and  generic  instances  of  othering
180 Pal Dissent 137-138.
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produced small datasets respectively which precluded extensive inter-curial findings on consistency.
They were moreover limited to particular ICL role-players. Although its absence at the post-WWII
IMTs was also relevant,  feminism only appeared under  the post-Cold War judicial  bodies.  The
antecedents to TWAIL were all coded for at Tokyo (this excludes, of course, the systemic TWAIL
arguments raised against the ICC because they have not yet appeared in judicial pronouncements).
Finally, the generic instances of othering appeared at the post-WWII IMTs and, with one exception,
exclusively in the justificatory arguments of counsel.
Because  feminism  and  TWAIL-type  arguments  involved  substantive  concerns  about  what  the
content  of  law  should  be,  they  seemingly  embodied  ‘thicker’ rule  of  law  concerns.182 Their
importance resides more in the fact that they appeared as opposed to how frequently they appeared.
Still, on the formal rule of law approach adopted in this study, their overall trends and value for the
rule of law will be considered. 
Coding for feminism in the selected ICL role-players revealed a progressive shift from no initial
recognition  at  the  post-WWII  IMTs  to  increased  substantive  recognition  at  the  post-Cold  War
judicial bodies, including the ICC. The increased reliance on feminism did not contravene Fuller’s
principle which prohibits constant shifts in justifications. Moreover, the reflection of feminism in
ICL jurisprudence  echoed  the  changed  zeitgeist,  on  the  interest-based  extra-curial  dynamic,183
towards  the  improvement  of  women’s  position  in  (international)  society.  These  arguments
represented the progressive development of law, which is, of course, completely congruous with
rule  of  law  ideals.  Although  the  autonomy  of  women  was  increasingly  safeguarded,  external
critiques have shown that much can still be done in this regard. This does not undermine this study’s
finding that feminism appeared in the cases considered. At the very least the shift to what is now
consistent and increased sensitivity to the position of women in the ICL justificatory arguments
should be construed as strengthening the rule of law.
Coding  for  critical  approaches  revealed  a  few  arguments  anticipating  TWAIL.  On  size,  the
antecedents  to  TWAIL  dataset  appeared  to  be  negligible.  However,  its  re-emergence  on  an
institutional level at the ICC proved that it is not the number of times a critique is made that matters,
but that it is made. The dataset was limited to role-players at Tokyo, namely Keenan, Takanayagi,
arguably  the  majority,  Pal  and  Röling.  Overall,  the  data  favoured  the  critique  of  the  power
182 See section 1.2.3.2.
183 See section 1.2.3.1.
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differential between East and West which undermined the foundation of the IMT somewhat. Yet,
TWAIL (and this should apply to its antecedents) accepts the existence of international law with the
aim to improve its fairness towards the Third World. The point of departure is that the law exists but
that it could be fairer.184 This does not purport to destroy the rule of law, but rather to improve it. For
the ICL role-players to recognise these concerns served the valuable function of transparency and to
push for increased fairness in ICL. This challenge remains, however, as attested to at the ICC, and
has the potential to undermine international law on a foundational level if it  is not attended to.
While  the  rule  of  law  is  directly  engaged,  the  Fullerian  requirements  (apart  from intra-curial
consistency) were circumvented. The focus here turned to an institutional rather than a law-making
level. For purposes of this study, the difference between international law institutions, including
how charging occurs (through the prosecutor), who creates judicial bodies, on the one hand, and
judicial pronouncements, on the other hand, is important. This study only focused on the judicial
pronouncements and their impact on rule of law and legitimacy. The antecedents to TWAIL showed
judicial  awareness  of  fairness  concerns  in  the  broader  institutional  framework of  ICL,  but  the
structural  issues  engaged  were  beyond  the  power  of  the  judiciary  to  affect  any  further.  The
structural issues are also outside the scope of this study. 
In sum, while feminism allowed judicial bodies to re-emphasise the protection afforded to a group
which were already under the authority of the rules they were tasked to adjudicate upon,185 TWAIL-
type  arguments  on  ICL data  engaged  with  institutional  level  concerns.  Antecedents  to  TWAIL
played out regarding those who created the ICL judicial bodies and the ostensible prejudices which
were  involved  thus.  Unlike  the  critical  approach  of  feminism,  the  judicial  bodies  utilising
antecedents to TWAIL could not directly alter any protection regime, but they could note the bias in
charging others for violations committed by oneself. More than noting this, the judicial bodies could
not do. Neither philosophical category could be construed as undermining the rule of law, in fact,
the converse is true. Also, anticipating the two liberalisms of ICL (like the codes under parts A and
B),  the  concrete  arguments  ventured  showed  concerns  for  victims  (feminism)  and  accused
(antecedents to TWAIL) although neither philosophy was conceptually bound to do so.
Generic othering was included because it forms part of the research question into the taxonomy of
philosophies utilised by the selected ICL role-players (i.e. part (ii) of SCA). However, such othering
arguments were only adopted to justify the unprecedented legal proceedings. This is further proven
184 Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (n 75) 36; Anghie and Chimni (n 77) 202; Gathi (n 85) 38-39. 
185 For the view that feminism is supplementary to other methods, see Charlesworth (n 10) 159.
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by its instrumental use. The post-WWII prosecutors especially favoured this argument to postulate a
deviant Other in need of correction while the defence and those sympathetic to the defence, like
Pal,186 questioned the privileged position afforded to Self thus. Apart from Pal, no judicial use of
this argument occurred. With almost no instances amongst the judiciary, othering did not impact the
rule of law or affect performance or consent legitimacy.
186 Boister and Cryer (n 22) 95.
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Part D
Realism and Liberalism as systemic philosophical categories for coding in the
selected international criminal law role-players 
This study assumes that the law should not be understood in isolation. Law functions within a
broader socio-political context which permeates and informs it.1 In particular, international law and
international politics exist  in the same conceptual space.  Together they form the ‘rules and the
reality of “the international system”’.2 Bearing in mind the definition of philosophy as  ‘general
theoretical questions about the nature of laws and legal systems’,3 judicial pronouncements on the
nature of this systemic environment of ICL are relevant here. This study thus coded for systemic
philosophies on two levels, namely the selected ICL role-players’ understanding on the nature of the
international system within which they exist as well as reflections on their own institutional design.
These  systemic  arguments,  in  turn,  constitute  the  broader  context  against  which  the  other
philosophical justifications investigated in this study may be understood.
Realism  was  identified  under  international  relations  (IR)  theory  and  liberalism  under  political
philosophy. Realism and liberalism can be understood in many different ways.4 As with the previous
chapters, the aim here is not to solve such theoretical debates, but rather to discuss these theories in
the  context  of  ICL  justificatory  narratives.  Briefly,  realism  is  a  descriptive  theory  of  the
international system on which states are the dominant actors focused on attaining their own interest
of which self-preservation, through self-help, is most important.5 Liberalism, under the influence of
1 MDA Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence (9th edn, Thomson Sweet Maxwell 2014) 1-2. 
2 A-M Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 European Journal of  International Law
503; C Reus-Smit, ‘The Politics of International Law’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The Politics of International Law
(CUP 2004) 36. See also RJ Pritchard, ‘An Overview of the Historical Importance of the Tokyo Trial’ in C Hosoya,
N Ando, Y Onuma and R Minear (eds),  The Tokyo War Crimes Trial An International Symposium (Kodansha Ltd
1986) 89; KC Moghalu, Global Justice The Politics of War Crimes Trials (Stanford Security Studies 2008) 5, 154; R
Cryer, ‘Royalism and the King: Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the Politics of Sources’ (2009) 12 New Criminal
Law Review 390-391; A Orakhelashvili,  ‘International  Law,  International  Politics  and  Ideology’ in  Alexander
Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 345,
349.
3 Freeman (n 1) 2. See, similarly, R Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence An Introduction to Legal Theory (3rd edn,
OUP 2012) 1. See section 0.2.
4 For realism, see T Dunne and BC Schmidt, ‘Realism’ in John Bayliss, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds), The
Globalization of  World Politics (4th edn, OUP 2008) 95-100; for liberalism, see  D Robinson, ‘A Cosmopolitan
Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’ (2013) 26  Leiden Journal of International Law 132-139;  D Bell,
‘What is Liberalism?’ (2014) 42 Political Theory 683-706.
5 Slaughter (n 2)  507;  KW Abbott, ‘International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing
Atrocities in Internal Conflicts’ in Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds),  The Methods of International
Law (ASIL 2004) 129-133; Dunne and Schmidt (n 4) 92-102; N Dower, The Ethics of War and Peace Cosmopolitan
and Other Perspectives (Polity Press 2009) 10, 29-33. 
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criminal law and human rights (HR) law, embodies individualism, individual responsibility, human
rights and moral autonomy, which are all associated with domestic liberalism.6 This preface  will
explain  why  the  IR  version  of  realism  and  the  domestic  version  of  liberalism  were  adopted.
Substantive detail on each philosophy will follow in chapter 6 because, like chapter 5, these theories
were directly coded for.
As role-players in international life, dependent on state cooperation for fulfilling their mandates,
ICL judicial bodies at times reflected on that relationship in judgments. This ensured that realism, as
an IR theory,  was a  feasible  philosophical  category for  coding.  However,  ICL pronouncements
regarding liberalism was not contextualised against international relations. ICL judiciaries lacked
the  detachment  to  fully  consider  the  IR  aspects  of  liberalism  which  would  include  their  own
function in the international system.7 When they reflect on their relationship with states, judiciaries
are situated as Self so they never, as far as coding in judgments revealed, needed to self-reflexively
analyse their own meta-position in and contributions to the international community. Nor have their
mandates necessitated such a consideration. In contrast, they often scrutinised their own internal
structures. In the process, the criminal law and HR aspects noted earlier could be identified. Still,
whether liberalism is seen as IR or transposed from the domestic context, significant overlap exists.8
Some have observed from an IR perspective that:
‘Liberal theorists stake out a strong predictive/normative position: the distinctions between international,
transnational, and domestic politics and law are artificial, inappropriate, and crumbling in practice. Thus,
liberals would predict and support increasing resort to individual criminal responsibility and the demise of
the distinction between international and internal conflicts, on political as well as legal grounds’.9
If the distinction between international and domestic politics and law hypothetically ‘crumbled’
thus, coding on a single liberalism code, as is done here, will be justified. If the distinction between
political liberalism and IR liberalism is maintained, the coded data could be construed as necessary
and sufficient to establish political liberalism, but merely necessary and insufficient to prove the
additional detail required by IR liberalism.10 Domestic liberalism, rather than IR liberalism, was the
common denominator and coded for thus. 
6 D Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms of International Criminal Law’ in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds)
Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press 2010) 116; D Robinson, ‘A Cosmopolitan
Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’ (2013) 26 Leiden Journal of International Law 132-133. 
7 C Reus-Smit, ‘International Law’ in John Bayliss, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds),  The Globalization of
World Politics (4th edn, OUP 2008) 287.
8 Abbott (n 5) 136; T Dunne, ‘Liberalism’ in John Bayliss, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds), The Globalization
of World Politics (4th edn, OUP 2008) 110.
9 Abbott (n 5) 154.
10 For the additional detail of IR liberalism, see as example Slaughter (n 2) 508.
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IR  realism can  be  effectively  juxtaposed  with  political  liberalism  as  they  respectively  revolve
around state-centric and individualist approaches.11 Moreover, liberals tend to argue that states are
subjected to ‘a universal jurisdiction for war crimes’ while realists argue that ‘[w]ar crimes trials
serve  inherently  political  ends  determined  mainly  by  states’  thereby  reflecting  different
understandings of the international system.12 These tensions explain why realism and liberalism
were coded together under systemic philosophy. In addition,  as noted throughout the study, the
discussion of liberalism will reflect on a significant tension within ICL liberalism which was due to
the basis thereof in both criminal law and human rights.13
This  study is  mindful  that  immanent  critiques  have revealed  problems in  the  liberal  principles
adopted  in  ICL  jurisprudence  and  that  the  blanket  transposition  of  domestic  concepts  to
international law is  inappropriate.14 However,  the focus here is  on the arguments raised in ICL
jurisprudence which revealed liberal sympathies. This study does not purport to evaluate the use of
liberal sentiments beyond compliance with Fullerian rule of law.15
11 Reus-Smit (n 7) 291.
12 Moghalu (n 2) xiii.
13 Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms’ (n 6) 115-118.  See also  GP Fletcher and JD Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental
Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’ (2005) 3 JICJ 540, 544. See sections 2.5, 3.4, 3.5 and the prefaces to
parts B and C.
14 D Robinson, ‘A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account’ (n 6) 134.
15 See section 1.2.3.2.
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Chapter 6
Systemic philosophy in ICL jurisprudence: Realism and Liberalism
6.1 Introduction
Coding for philosophical categories pertaining to the nature of the environment within which ICL
judicial  bodies  exist  as  well  as  their  structural  design  revealed  large  datasets  for  realism and
liberalism. While both philosophies are broader in scope than will be discussed here, the focus in
this study remains on philosophy in judicial pronouncements and the ensuing impact thereof on the
rule of law. Importantly, apart from constituting relevant philosophical categories, these systemic
philosophies provided the broader context against which all other philosophies used in this study
were made. This will be reflected on as necessary. The subsequent sections introduce the respective
approaches in detail before considering the coded data. As with part C’s critical approaches, this is
necessary because realism and liberalism were directly coded for.
6.2 Realism
Medieval  thought  regarded the law as  more  fundamental  than  political  institutions  (like  states)
whereas the nineteenth to early twentieth century trend has been to subordinate law to the state and
in fact render it an instrument of state.1 A similar tension between state interest and the requirements
of international law – might versus right – still dominates the international community, of which the
selected ICL role-players are part. 
International relations (IR) theory differs from the approaches identified earlier in this study. IR
neither focuses on doctrinal nor normative questions. IR aims to situate ‘legal rules and institutions
in their political context’.2 IR aids the description of legal institutions by considering how political
factors like ‘interests, power, and governance structures of states and other actors’ shape the law.3 IR
might also attempt to explain the behaviour of political actors.4 Admittedly, there are several forms
of  realism in  IR.5 Neither  space  nor  research  objective  allowed  a  detailed  discussion  of  these
intricacies.  More  importantly,  an  overall  lack  of  argumentative  detail  and  a  predilection  for
1 See SL Paulson, ‘Classical Legal Positivism at Nuremberg’ (1975) 4  Philosophy & Public Affairs 132, 134 for a
discussion of these trends in Bodin and Austin.
2 KW Abbott, ‘International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal
Conflicts’ in Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds), The Methods of International Law (ASIL 2004) 128. 
3 Ibid 129.
4 Ibid at 129-130.
5 T Dunne and BC Schmidt, ‘Realism’ in John Bayliss, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds), The Globalization of
World  Politics (4th edn, OUP 2008)  95  distinguishes  classical,  modern  and  structural.  See also  M Festenstein,
‘Pragmatism, Realism and Moralism’ (2016) 14 Political Studies Review 40.
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descriptive use,  meant the ICL arguments were not highly technical.  Certain common elements
which exist in the different strands of realism could therefore be coded directly.6 
For this study, realism is premised upon the understanding of the international system as constituted
by separate  political  communities,  i.e.  states.  This  view emphasises  the  attainment  of  national
interest which causes states to pursue their own interest first.7 Realism maintains that states exist in
a hostile environment where no common superior exists to enforce a coherent code of conduct; that
truly universal common values are absent or that the world is such an unpredictable, violent place
that  it  is  justified to look after one’s own interests.  It  is  own interest,  rather  than international
society’s  interest,  which  dictates  any  specific  course  of  action.8 The  most  important  goal  in
international politics is survival.9 Because of the lack of a central authority governing over them,
self-help  becomes an  important  tool  for  states  to  achieve their  goals.10 Power is  central  in  the
international  system  with  state  interactions  a  continuous  struggle  and  frequently  zero-sum.11
Through the balance of power between states, an equilibrium is sought which might prevent any
single state or coalition of states from dominating the rest.12 The three characteristics identified for
purposes of this study are thus the emphasis on states as role-players in international society, the
centrality of self-survival and the right to exercise self-help.13 
Realism can play out directly in the legal context too. Traditionally realists were sceptical of the
pronouncements  of  international  organisations  in  excess  of  ‘the  actual  practice  of  states  and
unambiguous expressions of consent of major states’.14 International rules and organisations, on this
view, are tools built on ‘underlying interest and power relationships’ which will vary along with
those  relationships.  Such  rules  and  organisations,  therefore,  have  little  direct  impact  on  state
conduct.15 On this view, states are expected to influence the design of international law in ways
6 These common elements are accepted in IR theory as well, see Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 100-103.
7 A-M Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 European Journal of  International Law
507; Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 100; N Dower, The Ethics of War and Peace Cosmopolitan and Other Perspectives
(Polity Press 2009) 33. 
8 Dower (n 7) 10, 29-31. See also C Reus-Smit, ‘The Politics of International Law’ in Christian Reus-Smit (ed), The
Politics  of  International  Law (CUP 2004) 16;  KC Moghalu,  Global Justice The Politics  of  War Crimes Trials
(Stanford Security Studies 2008) 137; BN Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (CUP 2008) 4-5; Dunne
and Schmidt (n 5) 92-93; Festenstein (n 5) 40.
9 Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 101-102.
10 Slaughter (n 7) 507; Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 102; Schiff (n 8) 5.
11 Slaughter (n 7) 507; Reus-Smit (n 8) 15; A Orakhelashvili, ‘International Law, International Politics and Ideology’
in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed),  Research Handbook on the Theory and History of International Law  (Edward
Elgar 2011) 356.
12 Reus-Smit (n 8) 16; Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 94; Schiff (n 8) 5.
13 Abbott (n 2) 132-133; Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 93-103. 
14 Abbott (n 2) 133.
15 Reus-Smit (n 8) 15-16; Abbott (n 2) 133.
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which would secure their national interests.16 The notion that a state complies with international
rules if it is in their interest is typically realist.17 
 
Realism manifested through political interactions with ICL judicial bodies, e.g., through funding,
state cooperation, procurement of evidence, apprehending accused and so on. This study, however,
focuses  on  its  appearance  in  ICL pronouncements.  Accordingly,  realist  issues  like  the  Russian
involvement  at  Nuremberg;18 the  inclusion  of  perceived  political  charges;19 claims  of  victor’s
justice;20 the political concerns surrounding the creation of the ICTY and ICTR;21 the legality of the
Tribunals;22 the selective arraignment of accused;23 the political concerns of the ICC as an unsafe
court;24 chequered state cooperation;25 potential personal interest  on the part  of judges26 and the
pressures surrounding re-election of judges27 fall outside the remit of this study unless they were
directly engaged in ICL pronouncements.
The core realist elements were utilised in the ICL justificatory narratives in two different ways,
namely descriptive and theoretical. Descriptive use usually revolved around pointing out a fact of
actual international life which impacted a decision.  Theoretical use meant an exposition on the
nature of international life in the abstract. Theoretical use normally included descriptive use while
the converse was not necessarily the case. 
16 Abbott (n 2) 153; Schiff (n 8) 5.
17 Slaughter (n 7) 507; Reus-Smit (n 8) 15; Abbott (n 2) 145.
18 T Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials (Skyhorse 2013) 639-640.
19 Taylor (n 18) 117; 467-472 for the killings in Katyn Forest in Smolensk in 1941. See Transcript of Proceedings 3
March 1948, 42 137 on the conspiracy charge.
20 N Boister and R Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (OUP 2008) 311.
21 P Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families  (Picador 1998) 252-253;
Moghalu (n 8) 5; Schiff (n 8) 65-66; T Meron, The Making of International Criminal Justice A View From the Bench
Selected Speeches (OUP 2011) 141; E Vulliamy, The War is Dead, Long Live the War Bosnia: The Reckoning (The
Bodely Head 2012) 66-67.   
22 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October
1995) paras  9-24; Prosecutor v Šešelj (Judgment) IT-03-67-T (31 March 2016) para 9. See also S Drakulić,  They
Wouldn’t Hurt a Fly (Hachete Digital 2004) chapter 9; Moghalu (n 8) 64-66. 
23 Moghalu  (n  8) 61-62  on  the  non-arraignment  of  NATO;  C del  Ponte,  Confrontations  with  Humanity’s  Worst
Criminals and the Culture of Impunity (Other Press 2008) 60, 88, 224-229; Meron (n 21) 84-86, Taylor (n 18) 89-90;
460. 
24 WA Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn, CUP 2011) 25-34. See ibid, at 38-42, for
Uganda’s use of the ICC to engender negotiations with the LRA and ibid, at 152, for the insulation of the Security
Council against prosecution.
25 Del Ponte (n 23) 88; 224-229; Meron (n 21) 84-86, 99-100, 131-132, 144-145.
26 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:342-
364. See also BVA Röling, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond Reflections of a Peacemonger (Antonio Cassese ed, Polity
Press 1993) 29; Boister and Cryer (n 20) 81-83; 311. See ibid at 94-95 for the view that bias was visible on the part
of the judges during the Tokyo trial. However, see Pal Dissent 10-13; 147  that the judges were present in their
personal capacities and that their moral integrity would protect against an impartial trial.
27 Meron (n 21) 108, 271.
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Realism can especially impact the rule of law on its institutional level, i.e. the independence and
objectivity of judicial role-players.28 Yet, in accordance with the focal point of this study, realism
can also be measured against a Fullerian model. Judgments which jettison legal principles or rule-
based methods to adjudication destroy the predictability of decisions, which in turn destroys rule of
law.29 According to Fuller,  law is the enterprise for the subordinating of people’s actions to the
governance of rules.30 If politics were used for decisions, then Fuller’s first desideratum requiring
rules  to  govern  would  be  violated.31 Also,  the  consistency  of  arguments  remained  the  central
structuring principle for the data.
The subsequent discussion will be clustered around the arguments and patterns found in post-WWII
IMTs, on the one hand, and the post-Cold War judicial bodies, on the other hand. Turning to the
Nuremberg IMT first, most coded data emanated from the selected counsel. For Jackson, ICL was
normatively superior to sovereignty as the Nuremberg Charter ‘evidences a faith that the law is not
only to govern the conduct of little men, but that even rulers are,...“under God and the law”’. 32 This
descriptive  statement  reflected  the  supremacy  of  law  to  state  sovereignty.33 Statism  was
subordinated to ICL on this view which opposed traditional realism.34 Shawcross based the British
participation at Nuremberg on the realisation that victory and might were not enough to ensure
lasting peace and rule of law. Also the IMT would educate future generations that right does not
necessarily entail might, but that law and justice would rule relations between states rather than
power.35 By subordinating power to law, Shawcross descriptively justified the British support and
participation in the IMT through a rejection of realism. 
In contrast to these positions rejecting realism, defence counsel Kranzbuehler argued that US naval
practices under Nimitz were comparable to those for which Dönitz and Raeder had been indicted.
Imposition of capital punishment would implicitly indicate that Nimitz deserved a similar fate.36 The
IMT responded  by  acquitting  the  accused  on  the  relevant  charges.37 While  Kranzbuehler’s  tu
28 S  Beaulac,  ‘The  Rule  of  Law  in  International  Law  Today’ in  Gianluigi  Palombella  and  Neil  Walker  (eds),
Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 212-220. See section 1.2.3.2. 
29 Meron (n 21) 255-256.
30 LL Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 96.
31 Fuller (n 30) 46-49. See section 1.2.3.2.
32 R Jackson in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. II:143.
33 In line with medieval jurisprudence, see Paulson (n 1) 134.
34 Reus-Smit (n 8) 15-16.
35 H Shawcross in  Trial  of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal ,  Nuremberg, Vol.
III:91; H Shawcross in  Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg,
Vol. XIX:434.
36 Taylor (n 18) 400-409.
37 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:313-
317.
192
quoque argument could be construed as natural law,38 the decisive issue was the political interest of
the US.39 Self-interest prevailed over justice in a typical realist manner. 
At  Nuremberg  the  notion  that  ‘the  Right  lies  in  the  Victory’,  which  was  central  to  Hitler’s
expansionist designs, became the very point around which the IMT revolved.40 Although the IMT
could be seen as a product of political negotiation, once created, it favoured reason over power, to
paraphrase  Jackson’s  opening  statement.41 Its  design  to  serve  as  countermeasure  for  wartime
violations was in conflict with the hitherto realist belief in war as prerogative of states. The notion
of sovereignty, which still accepted in realist terms that war was the continuation of politics by
‘other means’,42 was confronted by the IMT argument that armed conflict was inherently ‘evil’.43
The IMT, in terms of its premise and judgment, therefore attempted to oppose realism by favouring
law and downplaying power. 
At  both  Nuremberg  and Tokyo the  proceedings  against  the  accused were  criticised  as  victor’s
justice.44 Since the IMTs ventured pronouncements on the critique, its inclusion here is justified.
Unsurprisingly, both IMTs rejected this argument.45 At Nuremberg the ‘making of the Charter was
the  exercise  of  the  sovereign  legislative  power  by  the  countries  to  which  the  German  Reich
unconditionally  surrendered’.46 The  Tokyo  IMT judges  invoked  different  philosophies  in  their
respective dissenting opinions to address this realist critique of the proceedings as based on state-
interest and power. Webb found that international law supported belligerents prosecuting those who
committed crimes against their nationals;47 Jaranilla believed that Douglas MacArthur’s authority to
create the IMT was absolute;48 Bernard adopted natural law to support the Tribunal’s creation49 and
Pal also justified the IMT due to the moral integrity of the members of the IMT. 50 Pal surmised,
however,  that  ‘aggressors’ might  be  ‘chameleonic’ and  may  signify  ‘the  leaders  of  the  losing
party’.51 Different strategies were used at the IMTs to do so, but the notion of realist self-interest
38 See section 2.3; H Grotius, De Iure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (Francis Kelsey tr, Clarendon Press 1925) II.XX.III at
465-466. 
39 Taylor (n 18) 400.
40 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:202.
41 Jackson (n 32) 99.
42 C von Clausewitz, On War (Penguin Books 1982) 119.
43 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:186.
44 A Cassese, International Criminal Law (OUP 2003) 332-333; Boister and Cryer (n 20) 32-33. 
45 However, in the case of the Tokyo IMT without specific reasons from the majority, see Boister and Cryer (n 20) 33.
46 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:218.
47 Webb Separate Opinion 2.
48 Jaranilla Concurring Opinion 13.
49 Bernard Dissent 1-3.
50 Pal Dissent 10-14 and 147. See also Boister and Cryer (n 20) 33-34.
51 Pal Dissent 251b. See also Boister and Cryer (n 20) 132.
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and power as responsible for the creation of the Tribunals was consistently rejected.  
Another external critique which elicited response per curiam, at Tokyo, revolved around the non-
selection of several prominent Japanese leaders.52 In descriptive accounts, several judges lamented
the realist considerations impacting the selection of accused. Webb found the impunity granted to
the Emperor, despite his clear involvement with the war, fundamental enough to justify revisiting
the sentences to be imposed on the other accused as a matter of justice.53 Webb was quick to note
that  he was not suggesting that the Emperor  ought to have been indicted as such a suggestion
exceeded the judge’s function. Yet, Webb recognised the workings of realism in this matter as he
linked the Emperor’s immunity to the best interests of the Allied Powers.54 Years after the trial, he
lapsed and indicated the need to have prosecuted the Emperor.55 According to Bernard, the absence
of the criminal leader from the trial  undermined the very justice meted out by the IMT.56 Both
Bernard and Webb thus held the justice meted out by the IMT as lessened by the state power and
self-interest which was responsible for the selection of the accused. Their pronouncements could be
seen as responses to the reality of politics at the IMT. On a related argument, Pal indicated that if ‘it
is really law which is being applied I would like to see even the members of the victor nations being
brought before such tribunals’.57 Of course, self-interest and politics rendered such an occurrence
unlikely.58 Pal’s arguments under TWAIL are also relevant here as they also revolved around the
choices for selection and inclusion of accused.59 Pal’s realist implication was that power rather than
law produced the exclusive selection of accused from the vanquished nation. In all three opinions,
the concession of interest and power as determinative of the selection of accused can be found.
Coding for  realism at  Tokyo next  revealed  a  significant  theoretical  discourse  on  the  nature  of
international law by Pal. For Pal, state sovereignty was the very cornerstone of the international
community. States were parties and judges in their own cases.60 Pal accepted that the right to self-
52 The exclusion of the Emperor for prosecution was explicitly contained in paragraph 17 of the State War Navy
Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Directive on the Identification, Apprehension and Trial of Persons Suspected of
War Crimes. See also Awaya, ‘In the Shadows of the Tokyo Trial’ in Awaya, ‘In the Shadows of the Tokyo Trial’ in
C Hosoya,  N Ando, Y Onuma and R Minear (eds),  The Tokyo War Crimes Trial  An International Symposium
(Kodansha Ltd 1986) 85-86; BVA Röling,  ‘The Tokyo Trial and the Quest for Peace’ in C Hosoya, N Ando, Y
Onuma and R Minear (eds),  The Tokyo War Crimes Trial An International Symposium (Kodansha Ltd 1986) 131;
Röling (n 26) 48; Boister and Cryer (n 20) 21-23, 50, 62-69, 311; Moghalu (n 8) 42-46. 
53 Webb Separate Opinion 18 and 20.
54 Ibid 19.
55 Boister and Cryer (n 20) 68-69.
56 Bernard Dissent 19, 22. See also Boister and Cryer (n 20) 68-69. 
57 Pal Dissent 147.
58 Boister and Cryer (n 20) 61, 311.
59 See section 5.3.
60 Pal Dissent 123.
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preservation would override the duty one state might owe in respect of the rights of another state.61
He submitted that ‘self-preservation is not only a right of a state, it is also its paramount duty; all
other duties are subordinated to this right and duty of self-preservation. In international relations all
the states treat this right as a governing condition, subject to which all rights and duties exist’.62 All
the essential elements of realism appear in this discussion, including the centrality of states, the
fundamental right to self-help and the overarching importance of survival.63
Pal expounded on the realist  notion of a balance of power as well:  ‘The basis  of international
relations is still the competitive struggle of states, a struggle for the solution of which there is still
no judge, no executor, no standard of decision. There are still dominated and enslaved nations, and
there is no provision anywhere in the system for any peaceful readjustment without struggle. It is
left  to  the  nations  themselves  to  see  to  the  readjustment’.64 Stability  in  international  relations
depended on the power relations between states and the balancing of interests.65 With struggle as the
basis of this state of nature, Pal possibly even harks back to the Hobbesian paradigm where self-
interest  dictated  actions  in  a  nasty and brutish  anarchical  environment  which  was likely  to  be
violent.66 Such a Hobbesian state of nature further reverberated in Pal’s argument that the nature of
international relations was that of a society rather than a community. Unlike a community where
behaviour is ‘based on the solidarity of the members’, which establishes a ‘cohesive force without
which a community cannot exist’ and individuals are ‘united in spite of their individual existence’, a
society entails members ‘isolated in spite of their association’, with the law aimed at preventing the
bellum omnium contra omnes.67 
Pal’s  theoretical  explanation  of  the  realist  nature  of  international  life  gave  way for  descriptive
realism as he accepted Japan’s entry into the Tripartite Act as dictated ‘by the principle of the
balance of power, the only factor of relative stability in a world divided by alliances and counter-
alliances’.68 Japan’s action was thus determined by the desire for self-preservation in the hostile
environment of the international community which embodied the quintessence of realism.
61 Ibid 92-94.
62 Ibid 412.
63 Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 93-103.
64 Pal Dissent 222-223, 1003-1004.
65 Slaughter (n 7) 507; Reus-Smit (n 8) 15-16; Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 94.
66 T Hobbes, Leviathan (R Tuck tr, Cambridge University Press 2007) 86-90.
67 Pal Dissent 340-341. A Cassese, ‘Soliloqui’ in Heikelina Verrijn Stuart and Marlise Simons (eds),  The Prosecutor
and the Judge: Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese:  Interviews and Writings (Amsterdam University  Press
2009) 163 later repeated this sentiment in extra-curial writing.
68 Pal Dissent 775-776.
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Like Pal, Röling too conceded the realist nature of international relations pertaining to the limited
reach of law as opposed to self-help. For him, the criminalisation of aggressive war would remain
meaningless if other methods of aggression, which were as effective as war, were left unregulated.
Accordingly, the issue was one of ends and means – illegal ends may be obtained through legal
means.69 The judge essentially lamented the possibility of self-help legitimately circumventing the
law, yet achieving the same results as criminally impugned conduct and being just as (morally)
unacceptable.
Overall,  at  the  post-WWII  IMTs a  moderate  dataset  revealed  inconsistent  arguments  regarding
realist concerns. Consistency can be found intra-curially. At Nuremberg, claims supporting state
power  over  law were  consistently  rejected.  In  fact,  apart  from the  impact  of  defence  counsel
Kranzbuehler’s arguments,  the coded pronouncements revealed uniformity against realism. This
could have been functional as giving any quarter to accusations of the political basis of the IMT
would have undermined what was an unprecedented exercise in international criminal justice. At
Tokyo,  apart  from a  structural  issue  with  the  conspiracy  charge  and  some  opposition  against
individual criminal responsibility,70 no data appeared from the selected counsel.71 The individual
judges, however, considered realism and were divided. Whereas Webb, Jaranilla, Bernard and Pal
all opposed the realist challenge of victor’s justice underpinning the IMT’s creation; Bernard, Webb
and Pal took issue with the selection of the accused as dictated by state-interest.  Pal and  Röling
added theoretical explanations of the realist nature of international life. While the dataset on realism
at  Tokyo  was  therefore  inconsistent,  it  possibly  inclined  towards  realism  as  a  descriptor  of
international life. The impact of these arguments on the rule of law will be discussed below.
Similar  realist  matters  emerged  in  the  post-Cold  War  judicial  bodies.  The  initial  Rule  61
proceedings reflected the lack of direct enforcement powers of the ICTY.72 Rule 61 proceedings
served  to  disseminate  the  crimes  with  which  an  accused  was  charged  to  the  world.73 These
proceedings ensured that the Tribunal was ‘not rendered ineffective by the non-appearance of the
69 Röling Dissent 125.
70 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 206-42 2012, 42 258-42 259. See section 6.3.
71 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 137 on the conspiracy charge.
72 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-94-
2-R61 (20 October 1995) para 3; Prosecutor v Martić (Decision) IT-95-11-R61 (8 March 1996) para 3; Prosecutor v
Mrkšić (Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-95-13-R61 (3
April 1996) para 3; Prosecutor v Karadžić and Mladić (Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence) IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61 (11 July 1996) para 3;  Prosecutor v Rajić (Review of
the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-95-12-R61  (13 September 1996)
para 2.
73 Prosecutor v Rajić (Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-95-
12-R61 (13 September 1996) para 7.
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accused and can proceed nevertheless’.74 In the  Rajić Rule 61 decision, Sidhwa conceded in so
many words that these proceedings were a consequence of political realities.75 Realism here was a
descriptive fact of international life.  
The lack  of  state  cooperation (and initial  prosecutorial  direction76)  resulted  in  the  ICTY trying
several  lowly-ranked  soldiers  early  on,  including  Erdemović,  Tadić77 and  Landžo.  Landžo
challenged his arraignment, but the AC found no problem with the prosecutor’s strategy to ‘“focus
on persons holding higher levels of responsibility, or on those who have been personally responsible
for  the exceptionally  brutal  or  otherwise extremely  serious  offences”’.78 The descriptive  use  of
realism again explained how state self-interest ensured that only lowly-ranked accused were tried
early on. Only those accused were handed over whom the states were willing to apprehend.  Per
Nikolić,  the ICTY conceded that  it  was  initially  seen as  an ‘academic  or  diplomatic  response’
embodying ‘aspirational,  if  not academic,  ideals’.79 The culmination of these factors  could also
explain the functional reliance on the policy-oriented approach in  Erdemović  which was the first
judgment rendered by the ICTY.80 It was seemingly imperative for the ICTY to ensure a finding of
guilt  (especially  after  a  plea of  guilty)  as  this  would be a  confirmation of its  ability  to  render
judgment  in  future.81 These  arguments  reflected  the  difficulty  a  judicial  body,  tasked  with
determining  individual  criminal  responsibility,  faced  in  an  arena  where  states  were  still  the
dominant role-players.
State cooperation was clearly essential for the Tribunals to fulfill their mandates.82 However, the
ICL judiciaries were powerless to do anything more than note the refusal of state cooperation in the
instances it occurred. For example, Croatia was subpoenaed in the  Blaskić TC to produce certain
documents.  Croatia  invoked  various  reasons,  including  national  security  concerns,  why  these
74 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Review of the Indictment pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) IT-94-
2-R61 (20 October 1995) para 3.
75 Prosecutor v Rajić (Rule 61 Decision Separate Opinion of Judge Sidhwa) IT-95-12-R61 (5 July 1996) para 7. On
state-interest, see also Reus-Smit (n 8) 16; Moghalu (n 8) 137; Schiff (n 8)  4-5;  Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 92-93;
Festenstein (n 5) 40.
76 See, for e.g., A Cassese, ‘The ICTY: A Living and Vital Reality’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice
586, 595; Del Ponte (n 23) 124;  WA Schabas,  The UN International Criminal Tribunals The Former Yugoslavia,
Rwanda and Sierra Leone (CUP 2006) 125-126.
77 Whose  lowly  rank  was  considered  in  mitigation  of  punishment, Prosecutor  v  Tadić  (Judgment  in  Sentencing
Appeals) IT-94-1-A and IT-94-1-Abis (26 January 2000) paras 55-57.  
78 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mučić, Delić and Landžo (Judgment) IT-96-21-A (20 February 2001) para 614.
79 Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-S (2 December 2003) para 88.
80 As discussed in section 2.5.
81 For such an argument, see A Fichtelberg, ‘Liberal Values in International Criminal Law A Critique of Erdemović’
(2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 3, 18; Vulliamy (n 21) 225. 
82 See Meron (n 21) 84; GK McDonald, ‘Reflections on the Contributions of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia’ (2001) 24 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 160.
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documents could not be made available.83 It was only on appeal that access was gained to them.84
State self-interest directly determined the documents made available to the TC and consequently the
judgment  which  could  be  rendered.  The  TC  could  only  helplessly  reflect  on  the  state’s
unwillingness to turn over the evidence, i.e. descriptively raise the realist limits of ICL judicial
bodies.85
Self-interested state cooperation also affected punishment.  Žigić argued that his surrender to the
ICTY, while incarcerated in Banja Luka, had to be viewed in mitigation of sentence. This argument,
which found limited favour with the AC, relied on the ‘lack of cooperation between the authorities
of Republika Srpska and the Tribunal during the period under consideration’.86 These findings also
found favour in Simić87 and, implicitly, in Simić et al.88 In a series of cases, then, the Tribunal give
some credit for the conduct of accused which contributed to cooperation with the Republika Srpska
which, while technically not a state, is an entity traditionally opposed to the Tribunal due to its
perceived prejudice against its citizens. Lack of cooperation, due to state self-interest, thus shaped
the justice and punishment meted out in exemplary realist fashion.89
As with the post-WWII IMTs, the selection of accused at the ICTY was ascribed to politics and
addressed curially, necessitating its discussion here. The Tribunal rejected the defence argument in
Brđanin that the ICTY ‘may have developed an unintentional bias against Serbs’ by reiterating its
duty to ‘decide what, if any, is the individual criminal responsibility to be ascribed to an accused,
irrespective of nationality, religion, ethnicity or other grounds’.90 The realist matter of state-interest
influencing the ICTY was side-stepped in this case through a factual finding.
The last coded instance of realism at the ICTY appeared in  Šešelj.  Šešelj argued that politics and
bias dictated the charges against him.91 These accusations moved Antonetti, in a concurring opinion,
to question certain actions of both the registry and ‘certain members of the tribunal’.92 Despite these
83 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) IT-95-14-T (3 March 2000) paras 42-46.
84 Prosecutor v Blaškić (Judgment) IT-95-14-A (29 July 2004) para 4.
85 See McDonald (n 82) 164; Reus-Smit (n 8) 16; Moghalu (n 8) 137; Schiff (n 8) 4-5; Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 92-
93; Festenstein (n 5) 40. 
86 Prosecutor v Kvočka et al (Judgment) IT-98-30/1-A (28 February 2005) par 712.
87 Prosecutor v Milan Simić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-95-9/2-S (17 October 2002) para 107. See also Prosecutor v
Dragan Nikolić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-94-02-A (4 February 2005) para 56.
88 Prosecutor v Simić, Tadić and Zarić (Judgments) IT-95-9-T (17 October 2003) para 1110.
89 See Reus-Smit (n 8) 16; Moghalu (n 8) 137; Schiff (n 8) 4-5; Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 92-93; Festenstein (n 5) 40. 
90 Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) paras 38-39, 42.
91 Prosecutor v Šešelj (Judgment) IT-03-67-T (31 March 2016) para 9; Prosecutor v Šešelj (Judgment) MICT-16-99-A
(11 April 2018) para 26.
92 Prosecutor v Šešelj (Judgment) IT-03-67-T (31 March 2016) Concurring Opinion of Presiding Judge Jean-Claude
Antonetti p 28-29.
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reservations, for him, the judges were an obstacle to a conspiracy against the accused. The judge
went so far as to state explicitly that, for his part, he never received orders from any quarters to
decide in one way or another.93 The implication of this concession was that the resultant decision
was made on law, but that the accusations of interest necessitated this clarification.94
The  Šešelj case  required  an  exception  to  the  thesis  study  design  which  mainly  focused  on
judgments.  The decision  on  the  disqualification  of  Judge Harhoff  was particularly  relevant  for
considerations  of  realism  and  directly  shaped  the  final  TC  judgment  (also  by  changing  the
composition of the bench). The Šešelj defence brought a motion to disqualify on the basis of a letter
which Harhoff wrote that revealed ‘a strong inclination...to  convict accused persons of Serbian
ethnicity’.95 In  the  letter,  the  judge  criticised  recent  Tribunal  jurisprudence  which  diluted  joint
criminal enterprise (JCE). This led to a departure from a ‘more or less set practice’ until 2012 to
convict military commanders for their subordinates’ crimes.96 Harhoff ascribed the change in JCE to
the ‘pressure being exerted by the President of the Tribunal  on his colleagues in  deliberations,
which...may  form  part  of  a  broader  American/Israeli  plan  to  curtail  JCE  and  other  forms  of
responsibility’.97 This explicitly suggested that state-interest shaped judgments.98 In the decision, it
was Harhoff’s belief in a ‘set practice’ of convicting accused, without evidentiary support, which
led the majority finding reasonable grounds of bias.99 Liu disagreed that there was an appearance of
bias, but he criticised Harhoff for an ‘inarticulate critique of the recent jurisprudence of the Tribunal
based on unsubstantiated speculations and insinuations of improper conduct by other colleagues in a
fashion that is unbefitting of a judge’.100 The firm political undercurrents in the Harhoff letter cannot
be gainsaid. Harhoff’s letter engaged realism in two ways. First, he accused colleagues of requiring
judgments to be shaped in accordance with certain state-interests. This argument was rejected for
93 Ibid.
94 See also the pressure to finish the case conceded by Judge Niang in Prosecutor v Šešelj (Judgment) IT-03-67-T (31
March 2016) Individual Statement by Judge Mandiaye Niang para 2. That the judges ‘succumbed to the accused’s
blackmail’,  see  G  Sluiter,  ‘Compromising the  Authority  of  International  Criminal  Justice’ (2007)  5  Journal  of
International Criminal Justice 534.
95 Prosecutor v Šešelj (Decision of Defence Motion for Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the
Vice-President) IT-03-67-T (28 August 2013) para 2.
96 Ibid para 10. See also Prosecutor v Gotovina et al (Judgment) IT-06-90-A (16 November 2012) Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Fausto Pocar para 30 questioning the aims of the Majority to undermine JCE rather than to consider the
accused’s contributions thereto.
97 Ibid para 11.
98 See Reus-Smit (n 8) 16; Moghalu (n 8) 137; Schiff (n 8) 4-5; Dunne and Schmidt (n 5) 92-93; Festenstein (n 5) 40. 
99 Prosecutor v Šešelj (Decision of Defence Motion for Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the
Vice-President) IT-03-67-T (28 August 2013) para 13.
100 Prosecutor v Šešelj (Decision of Defence Motion for Disqualification of Judge Frederik Harhoff and Report to the
Vice-President) IT-03-67-T (28 August 2013) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu para 2. On appeal from an earlier TC
in which Judge Harhoff was a judge, the AC rejected that bias was proven, see Prosecutor v Stanišić and Župljanin
(Judgment) IT-08-91-A (30 June 2016) paras 42-57; Prosecutor v Stanišić and Župljanin (Judgment) IT-08-91-A (30
June 2016) Separate Opinion of Judge Afanđe paras 12, 25.
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lack of evidence. Secondly, he revealed his belief in a set practice to convict commanders. Without
proof of such a practice this  argument  raised concerns that Harhoff was deciding on non-legal
grounds (which directly contravenes Fuller’s first rule of law principle). 
The  Šešelj  TC provisionally released the accused on medical grounds prior to judgment.101 The
accused never returned to the ICTY for the trial judgment (which resulted in an acquittal102) or to
the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) for the appeals judgment.103 Šešelj’s
acquittal was partly overturned on appeal.104 But the sentence consequently imposed did not exceed
the time he had already served pending trial.105 This fact bore no small coincidence. A speculative
reading of the matter might be that the overturn of the acquittal ensured that those groups upset
about the TC acquittal could be somewhat appeased, yet the political difficulties of apprehending
the accused again could be circumvented. While such speculation will not be counted in this study,
the facts allow this possible realist interpretation. 
Turning to the ICTR, selective prosecutions were argued in Akayesu as ‘the Tribunal is prosecuting
only the “losers” in the Rwandan conflict  by failing to prosecute the perpetrators of “crimes of
extermination of the Hutu” who enjoy “complete immunity” from prosecution’.106 Kayishema and
Ruzindana argued that ‘as a result of the pressure from the Government of Rwanda, the Tribunal
systematically delivers verdicts against one ethnic group’.107 In both instances the submissions were
found to be unsubstantiated.108 Ntakirutimana likewise argued that only Hutus were indicted.109 The
TC understood the argument to show ‘the Tribunal’s “discriminatory purpose”, which is to “inflict
victors justice” on the surviving leadership and military of the former government of Rwanda...’.110
This argument was again dismissed by the TC for want of evidence.111 On these arguments the
defence  consistently  suggested  that  state-interest  dictated  arraignment.  However,  the  ICTR
101 Prosecutor v Šešelj (Judgment) MICT-16-99-A (11 April 2018) para 39.
102 Prosecutor v Šešelj (Judgment) IT-03-67-T (31 March 2016) Disposition.
103 Ibid paras 9, 39.
104 Ibid paras 142-166.
105 Ibid paras 176, 180.
106 Prosecutor v Akayesu (Judgment on Appeal) ICTR-96-4-T (1 June 2001) para 93. See B Van Schaak, ‘“The Grass
that Gets Trampled when Elephants Fight”: Will the Codification of the Crime of Aggression Protect Women?’
(2010) 15 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 369 footnote 159 for a possible reading of this as a
matter of just war.
107 Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana (Judgment) ICTR-95-1-A (1 June 2001) para 53.
108 Prosecutor v Akayesu  (Judgment on Appeal) ICTR-96-4-T (1 June 2001) paras 94-95, rejected this argument for
lack  of  evidential  proof  and  deference  to  prosecutorial  freedom.  See  Prosecutor  v  Kayishema  and  Ruzindana
(Judgment) ICTR-95-1-A (1 June 2001) para 61.
109 Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (Judgment) ICTR-96-10-T & 96-17-T (21 February 2003) para 760.
110 Ibid para 760.
111 Ibid paras 760-761.
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consistently  rejected  these  realist  concerns  for  lack  of  evidence.  In  sum,  realism  described
international life for the defence, but it was not proven for the Tribunal.
An  exception,  similar  to  that  in  Šešelj,  must  be  made  here  to  consider  the  responses  to  the
Barayagwiza  motion  to  be  released  from pretrial  detention  on  account  of  incarceration  for  an
excessively  long  time  before  the  initial  hearing.112 Although  the  TC  rejected  the  Barayagwiza
argument,  the  AC,  with  McDonald  presiding,  upheld  his  arguments  and dismissed  the  charges
against him ‘with prejudice’. This meant that the same charges could never be brought against him
again.113 The particular AC exhibited greater concern for the liberal rights of the accused than the
broader  rights  of  the  Rwandan genocide  survivors  (which  links  up with  liberalism in  the  next
section114).  Because  this  decision  was  ‘so  inherently  unjust’,  the  prosecution  filed  a  notice  of
intention to present a motion for review of the ruling.115 The AC decided that Barayagwiza would
stand trial, but that he would be entitled to financial compensation in case he was found guilty.116
The  TC  duly  found  him guilty  of  several  charges,  including  genocide.  Barayagwiza took  the
independence of the ICTY to task on appeal, alleging that ‘political pressure was exerted on the
Tribunal’.117 The AC responded to this realist charge of self-interest that ‘pressures were exerted is
not enough to establish that the Judges who ruled in this context on the [Request for Review] were
influenced by those pressures’.118 Like the defence allegations of selective arraignment earlier, the
AC rejected this ground of appeal for want of evidence.119 The defence contention of state-interest
dictating charges was again thwarted by the ICTR for want of evidence. 
Realism at  the  ICC was  only  arguably  visible  in  Katanga.  The  TC relied  on  regulation  55,  a
mechanism to recharacterise the mode of liability of the accused. For the defence this change, late
in the proceedings, arose suspicion that the majority tried to convict the accused. 120 In a strong
dissent,  Van  den  Wyngaert  took  the  majority  to  task  for  changing  the  mode  of  liability  from
112 Recounted in Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-99-52-T (3 December
2003) paras 14-18.
113 Del Ponte (n 23) 72.
114 D Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms of International Criminal Law’ in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds)
Future  Perspectives  on  International  Criminal  Justice (TMC  Asser  Press  2010)  129-135.  Strict  legality  was
favoured over substantive justice as per Cassese (n 44) 22, 139-145.
115 Del Ponte (n 23) 73.
116 For a discussion on the tension between the common-law and civil-law traditions in this case, see Del Ponte (n 23)
80-81.
117 Prosecutor v Nahimana, Barayagwiza, Ngeze (Judgment) ICTR-99-52-A (28 November 2007) paras 21-30. See also
Schabas (n 76) 31.
118 Ibid para 32. Some have found this argument unconvincing, see Sluiter (n 94) 534.
119 Ibid para 46.
120 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (7 March 2014)
para 1532.
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commission to common purpose liability. The judge felt the late recharacterisation indicated the
majority’s desire to mould the case against the accused. In fact, she referred to it as the ‘majority’s
case’.121 The  self-interested  role  of  the  majority  was  confirmed,  for  Van  den  Wyngaert,  by  its
rejection of the stay motion brought by the defence against the recharacterisation even though no
other party objected to the motion.122 Despite insufficient evidence before it, the majority betrayed a
‘tendency to accept evidence supporting [its] theory of the case and reject anything else’.123 The
judge suggested the reason for the majority’s argument was found in political considerations:
‘Sympathy for the victims’ plight and an urgent awareness that this Court is called upon to “end impunity”
are powerful stimuli. Yet, the Court’s success or failure cannot be measured just in terms of “bad guys” being
convicted and innocent victims receiving reparation. Success or failure is determined first and foremost by
whether or not the proceedings, as a whole, have been fair and just’.124
The majority denied these allegations, noting that ‘we should not find ourselves compelled to make
clear that we in no wise sought to appropriate a “case”, and even less, to take the place of the
Prosecution....  As is  the duty of any judge,  we merely conducted,  with objectivity  and without
preconceived  ideas,  as  careful  and  thorough  an  examination  of  the  evidence  in  the  record  as
possible..’.125 While  the  dissenting  judgment  accused  the  majority  of  a  self-interested  finding,
thereby engaging in a critique of a perceived realism, the accused later discontinued his appeal
proceedings as he ‘accepted the judgment of the Court and its conclusions on its role as well as his
conduct’.126 This concession somewhat blunted the dissent. The challenge of interested adjudication
remained, however. Underpinning Katanga is the systemic pressure to be seen as functional in the
eyes of an international arena where states are sceptical of ICL judiciaries (which reminds of a
similar  sentiment  in  Momir  Nikolić127).  If  a  judge  is  biased  towards  an  accused  or  group,  the
question of interest emerges. Is the judge furthering the interests of other external parties? If such
interest dictated how the case was decided, this would violate the Fullerian desideratum requiring
rules to decide disputes.
121 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (7 March 2014)
Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert paras 12, 143.
122 Ibid para 114.
123 Ibid paras 262, 313.
124 Ibid para 310. See opening quote of Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-
01/08 A (8 June 2018) Concurring Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji and para 21;  Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment
pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Separate Opinion Judge Christine Van den
Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison para 76. 
125 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) ICC-01/04-01/07 (7 March 2014)
Concurring Opinion of Judges Fatoumata Diarra and Bruno Cotte paras 2-3.
126 Press Release: 25 June 2014 Defence and Prosecution discontinue respective appeals against judgment in Katanga
case ICC-CPI-20140625-PR1021.
127 Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-S (2 December 2003) para 88.
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At the post-Cold War judicial bodies, clear trends could be identified surrounding arguments about
state-interest, in particular. The ICTY consistently described the reality of international life in realist
terms.  The ICTR saw consistent  arguments from the defence that  interest  dictated charges  and
selection. However, equally consistent were the Tribunal’s rejection of such charges on the facts of
the cases. Finally, the ICC delivered a negligibly small dataset, which could be construed as mixed
at best.
To summarise, the post-WWII IMTs were created by states completely victorious in war and so
there  was  no  problem  of  state  cooperation.  Realism  was  consistently  opposed  at  Nuremberg
whether by the selected prosecutors or the IMT. This is perhaps because of functional reasons as the
IMT was a watershed in international criminal justice and so necessitated a paradigm shift from the
realist-dominant  narrative  in  the  international  life  of  the  time.  At  Tokyo,  realism was likewise
consistently  opposed where  it  pertained to  the  legitimacy of  the  IMT’s  creation.  However,  the
selection of accused raised realist concerns from most of the dissenting judges while Pal and Röling
also  used  realism to  describe  the  nature  of  international  life.  So,  at  best,  Tokyo  exhibited  an
inconsistent dataset, inclining towards realism as descriptor of actual international life. The situation
post-Cold War was markedly different as these judicial bodies were not created by states victorious
in war. State cooperation or the lack thereof became crucial to the functioning of these Tribunals
and,  obviously,  directly  impacted  their  judgments.  Realism as  descriptor  of  actual  international
relations was consistently recognised at the ICTY. At the ICTR, realist concerns were often raised
by  the  defence  but  consistently  rejected  by  the  Tribunal  for  want  of  evidence.  At  the  ICC  a
negligible  dataset  arguably suggested mixed realist  concerns  regarding the recharacterisation of
charges. 
Realism, descriptively at least,  is inescapably part of the nature of international life. That state-
interest will compete with the interest of judicial bodies will persist for so long as the judiciaries
require states’ cooperation in fulfilling their mandates. The measurement of coded data against the
rule of law has to occur against  this  background. It  needs reiterating that the findings here are
relative to the selected ICL pronouncements and do not purport  to address the holistic political
pressures affecting the ICL judicial bodies.
While the data was again structured around consistency in argument, charges of power or politics
determining decisions could be seen as pressuring Fuller’s requirement for the existence of rules.
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Such arguments on the level of the ICL judicial bodies were rare. Only  Šešelj,  Barayagwiza and
Katanga were confronted with such claims of which only Šešelj conceded them. Šešelj revealed a
dual accusation of bias towards the ICTY President (through the Harhoff letter) and bias on the part
of Judge Harhoff himself. Only the latter claim was deemed to be proven. On this reading, in so far
as it pertains to the selected pronouncements, only  Šešelj revealed a decision on basis of interest
rather than rules. The ICTY acted decisively and removed the judge from the proceedings, while the
accusations he made in  his  letter  were dismissed as  unsubstantiated.  The rule  of  law was thus
protected  where  bias  was actually  found and short  shrift  was made of  an  unfounded claim of
prejudice.
A perennial issue which partly played out in ICL judgments pertained to the selection of accused.
While interest and cooperation played an inescapable role in this regard, only the Tokyo judges
conceded such bias on the part of their Allied creators. The judicial role-players selected in this
study could not have changed this selection. By noting the interest involved they contributed to
transparency of the administration of justice. 
On the descriptive front, claims of lack of state-cooperation, difficulty of obtaining evidence or
political influence were noted and discussed in judgments. Such transparency should be lauded,
from a curial perspective judges could not do much more to gain support for their judgments. If the
rule  of  law  was  undermined  institutionally  thus,  it  was  not  undermined  by  the  judicial
pronouncements which were the focus of this study.
Overall, the judicial pronouncements on realism did not reveal a contravention of the rule of law.
They  consistently  conceded,  however,  the  challenging  relationship  between  states  and  judicial
bodies.  The  scrutiny  next  turns  to  the  institutional  design  of  these  bodies  and  their  own
understanding thereof. The liberalism thus pursued should also be juxtaposed to the state-centric
realism discussed above.
6.3 Liberalism
As noted in the preface to part D, the data coded from ICL pronouncements on liberalism was
insufficient  to  confirm  the  IR  version  thereof.  Even  as  political  theory  liberalism  is  much
theorised.128 While  it  is  not  the  aim  of  this  study  to  conclusively  resolve  the  definitional
128 R Cryer, T Hervey, B Sokhi-Bulley with A Bohm,  Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart
Publishing  2011) 44;  D Robinson, ‘A Cosmopolitan Liberal  Account of International  Criminal  Law’ (2013) 26
Leiden Journal of International Law 133; D Bell, ‘What is Liberalism?’ (2014) 42 Political Theory 683-706.
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complexities at play, certain basic aspects are understood under this philosophy. The core ideas of
liberalism  include  individual  autonomy,  the  notion  of  universal  rights,  equal  citizenship  and
democracy.129 Respect for the individual’s agency, dignity and autonomy places restraints on societal
aims.130 The  importance  of  individual  rights in  the  political  order  is  paramount.  Unlike
consequentialist thinking, rights are not only respected in order to effect a particular end.131 For
some the basic deontic commitment, already espoused by Kant, to ‘respect...the moral agency of
individuals’ is foundational in ICL.132 Persons are understood as ‘possessed of dignity and capable
of  directing  their  behaviour  by  reason’.133 In  sum,  because  of  their  inherent  worth,  individuals
should be treated as ends unto themselves.134
Liberalism is part of the design of ICL and all the pronouncements made by the ICL judicial bodies
can be described as shaped by liberalism.135 ICL judicial bodies were indeed part of the paradigm
shift  in  the  international  arena  from a  state-centric  system to  one  where  individuals  are  now
recognised  too.136 At  first  glance,  coding  for  liberalism in  ICL judgments  may  therefore  seem
redundant. At the very least, on this view, coding for liberalism in ICL constitutes an immanent
critique  as  coding can  reveal  whether  ICL ‘is  failing  to  live  up  to  its  own professed  goals  or
principles’.137
Yet  liberalism  has  been  the  object  of  numerous  critiques,  including  the  meta-critique  on  the
uncritical application of domestic political ideas to international law.138 As a result of the transplant,
in ICL there exists a fundamental tension between criminal law liberalism, on the one hand, and
HR,  on  the  other.139 While  both  revolve  around  ‘respect  for  the  autonomy  and  integrity  of
individuals and protecting such individuals from misused state authority’, which are the common
129 Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 128) 44 quoting from N Lacey, ‘Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights
of Women’ in K Knop (ed),  Gender and Human Rights (OUP 2004) 13, 19. See also C Reus-Smit, ‘International
Law’ in John Bayliss, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (eds),  The Globalization of World Politics (4th edn, OUP
2008) 286-287.
130 Robinson (n 114) 116; Robinson (n 128) 132-133.
131 Fichtelberg (n 81) 9.
132 I Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals (Dover 2005) 45-46; Robinson (n 128) 129. 
133 Robinson (n 128) 131.
134 Kant (n 132) 45-46; Robinson (n 114) 116; Robinson (n 128) 146. 
135 Reus-Smit (n 129) 285; Robinson (n 128) 140.
136 For  agreement,  see  T  Meron,  ‘The  Humanization  of  Humanitarian  Law’  (2000)  94  American  Journal  of
International Law 239, 253. See also GP Fletcher and JD Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal
Law in the Darfur Case’ (2005) 3 JICJ 542; Reus-Smit (n 129) 291.
137 Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 128) 44.
138 Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 128) 44-45; Robinson (n 128) 128-129.
139 Robinson (n 114) 129-135. See also Fletcher and Ohlin (n 136) 540, 544.
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elements enumerated above, they have incompatible aspects.140 HR141 adopts broad constructions for
the greatest  protection of their  beneficiaries but,  unlike criminal  law,  are  unaccustomed to ‘the
special moral restraints which arise when fixing guilt upon an individual’.142 While both branches
aim to  protect  individuals,  HR focuses  on individual  victims whereas  criminal  law focuses  on
individual accused.143 
This section will firstly code for the characteristic elements of liberalism not yet captured elsewhere
in this study. Arguments of individualism or collectivism; the shift from state-centric to individual-
centric ICL; individual criminal responsibility; human rights and respect for moral autonomy will
be noted. Secondly, coding will consider the tension inherent to liberalism in ICL. Liberalism as
systemic philosophy provided the structure, within which ICL justificatory arguments were made.
As was shown throughout the thesis, liberalism pervaded some of the earlier codes.144 Brief cross-
references will be made to such other codes at the end of this section. 145 In sum, liberalism in ICL
will be coded both for its opposition to state-centrism, as well as the inherent tension between its
constitutive branches, namely HR and criminal law.146 It is the cumulation of these branches of
inquiry which will be measured against the Fullerian desiderata.
The  shift  in  international  law  from  state-centric  to  individual-oriented  was  acknowledged  at
Nuremberg by counsel  and the IMT. Regarding perpetrators,  Shawcross suggested it  was ‘both
logical and right that...those individuals who shared responsibility for bringing such wars about
should answer personally’.147 Just deserts were thus afforded to the perpetrator, who had neglected
their  duties,  in  order  to  respect  their  moral  autonomy.148 Regarding victims,  Shawcross  echoed
Lauterpacht  ‘that there is a limit to the omnipotence of the state and that the individual human
being, the ultimate unit of all law, is not disentitled to the protection of mankind when the state
tramples upon his rights in a manner which outrages the conscience of mankind’.149 Recognition for
140 Robinson (n 114) 115-117.
141 Which, for this discussion includes international humanitarian law (IHL), see Robinson (n 114) 116 footnote 6.
142 Robinson (n 114) 131. See also Fletcher and Ohlin (n 136) 544.
143 Robinson (n 114) 134.
144 Robinson (n 128) 133, 148-149 alluded to interpretation and legality. See sections 2.5, 3.4, 3.5 and the prefaces to
parts B and C.
145 Especially  JCE,  command responsibility,  interpretation and legality  will  be noted.  These  are also supported  in
literature, see Robinson (n 114) 119-129, 135-147.
146 Robinson (n 114) 115-117.
147 Shawcross Vol. III (n 35) 92, 105.
148 Robinson (n 114) 134.
149 Shawcross  Vol. XIX (n 35) 471-472. See  H Lauterpacht, ‘The Grotian Tradition in International Law’ (1946) 23
British Year Book of International Law 26-27; K  Sellars, ‘Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo’ (2011) 21
European Journal of International Law 1087 who confirms the collaboration of Lauterpacht and Shawcross on the
ideas of state and individual.
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both the accused and the victims attested to the adoption of both criminal law and HR liberalism.150
However,  it  seemed  Shawcross favoured HR liberalism as he later subordinated the fate of the
individual accused to the larger questions  ‘of truth and righteousness between the nations of the
world, the hope of future international co-operation in the administration of law and justice’ which
their actions brought before the IMT.151 
The  shift  to  individualism logically  led  to  considerations  of  individual  criminal  responsibility.
Jackson justified the inclusion of individual responsibility in the Nuremberg Charter on logic and
necessity ‘if international law is to render real help to the maintenance of peace’.152 Jackson argued
that peace was only possible if international law applied vis-a-vis individuals, because then it could
be enforced through measures other than war. This individual-centric argument was confirmed in
‘the idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always are
committed only by persons’.153 Reading in his teleology here that Jackson favoured HR liberalism is
probably  too  much,  given  that  his  claim  was  clearly  to  argue  for  the  main  shift  towards  the
individual  as  such.  Unsurprisingly,  defence  counsel  Jahreiss  opposed  the  notion  of  individual
responsibility ‘as long as the sovereignty of states is the organisational basic principle of interstate
order’.154 The  issue  between  counsel  here  revolved  around  individualism and  state-centrism in
international law. Jackson used teleology to favour the former, while Jahreiss retorted with a realist
understanding of the international community. 
While  Jackson  recognised  the  accused’s  right  to  be  presumed  innocent,  he  later  rejected  the
accused’s moral autonomy because it was not the individual persons contending before the judges,
but rather ‘the forces which these defendants represent, the forces that would advantage and delight
in their  acquittal,  [which] are the darkest and most sinister forces in society – dictatorship and
oppression,  malevolence  and  passion,  militarism and  lawlessness’.155 The  accused  were  ‘living
symbols of racial hatreds, of terrorism and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power.’ 156
The cumulation of Jackson’s arguments revealed concern for the protection of the broader society.
Such a HR liberalism would dovetail his function as prosecutor. This was seemingly repeated by
150 Robinson (n 114) 129-135.
151 Shawcross Vol. XIX (n 35) 528-529.
152 Jackson (n 32) 149-150. Achieving peace through law has been labelled liberal, see Reus-Smit (n 129) 289.
153 Jackson (n 32) 150. See also, although it lacked argument, RA Rudenko in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before
the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. XIX:577.
154 H Jahreiss argument in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal , Nuremberg,
Vol. XVII:478-479.
155 Jackson (n 32) 102, 154.
156 Ibid 99.
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Dubost  who  also  warned  against  treating  the  accused  as  ordinary  offenders,  rather  suggesting
sensitivity to the broader political context against which they perpetrated their crimes.157 
The  Nuremberg  IMT sided  with  the  prosecution  and  broke  with  the  state-centric  approach  to
international law. The IMT recognised that individuals could have duties and liabilities alongside
states in international law, arguing that international crimes ‘are committed by men, not by abstract
entities,  and  only  by  punishing  [these]  individuals...can  the  provisions  of  international  law be
enforced’.158 The IMT relied on several posited provisions to base individual responsibility on.159 No
findings on the tension inherent to ICL liberalism could be derived from the IMT.
At Tokyo, Keenan justified individual responsibility on the basis of domestic sources as there was
no  explicit  codification  thereof  in  international  law.160 After  recognising  that  governments  act
through  human  organs  who  may  not  be  shielded  for  criminal  acts  perpetrated  thus,  Keenan
concluded that individual responsibility should be recognised as ‘a principle that follows the needs
of civilisation and is a clear expression of the public conscience’.161 These arguments dovetailed
those at Nuremberg and embodied the movement away from state-centrism in international law. 
Regarding  the  recognition  of  moral  autonomy,  Keenan  wanted  to  expose  the  accused  as
extraordinary symbols of aggression as well as ordinary criminals. It was hoped that branding and
punishing  the  accused  as  common  felons  would  deter  future  would-be  aggressors.162 Their
prosecution was due to their subscription to the rule of force.163 The accused’s moral autonomy was
subordinated to their symbolic worth. Keenan, hereafter, emphasised the individual’s sanctity which
was ‘of the gravest moment and deserving of all reasonable efforts for its protection. The life of an
individual...can  never  be  lawfully  sacrificed  for  immoral  purposes’.164 Parallel  to  denying  any
concern with the accused as individuals,165 the lives of the victims were emphasised as sacred.
Keenan thus echoed Jackson and favoured HR liberalism. 
In what dovetailed Jahreiss at Nuremberg, Takanayagi countered that international law imposed
157 C Dubost in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. XIX:548.
158 Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Vol. I:223.
159 Ibid.
160 Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 431-433 refers to  Ex parte Quirin 317 United States Reports 1 and the
Yamashita case.
161 Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 435.
162 Ibid 387-389 and 461-463. See also Boister and Cryer (n 20) 158.
163 Transcript of Proceedings 4 June 1946, 463.
164 Ibid 464-465.
165 Ibid 463.
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duties and responsibilities on states rather than individuals. Moreover, in the absence of a world
state entrusted with a compelling universal law, individual guilt does not follow with the exception
of piracy, blockade-runners, contrabandists and war criminals.166 Takanayagi imputed the acts of
individuals performed in pursuance of the state’s command to the state. Individual responsibility
would therefore not follow in the absence of explicit provisions to that effect. On this construction
neither  the  Hague  Convention  III  nor  the  Kellogg-Briand  Pact  established  individual
responsibility.167 As was the case under the part A codes in chapters 2 and 3, the selected defence
counsel  thus  opposed  the  prosecution  on  what  was  ostensibly  functional  grounds,  namely  to
undermine the possibility of individual responsibility in international law. The defence’s realist,
state-centric opposition to the prosecution’s liberalism was apparent.
Despite the absence of explicit individual liability in the 1907 Hague Convention and the 1929
Geneva Convention, in the context of duty to prisoners, the Tokyo majority submitted that it ‘is not
a meaningless obligation cast upon a political abstraction. It is a specific duty to be performed in the
first  case  by  those  persons  who  constitute  the  government’.168 Reflections  on  individual
responsibility at Tokyo further appeared in the separate and dissenting opinions. Webb maintained
that criminal responsibility arose, when a state perpetrated an aggressive war, in relation to ‘those
individuals through whom it acts’.169 By enabling a criminal trial for crimes against the peace and
the imposition of punishment if convicted, the Charter ‘does not violate International Law or the
Natural  Law,  but  gives  effect  to  it,  as  well  as  to  the  Potsdam Declaration  and  Instrument  of
Surrender’.170 Webb  thus  exceeded  posited  instruments  to  vest  his  understanding  of  individual
liability on. For Bernard, the principle ensuring that the responsibility of the individual could not be
hidden behind the  responsibility  of  the  collective  was ‘inscribed in  natural  law and not  in  the
constitutive acts of the Tribunal by the writers of the Charter, whose honour it is, however, to have
recalled them’.171 Jaranilla adopted the normative position that the IMT may make provision for
individual responsibility ‘in accordance with law and justice’.172 Writing extra-curially several years
later, Röling noted the increased role in positive law of the individual as both bearer of international
rights and obligations.173 Pal, contrary to his colleagues, took the dictum of Nuremberg to task since
state practice,  according to him, did not support the notion of individual liability for crimes of
166 Transcript of Proceedings 3 March 1948, 42 206-42 208, 42 258-42 259.
167 Ibid 42 208-42 212. 
168 Tokyo Majority Judgment 29.
169 Webb Separate Opinion 6.
170 Ibid.
171 Bernard Dissent 11.
172 Jaranilla Concurring Opinion 22. See also Boister and Cryer (n 20) 131. 
173 BVA Röling, International Law in an Expanded World (Djambatan 1960) xxii.
209
aggression.174 Nonetheless, normatively, Pal stated that ‘the international relation has reached a stage
where...it is high time that international law should recognise the individual as its ultimate subject
and maintenance of his rights as its ultimate end’.175 This view reflected normatively what ought to
happen  for  Pal,  conversely  what  was  not  yet  the  case.  Congruent  with  his  realist  sympathies
discussed earlier, Pal rejected individual criminal responsibility on the basis that sovereignty was
still  the  supreme  organising  principle  in  international  society.176 The  Tokyo  judicial  arguments
overall favoured the shift in international law towards the individual, with only Pal siding with the
defence’s state-centric realism. The internal tension under liberalism was not clearly addressed here.
This shift towards the individual in international law continued at the post-Cold War judiciaries
even though individual criminal responsibility in international law was on much firmer ground in
the 1990s. At the ICTY, Cassese argued in Tadić that:  ‘A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has
been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman
law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est  (all law is created for the benefit of human beings)
has gained a firm foothold in the international community as well’.177 Abundant support for this
individualist  approach can be found in several other judicial  and extra-judicial  views, including
Meron who noted the law’s development from ‘an interstate to an individual-rights perspective’,178
McDonald  who  approvingly  reflected  on  the  Tadić dictum179 and  Rodrigues’  conclusion  in
Alekšovski  that post-WWII international humanitarian law (IHL) had developed ‘beyond its state-
centered beginnings’ and that IHL now ‘recognises the legitimacy of attributing individual criminal
responsibility for war crimes’.180 His conclusion called for the understanding of ICL cognisant of
the shift from a state-centric to an individual-oriented ICL, which had to further the aim of IHL to
protect individuals during times of war.181 The Nikolić TC emphasised individual responsibility as
opposed  to  group,  whether  ethnic,  religious  or  political,  responsibility.182 While  all  the  noted
instances merely reflected the overall shift to the individual in international law, Rodrigues showed
a predilection for HR liberalism. 
174 Pal Dissent 193, 197. See also Boister and Cryer (n 20) 132.  
175 Pal Dissent 145.
176 Pal Dissent 198. For Pal’s realism, see section 6.2.
177 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October
1995)  para  97.  See  also,  ibid,  par  96  where  Cassese  attributed  the  unequal  protection  regimes  applicable  in
international and non-international armed conflicts to state-centred realism.
178 Meron (n 21) 240, 247-251.
179 GK McDonald, ‘The Eleventh Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture: The Changing Nature of the Laws of War’ (1998)
156 Military Law Review 30, 34-35, 51.
180 Prosecutor v Alekšovski (Judgment) IT-95-14/1-T (25 June 1999) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Rodrigues para 31.
181 Ibid para 53.
182 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-S (2 December 2003) paras 59-60. Quoted with approval in
Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment) IT-99-36-T (1 September 2004) para 43.
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As indicated earlier, human rights are central to ICL liberalism.183 While the discussion here will not
enter the ‘tonsorial and agglutinative’ style by discussing references to human rights simply through
repetition of earlier case law, a few philosophically relevant instances were coded where human
rights were weighed up against competing considerations.184 Meron linked the post-World War II
shift from ‘an inter-state archetype to a homocentric system’ to several human rights treaties.185 In
Tadić, the AC suggested that it ‘would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for
justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully against human
rights’.186 The  Kupreškić AC explicitly ascribed overly broad charges and the lack of a particular
material fact to considerations of expediency. The AC noted that expediency should never trump the
fundamental right of the accused to a fair trial.187 Expedience was similarly subordinated to the
human rights of an accused by Pocar in Mrkšić as ‘concerns about efficiency in the administration
of justice can never be implemented to the detriment of human rights standards’.188 These instances
began to show some oscillation between support for the rights of the accused and victims.
Concerns  of  safeguarding moral  autonomy appeared  at  the  ICTY and played out  especially  in
relation to victims. The Plavsić TC cautioned against the objectification of individual victims. The
importance of noting that the crimes occurred against individuals rather than a nameless group was
emphasised.189 The Stakić TC, likewise, in an introductory statement showing awareness of the need
not merely to objectify victims, stated that it did ‘not wish to reduce the victims to mere numbers in
statistics. The  victims were people – men and women with different backgrounds, histories and
personalities’.190 Hereafter,  a  whole  section  was  devoted  to  the  fate  of  two  of  the  mentioned
victims.191 The victims were upheld as symbols – all for one and one for all –  yet, because of their
small number and the intimate details revealed, their dignity and moral autonomy were protected
against objectification as mere statistics. These arguments favoured the dignity of the victims.  In
183 Fichtelberg (n 81) 9.
184 See tonsorial and agglutinative style noted by LV Prott,  The Latent Power of Culture and the International Judge
(Professional Books 1979) 177.
185 Meron (n 21) 20, 44-45, 60-61. For the humanization of IHL through human rights, see T Meron, ‘Francis Lieber’s
Code and Principles of Humanity’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 269-281; Meron (n 136) 239-
278;  T  Meron,  The  Humanization  of  International  Law  (Martinus  Nijhoff  2006).  That  liberal  values  entered
international law through human rights, see Orakhelashvili (n 11) 368.
186 Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October
1995) para 58.
187 Prosecutor v Kupreškić (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-16-A (23 October 2001) paras 93-100.
188 Prosecutor v Mrkšić, Radić and Šljivančanin (Judgment) IT-95-13/1-A (5 May 2009) Partially Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Pocar para 10. See Schabas (n 76) 43.
189 Prosecutor v Plavsić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-00-39&40/1-S (27 February 2003) para 126.
190 Prosecutor v Stakić (Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003) para 18.
191 Ibid paras 827-868.
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two instances, the ICTY opposed the undermining of an accused’s autonomy as well. In answer to
‘whether the individuals who are called before this Tribunal as accused are simply an instrument to
achieving the goal of the establishment of the rule of law’, the ICTY answered with an emphatic no
as ‘deterrence should not be given undue prominence in the overall assessment of a sentence’.192
This can be contrasted with the arguments at the post-WWII IMTs where the selected prosecutors
dehumanised the accused as inhuman forces.  
At the ICTR the shift towards the individual was also recognised. Individual criminal responsibility
was held by the Muvunyi TC to be a key indicator of the paradigm shift in international law from a
state-only system to one which included individuals.  The principle’s heritage was traced to  the
Statute of the ICTR, the Versailles Treaty and the post-WWII IMTs.193 
Regarding accused and victim rights, the ICTR continued the oscillation just revealed at the ICTY.
The Kayishema and Ruzindana AC rejected the prosecution’s appeal as time-barred. Dissenting,
Shahabuddeen argued that  a  strict  interpretation of  procedural  rules should give way for  doing
substantive justice.194 In  Ntagerura, vague allegations against an accused were held by Dolenc to
require  dismissal  without  further  consideration  of  the evidence thereon.  In  order  to  prevent  an
unchecked retribution determining justice, ‘it is only through a fair trial that we can achieve any
lasting justice’.195 In contrast, Schomburg emphasised justice in the interpretation of the right to be
informed in  Muhimana. A slightly varied charge, which was substantively known to the accused,
was acceptable.196 
At the ICC, in an argument reminiscent of Nikolic,197 Van den Wyngaert took the majority to task in
Katanga for ostensibly attributing common criminal purpose to ethnic animosity. Because ICL is
ultimately concerned ‘with specific individuals and their personal criminal behaviour’, care should
be taken to ascribe collective criminal intentions to individual members of a group merely because
of such membership rather than based on solid evidence.198 Guilt by association needed to give way
192 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-S (2 December 2003) para 90. See for the same sentiment,
Prosecutor v Obrenović (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/2-S (10 December 2003) para 52. 
193 Prosecutor v Muvunyi (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-2000-55A-T (12 September 2006) para 459.
194 Prosecutor  v  Kayishema and Ruzindana (Judgment)  ICTR-95-1-A (1  June  2001)  Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judge
Shahabuddeen para 14.
195 Prosecutor v Ntagerura, Bagambiki and Imanishimwe (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-99-46-T (25 February 2004)
Separate Opinion of Judge Dolenc paras 3-6.
196 Prosecutor v Muhimana (Judgment) ICTR-95-1B-A (21 May 2007) Partly Dissenting Opinion Of Judge Schomburg
On The Interpretation Of The Right To Be Informed para 14 footnote 14.
197 Prosecutor v Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-S (2 December 2003) paras 59-60. 
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to individual responsibility. No more could be derived from this statement than support for the
general shift towards individualism in international law. This shift was also confirmed in the Bemba
AC.199 Only in the separate opinion of Van den Wyngaert and Morrison in Bemba, was any explicit
preference shown to the two liberalisms divide,  the judges emphatically favouring criminal law
liberalism above HR liberalism.200
Coding for liberalism, on elements not yet coded in this study, revealed functional uses thereof by
the prosecution and the defence counsel.  Individual-centrism and individual  responsibility  were
consistently argued by the prosecution. However, the moral autonomy of the accused was uniformly
offered upon the altar of the symbolic importance their prosecution would have. Nominally these
arguments appear to be liberal and illiberal respectively. But they were uniformly directed at the
objective of prosecuting the accused for serious atrocities and bringing the full weight of the matter
into  global  conscience.  Possibly,  the  apparent  contradiction  might  be  resolved on a  reading in
favour  of  HR liberalism  underpinning  the  sentiments.  This  could  explain  the  sacrifice  of  the
accused for the greater protection of the victims. The defence counsel consistently denied individual
criminal responsibility in international law based on a state-centric realism. This position, like those
they adopted under positivism,201 was congruous with their mandate to oppose the charges brought
against the accused. Both IMTs accepted the shift towards the individual in international life. Pal
alone, congruent with his realism, rejected individual responsibility in an international arena still
comprised,  according to  him,  only of  states.  The post-Cold War judicial  bodies,  including one
negligible instance from the ICC, consistently favoured liberalism as opposed to statism. Under the
elements of individualism, individual responsibility, human rights and moral autonomy only a few
instances  appeared  relevant  to  the  tension  inherent  to  ICL  liberalism.  The  data  revealed  an
oscillation in preference at the post-Cold War judicial bodies for either HR liberalism or criminal
law liberalism. The data was thus contradictory. 
In sum, on these elements not yet considered, if the coding for liberalism is taken as an immanent
critique, the ICL judiciaries would be in conformity with their status as liberal institutions as they
are indeed premised on and elaborate the principle that all law, in the final instance, is directed at
199 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial
Chamber III’s  “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Concurring
Separate Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji para 358.
200 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial
Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Separate Opinion
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison paras 4-5, 74-78. 
201 See sections 2.2, 2.3, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4.
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the individual.202 The preference between HR liberalism and criminal  law liberalism seemed to
oscillate between HR favouritism (by the IMT prosecutors) and contradictory views (from the post-
Cold War judiciary).
This is, however, not the complete story. If codes discussed elsewhere in this study, which also
reflected individualism, individual responsibility and human rights, are considered alongside the
direct pronouncements on liberalism discussed in this chapter, possibly this tension between the two
liberalisms can be resolved in favour of one approach.203 Throughout the study, references were
made regarding other codes’ relevance under this philosophical category. To reiterate, liberalism, as
was shown in this section, constituted the framework of ICL judicial bodies. All the other arguments
coded in this study occurred against this contextual framework. Several codes were engaged with
individualism,  responsibility  and rights  in addition to  the specific  philosophical  categories they
were  coded  under.  For  this  discussion,  the  policy-oriented  approach,  nullem  crimen  sine  lege
(NCSL), interpretation, sentencing purposes and critical approaches were relevant. Possibly even
the overall  opposition between the selected prosecutors and defence counsel in earlier  chapters
could  be  understood  as  reflective  of  the  interplay  between  HR  liberalism  and  criminal  law
liberalism respectively.204 However, these positions were also tied to counsel’s respective functions
and so should not be unduly weighted here. 
The use of the policy-oriented approach by McDonald and Vohrah and the opposition thereto by
Cassese205 could  be  seen  as  aimed  at  respectively  protecting  the  victims  or  accused  along  the
HR/criminal law liberalism divide.206 NCSL, on the coded data,  revealed an overall shift at the
selected judiciaries from natural law to positivism.207 Ostensibly compliance with NCSL (with or
without posited support) could be viewed as reflective of criminal law liberalism favourable to the
rights  of  the  accused,  whereas  non-compliance  (despite  codification  or  the  lack  thereof)  often
occurred to favour expansive protections in favour of the victims.208 Interpretation, on the coded
data,  likewise revealed a  shift  at  the selected ICL judiciaries from natural law to positivism. 209
Bearing  in  mind  that  the  expansive,  teleological  interpretations  mostly  allowed  expanded
202 Lauterpacht (n 149)  26-27.  M  Shahabuddeen,  International Criminal Justice at the Yugoslav Tribunal A Judge’s
Recollection (OUP 2012) 204-206.
203 Robinson (n 114) 129-135.
204 See sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4. 
205 See section 2.5.
206 Robinson (n 114) 142-145 discusses this as a form of teleological interpretation with utopian aims.
207 See section 3.4.
208 Circumventing NCSL by equating a HR/IHL violation with criminality is relevant per Robinson (n 114) 148-149.
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constructions in favour of protection and strict construction favoured the rights of the accused, the
data here too seemed to reflect both liberalisms.210 A principle like JCE, coded under interpretation,
can  be  construed  as  in  excess  of  criminal  law  liberalism.211 If  the  data  under  the  NCSL and
interpretation  codes  is  considered  without  awareness  of  developments  over  time,  both  datasets
clearly  revealed  the  two  liberalisms.  Did  the  inter-curial  shifts  in  each  from  natural  law  to
positivism  alter  this  fact?  With  NCSL increasingly  based  on  social  sources  and  its  directives
overruling  teleological  interpretations,  on  the  one  hand,  and interpretation  increasingly  moving
towards strict construction, it appears that both later inclined towards criminal law liberalism. 
Deontology  and  utilitarianism tended  to  reveal  the  same divide  between  accused-centrism and
victim-centrism,  which  naturally  followed  their  respective  concerns,  viz,  just  deserts  for  the
perpetrator or the maximising of happiness.212 Jackson’s dual argument under self-reflexive ethical
theories  neatly  embodied  both  approaches  and  both  liberalisms.213 Sentencing  purposes  were,
however,  important  for the current  discussion.  If  the coded data  is  considered quantitatively,  it
would appear utilitarianism exceeded deontology. However, most of the utilitarian purposes were
recognised  as  secondary  principles  and  utilised  to  individualise  punishment  through  judicial
discretion. Quantitatively there simply are more utilitarian than deontological sentencing purposes.
A better  reading  bears  in  mind the  general  compatibility  between  utilitarian  and deontological
sentencing purposes (which should render it innocuous for the tension inherent to liberalism) and
considers the instances where incompatibility was identified.214 On the coded data, a contradiction
was  found  in  the  manner  retribution  and  deterrence,  which  are  arguably  the  most  important
sentencing purposes, were supported (especially at the post-Cold War Tribunals).215 This fluctuation
in sentencing purposes might  indeed be another  embodiment  of the fundamental  divide in ICL
liberalism. 
Finally, even the arguments coded under the critical approaches of feminism and the antecedents to
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) can be construed in the context of the
opposing liberalisms, although this was based on the coded data rather than being inherent to the
theories.  Feminist  concerns  revolved  around  women  as  victims  and the  need  to  improve  their
210 Robinson (n 114) 135-147.
211 See section 3.5. See also Robinson (n 114) 119-124.
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protection under ICL.216 TWAIL revolved around the accused and the prejudice involved in the
arraignment of some and exclusion of others. It is possible, however, to see the accused (as Pal
surely did at Tokyo) as the victims of their political accusers.217 While these respective areas of
focus might in themselves be noteworthy, the fact remains that these positions could be divided
along the HR and criminal law liberalism divide or both construed as HR.
Based on the totality of the coded data in this chapter and throughout the study, the contradictory
pulls  internal  to  ICL  liberalism  can  be  confirmed  on  the  present  research  question.218 This
contradiction goes to the heart of ICL and while by no means the architects thereof, the judicial
bodies have contributed to its entrenchment. Perhaps it was the inescapable consequence of criminal
law  and  HR  merging  to  create  ICL.219 Nonetheless,  the  inconsistency  between  the  different
liberalisms  underpinning  so  many  ICL  justificatory  arguments  pressurised  the  rule  of  law.
Considering Fullerian desiderata beyond the non-contradiction element, possibly these oscillating
arguments make it difficult to keep abreast of which view would be accepted in a particular case.
Maybe a more prosaic way of formulating the problem is that the current position establishes the
rule of laws rather than the rule of law. So the question becomes which law is to be preferred?
While the creation of the system is and was the responsibility of different role-players, the judicial
role-players remain an important part of the process. They need to reflect on this matter as all of the
justificatory  arguments  identified  in  this  study  were  in  their  power  to  influence  in  a  coherent
manner. 
This remains a contradiction at the heart of the ICL enterprise and the coded data throughout the
study confirmed its existence in philosophical justificatory arguments as well. On a systemic level,
therefore, ICL revealed a philosophical tension. However, as will be suggested in chapter 7, such a
contradiction  does  not  necessarily  undermine  the  whole  ICL  enterprise.  Foreseeability  and
predictability required by the rule of law might be found precisely in the smaller codes identified in
this study relevant to the particular legal issues where they appeared.
6.4 Conclusion on the systemic philosophies of realism and liberalism under part D
Inductively, from the selected cases, two systemic philosophical categories were identified in this
study.220 One was concerned with the larger environment within which ICL judicial bodies function
216 See section 5.2.
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(realism)  and  one  reflected  an  understanding  of  the  internal  structure  of  ICL judicial  bodies
(liberalism).  The  data  precluded  findings  of  liberalism  on  an  IR  level.  Although  they  were
concerned with different contexts, these philosophies exist in a tension around state-centrism versus
individualism.  This dataset  also revealed an inherent  tension within liberalism. Overall,  realism
produced a large dataset. Liberalism was coded for on principles not yet captured elsewhere in the
study before briefly reflecting on relevant earlier codes as well. Liberalism thus also revealed a
large dataset. 
Unlike the majority of other philosophical categories coded, realism and liberalism were both used
by judicial  bodies  descriptively to  explain how ICL judicial  bodies perceived the nature of the
international community within which they function as well as how their structures were premised
on the individual.221 The philosophies under parts A, B and C tended to be used predominantly for
argument rather than description.
Still various inter-and intra-curial trends could be identified between both philosophical categories.
For  realism,  the  post-WWII  IMTs  revealed  a  mixed  dataset  which  inclined  towards  opposing
realism. Nuremberg revealed consistent opposition to realism, but Tokyo began a shift by opposing
realism regarding its creation and thereafter consistently using realism as descriptor of international
life. Tokyo thus revealed a somewhat mixed dataset which inclined to the acceptance of realism.
The  position  at  the  post-Cold  War  judicial  bodies  appeared  to  consistently  accept  realism  as
descriptor of international life. The ICTY consistently accepted realism. The ICTR was confronted
by realist charges which it consistently rejected on the facts of the case (rather than in principle).
Finally, the dataset at the ICC was small and, if anything, mixed. 
For  the  rule  of  law considerations,  the  use  of  realism as  descriptor  of  international  life  aided
transparency. While the reality of realism is a concern for ICL judicial bodies, it often plays out in
terms of structural matters over which the judiciary has no power (thereby excluding those concerns
for  this  study  with  its  focus  on  judicial  pronouncements).  For  the  judiciary,  noting  selective
arraignment (as at Tokyo) can add pressure on those with the authority to change the impugned
policies. The arguments made under antecedents to TWAIL also apply here.222 The Fullerian rule of
law principle requiring rules to determine a matter was only threatened directly in three instances.
This  was  in  Šešelj,  Barayagwiza and  Katanga where  findings  were  attributed  to  politics  and
221 Both excel at explaining different aspects of international life and institutional design, see Orakhelashvili (n 11) 366.
222 See sections 5.3, 5.5.
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external pressures. Only Šešelj accepted bias and removed Judge Harhoff from the proceedings. The
bias he alleged against the ICTY President was summarily dismissed as unfounded. This extremely
limited instance did not undermine the overall rule of law as, of course, the judicial body acted
decisively once bias was established.
Moving  to  liberalism,  the  data  across  all  role-players  (with  the  exception  of  the  IMT defence
counsel  and  Pal)  showed  consistent  support  for  individualism  and  individual  responsibility  in
international life. This could be expected based on the nature of ICL institutions,223 but the judicial
pronouncements considered here confirmed this position. The judicial bodies were part of a shift in
international  relations  from  realism  to  liberalism.224 The shift  in  international  life  towards  the
individual and its responsibility through ICL judicial bodies can be seen as reflective of a shift in
the interest-based extra-curial dynamic.225 Increasingly, the international community had warmed up
to the idea of ICL judicial bodies. However, state-interest (i.e. realism) remains a challenge to the
functioning of these bodies as the opposition to the ICC attests.226
A central tension within ICL liberalism between the rights and protection afforded to the victim or
society, on the one hand, and the accused, on the other hand, was confirmed.227 This tension could
be identified because it appeared from the philosophical justificatory narrative investigated here. As
far as could be ascertained this tension has not yet been linked to the philosophical justificatory
narrative  thus.  It  was  indicated  that  several  of  the  study’s  codes,  including  policy-oriented
approach,228 NCSL,229 interpretation,230 sentencing  purposes,231 feminism232 and  antecedents  to
TWAIL233 revealed oscillating support for a victim-centric or accused-centric approach to ICL. 
To summarise for the rule of law, the realist concerns which impacted the first desideratum of Fuller
were  a  small  minority  and  appropriately  addressed  by  the  judiciary.  Other  realist  concerns
impacting the establishment of judicial bodies, their composition, funding, jurisdiction, and so on
are beyond the control of the judicial bodies themselves. The judicial bodies could not do much
223 Reus-Smit (n 129) 285; Robinson (n 128) 140.
224 Moghalu (n 8) 10.
225 See section 1.2.3.2.
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more about realism as reality in IR than their noting of it. Like the argument under the antecedents
to TWAIL, this aided transparency which should aid legitimacy.234 
The  contradiction  between  the  opposing  liberalisms  remains  a  bigger  challenge.  Some tension
seems inescapable  because  HR and criminal  law were  both  used  historically  to  create  ICL.  It
appears a useful  political  tool  to reflect on the tendencies in  ICL which differ from whichever
position one holds self. This gives permanent rhetorical ammunition with which to oppose the ICL
institution. This means the consent legitimacy afforded to a specific philosophical position on the
liberalism conflict will tend to dovetail whether the particular role-player needs to side, based on
self-interest, with a victim or perpetrator. Perhaps, then, an argument for the preference of either
approach or a formalised combination is necessary to ensure that consent legitimacy only revolves
around  a  single  or  structurally  formalised  dual  regime.  This  matter  will  be  revisited  in  the
conclusion.
234 See sections 5.3, 5.5.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This  study  adopted  systematic  content  analysis  (SCA)  to  identify  philosophical  justificatory
arguments in a selection of international criminal law (ICL) pronouncements and measure them for
compliance against the Fullerian rule of law standard.  In line with SCA’s tendency to focus on
aspects of a case, the aim of this study was not to evaluate the legal correctness of the judgments
under  scrutiny,  but  rather  to  further  analytical  comprehension of  philosophy as justification for
decisions.1 This  position is  in  agreement  with the sentiment  of Foucault  that  ‘[t]he object  of a
critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on
what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought
the practices that we accept rest’.2 Some manner of systematisation was imperative to order a large
dataset  which covered several  philosophies  and appeared in  conjunction with a legion of legal
matters. SCA provided the tools required to comprehensively systematise said data.
As part (i) of SCA, a systematic selection of all possibly relevant cases (or the ‘sampling frame’)
was  identified  and reduced  to  a  smaller  and  more  homogeneous  number  of  cases  through  the
‘selection  method’ articulated  in  section  1.2.1.  To restate,  for  this  study,  the  focus  was  on  the
judgments on merits and sentencing,3 whether on trial or appeal from the Nuremberg and Tokyo
International  Military  Tribunals  (IMTs),  the  International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Mechanism for
International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) and the International Criminal Court (ICC).4 The focus
was on the judicial pronouncements and, at the post-WWII IMTs, selected prosecutors and defence
1 That this is in line with the tendency of SCA to focus on selected aspects of cases, see  MA Hall and RF Wright,
‘Systematic Content Analysis’ (2008) 96 California Law Review 88.
2 M Foucalt, Politics Philosophy and Culture (L Kritzman ed, A Sheridan trs, Routledge 1988) 154 quoted in R Cryer,
T Hervey, B Sokhi-Bulley with A Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart Publishing
2011) 72. Quality of reasoning as well as critique thereon influence reception, see R Cryer,  ‘Of Custom, Treaties,
Scholars and the Gavel: The Influence of the International Criminal Tribunals on the ICRC Customary Law Study’
(2006) 11 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 249.
3 Isolated exceptions, revolving around the Rule 61 decisions and a few interlocutory decisions at the ICTY, were also
considered.
4 The MICT contributed very little of substance as of yet.
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counsel. Within this focused selection, research revealed several cases at the ICTY,5 ICTR,6 MICT7
and ICC8 wherein no philosophical argument was found.
Part (ii) of SCA required coding for philosophical categories in the selected cases.9 This constituted
the bulk of the present research chapters as the codes had to be identified and analysed for the
reasoned identification of philosophical categories. It can be confirmed, on the study’s evidence,
5 Prosecutor v  Tadić (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1-T  (7 May 1997);  Prosecutor v  Mučić,  Delić  and Landžo
(Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-96-21-Tbis-R117  (9  October  2001);  Prosecutor  v  Sikirica,  Došen  and  Kolundžija
(Sentencing  Judgment)  IT-95-8-S  (13  November  2001); Prosecutor  v  Mučić,  Delić  and Landžo (Judgment  on
Sentence Appeal) IT-96-21-Abis (8 April 2003); Prosecutor v Babić (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-03-72-A
(18 July 2005);  Prosecutor v Miodrag Jokić  (Judgment on Sentencing Appeal) IT-01-42/1-A (30 August 2005);
Prosecutor v Momir Nikolić (Sentencing Judgment) IT-02-60/1-A (8 March 2006); Prosecutor v Brđanin (Judgment)
IT-99-36-A  (3 April 2007); Prosecutor v Blagojević and Jokić (Judgment) IT-02-60-A (9 May 2007); Prosecutor v
Limaj  et  al. (Judgment)  IT-03-66-A (27  September  2007);  Prosecutor  v  Halilović (Judgment)  IT-01-48-A (16
October  2007);  Prosecutor  v  Zelenović (Judgment  on  Sentencing  Appeal)  IT-96-23/2-A (31  October  2007);
Prosecutor v Hadžihasanović (Judgment) IT-01-47-A (22 April 2008); Prosecutor v Strugar (Judgment) IT-01-42-A
(17 July 2008);  Prosecutor v Delić (Decision on the Outcome of the Proceedings) IT-04-83-A (29 June 2010);
Prosecutor v Haradinaj,  Balaj  and Brahimaj (Judgment) IT-04-84-A (19 July 2010);  Prosecutor v Šljivančanin
(Review Judgment) IT-95-13/1-R.1 (8 December 2010);  Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj (Judgment)
IT-04-84bis-T (29 November 2012); Prosecutor v Perišić (Judgment) IT-04-81-A (28 February 2013); Prosecutor v
Stanišić and Simatović (Judgment) IT-03-69-T (30 May 2013); Prosecutor v Stanišić and Simatović (Judgment) IT-
03-69-A (9 December 2015); Prosecutor v Prlić et al (Judgment) IT-04-74-A (29 November 2017). 
6 Prosecutor  v  Serushago (Judgment  Appeal  against  Sentence)  ICTR-98-39-A (14 February 2000);  Prosecutor  v
Serushago (Reasons for Judgment) ICTR-98-39-A (6 April 2000);  Prosecutor v Kambanda (Judgment) ICTR-97-
23-A (19 October 2000); Prosecutor v Bagilishema (Judgment) ICTR-95-1A-T (7 June 2001); Prosecutor v Musema
(Judgment)  ICTR-96-13-A (16  November 2001);  Prosecutor  v  Bagilishema (Judgment)  ICTR-95-1A-A (3 July
2002);  Prosecutor  v  Bagilishema (Judgment  Reasons)  ICTR-95-1A-A (3  July  2002);  Prosecutor  v  Rutaganda
(Judgment)  ICTR-96-3-A (26  May  2003);  Prosecutor  v  Niyitegeka (Judgment)  ICTR-96-14-A (9  July  2004);
Prosecutor  v  Ntakirutimana  and  Ntakirutimana (Judgment)  ICTR-96-10-A &  96-17-A (13  December  2004);
Prosecutor v Semanza (Judgment) ICTR-97-20-A (20 May 2005);  Prosecutor v Kajelijeli (Judgment) ICTR-98-
44A-A (23 May 2005); Prosecutor v Gacumbitsi (Judgment on Appeal) ICTR-2001-64-A (7 July 2006); Prosecutor
v Mpambara (Judgment) ICTR-01-65-T (11 September 2006); Prosecutor v Rwamakuba (Judgment) ICTR-98-44C-
T (20 September 2006);  Prosecutor v  Ndindabahizi (Judgment)  ICTR-01-71-A (16 January 2007);  Prosecutor v
Simba  (Judgment) ICTR-01-76-A (27 November 2007);  Prosecutor v Seromba   (Judgment) ICTR-2001-66-A (12
March  2008);  Prosecutor  v  Muvunyi (Judgment)  ICTR-2000-55A-A (29  August  2008);  Prosecutor  v  Karera
(Judgment) ICTR-01-74-A (2 February 2009); Prosecutor v Zigiranyirazo (Judgment) ICTR-01-73-A (16 November
2009);  Prosecutor  v  Nsengimana (Judgment)  ICTR-01-69-T  (17  November  2009);  Prosecutor  v  Nchamihigo
(Judgment) ICTR-2001-63-A (18 March 2010);  Prosecutor v Kalimanzira (Judgment) ICTR-05-88-A (20 October
2010);  Prosecutor v Rukundo (Judgment) ICTR-2001-70-A (20 October 2010); Prosecutor v Renzaho (Judgment)
ICTR-97-31-A (1 April 2011); Prosecutor v Muvunyi (Judgment) ICTR-2000-55A-A (1 April 2011);  Prosecutor v
Nyiramasuhuko et al (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-98-42-T (24 June 2011); Prosecutor v Munyakazi (Judgment)
ICTR-97-36A-A (28  September  2011);  Prosecutor  v  Setako (Judgment)  ICTR-04-81-A (28  September  2011);
Prosecutor v Bagasora (Judgment) ICTR-98-41-A (14 December 2011);  Prosecutor v Ntawukulilyayo (Judgment)
ICTR-05-82-A (14  December  2011);  Prosecutor  v  Ndahimana (Judgment  and  Sentence)  ICTR-01-68-T  (30
December 2011);  Prosecutor v Karemera and Ngirmpatse (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-98-44-T (2 February
2012); Prosecutor v Kanyarukiga (Judgment) ICTR-02-78-A (8 May 2012); Prosecutor v Hategekimana (Judgment)
ICTR-00-55B-A (8 May 2012);  Prosecutor v Nzabonimana  (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-98-44D-T (31 May
2012); Prosecutor v Nizeyimana (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-2000-55C-T (19 June 2012); Prosecutor v Gatete
(Judgment) ICTR-2000-61-A (9 October 2012); Prosecutor v Ngirabatware (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR-99-54-
T (20 December 2012); Prosecutor v Mugenzi and Mugiraneza (formerly Bizimungu et al) (Judgment) ICTR-99-50-
A (4  February  2013);  Prosecutor  v  Ndahimana (Judgment)  ICTR-01-68-A (16  December  2013); Prosecutor  v
Ndindiliyimana et al (Judgment) ICTR-00-56-A (11 February 2014); Prosecutor v Bizimungu (Judgment) ICTR-00-
56B-A (30 June 2014);  Prosecutor v Karemera and Ngirmpatse (Judgment) ICTR-98-44-A (29 September 2014);
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that philosophical justifications are indeed an important part of the larger ICL justificatory regime. 10
If any doubt remained, a brief comparison of the arguments considered in this study from Judges
Bernard and Pal at Tokyo will show how different philosophies can help justify different findings.11
Bearing in mind the volume of data reflected in this study, the fact that these arguments are largely
under-explored in academic literature will hopefully begin to change. 
Whether such philosophical justifications, as part of a judicial body’s overall justificatory narrative,
complied with or impeded the Fullerian rule of law standard was investigated under part (iii) of the
SCA.12 The  Fullerian  non-contradictory  or  consistency  principle  served  as  structuring  element
through which arguments could initially be compared before measurement against the remaining
desiderata occurred. On this study’s premises, increased compliance with the rule of law is accepted
to improve outcome-based legitimacy. Improved outcome-based legitimacy, in turn, enables a more
persuasive argument for consent legitimacy to be afforded to the relevant institutions.13 
In  addition  to  briefly  summarising  the  results  of  the  SCA,  this  conclusion  will  attempt  to
consolidate the overall findings pertaining to the impact these philosophical justifications had on the
rule  of  law and on institutional  legitimacy.  Finally,  this  conclusion  will  present  some tentative
meditations on the relevance of these findings for the ICC.
The thesis set out to identify philosophical justifications used by a selection of ICL role-players. As
noted in section 0.2, in the ‘problems of the penumbra’,14 the philosophies used by judicial bodies
were significant for the conceptualisation and reading given to specific rules.15 The philosophies
identified in the selected ICL cases were natural law, legal positivism, deontology, utilitarianism,
feminism,  antecedents  to  Third  World  Approaches  to  International  Law (TWAIL),  realism and
liberalism.  Analysis  revealed  the  most  abundant  philosophical  categories  in  the  selected  ICL
Prosecutor  v  Nizeyimana (Judgment)  ICTR-2000-55C-A  (29  September  2014);  Prosecutor  v  Nzabonimana
(Judgment) ICTR-98-44D-A (29 September 2014).
7 Prosecutor v Ngirabatware (Judgment) MICT-12-29-A (18 December 2014).
8 Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Judgment on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber II
entitled “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/04-02/12 A (27 February 2015).
9 Methodological discussion in section 1.2.2.
10 Noted preliminarily in section 0.2.
11 See e.g. their views on cosmopolitanism and crimes respectively in section 2.4 and 3.3.
12 Articulated in section 1.2.3.
13 See sections  0.1,  0.2;  S  Dothan,  ‘How International  Courts  Enhance  Their  Legitimacy’ (2013)  14  Theoretical
Inquiries in Law 457-458.
14 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law Review 607.
15 Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 2) 5. For confirmation see also LV Prott, The Latent Power of Culture
and the International Judge (Professional Books 1979) 119; MDA Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence
(9th edn, Thomson Sweet Maxwell 2014) 12.
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judicial  bodies  to  be natural  law and legal  positivism. The data  was detailed enough to reveal
instances  of  the  Grotian  approach  to  international  law,  inclusive  legal  positivism  (ILP)  and
exclusive legal positivism (ELP).16 The data indicated that despite the theoretical lines between
natural law and positivism blurring, they remained viable in ICL practice. Some arguments could be
read as either theory,  but once an opposing argument was brought to bear  on the matter,  clear
differences could be identified. Normative ethics was also a comprehensive philosophical category,
especially in relation to sentencing considerations. Both deontology and utilitarianism appeared in
noteworthy datasets. Critical approaches, in the form of feminism and antecedents to TWAIL, were
less extensively found through the coding process  because they tended to accompany calls  for
changes in the status quo of ICL protections. Once the new position ‘normalised’ (e.g. feminism),
further justificatory arguments were unnecessary. If the required position did not change, renewed
arguments for change could be expected (e.g. TWAIL at the ICC). Coding finally also revealed the
pervasive nature of realism and liberalism in ICL adjudication. Although they originated externally,
whether in international relations (IR) theory for realism or political theory for liberalism, they were
addressed  per  curiam  at  times  thereby  conceding  the  situatedness  of  ICL  judiciaries  and
necessitating their inclusion in this study.
It needs repeating that this study did not purport to establish the definitive theoretical versions of
these philosophies. The philosophies identified here,  and the specific versions thereof,  were the
result  of the coded data.  In other  words,  these were the subjective philosophies utilised by the
selected ICL role-players. Because the judicial bodies rarely entered into elaborate philosophical
discourses, in many cases the data could not reveal specific versions of the philosophy identified.
There was some  correlation between the volume of data and the degree of nuance with which a
particular philosophy could be identified.
The volume of  data  identified  throughout  this  study and the  understanding  of  the  rule  of  law
adopted,  prevents  a  simple  holistic,  undifferentiated  answer  to  the  research  question  on  the
compliance of philosophical justificatory arguments with the rule of law. The various philosophies
involved as well as the plethora of legal contexts (or codes) wherein they appeared required some
degree of differentiated evaluation. Simply, not all philosophies were commensurate because they
revolved around different issues.17 If compliance with the rule of law requires law to be applied in a
predictable and foreseeable manner which gives effect to the moral agency of the person to act in
16 See preface to part A.
17 Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley with Bohm (n 2) 13.
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accordance with the law,18 it seems that a more accurate solution to this research question will be
found in a differentiated answer. In this regard, the systematisation allowed by SCA was crucial to
make  sense  of  the  data.  This  means  that  commensurable  philosophical  categories  have  to  be
separately measured against  the rule  of law standard.  Indeed, the use of one philosophy might
comply with the rule of law,  while the use of another  philosophy might  be in conflict  with it.
Moreover, due to volume of data, measuring natural law and positivism against the rule of law
required further nuance to the level of the codes to reflect sensible findings. It made less sense to
ask whether natural law or positivism was consistently used then to ask if natural law or positivism
was consistently used in conjunction with matters arising from just war, cosmopolitanism or any of
the other relevant codes.
The discussion will briefly revisit the substantive findings of the study on compliance with the rule
of law (especially on the ground of consistency) before considering the impact of the findings on
institutional legitimacy. In order to show two possible cross-cuts of the data, the findings will be
presented per commensurable philosophical category (per the value-based extra-curial and inter-
curial dynamics) first and thereafter per selected ICL role-player (per the intra-curial dynamic).19
This conclusion allows the findings to be juxtaposed for an overall understanding of the compliance
with the rule of law which was not possible in the individual chapters.
Across  all  role-players,  coding for  natural  law and legal  positivism revealed  that  philosophical
justifications  pertaining  to  the  self-reflexive,  just  war,  cosmopolitanism,  ICL sources,  nullem
crimen  sine  lege (NCSL)  and  interpretation  codes  were  noteworthy.  The  policy-oriented  and
substantive  crimes  datasets  were  too  small  for  purposes  of  overall  findings  (they  remained
important  for  the  first  point  of  study  significance,  viz,  the  identification  of  philosophical
justifications20).  Philosophical  justificatory  arguments  pertaining  to  interpretation  and  NCSL
exhibited natural law beginnings before shifting and settling into consistent positivism. Just war was
consistently  positivist.  Cosmopolitanism  started  with  mixed  arguments  before  settling  into
consistent natural law. While revelatory of small datasets, self-reflexive statements revealed some
preference for Grotian natural law (if only judicial bodies are considered and counsel are excluded)
and sources showed a mixed to natural law approach.
18 HLA Hart,  Punishment and Responsibility:  Essays in the Philosophy of  Law (OUP 1968) 181; LL Fuller,  The
Morality of Law (Yale University Press 1969) 162; J Finnis,  Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon Press
1980) 272.
19 See section 1.2.3.1.
20 See section 0.2.
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Coding for the ethical theories of utilitarianism and deontology delivered one negligible code on
self-reflexive statements and one large, significant, code on sentencing purposes. Evaluating the
overall consistency of ethical theories therefore coincided with the investigation into the code on
sentencing  purposes.  The  sentencing  purposes  of  utilitarianism  and  deontology  were  often
compatible because of complementary aims.21 Sometimes they were used together through judicial
discretion in individualising punishment.  Nonetheless, this study still  found either deterrence or
retribution to be inconsistently privileged from time to time without any overarching framework
explaining said oscillation. This most likely reflected the inherent tension in ICL liberalism between
human rights (HR) law and criminal law.
Coding  revealed  that  feminism  and  antecedents  to  TWAIL  were  significant  under  critical
approaches. The technique of othering was also identified in the selected ICL pronouncements but it
was omitted for testing against the rule of law because it produced a negligible dataset (almost
exclusively from post-WWII counsel). Feminism revealed a shift from no initial recognition post-
WWII to clear recognition post-Cold War. This was partly influenced by the role of international
organisations and judges which enabled the judicial bodies to readjust ICL to reflect the extra-curial
value  interest  which  had  turned  towards  HR.  Antecedents  to  TWAIL revealed  a  small  dataset
(limited to Tokyo), so inter-curial consistency was not measurable. Engaged with the rule of law on
an institutional level where interest determined the charges and accused, the ICL role-players both
recognised these concerns and advocated for increased fairness in ICL proceedings thereby ensuring
a greater degree of transparency in the matter. 
Coding revealed systemic philosophies  in  the guises of  international  relations (IR) realism and
political liberalism. Realism was consistently rejected at Nuremberg.  At Tokyo the realist challenge
of  victor’s  justice  was  rejected  before  consistently  resorting  to  realism as  descriptor  of  actual
international life. The reliance on the descriptive use of realism was consistent at the ICTY. At the
ICTR realism was consistently rejected on the facts of each case rather than in principle. Finally, a
negligible dataset appeared at the ICC. Liberalism revealed a large dataset revolving around, firstly,
the  shift  towards  the  individual  in  international  life  and,  secondly,  the  inherent  nature  of  ICL
liberalism.  Barring  the  ICTR  and  ICC,  which  produced  small  datasets,  all  other  role-players
produced consistent findings in support of the movement towards individualism in international life.
On  the  second  point  coded  under  liberalism,  a  contradiction  inherent  to  ICL liberalism  was
21 Hart (n 18) 9. See also  CR Snyman,  Criminal Law (4th edn, Butterworths 2002) 22-23;  R Cryer, H Friman, D
Robinson and E Wilmshurst, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (CUP 2014) 29-30 on
the combination theory.
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identified with HR liberalism and criminal law liberalism revealing opposing views of what ICL
should  be.  Various  other  datasets,  like  the  policy-oriented  approach,  NCSL,  interpretation,
sentencing purposes, feminism and antecedents to TWAIL,  were also engaged, revealing overall
oscillating support for the respective liberalisms. 
Adopting a different cross-cut of the research data, the findings of different ICL role-players can be
identified  (i.e.  intra-curial  dynamic).22 This  addresses  foreseeability  and  predictability  of
philosophical arguments per role-player. Thus, turning first to the selected prosecutors and defence
counsel, they respectively adopted consistent natural law (frequently inclining towards a Grotian
approach)  and  positivism  across  self-reflexive  statements,  just  war  theory,  cosmopolitanism,
sources,  crimes and NCSL. These  positions  reflected  their  respective functions  to  prosecute or
defend and can be explained functionally thus. This data can also be read as reflective of the HR
and criminal law divide in ICL liberalism. A negligible dataset appeared for the selected counsel
regarding self-reflexive statements and sentencing purposes in relation to ethical theories. Likewise,
feminism did not appear in the philosophical justificatory arguments of counsel. Under antecedents
to TWAIL a small dataset appeared at Tokyo only with the prosecutors arguing for a homogeneous
world-society and the defence conversely arguing for pluralism. Othering as technique was almost
exclusively used by the selected prosecutors to harmonise Other with Self with defence counsel
resisting  the  synthesis.  As  to  the  systemic  theories,  realism  resulted  in  a  small  dataset  which
reflected a  divide of  prosecutors rejecting realism in favour  of law and the defence conceding
realism as reality. Finally, regarding liberalism, the selected prosecutors all favoured individualism
and  individual  criminal  responsibility.  Moreover,  they  unanimously  construed  the  accused  as
symbols, thereby undermining their moral autonomy for the purpose of vindicating the rights of the
victims.  This  revealed  HR  liberalism.  The  defence  contested  the  shift  from  a  state-centric
international life to individualism. Throughout, the respective positions adopted were consistently
informed by the objectives to prosecute or defend. This would constitute the common denominator
over all the data from counsel.
On the  post-WWII  judicial  level,23 the  scrutiny  first  turned to  the  Nuremberg  IMT.  Regarding
natural  law and  legal  positivism,  the  IMT produced  a  small  dataset.  In  sum,  natural  law was
ostensibly favoured across sources, crimes and NCSL. Positivism appeared under cosmopolitanism.
No data appeared from the IMT in relation to either of the codes on ethical theory. Neither was any
22 See section 1.2.3.1.
23 Thus excluding the counsel arguments.
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data coded from the critical approaches of feminism or the antecedents to TWAIL. Of course, under
feminism such a silence was, in fact, relevant.24 Realism, however, appeared in a small number of
instances.  The  IMT favoured  law  over  power  and  rejected  the  victor’s  justice  challenge,  but
conceded  Kranzbuehler’s  arguments  exonerating  Dönitz  and  Raeder.  On  liberalism,  the  IMT
accepted the shift in international law towards the individual. Overall, only a small dataset appeared
at Nuremberg. The philosophical justifications adopted appeared, moreover, focused on enabling
the Tribunal to conduct its business of conducting a trial and meting out punishment. Its arguments
were unified in their aim to keep the IMT functional.
The Tokyo IMT produced a significant dataset.25 Comprising both a majority judgment and several
individual  opinions,  a  tentative  overall  finding  will  be  suggested  as  well  as  a  more  detailed
breakdown of the different constituent arguments. Overall (intra-curially), in terms of natural law
and positivism, the dataset was mixed. More sense can be made on the level of the codes. Thus, a
Grotian natural law approach was favoured under self-reflexive statements; just war theory, sources
and  crimes  delivered  mixed  justifications;  cosmopolitanism  revealed  a  slight  preference  for
positivism and NCSL produced consistent  support  for  natural  law.  The number  of  role-players
involved probably explains the number of disparate findings. Because they were forthright about
their positions, specific findings relative to each relevant judge (intra-and inter-jurist dynamic26)
could also be ventured.  Webb delivered a small  dataset,  involving self-reflexive statements and
crimes, wherein he consistently utilised a Grotian natural law approach. Bernard invoked consistent
natural law in relation to cosmopolitanism, sources, crimes and NCSL with only his self-reflexive
statement moving into a natural law-favoured Grotian approach. Röling produced a mixed dataset.
He  favoured  natural  law  regarding  self-reflexive  statements,  sources  and  NCSL,  turned  to
positivism under cosmopolitanism, crimes and just war theory. This confirmed the finding about
Röling’s eclecticism in literature in another context.27 Jaranilla delivered a small  dataset,  which
seemingly favoured natural law. Natural law appeared in relation to his arguments about just war
theory, cosmopolitanism and NCSL. Only regarding sources did Jaranilla use positivism. Finally,
Pal  utilised  a  largely  consistent  positivism  across  self-reflexive  statements,  cosmopolitanism,
sources,  crimes  and  NCSL.  While  he  proposed  a  positivist  understanding  of  just  war,  the
consequences of his arguments justifying Japan’s conduct was revealed to embody some natural
24 H Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ in Steven Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter (eds),  The
Methods of International Law (ASIL 2004) 162.
25 Also noted by N Boister and R Cryer, The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal (OUP 2008) 271-
300.
26 See section 1.2.3.1.
27 Also noted by Boister and Cryer (n 25) 283-285.
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law. This reaffirms the findings made on Pal in literature as more nuanced than simply espousing
positive law.28 The dataset under self-reflexive statements on ethical theories was negligible despite
Jaranilla’s utilitarian argument being the only instance from the post-WWII IMTs on this code.
Under sentencing codes, the Tokyo IMT delivered a small dataset wherein only Webb and Röling
ventured findings. Both utilised utilitarianism. No data appeared at Tokyo on feminism. As with
Nuremberg, such a silence was relevant for feminism.29 Tokyo was the only role-player to produce
intra-curial data on the antecedents to TWAIL. While not a large dataset, as a critical approach, its
appearance rather than the quantity thereof was noteworthy. While the majority appeared to suggest
the existence of a homogeneous world, Pal and Röling both adopted arguments anticipating TWAIL
to  expose  Western  hegemony and argue  for  value  pluralism in  the  international  arena.  Finally,
Tokyo produced a noteworthy dataset on realism which could be measured overall for consistency.
While the majority, Webb, Jaranilla, Bernard and Pal all rejected realism in terms of the victor’s
justice challenge, the rest of the coded dataset revealed the consistent use of realism by Webb,
Bernard, Röling and Pal as descriptor of actual international life. In sum, the dataset was slightly
mixed, yet with a strong inclination towards realism as descriptor. On liberalism, the Tokyo IMT
consistently  favoured  individualism and  individual  responsibility  in  international  life.  Only  Pal
rejected the argument that the state-centric system of international law had already given way to
individualism. It is suggested that by considering specific role-players and codes at Tokyo, more
sense can be made of the findings. Still, the number of voices involved resulted in an overall dataset
with no clear common denominator.
The ICTY also produced a significant dataset. Overall, in terms of natural law and positivism, just
war theory and NCSL (albeit the latter with initial natural law) were consistently addressed through
positivism; cosmopolitanism and sources were addressed through consistent natural law arguments.
The policy-oriented approach, which was a small dataset only extant at the ICTY, was inconsistent.
Coding for philosophical argument pertaining to crimes delivered a mixed dataset. Interpretation
techniques shifted from natural law to positivism. The importance of noting this shift qualitatively
is evident on a principle of liability like joint criminal enterprise (JCE). If the data is read simply for
quantity of philosophical justifications, the data must be read to support positivism. However, a
qualitative  reading  reveals  that  while  subsequent  justifications  might  have  relied  on  posited
28 E Kopelman, ‘Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial’
(1991) 23 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 375-376, 411-424; A Nandy, ‘The Other
Within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on Culpability’ (1992) 23  New Literary History 49-65;
Boister and Cryer (n 25) 285-291;  K Sellars, ‘Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo’ (2011) 21  European
Journal of International Law 1095.
29 Charlesworth (n 24) 162.
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material, the initial principle was firmly vested in natural law (in excess of posited material) thereby
shaping the subsequent readings as well.  Finally,  a negligible dataset appeared on self-reflexive
statements. In terms of self-reflexive statements on ethical theories a mixed dataset was produced
with support  for  both utilitarianism and deontology.  The sentencing purposes,  under  the  ICTY,
comprised a significant proportion of the total findings under that code and thus reflected the same
contradiction mentioned above in terms of the overall findings. Thus, despite the possibility of a
combination  theory,30 the  inconsistent  preference  for  retribution  at  times  and  then  later  for
deterrence could not both be correct without an overarching framework of some sort. The ICTY
dataset revealed a moderate dataset under feminism, which consistently advanced the protection
afforded to women (even if more could be done in that regard31). The ICTY produced no data on the
TWAIL-type arguments. The dataset on realism from the ICTY was very consistent in its reliance
thereon as a descriptor of international affairs and the concerns pertaining to state cooperation in
particular.  Finally,  the ICTY delivered consistent support for the shift  towards the individual in
international life under liberalism. The ICTY further revealed liberalism by going to some effort to
acknowledge the moral autonomy of both victims and accused. Both criminal law liberalism and
HR liberalism were used at the ICTY.
The ICTR delivered a much smaller dataset, most likely because its judgments largely revolved
around the Genocide Convention and matters of fact.32 In terms of natural law and positivism, no
datasets  appeared  under  self-reflexive  statements,  sources  or  crimes,  while  a  negligible  dataset
appeared  for  NCSL and interpretation.  Very  small  datasets  occurred  for  just  war  theory  which
reflected positivism and cosmopolitanism which reflected natural law. No data appeared for self-
reflexive  statements  under  ethical  theories.  However,  a  significant  dataset  appeared  regarding
sentencing purposes. Unlike the ICTY, however, this code did not reveal fluctuating support for
retribution or deterrence at different times and, on the combination theory,33 most of the remaining
factors were compatible. If anything, an overall inclination towards utilitarianism might be derived
from the coded data. The ICTR revealed a small dataset on feminism, which was still noteworthy
because  it  contributed  to  the  advancement  of  women  in  ICL  (and  indeed  preceded  the
pronouncements on feminism from the ICTY). The ICTR produced no data on the TWAIL-type
30 Hart  (n  18)  9.  See  also  Snyman (n  21) 22-23;  Cryer,  Friman,  Robinson and  Wilmshurst  (n  21) 29-30  on  the
combination theory.
31 Charlesworth (n 24) 159 et seq.
32 R Cryer, ‘The Philosophy of International Criminal Law’ in Alexander Orakhelashvili (ed), Research Handbook on
the Theory and History of International Law (Edward Elgar 2011) 251.
33 Hart  (n  18)  9.  See  also  Snyman (n  21) 22-23;  Cryer,  Friman,  Robinson and  Wilmshurst  (n  21) 29-30  on  the
combination theory.
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arguments.  A consistent  dataset  pertaining  to  realism  appeared  under  the  ICTR,  with  defence
arguments often alleging a realist state of affairs and the ICTR consistently rejecting realism on the
facts  of  the  particular  cases.  A small  dataset  appeared  under  liberalism,  with  individualism in
international law recognised and both criminal law liberalism and HR liberalism used.
Finally, the limited output to date from the ICC can also be considered for consistency. No data
appeared in relation to the natural law and positivism codes of self-reflexive statements, just war
theory, cosmopolitanism, sources or crimes. A small dataset appeared under NCSL which favoured
positivism. A large dataset revolved around interpretation which was consistently positivist (with a
hint of ILP). Self-reflexive statements under ethical theories produced no data. Sentencing purposes
also revealed a large dataset which favoured utilitarianism. The sentencing purposes at the ICC
were  not  inconsistently  privileged  as  occurred  at  the  ICTY.  A small  dataset  appeared  under
feminism, which, like the ICTY and ICTR, advanced the protection afforded to women. No intra-
curial  instances of TWAIL appeared,  although the discussion at  the end of this  conclusion will
revisit some of the future philosophical challenges, including the external TWAIL critique, facing
the Court. Turning to realism, the ICC revealed a small, negligible dataset. Finally, under liberalism
a very small dataset confirmed individual responsibility in international life. The two liberalisms
could  be  identified  with  arguments  on  merits  reflecting  criminal  law  (through  strict  positivist
versions of NCSL and interpretation) and the sentencing considering communal interest (through
utilitarianism) in the vein of HR liberalism. 
While the overall trends in the use of philosophy generally and the use of philosophy per selected
ICL role-player are thus identified, the query needs to move into the effect the identified trends had
on the rule of law. Obviously consistency through trends or, in Fullerian terms, refraining from
using contradictory justifications was not the only obstacle  to  compliance with the rule of law
(albeit in this study it was central). The measurement against the rule of law must be understood as
an analysis of the outcome-based legitimacy of the ICL pronouncements as well. As argued earlier,34
giving effect to the rule of law ensures that the institution of law complies with the requirement of
outcome-based legitimacy.35 The output of the judiciaries, including their judgments (and attendant
justificatory arguments on the thesis pursued here), need to be clear and consistent to comply with
outcome-based  legitimacy.36 The  desiderata  of  the  rule  of  law  therefore  directly  link  it  to
34 In sections 0.2 and 1.2.3.2.
35 T Treves,  ‘Aspects of  Legitimacy of Decisions of International  Courts and Tribunals’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum and
Volker Röben (eds), Legitimacy in International Law (Springer 2008) 172.
36 Ibid.
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considerations  of  legitimacy  as  compliance  with  the  rule  of  law  enables  the  law  to  fulfil  its
purposes.  Conversely,  subjects  of  a  regime will  feel  discontent  if  the  requirements  of  law are
unclear, contradictory, impossible to comply with or inconsistently applied.37 
Comparing the data for compliance with the remaining rule of law principles, it needs reiterating
that  the  manner  through  which  the  data  is  collated  will  be  crucial  to  the  subsequent  finding.
Different approaches could be pursued depending on different research questions. The argument
pursued  here  compares  the  data,  over  all  the  role-players  and  relative  to  the  commensurable
philosophical categories and the coded instances thereof, against the rule of law standard in order to
answer  the  research  question  of  whether  the  ICL justificatory  regime enhanced outcome-based
legitimacy or not. This also means that negligible small datasets, which included the policy-oriented
approach,  crimes  and  self-reflexive  theories  under  ethical  theories,  will  be  discarded  in  this
evaluation.  Such  negligible  datasets  remain  important  for  the  identification  of  philosophical
arguments pursued as the first-mentioned point of significance in section 0.2.
The arguments under natural law and positivism, relative to their respective coded appearances,
gave effect to the majority of the Fullerian requirements (including rules being created,  public,
clear, stable, intra vires and congruent with their administration38). While the desideratum against
retrospectivity was pressured by the early natural law beginnings of NCSL, this might have been
unavoidable in  a new legal  regime wherein the principle  itself  was not  codified until  1998. In
addition, initial interpretation favoured expansive teleology. It is suggested that while this did put
pressure on the rule of law, the overall aim to focus on the enhanced protection of victims (to
invoke one of the branches of liberalism) quickly became apparent in justificatory rationale and
ensured that subsequent justifications remained foreseeable and predictable as required by the rule
of  law.39 In  sum,  while  the  different  codes  under  natural  law and positivism revealed different
degrees of support for either theory, relative to those codes foreseeability and predictability was
assured  because consistency (ensured through the Fullerian desiderata  of  non-contradiction  and
stability of rules) existed relative to those codes (and as indicated in the preceding discussion on
trends). The moral autonomy of the legal subject was thus protected as long as he or she was aware
broadly of which type of concern their actions might engender.
37 C Murphy, ‘Lon Fuller and the Moral Value of the Rule of Law’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 239, 242.
38 Fuller (n 18) 39-94. See generally Murphy (n 37) 239-247; J Waldron, ‘The Rule of International Law’ (2006) 30
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 17; S Beaulac, ‘The Rule of Law in International Law Today’ in Gianluigi
Palombella and Neil Walker (eds), Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 205-220. See section 1.2.3.2.
39 Hart (n 18) 181; Fuller (n 18) 162; Finnis (n 18) 272.
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The first significant concern (on the Fullerian principles of public, clear, non-contradictory rules or
justifications40) arose in relation to the ethical theories and, more specifically, regarding sentencing
purposes. It is true that the respective sizes of the datasets slanted the overall finding in that the
much larger ICTY dataset meant that the smaller, yet non-contradictory, datasets of the post-WWII
IMTs,  ICTR  and  ICC  were  assimilated  into  a  larger  narrative  wherein  a  particular  problem
appeared. This is also the result of intentionally looking at the overall philosophical justification
here. This problem needs proper delineation as utilitarianism and deontology in sentencing are often
compatible because of complementary aims41 or individualising punishment. Yet, this study found
contradictory privileging of deterrence and retribution from time to time without any overarching
framework  explaining  said  oscillation.  While  both  may  be  compatible,  both  can  not  be
simultaneously most important. The Fullerian desiderata in play were thus the requirements of non-
contradiction and clarity. It was suggested that a part of the reason for these opposing arguments
might be the opposing views on ICL through either HR liberalism or criminal law liberalism. But
absent any explanation, there was a lack of clarity as to the reason for the different views. While
this tension undoubtedly pressured the rule of law, one further requirement played out at both post-
Cold War Tribunals, namely whether the philosophical justificatory regime was genuinely made
public.  Both  institutions  were  guilty  of  frequently  referring  to  sentencing  purposes  with  rich
philosophical subtexts yet omitting any reference to such subtexts. The pressure on a Fullerian rule
of law standard cannot be denied here. However, with the focus of these matters pertaining to the
contours of sentencing, the concern is  alleviated somewhat.  Foreseeability and predictability of
punishment was assured, it was just the delineation of the punishment itself which left something to
be  desired.  Perhaps  this  is  an  instance  where  compliance  with  the  rule  of  law occurred  ‘to  a
degree’.42 Therefore,  this  is an area of concern which might be identified as in need of greater
theoretical clarification.
Regarding the critical approaches, feminism was consistently argued across the coded data and none
of the Fullerian desiderata were in contention. The fact was that a protection regime which already
existed was merely reiterated because it  had been neglected through silence.  In the case of the
antecedents to TWAIL a small dataset appeared, but its significance remained for the challenge it
directed towards institutional legitimacy. As was noted in section 5.4, these critical arguments did
not directly engage the Fullerian principles because the matter under contention was not one of
40 Fuller (n 18) 49-51, 63-70.
41 Hart  (n  18)  9.  See  also  Snyman (n  21) 22-23;  Cryer,  Friman,  Robinson and  Wilmshurst  (n  21) 29-30  on  the
combination theory.
42 Fuller (n 18) 42-45, 122-123, 145; J Raz,  The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Clarendon Press
1979) 211-222. Finnis (n 18) 276-281 also noted that legal systems and the rule of law exist as a matter of degree.
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making law or proposing a justification. Rather the focus here was on those who had created the
institution and the prejudice which accompanied decisions like the selection of accused. While the
rule of law, in an institutional sense was therefore engaged, this study focused on the rule of law
through  the  law-making  model  of  Fuller.  What  can  be  noted,  was  that  the  judicial  arguments
anticipating  TWAIL furthered  transparency  in  ICL and  its  institutions.  Both  feminism and  the
antecedents to TWAIL could be construed as ‘thicker’ approaches to the rule of law, directing what
the substance of the law should look like.43 At the least, for this study, both arguments under critical
approaches should be construed as bolstering the rule of law and, consequently, outcome-based
legitimacy. 
Finally,  the  systemic  philosophies  of  realism and  liberalism require  consideration  as  they  also
revealed concerns for the rule of law pursued here. These theories provided the contextual space
within which the other arguments were made. Especially liberalism, as was shown in section 6.3,
cuts  across  many  other  codes.  Nonetheless,  both  need  to  be  measured  against  the  Fullerian
requirements  as  well.  Realism was  initially  opposed,  before  consistent  acceptance  followed  to
describe actual international life. Like the antecedents to TWAIL, the admission of realism aided in
the transparency of the ICL regime, whether pertaining to difficulty in obtaining state cooperation
or selection of accused. Because many of these matters fell outside the power of the selected role-
players to do anything about, the explicit recognition of these factors gave effect to the Fullerian
principle of clarity and the requirement of public justifications. Judgments simply did not hide or
obscure  the  fact  that,  due  to  the significant  role  of  states  in  international  life,  judgments  were
sometimes  shaped  by  their  actions.  Such  transparency  should  be  viewed  as  supportive  of  the
Fullerian  rule  of  law.  This  does  not  dispute  the  serious  pressures  these  actions  exert  on  the
institutional level, but simply points to the fact that in their justificatory arguments, the selected
role-players  did  what  was  in  their  power  to  do.  In  three  instances,  the  Fullerian  desideratum
requiring rules rather than, for e.g., politics to regulate was directly challenged. In two cases, the
challenges of bias were rejected but  in one it  was conceded. However,  the judicial  body acted
decisively and the judge was removed. This was, therefore, an aberration which did not undermine
the rule of law. In fact, the prompt response of the judicial bodies suggested the rule of law was
enhanced. Outcome-based legitimacy should therefore be strengthened on these arguments.
Turning to liberalism, two points of reference need measurement against the rule of law standard.
43 Beaulac (n 38) 201. See also PP Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical
Framework’ (1997) Public Law 467. 
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First, the acceptance of a shift in the international arena away from a state-centric system to one
based on individualism and individual responsibility was consistently maintained. No concerns thus
occurred under the rule of law. The matter was much more complicated under the second point
regarding the internal contradiction identified in ICL liberalism.44 It needs clarification at the outset
that the contradiction in liberalism, which played out over several of the other codes, did not in
itself undermine all other findings on philosophical consistency. Simply, the other findings reveal
predictability relative to those specific philosophical categories. Liberalism might even help make
sense of some of those inconsistencies (e.g. regarding sentencing purposes). Although liberalism
functions on a systemic level, it should also not be overstated. The pull between HR and criminal
law, or the rights of the victims and the rights of the accused, is also applicable to domestic criminal
law  in  the  modern,  rights-based  world.  Pertaining  to  the  contradiction,  these  fundamentally
opposing views played out over a range of philosophical arguments as coded in this study. Hence,
the policy-oriented approach, NCSL, interpretation, sentencing purposes, feminism and antecedents
to  TWAIL  revealed  oscillating  support  for  these  respective  views.  The  requirement  that
justifications not be contradictory is central for Fullerian rule of law. The fact of the matter is that
two systems of law compete (partly because they were directly used in the historical creation of
ICL45) without it necessarily being clear which is to be preferred or how the contradictory views are
to be regulated. This places significant pressure on the rule of law and, by implication, outcome-
based legitimacy. It is suggested that this contradiction requires attention on the part of everyone
involved with the ICL endeavour, including the judicial role-players under scrutiny in this study.
In sum,  outcome-based legitimacy,  based on a  formal  rule  of  law favouring  foreseeability  and
predictability, exists for the philosophical arguments pertaining to natural law, positivism, critical
approaches and realism. However, the concerns for rule of law, and thus outcome-based legitimacy,
revolve  around  ethical  theories  and  liberalism.  The  subsequent  discussion  will  venture  some
suggestions as to how these concerns might be improved upon for consent legitimacy. To reiterate,
what was stated in section 1.2.3.2, consent legitimacy is comprised of various factors, including
self-interest, which might not be swayed by arguments simply suggesting that following a regime
which complies with the rule of law is preferable. If compliance with rule of law is significant,
however, then at least this element of the justificatory rationale would add pressure to accept the
legitimacy of the regime.
44 D Robinson, ‘The Two Liberalisms of International Criminal Law’ in Carsten Stahn and Larissa van den Herik (eds)
Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice (TMC Asser Press 2010) 129-135. See section 6.4.
45 Ibid 115-117.
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It seems that a solution to the inherent tension in ICL liberalism might resolve the contradiction in
ethical  theories  too.  Put  differently,  if  the  tension  is  clarified  it  might  provide  the  overarching
framework for ethical theories which is currently lacking. While both HR liberalism and criminal
law liberalism might coexist  in theory,  for the question about compliance with rule of law (i.e.
outcome-based legitimacy) leading to improved consent legitimacy, a side might have to be chosen
to solve the contradictory regimes in play. This is especially true if the added strain of realism in IR
is taken into account. 
Consent legitimacy will be shaped differently depending on whether the judicial body in question is
‘unsafe’ or ‘safe’, i.e. whether that body might be able to try a state’s own nationals or not. HR
liberalism tends to be more popular when a judicial body is ‘safe’, i.e. not directed at one’s own
nationals. This was evident from the expansive interpretations and less stringent requirements under
NCSL at  Tokyo and the ICTY.46 But  with an  ‘unsafe’ judicial  body,  such as  the ICC, consent
legitimacy  will  most  likely  be  furthered  by  the  more  conservative  approach,  i.e.  criminal  law
liberalism. The data bore this notion out too as ICC interpretation was stricter and the codification
of a rigid version of NCSL was achieved in the Rome Statute.47 In sum, expansive HR liberalism
might have been possible at a time when the judicial bodies were ‘safe’, i.e. post-WWII and the
post-Cold War Tribunals, in addition to the rudimentary nature of ICL, but stricter application and
safeguards will become important if states are to buy into an ‘unsafe’ ICL regime.48
As long as realist self-interest remains a core part of international life, criminal law liberalism will
be preferable. The implications for the coded data include that codes favouring strict construction
and the rights of the accused are to be preferred. Yet this becomes problematic where, like with
interpretation and NCSL, the basis was expansive natural law and a shift occurred in favour of
posited  sources  established  on  the  earlier  expansive  basis.  This  preference  for  criminal  law
liberalism  would  also  favour  deontology  over  utilitarianism  in  sentencing  purposes.  TWAIL
arguments might still be acceptable especially if it ensures that accused are not unequally charged.  
These findings necessitate a brief discussion on the ICC, which is positioned as the permanent ICL
Court for the future. Of all the judicial bodies considered in this study only the MICT and ICC are
46 See  sections  3.4,  3.5.  See  Robinson  (n  44)  119;  135-147;  AM  Danner,  ‘When  Courts  Make  Law:  How  the
International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War’ (2006) 59 Vanderbilt Law Review 22, 33.
47 Articles 22, 23.
48 F Pocar, ‘Criminal Proceedings before the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(2006) 5 Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 93 argued for criminal law liberalism at the ‘safe’
ICTY for legitimacy and rule of law purposes.
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still active, with the MICT mandated to finish its proceedings soon.49 This means that the findings
of this study take on added significance for the ICC. As alluded to in section 0.2, the ICC is a phase
in the continuous struggle between justice and sovereignty.50 Some have suggested that while the
ICC ‘seeks  to  build  legitimacy,  hence  support,  by  acting  transparently  and  on  purely  judicial
grounds’ it  will  not escape politics because of the ‘vague boundary between political  and legal
judgment, and the compulsions of organization behaviour’.51 Considering that both intra-curial and
external philosophical arguments have already appeared before the ICC, this study’s claim that such
philosophical narratives matter is confirmed. While the intra-curial philosophical arguments were
coded for in this study, a brief overview of some of the current external philosophical pressures will
follow. The position of the ICC in the ICL landscape relative to the philosophical justificatory
narrative investigated in this study will also be considered. It is hoped this further entrenches the
study’s  premise  about  the  importance  of  philosophy  for  ICL and  indicates  some  of  the  more
immediate future instances wherein it will be invoked.
Four external concerns which have already been raised pertain to feminism, TWAIL, realism and
just war. Concern has been expressed that aggression, for example,  contains no gender-specific
charging elements.  Acts of aggression are confined to actions perpetrated between states which
undermines the protection of the individual.52 Prosecuting aggression may lead to an emphasis on
perpetrators in a leadership role rather than direct perpetrators which could weaken the gender-
sensitive prosecution regime advocated for by feminists.53 The TWAIL concern, as mentioned in
section 0.2, entails that because all the accused before the ICC are from Africa, the Court shows
bias towards punishing Africans.54 Concerns of realism have been raised in relation to the crime of
aggression.  The amendments to this crime enable state parties to refer each other to the ICC on
account  of  contravening  the  prohibition  on  aggression.  Possibly  this  referral  mechanism could
render the Court open to self-interested state manipulation. The result would be a politicised and de-
legitimised Court.55 While the aggression provision in the ICC Statute requires states to ratify the
new provisions,  it has been suggested that the (eventual) prosecution of aggression will possibly
demotivate  compliance  with  the  rules  applicable  during  armed  conflict  since  states  labelled
49 Para 17 of S/Res/1966 of 22 December 2010.
50 KC Moghalu, Global Justice The Politics of War Crimes Trials (Stanford Security Studies 2008) 126, 129.
51 BN Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (CUP 2008) 9-10.
52 B Van Schaak, ‘“The Grass that  Gets  Trampled when Elephants Fight”:  Will  the Codification of the Crime of
Aggression Protect Women?’ (2010) 15 UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs 350-352.
53 Ibid 334-335.
54 See for example A Cassese, ‘Soliloqui’ in Heikelina Verrijn Stuart and Marlise Simons,  The Prosecutor and the
Judge: Benjamin Ferencz and Antonio Cassese: Interviews and Writings (Amsterdam University Press 2009) 174.
See section 0.2.
55 Van Schaak (n 52) 327, 335.
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‘aggressors’ would see little benefit in complying with the ius in bello  after having already fallen
foul  of  the  ius  ad bellum.56 The  judges  would have  to  firmly separate  ad bellum and  in  bello
analyses so that combatants do not perceive bias in relation to how the law is applied to them.57 
Several challenges thus lie ahead of the ICC. Backing up for a moment, the structure of the ICC
relative  to  the  philosophical  narrative  evaluated  in  this  study  needs  renewed  scrutiny.  On  the
research data, sentencing purposes under ethical theory and the two liberalisms inherent to ICL
were identified as the most significant challenges to the rule of law (and, by implication, outcome-
based legitimacy) which would impede consent legitimacy in turn as well. The ICC, more than any
other judicial body discussed in this study, may have coherent structures in place at least in so far as
this study’s argument pertaining to philosophical arguments in ICL are concerned. This discussion
purports to only address this particular context. Accordingly, the ICC data already revealed that the
same contradiction found at the ICTY regarding sentencing purposes does not exist. In fact, the ICC
sentencing purposes showed a direct preference for utilitarian arguments. On the second concern
pertaining to the inherent tension in ICL liberalism, the ICC did not deliver direct data. Based on the
suggestion earlier, in relation to an ‘unsafe’ judicial body, in the broader context of realism, states
will not likely condone an expansive court.58 In this regard, the positivism of the ICC in relation to
interpretation  can  be  noted  as  well  as  the  strict  understanding of  NCSL contained  in  the  ICC
Statute.59 Yet, an institution dispensing ICL cannot ignore the rights of the victims of atrocities. The
judicial body occupies the place of the aggrieved in society. So the same liberalism tension requires
attention here. It is suggested that the ICC structure is probably the best solution to this conundrum.
Adopting strict, accused-centric rights for the findings on merits should give way to broader victim-
centric concerns under sentencing (while, of course, still affording the perpetrator their just deserts).
In the process both parts of the ICL liberalism equation can be complied with on a structural level.
The philosophical structure of the ICC seems to alleviate much of the general theoretical issues
identified earlier. On this alone, it could be argued that consent legitimacy for this institution should
be improved. 
In conclusion, the thesis closes with a sentiment from Judges Van den Wyngaert and Morrison in the
Bemba AC which embodies the pervasiveness of philosophy in ICL, stresses the importance of rule
of law in international law, shows concern for institutional legitimacy and confirms the position of
56 Van Schaak (n 52) 334-335, 367-369.
57 Ibid 368.
58 GP Fletcher and JD Ohlin, ‘Reclaiming Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case’ (2005) 3 JICJ
540, 561 also advocated a victim-centric Court.
59 Articles 22, 23. 
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this thesis by solving the main philosophical incongruity detected between the two liberalisms of
ICL in favour of criminal law liberalism: 
‘However, even if Aristotle’s dictum that law should be reason, free from passion, may strike us in the 21 st
century as somewhat inhuman, it remains true more than two thousand years later that, as humans, we can
only hope to establish the rule of law if we discipline ourselves to be guided by rationality and resist the urge
to allow emotions to determine judicial decisions’.60
60 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial
Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”) ICC-01/05-01/08 A (8 June 2018) Separate Opinion
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert and Judge Howard Morrison para 79. 
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